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Series Preface 
For some time now, the study of cognitive development has been far and away the 
most active discipline within developmental psychology. Although there would be 
much disagreement as to the exact proportion of papers published in developmental 
journals that could be considered cognitive, 50% seems like a conservative estimate. 
Hence, a series of scholarly books devoted to work in cognitive development is espe-
cially appropriate at this time 
The Springer Series in Cognitive Development contains two basic types of books, 
namely, edited collections of original chapters by several authors, and original 
volumes written by one author or a small group of authors. The flagship for the 
Springer Series is a serial publication of the "advances" type, carrying the subtitle 
Progress in Cognitive Development Research. Each volume in the Progress sequence 
is strongly thematic, in that it is limited to some well-defined domain of cognitive-
developmental research (e.g., logical and mathematical development, development 
of learning). All Progress volumes will be edited collections. Editors of such collec-
tions, upon consulting with the Series Editor, may elect to bave their books pub-
lished either as contributions to the Progress sequence or as separate volumes. All 
books written by one author or a small group of authors are being published as 
separate volumes within the series. 
A fairly broad definition of cognitive development is being used in the selection 
ofbooks for this series. The dassie topics of concept development, children's think-
ing and reasoning, the development of learning, language development, and 
memory development will, of course, be included. So, however, will newer areas 
such as social-cognitive development, educational applications, formal modeling, 
and philosophical implications of cognitive-developmental theory. Although it is 
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anticipated that most books in the series will be empirical in orientation, theoretical 
and philosophical works are also welcome. With books of the latter sort, heter-
ogeneity of theoretical perspective is encouraged, and no attempt will be made to 
foster some specific theoretical perspective at the expense of others (e.g., Piagetian 
versus behavioral or behavioral versus information processing). 
C.J. Brainerd 
Preface 
We first met in May 1982 at the University ofNotre Dame. MP was a visiting profes-
sor and WS was touring the United States as part of a leave from the Max Planck 
Institute to Stanford. At the time of the meeting, we had both been researching 
memory development for some time and had been thinking about metamemory in 
particular. lt was apparent immediately that we shared many of the same points of 
view. We both had a no-nonsense, "what-do-the-data-say" attitude about the study 
of memory development. MP was particularly impressed by WS's thorough analysis 
of metamemory, one eventually published as Schneider (1985c). 
We met again from time to time at conferences. In the summer of 1984, MP came 
to the Max Planck Institute, a visit reciprocated by WS to the University ofWestem 
Ontario in the spring of 1985. At that time we were working on the good strategy 
user model (along with John Borkowski). The result was an integrative framework 
for thinking about memory functioning, one that included cognitive, metacognitive, 
and noncognitive components. The latest version is taken up in Chapters 6 and 7 of 
this volume. 
The summer of 1986 brought MP back to Munich, as WS was finishing his habili-
tation. lt was clear that we were once again thinking about many of the same issues, 
and once again, the differences in our thinking were much smaller than the similari-
ties. There seemed to be good reason to think about putting our common thoughts 
into a book. WS suggested parts of his habilitation as a starting point; MP agreed. 
This volume is the result of many rewritings and reworkings from that point of 
departure. We especially tried to focus on the main themes and methods in memory 
development. We feit it important, however, to take positions on some of the more 
controversial issues of the day. We debated long and hard about some of the perspec-
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tives offered here, but in the end believe that our conclusions are eminently defensi-
ble in light of the available data. We also went well beyond the habilitation, espe-
cially in developing our theory of good strategy use in light of the extensive memory 
development data base. 
This book is intended foranurober of audiences. First of all, it is meant as a coher-
ent introduction to memory development for students and professionals wbo have 
little background in either cognitive or developmental psychology. We tried to write 
a good book for advanced undergraduate and first- and second-year graduale 
courses. lt is also a volume for our peers, however, in that we do try to provide clear 
stances on many of the major issues of the day. We worked hard to separate the 
"wheat from the chaff' and, thus, have identified the Iiterature that we hope our 
peers will consider seriously as they plan future research. There was no hesita-
tion to indicate gaps in the literature, thus hoping that some of the senior scien-
tific community might be stimulated by our discussion and consider filling in 
those gaps. For student readers, these gaps might provide many thesis and disserta-
tion opportunities. 
This volume will be updated with a second edition in a few years. Most ofthe revi-
sion will follow from new work that will appear in the literature, but some of it will 
involve rethinking the work already conducted. Piease do not hesitate to Iet us know 
if you believe that some data and/or interpretations not presented in this volume 
should be considered for the revision. 
There are a Iot of people who deserve thanks for their contributions to our work. 
Both of us agree that John Flavell has influenced our thinking enormously. WS has 
visited Stanford several times in the 1980s; John was MP's advisor during bis early 
graduate school years. Flavell's influence is apparent throughout this volume. Our 
mutual friend and frequent coauthor John Borkowski also deserves thanks. He con-
tinuously challenges us to think about memory differently than we would have 
otherwise. Many of these ideas were developed in part in the South Dining Hall on 
the campus of the University of Notre Dame. WS acknowledges the support of bis 
colleagues and staff at the Max Planck Institute. He is particularly grateful to Franz 
Weinert, who first stimulated bis interest in memory development about a decade 
ago and has provided continuous support since then. WS's ideas about the memory-
metamemory relationship have been expanded by bis discussions with Marcus 
Hasselhom, Joachim Körkel, Beth Kurtz, Beate Sodian, Gerhard Strube, Monika 
Knopf, and Michael Waldmann. MP bounced many of these ideas offbis graduale 
students, including Barbara L. Snyder, Teresa Cariglia-Bull, Eileen Wood, and 
Patricia Devolder. Bill Rohwer ofBerkeley and Joel Levin have provided continuous 
feedback for 15 years about MP's work on elaboration, some of which is summarized 
in Chapter 7. 
We hope that we wrote a book that summarizes the field well in a fashion that is 
interesting. Let us know what you tbink. 
Munich, FRG Wolfgang Schneider 
London, Ontario, Canada Michael Pressley 
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1. A Brief History of Memory 
Development Research 
The aim of this book is to give an integrative introduction to theory and research on 
memory development from early childhood to early adulthood. Research on 
memory development has been stimulated by a shift in both experimental and 
developmental psychology away from behaviorist theories toward cognitive the-
ories, a shift that emphasizes information processing considerations. The discovery 
ofPiaget by American developmental psychology (Bruner, 1964; Flavell, 1963) also 
encouraged the cognitive "Zeitgeist" in developmental psychology (Ornstein, 
1978a). A "Symposium on Memory Development," which posed the question, 
"What actually develops?" (Fiavell, 1971) was an additional stimulant. 
While in 1965 the key word "memory" was not used in the index of Child Develop-
ment Abstractsand Bibliography (as noted by Kail & Hagen, 1977a), every issue of 
that outlet now includes abstracts for a number of sturlies of memory. lt would have 
been much easier to summarize this field even a decade ago (W"lDliDer, 1976) with 
most ofthe important research programs covered comprehensively in a single edited 
volume (Kail & Hagen, 1977a). Since then, there has beena dramatic increase in the 
arnount of research and the approaches taken by memory development researchers. 
For instance, although Flavell and Weilman (1977) summarized most of the existing 
metamemory research in a single chapter, Forrest-Pressley, MacKinnon, and Waller 
(1985a, 1985b) published two entire volumes about metacognition research pro-
grams, with much of the research focussing on metamemory. 
Students and scholars not specializing in memory development could easily be 
overwhelmed by the quantity and diversity of this literature. Thus, a main purpose 
in writing a book about the highlights of memory development is to make accessible 
the most important ideas and research in this area. In doing so, we focus on what we 
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view as the main components of the memory system including short-term memory 
structures, memory strategies, metamemory, and the nonstrategic knowledge base. 
Separate chapters are dedicated to these main components, with interactions 
between components considered at appropriate places (e.g. , strategy development 
as it relates to development of the nonstrategic knowledge base and to meta-
memory) . The book concludes with chapters that focus on how the components 
function interactively and the challenge of improving memory through instructional 
development of components and their interactions. Before turning to recent research 
on memory development, however, we provide some history in this chapter. 
1885-1935 
Investigations of Immediate Memory 
Most of the developmental memory studies at the turn of the century were con-
cerned with the memory span, that is, with immediate memory. Given the interest 
of German psychologists in memory in general , it should not be surprising that much 
of the memory development research at that time was conducted in Germany. 
Ebbinghaus hirnself was concerned with memory-span capacity at different age 
Ievels, with particular interest in identifying the developmental memory-span 
curves for various types ofmaterials (Ebbinghaus, 1885, 1887, 1902). Thus, many 
studies were conducted in which children were exposed to meaningless syllables, 
single-syllable words, or numbers with recall required immediately after one 
presentation. For instance, Ebbinghaus found that Iearners between 18 and 20 years 
of age were able to recall about 1 'h more syllables or words than 8- to 10-year-old 
Iearners. lt was also determined early that meaning played a significant roJe in deter-
mining the amount recalled (Netschajeff, 1902). For instance, whether nonsense 
words were one or two syllables in Iength had little impact on span. On the other 
hand, Binet and Henri (1894a, 1894b) found that preschoolers exhibited substan-
tially better memory for sentences with many words (e.g. , 38 words in length) than 
for short lists (e.g., seven items) of meaningless words. As a rule, the core verbal 
units that suggested meaning were remernbered best. 
Frequently, experimental investigations were commissioned for the purpose of 
answering particular practical questions, for instance, what the effects of intensive 
practice (five hours) was on the mental alertness of students. Often a number of 
different age groups were tapped in these investigations, making it possible to con-
struct descriptive curves of memory-span development. 
Other investigations were prompted by theoretical issues. In two studies in partic-
ular (Lobsien, 1902a; Netschajeff, 1900), 9- to 18-year-olds were administered a 
series of memory tasks, including immediate memory span for multidigit numbers 
and for serial word Iists. The words on these Iists included terms that described sen-
sations (cool, hot) , described sounds (music, bell) or referred to abstract concepts 
(cause, justice) . In addition, memory for actual sounds and objects was tested. For 
all types of items, memory-span performance increased with age, with better 
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memory for objects and Iabels describing sensations than for sounds and abstract 
concepts. Lobsien's analyses of tbe exact recall sequences yielded anotber important 
result- tbat memory of items in order develops later than simple free recall of list 
items. At all age Ievels, bowever, fewer items were produced in tbe correct serial 
order than were recalled overall. 
Meumann (1907a) arid Offner (1924) regarded botb Lobsien's (1902a) and 
Netschajeffs (1900) investigations as particu1ar1y valuable in tbat tbey bighligbted 
the ex.istence of several memory functions tbat did not deve1op in parallel. Tbus, tbe 
same 9-year-old children who could produce about 30% of a list of nonsense sylla-
bles were more successful when the trial consisted of numerical series of tbe same 
length (about 60% recall) ~r meaningful word lists (about 70%) (e.g., Jacobs, 1887; 
Lobsien, 1902a; Pohlmann, 1906). These fmdings, moreover, were consistent witb 
earlier studies conducted by Kirkpatrick (1894) and Lobsien (1911a). In Kirk-
patrick's study, scboolchildren were able to recall seven out of 10 meaningful words 
on average, regardless of whether tbe words were read or heard. In contrast, tbe 
subjects in Lobsien's experiment (aged 7 to 15 years) recalled only 2.3 out of 10 
nonsense words on average. 
A number of studies of immediate memory span were made using the "word-pair 
metbod" developed by Ranschburg ( 190 1), tbe forerunner of tbe paired-associate 
Iearning tecbnique. On each trial a series of word pairs were presented witb subjects 
instructed to repeat eacb pair several times. At testing, the experimenter read tbe 
firstpair member witb subjects required to recall its pairmate. Nagy (1930) con-
ducted experiments witb this technique. His participants were 700 schoolchildren 
between the ages of 7 and 19. Tbere were four different lists, eacb composed of 12 
word pairs. Lists differed systematically in terms of the abstractness/concreteness 
dimension. Nagy found that abstract word pairs were barder to remernher tban 
concrete ones. 
lnvestigations of Long-Term Memory and Forgetting 
One of tbe frrst investigations of children's retention and forgetting of verbal 
materials (Vertes, 1913, 1931) used tbe word-pair metbod. Vertes was interested in 
the interval between learning and testing as a deterrninant of recall in children 6 to 
18 years of age. The test for immediate retention was followed by two delayed tests 
at intervals of one day and one week. Tbat more than 80% of tbe material was 
recalled on the immediate memory test suggests tbat the concrete words on tbe Iist 
were easy to memorize, particularly for the o1der children. After an interva1 of one 
day, tbe rate of forgetting was about 8% in tbe 6- to 13-year-old sample and no more 
than 3% in tbe 13- to 18-year-old group. After one week the results were astonishing 
for cbi1dren o1der tban 10 years of age. Tbey actual1y remernbered more tban tbey 
bad on tbe previous tests. Younger cbildren (especially 6-year-olds) performed 
worse after a week tban they bad after 24 bours. 
How do these fmdings compare witb dassie forgetting curves (e.g., Ebbingbaus, 
1885)? Ebbingbaus conceived of forgetting as a quantitative fading of memory and 
a nonlinear function of passage of time. This relationship could be expressed as 
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(retention/forgetting) = kl(log time)C with k and c referring to constants. In every-
day language, this function specified that the rate of forgetting is greater shortly 
after learning than it is later. Vertes results clearly did not conform to this principle, 
with Vertes offering three potential explanations. One was that the word-pair 
method was not the same approach that Ebbinghaus used to study retention and 
forgetting. The second was that there was already a substantialliterature suggesting 
that forgetting did not occur as specified by Ebbinghaus' formula. The third explana-
tion was that forgetting might be different for children than for adults. 
Vertes third hypothesis is by far the most important one in this context. Vertes was 
aware of the comprebensive analyses of retention and forgetting in children and 
adults that bad been made by Radossawljewitsch (1907). Radossawljewitsch's study 
was stimulated by criticisms of Ebbinghaus' experimental method. In particular, 
Meumann, Radossawljewitsch's advisor, doubted Ebbingbaus' findings because 
neither be nor bis collaborators were able to replicate them, and because they did 
not accord with the experiences of everyday life and work. 
Radossawljewitsch's subjects were 16 students between 20 and 40 years of age and 
11 children (aged 7 to 13). The participants learned nonsense syllables and meaning-
ful materials (poems) and were tested on immediate memory and relearning after 
lapses of 5 minutes, 20 minutes, 1 hour, 8 hours, and subsequently after 2, 6, 14, 30, 
and 60 days. Compared to adults, children needed a very large nurober of repetitions 
to learn a series for the first time, but the children forgot less ofthe material that was 
learned and their rate of forgetting seemed less than that of adults. These differences 
were most salient at long retention intervals (30 to 60 days). The rate of forgetting 
of meaningful material in both age groups was similar to the forgetting rate for non-
sense syllables, but "savings" (i.e., reduction in time to relearn tbe material com-
pletely) were generally greater for meaningful material. 
Altbough the slopes of the forgetting curves were different for children and adults, 
tbe most important finding was the forgetting curves obtained for the two groups 
did not correspond to the curve obtained by Ebbinghaus. Although the curves were 
in accord with tbe assumption that forgetting is a decelerating function of time, 
tbey differed from tbe curve obtained by Ebbinghaus in tbat forgetting did not take 
place as rapidly. In particular, tbe children's rate of forgetting was slower than tbe 
rate reported by Ebbinghaus. The discrepancy between tbe two sets of data was 
very great- Ebbinghaus forgot more information in one hour than adults in Rados-
sawljewitsch's study forgot in eight hours. Finkenbinder (1913) conducted research 
aimed at reconciling the discrepancy between the outcomes in the experiments 
conducted by Ebbinghaus and Radossawljewitsch. Althougb there is no need to 
consider Finkenbinder's methods or results in detail, one of bis main conclusions is 
important. He argued that the rapid rate of forgetting by Ebbinghaus was probably 
due to the relatively rapid rate of self-presentation in that study. 
Studies of General Memory Development 
A study by Brunswik, Goldscheider, and Pilek (1932) differed from earlier investi-
gations in that tbe goalwas to provide a general description of memory in scbool-age 
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children. In addition, the issues addressed in this study were derived directly 
from a truly developmental theory, Charlotte and Karl Bühler's doctrine of phases 
and stages. The study was also unique compared to previous research in that sta-
tistical significance tests were used. Brunswik et al.'s (1932) experiments focused 
on verbal memory of children 6 to 18 years of age. For the younger students in 
the study, nonsense syllables, one-syllable words, and numbers were used as the 
learning materials and only immediate retention was tested. The tests for older 
students involved short-term and long-term memory for poems, memory ofBühler's 
paired concepts (e.g., rabbit and fir tree-Easter and Christmas), as well as "Mars 
number tasks;' another pair-associate test involving combinations of numbers and 
nonsense syllables. 
Six- to 13-year-olds required more practice to leam nonsense syllables than words 
or numbers. This difference was particularly marked for the youngest childreo. 
With iocreasing age, the number of repetitions to leam these types of materials 
declined. The findings for the older students, however, were not equally clearcut. 
While the typical age trendwas obtained with the Mars numbers (i.e., olders learned 
more easily), no age differences were reported for the two tasks involving more 
meaningful materials (poems and paired concepts). For the paired-concepts task, 
this was probably due to marked ceiling effects. That was not the case for poems, 
however. 
Although no exact figures were reported for delayed recall, the results with 
meaningful Ieaming materials were geoerally similar to the findings reported by 
Vertes (1913, 1931)-higher scores were obtained after one week than bad been 
obtained at immediate recall. As in Vertes' work, the rate of forgetting was greater 
for the older subjects compared to the younger ones. 
In addition to the tests ofverbal memory, Brunswik et al. (1932) included nonver-
bal tests of memory span. The "School of Balls" test involved nine exercises with a 
ball, with subjects required to repeat these in correct sequence. Recall and recogni-
tioo of nine geometric figures as well as serial recall of nine different colored pat-
tems was also required. Meaningful memory spao was assessed by recalling a 
picture story (Christmas eve), learning 24 pairs of real objects, and remembering 
instructions in correct sequential order (i.e., following instructions to tidy up the 
classroom). 
The major fmdings on the spao tasks were that memory for meaningless materials 
peaked by about age 12, whereas the maximum span for Gestalt memory configu-
rations and meaningful elements continued to develop into adolescence. Given the 
different developmental pattems, Brunswik et al. (1932) concluded that there must 
be different memory functions. Their view was that the rote-associative memory 
system was dominant early in development and was eventually replaced by higher 
functions, a view that was generally consistent with the Bühlers' theories of 
development. 
In their efforts to make their findings congruent with the Bühlers' perspectives, 
Brunwik et al. (1932) interpreted their complex data too uniformly, however. The 
alert reader will have noticed already that the conclusion that rote-associative 
processes predorninate in young children is inconsistent with the data on the verbal 
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learning tasks; the younger children required more practice to learn nonsense sylla-
bles than meaningful words, with continuous irnprovement in the learn of nonsense 
syllables up until age 18, even though ceiling effects were obtained with meaningful 
material much earlier in development. In addition, other scientists have failed to 
fmd support for the position that children can skillfully learn nonmeaningful 
material by rote before they can master more meaningful materials (e.g., Fechner, 
1965; Weinert, 1962). For instance, Weinert found that 6-year-o1ds learned word 
pairs composed of farniliar words much more easily than they learned pairs consist-
ing of meaningless, unfarniliar syllables. 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the study by Brunswik et al. (1932) is a valua-
ble contribution to memory development. The use of more precise methods and var-
ious learning materials gave rise to more specific hypotheses concerning age 
differences in memory development. The disparate growth curves obtained for 
different memory functions were consistent with the data in previous studies (e.g., 
Netschajeff, 1900, 1902; Offner, 1924). The graphical representation ofthe general 
development of immediate memory is particularly interesting in light of the assump-
tions of the day about the course of memory development. Their curve was based on 
scores from about 700 students and represented an aggregation across all measures 
included in the study, using a special standardization procedure (see Fig. 1.1). The 
outcomes recorded in Fig. 1.1 correspond closely to those reported by Nagy (1930) 
and Vertes (1913, 1931) who found linear and steep rises in performance from 6 to 
11 years of age. Brunswik et al:s results are also consistent with other reports that 
there is a plateau in performance during pre- and early ado1escence (e.g., Bourdon, 
1894; Lobsien, 191la, 1911b; Nagy, 1930; Pohlmann, 1906). On the other band, 
the findings of Brunswik et al. differ substantially from the results obtained by 
Ebbinghaus who concluded that the period from ages 13 to 15 was characterized 
by a major increase in memory performance. From the slope of Brunswik et al. 's 
curve, it seems likely that maximum performance had not yet been obtained by age 
18. This aspect ofthe data was consistent with Meumann's (1907a) and Pohlmann's 
(1906) resultS, indicating that immediate retention for verbal materials continues 
to increase up to the age of 25, and only then is there an enduring plateau in per-
formance. Finally, the findings of Brunswik et al. (1932) concerning long-term 
memory for meaningless materialarealso supportive of Meumann's and Radossawl-
jewitsch's earlier results. The retention of older children and adolescents appears 
even lower than that of younger children. The results of Brunswik et al. were also 
consistent with the apparently paradoxic outcomes in Vertes, indicating irnprove-
ments in performance after long time intervals. 
Individual Differences in Memory Development 
The majority of the early studies attached great importance to the identification of 
interindividual differences in memory development. At the time these studies were 
conducted, demonstrations that adults produced superior recall than children were 
by no means trivial, for there were hypotheses that children would learn some types 
of material (e.g., nonsense syllables; Meumann, 1907a) better than adults would. In 
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FIGURE 1.1. Memory development in cbi1dren and ado1escents. Data from Brunswik et al. 
(1932). 
addition, there was a great deal of concern with sex differences. Many of the oppo-
nents of coeducation sought to win the cause of separate education by arguing that 
girls had inferior intellectual aptitudes. Since women were portrayed as not being 
able to keep up with men, coeducation was considered a "sin against nature" by some 
(Braunshausen, 1914, p. 95f). The early studies also dealt extensively with the pos-
sibilities that there were memory types and that there are important relationships 
between memory and intelligence. 
SEX DIFFERENCES 
Although Bolton (1892) assumed that girls were in general superior to boys, 
Ebbinghaus (1897), Lobsien (1911a), and Nagy (1930) aU reported higher perfor-
mance Ievels for boys in younger populations (9 to 12 years of age), while girls did 
better in older age groups. In general, Bolton's fmdings were consistent with the bulk 
of the data, however (e.g. , Brunswik et al. , 1932; Kesselring, 1911; Netschjeff, 
1900; Pohlmann, 1906; Vertes, 1913, 1931}, although in most cases the differences 
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in favor of girls were small. One of the greatest difficulties in interpreting this entire 
Iiterature is that any minor difference was interpreted as important, however. The 
study by Brunswik et al. (1932) was an exception in this respect since it included 
significance tests to evaluate mean differences. A comparison of sex differences 
across several memory tasks revealed that the differences were relatively weak, 
especially compared to the age differences found for the same tasks. 
MEMORY TYPES 
Research on memory types in children was inspired on the one band bythe everyday 
observation that memory for figures, melodies, stories, and other materials can 
vary enormously within the same person, and on the other band by mnemonists 
whose proficiency seem clearly confined to one modality (Braunshausen, 1914; 
Offner, 1924). Classifying students into groups of acoustic-auditory, optic-visual, 
tactile-motor, or mixed-memory types seemed directly relevant to tbe design of 
instruction in scbool. There was also an interest in determining whether there is an 
optimal combination ofvisual and auditory instruction (Kemsies, 1900, 1901; Kirk-
patrick, 1894). 
A particularly prominent study at the turn of the century was by Netschajeff 
(1900) who asked students about their leaming habits and classified them as visual, 
auditory, or motor-memory types on the basis of their responses during these inter-
views. lt should be noted that Netschajeff was fully aware of tbe methodological 
problems arising in any such classification. For example, it was difficult to fmd 
clearcut memory types, with only about 10% of the sample classified unequivocally. 
In addition, tbe individual differences that were detected proved not to be stable 
(Meumann, 1907a; Pohlmann, 1906; Radossawljewitsch, 1907). Despite the 
difficulties, Braunshausen (1914) and Offner (1924) still regarded knowledge about 
memory types as potentially important in terms of practical consequences for 
instruction. However, use of memory types in planning instruction was never 
implemented extensively, although there are even contemporary attempts to show 
instruction to accommodate memory types (see Cronbach & Snow, 1977). 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND MEMORY 
An informal observation of the day was tbat bright students did not always have 
good memories. This issue was investigated empirically by cross-classifying sub-
jects in terms of relative academic achievement and relative memory performance. 
In a study of memory span, Bolton (1892) and Ebbingbaus (1897) found evidence 
in support of the everyday observation. The correlations between academic achieve-
ment and memory span were low. Others, however, found more striking relation-
ships between simple memory performance and achievement (e.g., Binet, 1909; 
Bourdon, 1894; Meumann, 1912; Pohlmann, 1906; Winch, 1906). Meumann's and 
Binet's studies were particularly noteworthy in that academic ability was not 
inferred from school achievement, but was instead measured using psychometric 
and experimental techniques. Not surprisingly, the more meaningful and complex 
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the to-be-memorized materials, the greater the correlation between memory and 
intelligence (Brunswik et al., 1932; Vertes, 1913, 1931). When all ofthe data were 
considered, the relationship between intelligence and memory performance proved 
positive, although the corre1ations were not particularly high in many cases. This 
finding seems tobe in line with Bolton's (1892) conclusion: 
Intellectual acuteness, while more often accompanied by a good memory span and great 
power of concentrated and prolonged attention, is not necessarily accompanied by them (p. 
379). 
SUMMARY 
1n the first three decades following Ebbinghaus' dassie work, a great number of 
studies of children's memory were undertaken using methods closely related to the 
paradigms of general memory research. Much of this researchwas conducted in 
Germany. The Jarge number of replication studies make c1ear that early research on 
memory development was systematic and programmatic. Ioterest focused more on 
performance than on process. The major conclusions that could be drawn from the 
data available by the rnid-1930s can be summarized briefly: 
1. In general, memory performance (e.g., immediate recall) improves over the 
schoo1 years and continues increasing unti1 about the age of 25. 
2. A particularly steep, linear increase in Ievels of performance can be observed 
between the ages of 7 and 11, with a p1ateau between the ages of 13 to 16. 
3. The slope of the age curve differs depending on the type of memory function 
investigated and the type of 1earning material used. 
4. A sharp distinction must be made between the development of immediate and 
long-term retention. Contrary to the findings for immediate recall, long-term 
retention seemed better for younger children and declined with increasing age. 
5. Regardless of the age group or task studied, sex differences were small. 
6. On average, there were positive corre1ations between memory performance and 
intellectual aptitude. 
When these early studies are exarnined today, a number of deficiencies in thern are 
apparent. For one, very few tasks were studied, and thus, it should not be surprising 
that the shape of the Jearning curve cited in summary point 3 would not prove to be 
general across the many rnemory tasks considered by contemporary workers. There 
were few contro1 groups and frequent confoundings in these studies. For instance, 
these early investigators did not recognize the many problems associated with 
evaluating retention when the arnount of time required to Jearn material varies dra-
matically between groups, as it did between children and adults (e.g., Underwood, 
1964). Contemporary recognition of this methodological difficulty makes obvious 
one factor that may have accounted for children's retention seerning tobe better than 
adults' retention in these early studies. Finally, there were few inferential statistical 
analyses in these studies. Despite these reservations, we emphasize how impressive 
it isthat generally replicable fmdings emerged from this work. These pioneers made 
a Iot of important progress. 
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1936-1965 
The state of Germanresearch on memory development from 1935 to 1965 can be 
described easily. No important empirical studies of memory development were pub-
lished in Germany between 1933 and 1961. The great progress made by German 
researchers in the early 20th century came to a halt as the winds of war gathered and 
exploded over Europe. Theoretical perspectives that predominated in the immediate 
postwar period (i.e., Gestaltist, phenomenological) did not encourage analytic 
research on memory or memory development. 
American Research 
The situation was much different in America. Learning theories were popular, 
including ones that encouraged research on verbal learning. The major issues out-
lined by Ebbinghaus' classical study (e.g., serial position effects, massed vs. spaced 
practice, meaningfulness, interference) remained as part of this tradition until weil 
into the 1950s. The verbal learning theorists were not particularly interested in 
developmental issues, however, since their primary concern was identification of 
general laws (see K~ppel, 1964; Goulet, 1968; McGeoch & Irion, 1952; Munn, 
1954; Weinert, 1964). In this sense, conclusions by contemporary authors (Brainerd 
& Pressley, 1985a; Kail & Strauss, 1984) that there was a dearth of research on 
memory development prior to 1965 applies to American developmental psychology 
between 1936 and 1965. 
Developmentallearning research during this period was most often conducted in 
simple learning paradigms, with studies of classical and instrumental ·conditioning 
and discrirnination learning. The few studies of verballearning that were conducted 
were concerned with Iist learning (free recall), seriallearning, and paired-associate 
learning (Spiker, 1960). Studies öf free recall and seriallearning were natural exten-
sions of the earlier research on memory span, since memory-span tasks consisted of 
free and serial recall of progressively Ionger lists. Paired-associate learning allowed 
the possibility of independent manipulation of stimulus and response characteris-
tics. The task was easily adaptable with children, and it was possible to gain insights 
into the processes that children were using to mediate their paired-associate learning 
(Goulet, 1968; Spiker, 1960). Unfortunately, however, most of the verballearning 
studies with children were descriptive, with studies often conducted at a single age 
Ievel. Research on children's verballearning was rarely programmatic, with ·Single-
shot studies common. The brief review of verballearning issues that were studied 
from 1936 to 1965 is meant only to provide examples of the kind of American 
research that was being conducted during the era and is lirnited only to examples that 
provided an analysis of age trends and exarnined hypotheses of age by learning 
process interactions. 
PAIRED-ASSOCIATE LEARNING 
Developmental processes were typically studied within the three basic paired-
associate transfer paradigms (i.e., A-B, A-C; A-B, C-B; A-B, A-Br). In each of these 
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three paradigms, subjects learned two paired-associate lists. The first listwas desig-
nated A-B, and the second was defined by its similarity to the first. The A-B, A-C 
paradigm involved identical stimuli on the two lists, but unrelated responses. The A-
B, C-B paradigm involved lists with identical responses but different stimuli. The A-
B, A-Br paradigm involved identical stimuli anq responses except that the stimuli 
and responses were paired differently on the two lists. The interference theory (e.g., 
Postman, 1961) that motivated use of these transfer paradigms assumed that the 
similarity of tbe successive tasks typically produced negative transfer. For instance, 
learning of the second list was assumed to be barder than learning of the first list 
from this theoretical perspective. Subsequent recall of either list when two lists were 
leamed was hypothesized tobe barder than recall if only one listbad been leamed. 
The substantial role played by verbal associative strength of stimuli to responses 
as a determinant ofleaming rate was demonstrated in studies by Castaneda, Fabel, 
and Odom (1961) and Wicldund, Palermo, and Jenkins (1965). Linear, positive 
relationships were produced in these studies between the verbal associative 
strengths of to-be-learned pairs and the speed of children's leaming. This observa-
tion suggested a developmental hypothesis, derived from interference theory. Since 
verbal-associative strength is largely determined by the relationship of the to-be-
leamed materials to the k:nowledge base, and since the knowledge base should be 
richer for older compared to younger children, meaningful A-B and A-C associa-
tions sbould be stronger for older comp~ed to younger cbildren. Thus, there is the 
possibility of greater interference with older compared to younger children. 
This hypotbesis was tested in a study ~ Kopenaal, Krull, and Katz (1964) for 
preschool, kindergarten, and third-grade children. All children learned two con-
secutive paired-associate lists following the A-B, A-C paradigm. After 24 hours sub-
jects in the retroactive inhibition conditions recalled the first list. These retroactive 
inhibition conditions tapped whether learning a subsequent list interfered with 
recall of the first list. Subjects in the proactive inhibition conditions recalled the 
second paired-associate Iist. These conditions tapped whether leaming the first Iist 
interfered with retention of the second list. The outcomes were consistent with the 
developmental hypothesis that was derived from interference theory. The third-
grade children showed significant retroactive and proactive inhibition; tbe kinder-
garten subjects only experienced significant retroactive interference; preschoolers 
evidenced no interference (all comparisons relative to control conditions in which 
subjects leamed only one list). 
FREE RECALL 
The studies by Bousfield and his associates (Bousfield, 1953; Bousfield, Cohen, & 
Whitmarsh, 1958) on free recall ofword lists stimuJated many studies with college 
students, with a nurober of variables systematically manipulated induding interitem 
associative strength, meaningfulness, and Iist length. Only a few developmental 
studies of free recall were conducted during this period, however. An important one 
was the dassie study by Bousfield, Esterson, and Whitmarsh (1958). They com-
pared the degree of associative dustering in free recall of third-grade, fourth-grade, 
and college students. The theoretical rationale of the study was derived from Heinz 
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Wemer's (1948, pp. 234-243) assumption that organizational principles change dur-
ing development. According to Werner, perceptual-sensory ordering is initially 
dominant but is replaced later by a tendency to organize conceptually. Thus, the 
word lists used by Bousfield et al. (1958) could be dassified either on the basis of 
perceptual categories (color) or conceptual categories (meaning). An important 
aspect of this study was that it included measures of dustering presumed to tap 
processing more directly than simply the amount of material recalled. The most 
important finding was that both recall and dustering on the basis of categoric infor-
mation correlated positively with age. Contrary to expectations, color dustering 
was low in all age groups. 
Laurence (1966) used Tulving's (1962a) measure of subjective organization. Sub-
jective organization is the tendency to recall unrelated Iist items in a constant order 
from one trial to the next. To test the validity of Thlving's hypothesis that recall 
varies positively with subjective organization, Laurence induded college students 
as well as elderly adults and children between 5 and 10 years of age. The subjects 
were presented a free recall task involving 16 unrelated pictures. There were strik-
ing differences in the subjective organization Ievels of children and adults. Young 
adults learned more quickly than either children or the elderly. The elderly leamed 
faster than 5- to 8-year-old children, but at about the same rate as 10-year-olds. In 
contrast to the simple recall differences between the younger and older adults, 
however, there were negligible differences in subjective organization between these 
two groups of adults. Despite the comparable recall Ievels for the elderly and the 
10-year-olds, the elderly had higher subjective organization scores. In addition, high 
correlations between subjective organization and recall for both adult samples and 
the 8-year-old and 10-year-old children, but not for the younger participants, creates 
problems for Tulving's hypothesis. Thus, across the life span, subjective organiza-
tion and recall appear to manifest different developmental trends. The data provided 
by Laurence were not consistent with the simple cause-and-effect relationship pro-
posed by Tulving. 
SUMMARY 
Developmental changes were not central concems of North American verballeam-
ing researchers. In an important review of children's learning research during this 
period, Keppel (1964) emphasized the striking correspondence between college 
student data and results in the few investigations conducted with children. Our point 
of view is that this was nothing more than an attempt (and a lame one at that) to 
legitirnitize verbal learning researchers' Iack of interest in developmental issues. 
Goulet's (1968) subsequent review ofverballeaming in children is especially note-
worthy for critically exarnining the presumed correspondence between the child and 
adult data. As the studies of free recall and paired-associate Jeaming that were 
covered here make evident, it cannot be assumed that the processes that mediate 
verbal learning at different age Ievels are qualitatively identical. The experiments 
by Koppenaalet al. (1964) and Bousfield et al. (1958) stand out for having proposed 
developmental functions arid for producing data substantiating important onto-
genetic differences. 
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The majority of the developmental studies of verballearning that were undertaken 
were conducted at the end of the 1950s or at the start of the 1960s. We note that these 
studies anticipated a great deal of work on children's paired-associate and Iist learn-
ing that was conducted after 1965. Traditional verba11earning techniques played an 
important role in the major advances in developmental memory research during the 
1970s and l980s. 
Soviet Research 
Soviet researchers were particularly interested in the development of meaningful 
memory (i.e., memory mediated by prior knowledge) compared to rote, "mechani-
cal" learning. A prototypica1 example of Soviet thinking is provided by Smirnov's 
(1948, cited by Smirnov, 1973) ana1ysis of rote versus logical memorizing at dif-
ferent age Ievels. In particu1ar, Meumann had asserted that logical memory begins 
to predominate at about 13 or 14 years of age, and thus, differences in leaming 
that favor meaningful material over nonsense material should increase with age. 
Stnirnov evaluated this claim by examining studies that used nonsense syllables as 
indicators of rote learning and meaningful word materials to tap logical memory, a 
methodological approach that was generally consistent with European thinking in 
the firsthalf of this century (Brunswik et al., 1932; Lobsien, 1911a; Pohlmann, 
1906). Meumann's proposal that the advantage ofmemorizing meaningfu1 material 
versus nonsense material should steadily increase with increasing age was not sub-
stantiated by Smirnov's review. In fact, the efficiency of memorizing nonsense 
material increased more rapid1y with age than did the efficiency of 1earning mean-
ingfu1 material. The superiority of "logical" over rote memory (i.e., memory of 
meaningful materials over nonmeaningful materials) was more pronounced in 
elementary school children than it was in adolescents. Concerning this apparently 
paradoxical result, Smirnov argued that in the older children, rote memorizing 
without consideration of meaning is only rarely found. With age, children have a 
greater ability to give meaning to meaningless material, and thus, they transform 
what cou1d be a mechanical and rote process (i.e., 1earning of nonsense materials) 
into a meaningful one. A great deal of modern data support this latter conclusion 
(e.g., development of uninstructed use of elaboration, Chapter 6). 
The increasing relevance of conscious, independent, and goal-oriented memory 
activity as the causa1 origin of memory development was emphasized by a number 
of Soviets in the 1930s (see reviews by Leontjev, 1977; Meacham, 1977; Smirnov 
& Zinchenko, 1969). Two major concerns can be distinguished in the empirical 
studies. One was the study of involuntary memory, which was not regarded as an 
independent, goal-directed operation. Involuntary memorizing occurs when the 
ultimate goa1 ofthe subject is not memory, but something eise, often comprehension 
in the Soviet studies. In such cases, memory is involuntary in that it is a byproduct 
of comprehension. The second focus was voluntary memory, which is a product of 
activities that aredriven by a goal to remember. The Soviets assumed that superior 
forms of memory develop on the basis of the transition from natural and involuntary 
memorizing to subject-controlled and voluntary memory involving the use of medi-
ating processes and cues (Leontjev, 1931, cited by Leontjev, 1977). 
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INVOLUNTARY MEMORY 
As Zinchenko ( 1967) pointed out, the practical significance of involuntary memory 
in people's everyday lives had been underestimated by many. Early research projects 
on involuntary remembering were undertaken at the end of the 1930s and at the start 
of the 1940s, concentrating primarily on the effects that active intellectual participa-
tion had on memory performance (see Smirnov, 1948; Zinchenko, 1939, cited by 
Zinchenko, 1967). A study by Zinchenko (1939, cited by Smirnov & Zinchenko, 
1969), one that produced a striking set of results, can be used to illustrate research 
on involuntary memory. Illustrations of various objects depicted on 15 pieces of 
cardboard were presented to schoolchildren and adults. A two-digit nurober was 
recorded in the right-hand corner of each piece of cardboard. Subjects in one 
experimental condition were asked to categorize the picture objects. In the second 
experimental condition subjects were asked to arrange the cardboard pieces in 
sequence on the basis of the numbers. Immediately following completion of the task, 
subjects in both conditions were unexpectedly instructed to describe and list the 
items. The findings were clearcut. The adults who had been asked to categorize the 
materials recalled many more pictured objects than numbers. The second group 
(who has sequenced the cards) recalled many more numbers than pictures. The pat-
tern of results was similar with children. From these findings, Zinchenko concluded 
that active intellectual participation determines what is remembered. 
VOLUNTARY MEMORY 
A nice example of research on voluntary memory was provided by Istomina ( 1948; 
cited in lstomina, 1977), who sought to determine when and under what conditions 
voluntary memorizing and voluntary recall first emerge. This classical study is often 
cited in the Soviet Iiterature under the rubric of "motivation and memory;• since it 
involved a comparative analysis of the memory performance of preschoolers (aged 
3 to 7) in an exciting game situation versus a typicallaboratory task. Under labora-
tory conditions the experimenter read five words to children and asked them to 
recall the list after a short delay. During the game the children were asked to go 
on an errand to a store and buy five items for the kindergarten. As indicated in 
Table 1.1, the children's memory performance was much better given the shop-
ping task. 
Istomina assumed that the systematic recall differences favoring the game over 
the laboratory task were due to different motivational incentives for the children. 
Remernhering presumably was an intrinsically important goal and had real meaning 
for the children in the game situation, especially in comparison to the laboratory sit-
uation. Consequently, they probably showed greater interest in the task. 
One of the earliest studies on the use of retrieval cues following voluntary 
memorizing activities was conducted by Leontjev (1928; cited by Leontjev, 1977) 
with normal and mentally retarded children between 9 and 14 years of age. In one 
condition, 15 words were presented with subsequent recall required. A second con-
dition differed in that pictures could be selected from a larger group of pictures for 
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TABLE 1.1. Mean nurober of items recalled by preschoolers 
and k:indergarteners as a function of age and activity (Lab 
vs. Game) .* 
Age Activity 
(yr) Lab Game 
3-4 0.6 I 
4- 5 1.5 3 
5-6 2.0 3.2 
6-7 2.3 3.8 
*Reconstructed after Istomina (1977, pp. 109, 111). 
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use as retrieval cues. Normal grade-school children's recall increased enormously in 
the retrieval cue condition. For the handicapped children, however, the effect of 
retrieval cues was much smaller, and in some cases, even negative. The use of 
retrieval cues seemed to make the task too complicated for the retarded children. 
Leontjev obtained results similar to the grade-school retarded data when a group of 
preschool children participated in the same task. Preschoolers did not benefit from 
the opportunity to select and use retrieval cues. 
Children's learning from text was examined in a large nurober of studies of volun-
tary memory. This research was stimulated both by theoretical concerns about the 
development of organizational processes that could be applied to text and to the 
pragmatic possibility of providing guidelines for educators. For instance, Korman 
(1944, 1945; cited by Yendovitskaya, 1971) studied preschool children's memory 
for connected material (fairy tales). Korman was impressed by the children's ability 
to recall the main events of the stories correctly. Although he noted that the chi1dren 
frequently departed from the original sequence of events, the deviations were often 
logically consistent with the story. The recaU differences found between groups of 
4- to 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds were primarily quantitative. The younger children 
recalled the skeleton of the story, whereas the older children gave a more detailed 
and precise recaU of the fairy tale. 
A more systematic study with preschool children was reported by Smirnov (1948; 
cited by Smirnov, 1973), who was particularly interested in the impact of text struc-
ture on children's recaU. Second , fourth, and sixth graders were presented two texts, 
with sentences arranged in a coherent fashion or randomly. After two attempts at 
recalling the two texts, subjects were instructed to break up the texts into pieces of 
information that went together (done from memory). For random texts, this was a 
difficult mental reconstruction of the text. The most important fmding was that the 
youngest subjects (second graders) were not able to reorganize the text. Only a small 
percentage of fourth and sixth graders were able to break up the text into meaningful 
elements, and these successes were usually obtained when subjects were reading the 
coherent text. Although most of the children could identify that random texts were 
barder to break up than coherent texts, they were not consciously aware of the struc-
tural differences between the texts. lt was interesting that children often recalled a 
considerable nurober of coherent transitions between topics in random stories when 
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asked to recall tbe story freely, even tbougb they bad trouble rearranging tbe random 
story elements, a finding consistent witb recent data (reviewed in Cbapters 5 and 6). 
Given this obvious divergence between conscious and unconscious processes, Smir-
nov concluded tbat meaningful grouping processes first proceed in an unconscious 
way before becoming conscious activities. 
In anotber experiment conducted by Smirnov (1948; cited by Smimov, 1973) with 
second, fourth, and sixtb graders, the goal was to determine whicb cognitive 
processes influence encoding and intentional memorizing of text. Tbere were large 
individual differences for eacb age group, which were particularly pronounced for 
tbe youngest group. Only a few of tbe most capable second graders evidenced a 
process like self-cbecking, which was observed more frequently in older cbildren. 
Selective repetition of material also increased with age. In general, there were age-
related increases in text recall that were presumably due to tbe use of increasingly 
complex and flexible coding strategies. 
CORRELATION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AND INVOWNTARY MEMORY 
Leontjev tested bypotbeses derived from Vygotsky's (1978) cultural-bistorical 
tbeory of mental development. In particular, Leontjev conducted studies to deter-
rnine wbetber tbere were qualitative shifts in children's memory with development. 
He particularly believed that tbere were irnportant shifts between prescbool and tbe 
early grade-scbool years. 
In Leontjev's first series of experirnents on involuntary memorization, tbe to-be-
learned materials ( nonsense syllables and meaningful words) were given to subjects 
witbout instructions to memorize or to use cues. Tbe subsequent instruction to 
recall tbe materials was tberefore unexpected. In tbe second series of experiments 
using tbe same material, an explicit memorizing instruction was given (i.e., tbese 
were sturlies of voluntary memorization). Tbe most important finding was that 
preschoolers' memory performance hardly differed across tbese experiments. On 
tbe other band, children in tbe early grade-school years profited considerably from 
tbe introduction of memory cues and acbieved higber Ievels of performance under 
voluntary memory instructions. Subsequent comparisons of voluntary memoriza-
tion witb and witbout extemal memory cues (pictures) produced greater memory 
performance for older school cbildren and adults wben no cues were provided. 
Leontjev (1931, cited by Smirnov, 1973) interpreted these findings as consistent 
witb the Soviet tbeory tbat older cbildren use intemal memory cues more efficiently 
than extemal memory cues. 
Similar experiments were undertaken by Zinchenko (1939, cited by Zincbenko, 
1967; Smirnov, 1973). In one of bis studies, picture recall performances of pre-
scbool cbildren, scboolcbildren, and adults were compared under conditions of 
involuntary versus voluntary memorization. Voluntary memory was again tested 
witb and witbout external memory cues. For the preschool children, involuntary 
memorization instructions produced better recall tban voluntary memory direc-
tions. Tbe higber involuntary memorizing scores obtained by Zinchenko's 
prescboolers as compared to teontjev's subjects are probably attributable to tbe 
mnemonic orientation given in Zincbenko's experiments. Zincbenko's directions 
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elicited a goal-directed activity (classification of picture materials), on the basis of 
which the meaning of the item would be deduced. For the younger grade-school 
children, voluntary memorization by use of extemal cues yielded the highest recall 
scores, whereas for older children and adults, recall was approximately equal across 
voluntary and involuntary procedures. 
The experiments subsequently conducted by Srnimov (1948, cited by Smimov, 
1973) were designed to test the generalizability of Zinchenko's findings, since 
Zinchenko bad lirnited hirnself to only one type of activity, namely, the classification 
of pictures. Smimov also included words and sentences as test material. The sub-
jects were second and fourth graders and college students. The design of the experi-
ment was rather complex. In both involuntary and voluntary memorizing 
conditions, intensity of processing was varied. For instance, writing words dictated 
by the experimenter or finding spelling errors in sentences were regarded as less 
intensive intellectual activities than combining words in a meaningful way to evalu-
ating the meanings of sentences. 
The efficiency of involuntary memorizing was higher the more intensive the 
intellectual processing with the learning material. This result is consistent with 
Zinchenko's findings, according to which, under specific conditions, involuntary 
memory may be superior to voluntary memory. Depth of processing and the Ievel 
of intellectual activity connected with it are the most important conditions affecting 
the efficiency of involuntary memorization. With increasing age, the effectiveness 
of involuntary memorizing decreases relative to voluntary memorization, that is, 
the number of cases where voluntary memorizing proves more efficient than 
involuntary memorizing increase. 
The relationship between voluntary and involuntary memory in developmental 
processes was also analyzed in correlational studies undertaken by Istomina (1977), 
Samokhvacova (1962, 1965; cited by Srnirnov & Zinchenko, 1969), and Barkhatova 
(1964; cited by Srnimov & Zinchenko, 1969) with preschoolers, schoolchildren, 
and adults. The correlational coefficients obtained varied considerably with the age 
of subjects and the type of task used. Aggregated across tasks, the mean correlation 
between involuntary and voluntary memorywas 0.80 for the 3- to 4-year-olds, but 
only 0.45 for the 5- to 6-year-olds. Mean correlations decreased steadily up until 
grade 8 (0.40 in grade 2; 0.21 in grade 5; and 0.09 in grade 8), but increased again 
up to 0.26 for college students. The interindividual differences were explained in the 
sense that the younger preschool children more frequently behaved the same way 
when given involuntary and voluntary memorization instructions. Older children's 
memory behaviors differed considerably when given voluntary instructions com-
pared to involuntary directions, with more memorizing activity and higher perfor-
mance when voluntary memorizing instructions were provided. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VISUAL AND VERBAL-LooiCAL MEMORIES 
According to Blonskii (1935), four distinct forms of memory (motor, emotion-
al, visual, and verbal) constitute the ontogenetic stages of memory. Blonskii 
considered most important the hypothesis that visual memory develops before 
verbal memory. 
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Particularly relevant to this theory were sturlies comparing recall of pictures and 
verbal material, especially ones conducted by Farnpanova (1953, 1958; cited in 
Smirnov, 1973). In her experiments, the subjects (second, fifth, and seventh graders 
as weil as college students) were asked to memorize different types of materials. On 
the first trial subjects were given pictures of objects that could easily be named by 
children; on the second trial they were provided verbal materials that could be 
visualized (i.e., names of concrete objects); on the third trial subjects were provided 
pictorial materials that were difficult to Iabel (i .e., pictures of various types of fish 
and mushrooms); and on the fourth trial, abstractverbal materials were provided. 
The central hypothesiswas that visual and verbal memory would always be involved 
in memorization, but that the roJe they played would differ depending on materials. 
The most important result was that at all age Ievels, the memorization of easily 
named pictures was best; the recall of visualizable words was also high, but not as 
good. Much poorer recall was obtained for hard-to-name pictures and hard-to-
visualize ~ords. The second graders remernbered hard-to-label pictures better, 
while the older schoolchildren and the adults did better with abstract words. Recall 
of both visual and verbal material increased with age, but recognition and recall 
scores increased faster with age for words than for pictures. As a result, the differ-
ence between recall of pictures and words tended to diminish with increasing age. 
A very similar experimental procedure was used by Kornienko (1955; cited in 
Srnirnov, 1973) with preschool children. In a series oftrials, subjects were asked to 
memorize and recall a number of toys, the same nurober of familiar words, and the 
names oftrees and shrubs that were unfamiliar to children. The results werecompat-
ible with the ones obtained by Farapanova. At all age Ievels (younger, middle, and 
older preschoolers), the highest recall and recognition scores were obtained for the 
toys. Memory for farniliar words ranked second. 
Maltseva (1948, 1958; cited in Smirnov, 1973) adopted a different approach to the 
problern of comparing visual and verbal memory. In her studies, visual and verbal 
stimuli were used as retrieval cues for encoding and recalling text materials, with 
second, fourth, and sixth graders as weil as college students serving as subjects. All 
subjects performed better with visual cues. Consistent with the other results, older 
subjects benefited relatively more from verbal cues, however. That is, recall differ-
ences due to the use of visual versus verbal cues decreased with increasing age. 
Taken together, the fmdings from various sturlies are sirnilar. The role of the ver-
bal system increased with age in all of these experiments. There was a gradual reduc-
tion in the dominance of the visual system observable from the preschool through 
the grade-school years. Nonetheless, even in adults, visual material was better 
recalled than abstract material. Soviet researchers assumed that optimal recall 
occurs when the visual and verbal systems function together. 
SUMMARY 
Relative to western researchers of the day, Soviet scientists emphasized more the 
development and evaluation of particular theoretical positions (see Meacham, 
1977, for an extensive overview). The Soviets be1ieved that qualitatively distinct 
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memory processes and learning activities are prevalent at different age Ievels. The 
support for this position was provided principally by studies of involuntary and 
voluntary memorization. 
A number of conclusions foUowed from this data base: 
1. Three- to 4-year-olds generally did notshowintentional memory hehaviors when 
instructions to remernher were provided. That these children were not very 
active when attempting to memorize was apparent in a numher of analyses. More 
optirnistically, preschoolers' memories could he irnproved by manipulations that 
increased their meaningful processing of material. 
2. The first signs of goal-directed activities in the memorization of objects, pictures, 
and words were observed among 5-year-olds. They appear to set goals about what 
they want to remernher and try to achieve these memory goals. Unfortunately, 
they usually did not possess means by which to accomplish most memory goals. 
3. Six- to 7-year-olds more frequently possessed methods that facilitated the recall 
of objects and pictures. Nonetheless, the repertoire of memorizing methods was 
observed to he lirnited to simple repetition. Conscious reorganization strategies 
were rarely observed. 
4. Additional irnprovements in performance were noted between the second- and 
fifth-grade Ievels, with development greater during this period than during the 
fifth- to seventh-grade interval (Smirnov & Zinchenko, 1969). 
There are many problems in appraising the Soviet literature, however. In general, 
western reviewers in the 1980s must rely on secondary sources, for the primary 
sources are either not available at all or not readily accessible. These secondary 
sources are often incomplete with respect to designs, procedures, and results. Even 
more disheartening, when primary sources are Jocated and translated, they, too, are 
often vague about how studies were conducted and analyzed, given a different 
emphasis in the Soviet Union on the importance of the methods and results sections 
compared to the discussion section in scientific articles. (Reading any issue of Soviet 
Psychology makes this point obvious.) 
When westemers can peruse the methods of important experirnents (e.g., lsto-
mina, 1977), it is clear that Soviet experimental studies arenot as weU controlled as 
American studies, with this conclusion especiaUy compelling for studies conducted 
before 1960. For instance, "practice" controls in Istomina (1977) did not really 
control for practice! (See Smirnov, 1973, for a description ofthese procedures.) At 
least one other confounding is apparent as weil. The experimenter repeated the 
names of the objects several times in the game situation, but only once in the Iab 
task. lstornina's (1977) findings and conclusions must, therefore, he viewed with 
caution, especially since western researchers have had difficulty replicating that 
memory is hetter in a natural game-like situation compared to in the laboratory. 
Neither Weissherg and Paris (1986) nor Schneiderand Brun (1987) could reproduce 
Istomina's finding. 
More optimisticaUy, other Soviet outcomes have been duplicated by western 
researchers using contemporary methodologies. Consistent with Smirnov (1973), 
Murphy and Brown (1975) found that preschoolers' involuntary memorization of 
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picture Iists that were meaningfully processed (i.e., categorizing items as pleasant 
or unpleasant) was greater than thP.ir voluntary memorization of materials. Christie 
and Schumacher (1975) replicated Korman's study (cited by Yendovitskaya, 1971). 
Young children were able to produce essential text information (i.e., the logical, 
core sequence of a story) but did not recall the details of the main events. Repli-
cations such as these suggest that a concise, fair assessment is that Soviet scholars 
were doing important work on memory development during the middle third of 
this century. 
The Modem Era 
Most of the rest of this book is concerned with research conducted sinc~he 
modern conception of memory is in terms of interacting components, wJh-~~ry 
development a product of developing components in ever more complex interac-
tions. For simpllcity of organization, we consider each important part of memory in 
Chapters 2 through 5. Some interactions between these components are taken up in 
Chapters 2 through 5 as appropriate, although much of the discussion of interactions 
between components is deferred until Chapters 6 and 7. In those chapters we detail 
a complete model of competent memory that we refer to as the Good Strategy User 
Model. 
~of the research that is taken up in the subsequent chapters was carried out 
in the west. Although Genevan and Soviet influences were important stimulants for 
some studies that are reviewed, the most influential theoretical perspective by far 
is the general information processing approach. Thus, the four chapters on compo-
nents of memory development are about components that are common to most infor-
mation processing models of performance. 
For readers who are not farniliar with information processing, a few simple 
distinctions should help as advance organizers for Chapters 2 through 5. Many 
i!tformation-processing models divide memory into short-term and long-term com-
ponents (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Information that is in short-term memory 
ls currently in cons~. when a person reads a story, they may be aware 
at any given instant of the exact wording of the last sentence read and a few other 
pieces of recently encountered information. Perhaps one or two points covered a 
while back in the text are activated as weil- maybe because they were associated 
with information that was processed recently. Only a limited arnount of information 
can be consciousl rocessed at any one time-that is, short-term capa~ty is 
limited. et er t ere- are devefopmental cbanges in this short-term capacity is 
taken up in Chapter 2.) If nothing is done with information held in short-term 
memory, it is usually forgotten quickly. (Short-term memory is short-term in that 
what is there usually does not stay there for long!) In contrast to short-term memory 
is a long-term store that contains virtually everything that the person knows. Partic-
ularly relevant here, this long-term store contains knowledge of procedures (i.e., 
strategies) that can operate on information in short-term storage. The development 
of strategy use is taken up in Chapter 3. In addition to knowing procedures, people 
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know many others things-concepts, associations between concepts, hierarchic 
classifications of concepts, schemas, etc. This nonstrategic knowledge (world 
lQtowledge) often has direct effects on the memorability of newly encountered con-
tent, as weil as profound influences on whether strategies operate efficiently or can 
operate at all. This knowledge base as a determinant of children's memory and 
memory development is considered in particular in Chapter 4. Whether strategic 
procedures are used correctly depends on knowing when and where to use particular 
procedures, a form of metacognition (i.e., knowledge about thinking). Metacogni-
tive knowledge is also stored in long-term memoryV~~l&, the metacognition 
(metamemory in particular) the topic of Chapter 5. In relegating~tegies, nonstra-
tegic knowledge, and metamemory to long-term memory, we emphasize that when 
these components are activated, they operate in consciousness, and thus, short-term 
capacity deterrnines their use in _part. This interaction between short-term memory 
and long-term components is just one of many interactions that will be considered 
in the chapters that follow, but it is a very important one. Thus, we devote a chapter 
to short-term capacity before moving on to consideration of long-term components. 
I 
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2. Capacity 
This chapter examines an extremely simple hypothesis about the development of 
memory-perhaps memory improves with development because children's "capac-
ity" to remernher increases, with capacity at least partially determined by neurologi-
cal development. We explore the capacity question flrst because it is important to 
understand the nature of capacity and its development, since all strategies, metacog-
nition, and world knowledge that is used by the child must operate within the con-
straints posed by capacity. A second reason for dealing with studies of capacity early 
in the book isthat research on this topic is directly related to the earliest studies that 
examined memory development, the work on memory span conducted at the turn of 
the century and reviewed briefly in the last chapter. 
Before beginning this discussion, readers are forewamed that sumrnarizing 
research on the capacity hypothesis is not easy, a fact that becomes obvious by read-
ing the re~w~ of short-term ca acity that have been rovided b others (Dempster, 
1981, 1985; Hasselhom, 1986; Weinert, 1979). The greatest source of confusion is 
the fact that various models of short-term memory have been formulated. These 
range from a rather passive system, as proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) and 
described by Brown and DeLoache (1978) as a "container" model, to an extremely 
active "working memory" system with several components in interaction, including 
both central processing and peripheral mechanisms such as subvocal rehearsal (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1981, 1986). As described by Case and his colleagues (e.g., Case, 1978; 
Case & Kurland, 1980; Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982), short-term m ocy .....,..____ 
working memory differ in that the former involves only storage and re roduction of 
informationimntre latter-i~ttre-ca ac1 to transform information bein held-
in t es ort- erm system (also, Dempster, 1985). The current trend is more to focus 
---
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on the aetive, multicomponent short-tenn processing that is eaptured by the working 
memory eonstruet. 
Dempster (1985) reviewed in detail potential sources of development for short-
term eapacity. Important candidate explanations included the possibility that there 
is an inerease witb development in the maxirnum number of representations from 
long-term memory that ean be activated or reactivated simultaneously and that the 
speed of information aetivation and deactivation increases. One important hypothe-
sis is whether apparent age-correlated increases in representational activation 
capacity are due to ehanges in strategy or to other changes including the possibility 
that there are more neurologically determined "slots" (Miller, 1956) with develop-
ment. Following Dempster (1985), we take the position that struetural ehanges ean 
only be assumed (i.e., developmental increases in tbe number of storage slots), if age 
differenees eannot be redueed to differenees in nonstructural strategic or Donstra-
tegie eharaeteristies. 
Potential Deterrninants of Performance on Memory-Span Tests 
Memory-span tasks are struetured simply and provide reliable data. Subjeets are 
usually presented sequences of stimuli at a eonstant speed (e.g., one item per 
seeond). Short sequenees (e.g., three items) are used first, with subsequent presen-
tations increased by one item at a time until the subject ean no Ionger produee the 
entire sequenee. Even Ebbinghaus (e.g., 1897; 1902; 1905) realized that develop-
mental improvement on these tasks was deterrnined in part by the type of material 
being memorized, with the slopes of developmental memory-span eurves varying as 
a funetion of item type (see Figure 2.1). That perfonnance on memory-span tasks 
is materials dependent was an early stimulus for the hypothesis that strategic Opera-
tions rnight be mediating developmental differenees in apparent memory span. 
Strategies and Skills 
REHEARSAL 
Strategie mediation of memory-span performance seemed likely for digit span, for 
whieh marked developmental improvement occurs. Age differenees were hypothe-
sized to be due to developmental inereases in spontaneous use of rehearsal. This 
hypothesis was assessed by analyzing developmental memory-span data for 
"prirnaey effects." The assumption was that use of rehearsal provides greater 
eneoding opportunities for material presented early in a Iist compared to later 
material, and hence, greater memory of frrst compared to later material would 
suggest the operation of rehearsal (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Waugh & 
Nonnan, 1965). Although researchers were able to fmd primaey effeets in children's . 
digit-span data, they generally did not obtain developmental differenees in the 
presence of primacy effects (e.g., Harris & Burke, 1972; Ruttenlocher & Burke, 
1976). Thus, this researeb taetie failed to yield support for the position that develop-
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mental improvements in memory-span performance are due to developmental shifts 
in the use of rehearsal. ==) M ~ .S t... 'I 
rank and Rabinovttc i974) tried another tactic They studied "running 
memory span" in 7- to 11-year-olds. "Supraspan" lists were presented with subjects 
required to recall as many items as possible from the end of the Iist. They reasoned 
that since the end of long lists cannot be anticipated, active repetition would be sup-
pressed. If the rehearsal hypothesis were true, then developmental differences 
apparent with normal digit span should not materialize with running digit span. That 
performance did increase some between 7 and 9 years of age for running digit span 
suggested that, at the very least, more than just rehearsal mediated the developmen-
tal changes in digit-span performance. 
This sample of data makes obvious that rehearsal alone could not account for 
between-age digit-span differences. See Dempster (1981, 1985) for additional 
commentary. 
GROUPING 
Another strategy hypothesis was that active grouping and regrouping of to-be-
learned materials mediated developmental differences in span performance. This 
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hypothesis followed from the observation that adults spontaneously group items 
given a span task and that adults generally remernher more items on lists that contain 
temporal or rhythmic groupings (Dempster, 1981, reviewed the relevant literature). 
The studies of the developmental grouping hypothesis are restricted to experi-
ments about temporal grouping by the experimenter. Unfortunately, the effects of 
such grouping were not entirely predictable. For instance, Rohwer and Dempster 
(1977) predicted that age differences in memory span with temporal grouping 
should increase since older children would be more likely to take advantage of the 
experimenter-provided groupings. Alternatively, Ruttenlocher and Burke (1976) 
hypothesized that young children would be 1ess likely to group items spontaneously 
and thus, would benefit from the experimental intervention (see also Engle & Mar-
shall , 1983; Samuel, 1978). All authors contributing to this literature, however, 
predicted interactions between age and grouping variables. 
The tests of the grouping hypotheses were plagued with methodological difficul-
ties, not the least of whicb were ceiling effects for older subjects (who were often 
provided lists barely Ionger than their memory spans) and floor effects for the youn-
ger subjects (who were provided lists far Ionger than their spans). When the 
predicted age by grouping interactions were obtained (Frank & Rabinovitch, 1974; 
Ruttenlocher & Burke, 1976), ceiling and/or floor effects were present in the data. 
When data were consistently mid-range, there was little evidence of developmental 
interaction (Engle & Marshall , 1983; Rarris & Burke, 1972; McCarver, 1972; 
Samuel, 1978). There is little support for the grouping hypothesis. 
CHUNKING 
Miller ( 1956) introduced the "magic" nurober "7 ( + or - 2)" as the maximum nuro-
ber of chunks of verbal information that could be held in short-term memory. The 
magic in this approach was that although capacity in terms of chunks was invariant, 
individual differences · short-temrmem ry capacity (e.g., Simon, 1974) could be 
explained in terms f differ~ize chunks. Sirnon reviewed a number of tests of his 
hypothesis and conc u ed: 
The psychological reality of the chunk has been fairly weil demonstrated, and the chunk 
capacity of short-term memory has been shown to be in the range of five to seven. Fixation 
of information in long-term memory has been shown to take about 5 to 10 seconds per chunk 
(1974, p. 487) . 
From this perspective, age differences in memory span are presumed to be due to 
larger and larger information sequences being encoded as chunks with increasing 
age. With larger chunks, the amount of information that can be stored and processed 
simultaneously increases proportionately. In contrast to repetition and temporal 
grouping procedures, the degree of chunking that is possible depends on the amount 
ofprevious knowledge about the respective stimuli; thus, it is a knowledge-specific 
strategy (Chi , 1978). 
Dempster (1978) compared the short-term memory performances of 7-, 9- , and 
12-year-old children who were presented various materials (numbers, consonants: 
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words, nonsense syllables). The systematic variation ofletter sequences was of Spe-
cial importance to the "chunking" hypothesis. The comparison of memory for con-
sonant sequences that cannot be recoded easily and memory for generally known 
consonant-vowel sequences was compared. Age differences in memory spanwerein 
fact very dependent on material type (see also Chi , 1976). Only minimal age differ-
ences were found for consonant sequences that could easily be integrated, whereas 
relatively marked developmental differences were obtained for consonant-vowel 
sequences. In short, developmental differences were obtained for the task that could 
be mediated by chunking, but not for the one that did not require chunking. 
Unfortunately, Burtis (1982) failed to obtain data that complemented Dempster's 
(1978) finding. Burtis presented 10- to 14-year-olds with easy-to-recode, somewhat 
difficult-to-recode, and difficult-to-recode consonant sequences. Regardless of age, 
Burtis' subjects seemed to chunk all of these materials, underrnining the conclusion 
that chunking alone could account for age-correlated increases in recall of con-
sonants. 
Although it is difficult to explain the discrepant fmdings in these two studies, in 
neither piece of research were students' prior familiarity with the consonant 
sequences determined directly. A study carried out by Chi (1978) did control this 
factor with more complex materials. She compared the abilit1es of chess experts and 
novices in memorizing chess board positions. Most fascinating from a developmen-
tal perspective, the children were the experts in this study and the adults the novices. 
Although the children performed more poorly than the adults on a digit-span task, 
the results were reversed for recall of the chess positions. Chunking was implicated 
in the post-experiment interviews, with child experts indicating that they viewed the 
whole chessboard as the unit of leaming. The children who knew a Iot about chess 
were in a better position to create chunks than were the Iess knowledgeable adults. 
Chi's (1978) study made clear that chunking can play an important role in mediating 
some types of memory performance differences. Whether it plays a similar rote in 
mediating performance on memory-span tasks that include numbers, words, or let-
ters as stimuli, is still unclear. Again, see Dempster (1981) , who takes this issue up 
in greater detail. 
ITEM SEQUENCING 
Some researchers ( e.g., Chi, 1977; Dempster, 1981 ; Huttenlocher & Burke, 1978) 
suggested that age differences in memory span may be due in part to the requirement 
that materials on memory-span lists be reproduced in order. They believed that this 
ordering requirement would especially penalize very young subjects since very 
young children are not familiar with the sequential ordering of ordinal numbers. 
In. support of this hypothesis, Chi (1977) reported 100% improvement in recall 
perf9~ance by 5-year-olds when ftm"order of items was not considered. Case et al. 
(1982) ignored ordering of information in their study of children's sliort-term 
memory, and obtained higher "memory span" values than are obtained when correct 
serial ordering is required (cf. , Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970; Yussen & Levy, 
1975). Thus, although the data base is not extensive at this point, there is some 
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support for the hypothesis that sequential ordering skill may be part of the eause of 
age differences in memory span. 
Speed of Information Processing 
Altbough tbere is little eompelling evidenee for the hypothesis that Strategie varia-
bles are eausally eonnected to age-related ehanges in memory span, there remains 
the question of whetber nonstrategie faetors might aeeount for developmental 
inereases in span performanee. One of these is the speed of information processing 
(Dempster, 1985). 
There is no doubt that speed of processing generally inereases with age during 
ehildbood. For instanee, the rate of item identification (i.e., the time necessary to 
recognize or name to-be-remembered items) deereases with age. Chi (1977) com-
pared recognition time for faces in 5-year-old ehildren and adults and diseovered 
that the time needed by the ehildren was mueb greater than the time needed by 
adults. Both groups needed more time to name the faees, altbough the differenee 
favoring adults over ehildren remained on the naming task. Spring and Capps (1974) 
produced complementary results for 7- to 14-year-olds. See Keating and Bobbitt 
(1978) for similar developmental results on another task. 
Tbere arealso cleareut data indieating that rate of item identifieation is eorrelated 
with memory-span performanee. In Chi (1977) the differences in memory span per-
formanee between kiDdergarten ehildren and adults were redueed drastieally when 
the time of pieture presentation was redueed by half for adults, and thus, the effects 
of processing speed were diminisbed. Case et al. (1982) diseovered a monotone and 
almostlinear relationship (r = -. 74) for ehildren from 3 to 6 years of age between 
reaetion time rate and memory span. Case et al:s eorrelation was significant, even 
when the effect of age was removed statistieally (r = - .35). Nieolson (1981) 
reported a similarly high eorrelation. In short, it seems as ifthe relationship between 
rate of processing and memory span is very pronouneed both between and within 
age groups. Individuals who process rapidly have relatively large memory spans. 
Case et al. (1982) also tested whether there was a eausal relationship between 
speed of aetivation and memory-span performanee. This was tested by construeting 
to-be-reealled lists that were eomposed of materials that were named at the same 
rate by ehildren and adults. Case et al. reasoned that if memory span is dependent 
on speed of naming, then span differenees between ehildren and adults should be 
eliminated with materials that are processed at the same rate by both groups. On the 
other band, if span inereases are mediated by other faetors, then memory-span per-
formanee should be better for adults than ehildren, even with materials processed 
at the same speed. Case et al. in faet found that with speed of processing equated, 
ehildren and adults bad eomparable memory spans. Nieolson (1981) reaehed a simi-
lar conclusion with a sample of 8- to 12-year-old ehildren, reporting no age-related 
memory-span differenees when reading speed was equated aeross age Ievels. lt 
seems likely that speed of item identifieation is an important determinant of 
memory span and developmental differenees in speed ean at least partially explain 
eorrelated span differenees. 
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Summary 
The exact determinants of individual differences in memory-span performance are 
not known at this time. In our judgment there is good reason to continue research on 
the c~nking, speed of processing, ..and &_erial-ordering factors that were reviewed 
here. e particularly believe that there is a great deal of room for additional true 
experiments in this area. For instance, if the chunking hypothesis is correct, then 
teaching children who do not chunk to chunk should increase their functional 
memory spans. Manipulations that increase the rate of item identification should 
also have a positive effect on memory-span performance. Thus, perhaps seriallists 
could be constructed from materials that were initially unfamiliar to subjects. If 
some subjects were given familiarity training to the point that their recognition of 
particular items was very rapid and others were not given such training, it would be 
expected that prefamiliarized subjects would have greater memory spans for lists 
composed of the familiar materials than would subjects not provided familiarization 
training. A Iot more work could and should be done on the memory-span problem. 
Because only brief coverage of this problern was provided here, we strongly suggest 
that readers who are interested in these issues read the reviews provided by Dernp-
ster (1981, 1985). 
Are There Really Development Changes in Memory Span? 
Answering this question requires a brief overview of one particular developmen-
tal theory, Pascual-Leone's (e.g., 1970) theory of constructive operators. It has 
prompted a number of studies on the development of memory capacity. The theory 
is a new interpretation of Piaget's structural model of intellectual development (see 
also Ewert & Schumann, 1983). The central claims ofthe theory are stated in terms 
of the Piagetian concept of schema. Pascual-Leone divides schema into three com-
ponents. There are figurative schema, which are roughly equivalent to the "chunks" 
reviewed earlier in this chapter; there are operative schema, which can be inter-
preted as rules or strategies; and there are executive schema, which are essentially 
task solution plans. The activation of particular figurative or operative schema is 
orchestrated by executive schema. 
Pascual-Leone believes that a quantitatively specifiable parameter can be used to 
explain many of the qualitative phenomena described by Piaget. This is "central 
computing space" or "mental space" (abbreviated M-space). M-space is the maxi- ( 
mum number of schema that a person can activate and/or coordinate simultaneously. 
Particularly critical to developmental psychology, Pascual-Leone hypothesizes that 
there is a linear increase from 3 to 16 years of age in this mental capacity. Capacity 
is hypothesized to increase by one schema every two years. At every age Ievel, a 
constant "a" is added to this maximum number of schema. This constant stands for 
the additional storage space needed for the executive schema that is coordinating the 
activation of the other "k" schema. Hence, total capacity at any given age is equal 
to a + k, with k varying between 1 and 7 and equal approximately to (age - 2)/2. 
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Designing tasks that permit assessment of the k component is not easy. Pretraining 
of the task is necessary so that the child has the necessary executive skills to carry 
out the task. The task must involve some mental transformations so that he or she 
is tapping the many aspects of short-term capacity that are presumably represented 
by k. In addition, it is important to suppress strategies like chunking. That is, the size 
of each chunk must be known by the experimenter in order to determine k, and that 
is very difficuJt if subjects are recoding materials into larger chunks. 
Pascual-Leone (1970) relied heavily on one particular task to provide a measure 
of M-space, the "compound visual stimulus information" task (CVSI). This task 
requires chiJdren between 5 and 11 years of age to react motorically by clapping or 
raising their hands in response to various visual stimuli (e.g., a square, the color 
red). After subjects master stimulus-action pairings (e.g., a square calls for clap-
ping, red calls for raising hands), the critical measurements are taken. Combination 
stimuJi are presented (e.g., a red square) and subjects are required to make every 
response that would be appropriate for such a stimulus (i.e., both clap and raise 
hands). The compound stimuli vary in complexity. The results obtained by Pascual-
Leone were perfectly consistent with his model in that the complexity of stimuli that 
subjects could respond to increased with age. For instance, 5-year-olds could per-
form correctly for compound stimuli made up of two stimuli-action sequences, 
whereas 11-year-olds could respond correctly to compounds requiring five 
stimulus-action sequences. A nurober of other studies have also provided data con-
sistent with Pascual-Leone's assumption that there are age-correlated increases in 
M-space (e.g., Burtis, 1982; Case, 1972; Case & Serlin, 1979; Ewert & Schumann, 
1983; Globerson, 1983). 
Nonetheless, there are a nurober of objections that can be raised against the con-
clusion that mental capacity increases with age. First of all, from a theoretical per-
spective, it is somewhat disturbing that the amount of space allocated to executive 
action is considered constant across childhood (i.e., equal totheinvariant parameter 
"a" at alJ age Ievels). Just the fact that mental processes are executed more rapidJy 
with increasing age (as reviewed briefly earlier in this chapter) wouJd suggest that 
the functional capacity used by executive schema might change. In particuJar, with 
increasing age and increasing speed, it might be expected that the amount of space 
required for the executive actions would decrease. In addition, the assumption that 
stimulus-action pairings are equal to one same-sized chunk at all age Ievels poses 
difficulties. The speed of recognition and execution of these pairings should also 
increase with age, and thus, reduce the amount of capacity required to attend to and 
execute a single pairing. In short, speed of information processing was not taken into 
account by Pascual-Leone (1970). More recent data suggest that speed of informa-
tion processing may better account for developmental shifts in complex tasks than 
do other factors (e.g., Case et al., 1982). 
In addition, there are disturbing problems with the data that are reported in sup-
port ofPascual-Leone's theory. First of all, different measurement methods produce 
differ age norms (e.g., compare Pascual-Leone, 1970, with Globerson, 1983). 
Sometimes the same methods produce different age norms (e.g., compare Case, 
1972, with Globerson, 1983). Sometimes there are obvious alternative explanations 
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of the developments that are reported. For example, consider when numerical 
material is used in a transformation task such as the "digit placement task" used by 
Case (1972) and Globerson (1983). Subjects are presented numerical series where, 
except for the last item, the numbers increase. The subject's task is to put the last 
number in the correct position in the series. There is the obvious possibility that 
developmental irnprovement on the task is mediated by irnprovement with age in 
numerical ordering skills rather than simply changes in M-space as assumed by 
investigators in the Pascual-Leone tradition. 
In addition, all of this is complicated by the fact that there were procedure by age 
confoundings. For instance, the number of reactions required in Pascual-Leone's M-
space tests were systematically confounded with age (i.e., younger children were 
given fewer stirnulus-action pairings to leam and produce in reaction to compound 
stimuli). See Trabasso and Foellinger (1978) and Trabasso (1978) for a thorough 
review of the problems in Pascual-Leone's research as well as Pascual-Leone's 
responses (Pascual-Leone, 1978; Pascual-Leone & Sparkman, 1980). 
What has emerged from the investigations of memory span that have been con-
ducted as part ofthe eva1uation ofPascual-Leone's theory is a revision ofthe theory. 
Case et al. (1982; Case, 1985) have provided the leadership in this effort, proposing 
that there are developmental increases infunctional capacity due to more efficient 
processing of stimuli (e.g., faster recognition and speed of processing). Particularly 
critical to Case's position is the argument that the amount of space required to oper-
ate on stimuli functionally decreases with increasing age given more efficient Opera-
tion of the executive actions. This, in turn, frees up more space for storage of 
material and accounts largely for the increases in memory-span performance that 
are observed. 
Summary 
Several general conclusion emerge from the data considered in this chapter. There 
is no reason to assume that age-correlated performance increases in memory span 
should be interpreted as enlargement of some biologically determined capacity. 
Developmental increases in memory-span performance, however, are probably not 
due to use of strategies alone, which was another popular hypothesis. In fact, only 
one strategy, chunking, seems worthy of additional investigation as a potential con-
tributor to memory-span improvements. Factors that likely contribute to develop-
mental increases in span include developmental increases in speed of information 
processing and automatic item sequencing. In particular, more efficient execution 
of operations "frees up" more space for storage (Case et al ., 1982). 
We note as well that intraindividual differences only were considered in this chap-
ter, and thus, all of these conclusions arerelevant only to intraindividual differences 
in memory span performance. That is, they are explanations about how the same 
person can perform differently on memory span tests at one developmental Ievel 
compared to another developmental Ievel. As such, they cannot serve as explana-
tions of interindividual differences in memory-span performance, which may very 
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well be determined by biologically mediated differences in capacity or other factors 
(e.g. , biologically mediated differences in speed of processing). 
This research on memory span is important because it has been revealing about 
the "hardware" that the developing child possesses. As the discussion tums to strate-
gies, metacognition, and the knowledge base as determinants of developmental 
improvements in memory performance, it is important to remernher that although 
the actual capacity of the child's biological endowment may not change, the func-
tional capacity does because of more efficient and speedier processing. lncreases in 
speed ofbasic processes presumably contribute to more efficient execution of strate-
gies and more rapid identification and use of metacognition and world knowledge. 
With increasing age, use of strategies and their coordination with relevant metacog-
nition and world knowledge should be more certain. Thus, much of the development 
that is documented in the rest of this book is probably highly dependent on the 
development of more efficient, basic processing (i.e. , better and quicker use of the 
biologically determined capacity that is available). 
3. Development of Encoding 
and Retrieval Strategies 
The influence of neobehaviorism in American experimental research decreased 
markedly during the 1960s as the Iimits of the stimulus-response frameworks 
became more and more evident. Many experimental findings could not be explained 
using conventional S-R terminology (e.g., .Kail & Strauss, 1984), which was based 
on the premise of a passive organism. This made it necessary to give up the "black-
box" approach that characterized much of American learning (including verbal 
learning) research in favor of a model of a cognitively active organism (Hagen, Jon-
geward, & Kail, 1975). 
American research on cognitive development was influenced at this time by a 
nurober of factors. One of these was the growing awareness of Piaget's theory. A 
differentiation was made by the Genevans between the development of intentional 
recall and the development of the operations that determine intelligence and 
memory. Memory was viewed as highly dependent on these general operations 
which changed dramatically with development (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). Most 
relevant here, the Piagetians believed that qualitative changes in memory would fol-
low from these shifts, since memory was viewed as cornpletely dependent on opera-
tional intelligence. This motivated studies aimed at identifying qualitative shifts in 
memory during development. 
The empirical studies on mernory conducted by Piaget and Inhelder were con-
cemed rnainly with testing two hypotheses that followed from their theory: (1) They 
believed that children's memory performance depends on their basic understanding 
of the task as determined by their Ievel of cognitive development. Thus, identical 
stimuli are processed differently and in turn remernbered differently by .different 
age groups. (2) lf it is true that children's cognitive processes reorganize themselves 
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over long periods of time, then the memory for a specific event should also be 
affected in that the memory trace itself should change over time, and at least in some 
cases, be improved as the child matures (Liben, 1977, 1982; Naus & Halasz, 1979). 
Although Piaget and Ioheider reported positive support for both hypotheses, numer-
ous American attempts at replication were less successful (Liben, 1977), especially 
for the claim that there is long-term improvement in memory performance (see also 
Weinert & Knopf, 1983). The decline in interest in the Piagetian theory of memory 
was in part due to these failures, although many developmentalists continued to 
believe that there were qualitative changes in memory over the course of childhood. 
)I 
~ A second influence on developmental reseachers was a major insight gained from 
Soviet research- that it was important to differentiate voluntary from involuntary 
(i.e., intentional from incidental) memory (see Chapter 1). The Soviet perspectives 
on intentional and incidentalleaming were similar to those of Piaget and bis associ-
ates. Both groups believed that most of children's memories and knowledge of the 
world were built up through incidental processing that occurs as part of the continual 
interactions with the world (Brown, 1975). Involuntary memory was viewed as a 
byproduct of the use of information in specific situations and determined in part by 
how information is processed and used (Smimov & Zinchenko, 1969; Yendovit-
skaya, 1971). Thus, if a child tries to figure out tbe meaning of a stimulus, meaning-
ful properties of the object will be remembered; if tbe child focusses on physical 
aspects of a stimulus, physical attributes are encoded. Many studies have confirmed 
Soviet hypotheses about the influence of incidental memory processes on memory 
in preschoolers and school cbildren (e.g., Geis & Hall, 1976, 1978; Ghatala, 1984; 
Ghatala &Levin, 1981, 1982; Levin& Ghatala, 1982; Owings &Baumeister, 1979; 
Sophian & Hagen, 1978). Nonetheless, much of the Soviet researchwas embedded 
in dialectical models (e.g., Riegel, 1974, 1975) that were not nearly as appeallog to 
North American developmentalists (nor as available or comprehensible to them; 
e.g., Wozniak, 1972, 1975) as the models of human information processing that 
predominated in adult cognitive psychology in the Iate 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, 
the Soviet positionbad lirnited impact. 
The "cognitive turn" in North American experimental psychology made popular 
some old concepts that bad almost been forgotten. So it was, for example, that the 
differentiation made by William James (1890) between "primary" and "secondary" 
memorywas the basis ofWaugh and Norman's (1965) specification ofthe frrst con-
temporary model of memory. Primary memory was postulated as a limited capacity 
store, with rehearsal as the only means of preventing forgetting and permitting 
transfer of information to the permanent, secondary memory. A short time later, 
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968, 1971) presented a greatly expanded version of this 
model, which can be considered the most popular of the multistore conceptions (see 
Hagen, Jongeward, & Kail, 1975). Analogaus to com uter programming languages, 
the model differentiates between invanant structural elements ("hardware") and 
control esses at can mO<fified 'software' Atkinson-an~s 
odel, the structural com nents are the sensocy..re~s, long:- and short-term 
memories. Information passes through the sensory registers into the short-term 
memory, which holds in consciousness both inputs ftom the sensory registers and 
activated information from ong-term memory. The limited capacity of short term 
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FIGURE 3.1. A general model representing memory structures and processes (modified after 
Wippich, 1984). 
m mory can be extended by control processes such as rehearsal, which also 
increases the probabillty thalthls information will reach the unlimited capacity 
long-term memory. 
Although this model was at first well received by developmentalists, its use in 
developmental explanations was reduced considerably by an alternative proposal by 
Craik and his associates (Craik & Jacoby, 1975; Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Jacoby & 
Craik, 1979). Cli · &l' vels of processing approach criticized the computer 
modelas a useful metaphor for adult cognition. It replaced the notion of a multistore 
model with a conception that defines the "depth" or Ievel of processing of incoming 
information. The role of subject-control memory processes and semantic 
memory was clearly more important in this model than in the multistore concept. 
The resistance of the memory trace to forgetting is viewed as a function of the 
"processing depth." While shallow processing is associated with attending more to 
physical features of a Stimulus, deeper processing involves more complete and 
meaningful processing. Given the similarity of this position and Soviet theories of 
incidental memory being determined by activities that the Iearner engages in, it is 
not surprising that developmentalists were attracted to Craik's thinking. 
Nonetheless, depth-of-processin models did not com letely replace multi-store 
models (Lachman c an, 197 . New structural mooels of t n arose, 
one that included centrat processing and storage as well as levels-of-.Processing 
components (Bower, 1975, 1978; Kintsch, 1975 Raaijmäkers & Shiffrin, 1980, 
1981). A vers10n of such a model is presented in Figure 3.1. Combined structural 
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and depth-of-processing models are compatible with much more of the available 
data than simpler alternatives (e.g., Bower & Hilgard, 1981). Virtually all of the 
developmental data reviewed in this chapter are compatible with this type of com-
bined model. 
The pioneering work of John Flavell and bis associates (e.g., Flavell, 1970; 
Flavell, Beach, & Chinsky, 1966; Keeney, Cannizzo, & Flavell, 1967; Moely, 
Olson, Halwes, & Flavell, 1969) especially stimulated research on information 
processing in children. Their early research was concemed with children's use of 
verbal mediators in storage and recall of verbal information. Flavell and colleagues 
particularly focused on conscious and intentional memory activities, although 
Flavell (e.g., 1970) always recognized the irnportance of incidentallearning to the 
development of children's knowledge. Consistent with a distinction made by Mac-
coby (1964), Flavell's group studied two potential difficulties in particularly great 
detail. One possibility was that young children do not produce mediators that can 
effectively promote leaming (i.e., they have a production deficiency). Altema-
tively, children rnight produce mediators when learning, but the mediators would 
fail to facilitate performance as they do for older children and adults (i.e., the chil-
dren would have a mediational deficiency; Reese, 1962). 
The usefulness of the distinction between production and mediational deficien-
cies was apparent in Keeney et al. (1967). First, it was determined that some 
first-grade children used a verbal-rehearsal strategy during Iist learning, whereas 
other first-grade children failed to do so. Memory was clearly better for the chil-
dren who produced the rehearsal strategy. When the production-deficient children 
were taught the rehearsal strategy, their memory improved dramatically, how-
ever. Thus, the children who failed to use the strategy spontaneously bad a pro-
duction deficiency, but not a mediational deficiency. Moely et al. (1969) also 
demonstrated a production deficiency in grade-school children. In this case, kinder-
gaTten, first-, and third-grade children failed to use a sorting-clustering strategy 
when learning lists of potentially categorizable pictures (see p. 53, this volume). 
Again, it proved possible to teach the strategy to these children. As in Keeney et al., 
there were consistent correlations between use of the sorting-clustering strategy and 
memory performance. 
The conclusion that was reached following these early experiments was that 
memory could primarily be understood as a transition from nonstrategic to strategic 
behavior. Age of "spontaneous" strategy use seemed to vary (e.g., rehearsal strate-
gies appeared developmentally earlier than sorting-clustering strategies). A positive 
sign was that children who did not use strategies on their own could profitably be 
instructed to execute them. That is, they could execute the strategies and their per-
formance went up when they did so. More negatively, however, it was apparent even 
in these early sturlies that continued use of strategies was not an automatic 
byproduct of instruction. 
Flavell's (1970) summary of bis early work and a Society for Research in Child 
Development symposium organized by Flavell (1971; Belmont & Butterfield, 1971; 
Hagen, 1971) stirnulated a great deal of memory development research during the 
next decade. The developmental psychology of memory that followed was domi-
nated by sturlies assessing the use and significance of strategies, the role of the 
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knowledge base in memory and strategy use, and the relationship of strategy use to 
knowledge of memory (i.e., metamemory). 
Brown (1975) laid out five ways to classify mernory development research, rely-
ing on dichotomous distinctions that seemed to characterize the work. These five 
dichotomies permit organization of the research and they highlight that workers in 
memory development have been very selective about the problems that they have 
studied: (l) Although there were experiments on both intentional and incidental 
leaming, research on intentional learning predominated following Flavell's Iead. 
(2) Although memory development was sometimes studied as a means to an end 
following Soviet suggestions (e.g., Smimov & Zinchenko, 1969), more often 
it was studied as an end in itself. Again this was consistent with Flavell's early 
work. (3) Studies of exact recall were complemented by studies of not-so-exact 
recall (e.g., gist recall of text)-ones involving constructive errors that reflected 
the leamer's knowledge base, Nonetheless, there were many more experiments 
that focused on exact learning compared to constructive memory. (4) The effects 
of strategies that produced "deep" compared to "shallow" comprehension were 
assessed, although this problern did not command the attention that it did in the 
adult literature. (5) Although the pifference between memory for particular epi-
sodes versus semantic memory (memory of definitions, concepts, relationships, 
which is not tied to memory of particular exemplars of the concepts or relationships) 
was recognized following Thlving's (e.g., 1972) Iead, most of the developmental 
work focused on episodic memory. Again, this was due in part to the fact that 
the earliest, seminal developmental studies were exclusively concemed with epi-
sodic memory. 
Since Flavell's seminal work, there has been an enormous amount of research on 
children's use of memory strategies. It is certainly not possible to review all of this 
work, especially given the diversity of strategies that were studied (e.g., Pressley, 
Heisel, McCorrnick, & Nakamura, 1982). lnstead, the tactic that we take in this 
chapter is to review two particular approaches to encoding (one other approach, 
elaboration, is considered in some detail in Chapter 6) and the development of 
retrieval skills, as weil as issues surrounding the development of encoding and 
retrieval strategies. 
Before tuming to strategy development, however, the defining characteristics of 
memory strategies should be considered. For a long time, there was little con-
troversy about the nature of strategies. lt was assumed that strategies were task-
relevant cognitive activities that were under conscious control. Strategies facilitated 
attainment of various goals (Naus & Ornstein, 1983; Omstein, Baker-Ward, & 
Naus, in press; Paris, Newman, & Jacobs, 1985). Recently, however, there is more 
debate about the fundamental nature of strategies. For instance, in Pressley and 
Levin's two-volume set on cognitive strategies (Pressley & Levin, 1983a, 1983b), 
many different definitions of strategy were provided by the various contributors to 
the books. 
There are two important factors contributing to the confusion about the definition 
of strategy. First, automatic information processing can produce the same effects as 
conscious use of strategies (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Naus & Halasz, 1979; 
Walter Schneider, & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Walter Schneider, 1977). Uncon-
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scious activities sometimes produce performance that is even better than that 
obtained by conscious efforts. Second, it is possible that some of the activities inter-
preted as conscious strategies actually reflect automatic processes. A typical situa-
tion is the one described by Lange ( 1973, 1978). He demonstrated that the category 
dustering observed in young students performing sort-recall tasks was due to auto-
matically activated associations rather than strategic activities. (More about this 
example later in the chapter.) 
Nonetheless, some researchers continue to argue that memory strategies must be 
conscious (e.g., Paris, Lipson, & Wixson, 1983; Pariset al., 1985). The majority of 
memory development researchers (e.g., Brown, 1978; Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, 
& Campione, 1983; especially Campione & Armbruster, 1985; Flavell, 1985), 
however, employ a much less restrictive criterion regarding intentionality. Pressley, 
Forrest-Pressley, Elliott-Faust, and Miller (1985) provided one of the more detailed 
of the new definitions of strategy: 
A strategy is composed of cognitive operations over and above the processes that arenatural 
consequences of carrying out the task, ranging from one such operation to a sequence of 
interdependent operations. Strategies achieve cognitive purposes (e.g., comprehending, 
memorizing) and are potentially conscious and controllable activities (p. 4) . 
There is no doubt, of course, that this defmition is fairly imprecise. That was 
Pressley, Forrest-Pressley, Elliott-Faust, and Miller's (1985) intention, because they 
conceptualized strategy as a "fuzzy set" of activities. The natureofthat fuzzy setwill 
be more obvious after some particular examples are considered in detail. 
Strategie Behaviors in Very Young Children 
We know much more about strategy use by school age children than by preschoolers. 
In part this is because the early American work (e.g., Keeney et al., 1967; Hagen & 
Kingsley, 1968) and Soviet research (e.g., Yendovitskaya, 1971) provided little 
evidence that intentional, strategic memorizing occurred before six years of age. 
In fact, it is fairly easy to produce data consistent with this conclusion by using 
tbe "modal memory" study model (Brown & DeLoache, 1978; DeLoache, 1980). 
That approach involves presenting a sample of very young children with a memory 
task that is composed of unfamiliar materials that are presented in an unfamiliar 
context. In general, researchers have used the nonstrategic behavior produced by 
preschoolers in such situations as a baseline against which the progress of older 
subjects has been demonstrated. The basicproblern with such an approachisthat we 
find out little about preschoolers (e.g., Gelrnan, 1978)-we only know what they 
cannot or will not do. 
There is another reason why there is so little understanding of early strategy use, 
however. lt is very hard to carry out studies with children two to five years of age 
compared to older subjects. lt is both difficult to get children to understand what you 
want them to do and it is difficult to get them to do it (DeLoache, 1980). These 
difficulties make obvious that standard techniques for analyzing the memory 
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behaviors of older children arenot appropriate with preschoolers. Fortunately, there 
are other methods available, especially adaptations of ones used to study memory 
in infants. Use of these procedures seemed especially appropriate since there was 
the possibility of finding developmental connections between infancy and the 
preschool years (e.g., Sophian, 1984). 
Thus, recall in preschoolers has been studied with retrieval-of-hidden objects, 
memory-for-events, and memory-for-objects paradigms, all approaches that were 
used in one form or another to study infant cognition (Daehler & Greco, 1985). The 
main issue addressed in these studies was whether, and at which age, conscious, 
intentional memory activities are Observable in very young children. Memory 
activities were judged to be intentional in these experiments if they developed out 
of knowledge about a particular memory goal and were selectively employed (e.g., 
in the context of memory instructions; Wellman, 1977a). 
Retrieval of Hidden Objects 
Two different research strategies have been used to study memory for location in 
small children. There are "naturalistic" studies, which are based on daily Observa-
tions that are recorded in diaries or observation protocols. This approach was first 
applied with infantsandsmall children by Stern and Stern (1909; also Bühler, 1930) 
and with preschoolers by Hurlock and Schwartz (1932). The second method is the 
"delayed reaction;' or "hide-and-seek'' task (Del..oache, 1984). In its simplest form, 
the child first observes an object being hidden. After a period of time that is fllled 
with other activities, the child is requested to locate the hidden object. 
The naturalistic studies provide anecdotal evidence of intact memory for location 
in one year olds. Bühler (1930) reported a case where a ball rolledunder a cabinet 
du ring play. When asked to Iook for the ball about an hour later, the child was able 
to find it immediately although he had been occupied with other things since the 
disappearance of the ball. When Ashmead and Perlmutter (1980) analyzed entries 
in mothers' diaries, they found evidence of development between 7 and 11 months 
of age. The younger children were observed remembering the locations of objects 
that had relatively fixed positions (e.g., telephone, closet). Older subjects were 
better able to recall objects with changing positions. Nelson and Ross (1980) also 
used the diary method and determined that toddlers (who had just turned two) 
employed more intentional memory activities for recall of events than for the loca-
tion of meaningful objects. The older children were able to recall both objects and 
events accurately after a relatively long period of time (i.e., up to three months). 
Although these diary studies provide valuable information about infants, there are 
methodological problems with them. Mothers' motivations and/or subjective inter-
pretations cannot be evaluated reliably (Nelson & Ross, 1980). In contrast, reliabil-
ity of measurement is no problern when memory for location is studied with hide-
and-seek tasks, Situations that permit examination of a naturalistic behavior in a 
controlled setting. 
A simple version of the hide-and-seek task, the "perseveration" task (Sophian, 
1984), has been used in a number of studies and is useful for illustrating conscious 
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decision-making processes during search. The task consists oftwo trials. During the 
first, an object is hidden at place A; during the second, it is hidden at place B. Very 
young children (i .e., 6 to 9 months old) make the perseveration error or AB rnistake 
(Daehler & Greco, 1985). Although they observe the object being hidden at pla~e B 
on trial2, they again search for the object at position A. This error is obtained even 
with a short retention interval foUowing hiding at B. Sophian (1984) suggested that 
this phenomenon was due to the inability of very young children to differentiale 
between present and past behavior. By age 1 'h, children ignore the A position in 
favor of B, although this competency can be disrupted if complications are intro-
duced, for example, by decreasing the explicitness of information about hiding and 
retrieval (Sophian & Wellman, 1980, 1983). In contrast, slightly older children (i.e., 
3- and 4-year-olds) perform well in this situation even when things are complicated. 
Intentional memory for location has been researched intensively in recent studies 
with many of these studies framedas research on the development of retrieval skiUs. 
The results ofthe early studies were ambiguous. Although Horn and Myers (1978), 
Loughlin and Daehler (1973), and Ratner and Myers (1980) found almost no evi-
dence that children under three years of age profit from the presentation of retrieval 
cues, Perlmutter and her associates provided demonstrations that 2- to 3-year-olds 
make use of retrieval cues under certain conditions. For instance, Blair, Perlmutter, 
and Myers (1978) showed children colored pictures one at a time. Then the picture 
was hidden in one of nine drawers in a small ftling cabinet. In the retrieval-cue con-
ditions, another picture of another object was attached to the front of the relevant 
drawer. In the control condition, no picture was attached to the front of the drawer. 
The children then looked away from the ftling cabinets for 25 seconds before 
attempting to retrieve the hidden picture. Provision of a retrieval cue aided the 
search of the 27- to 45-month-old participants in the study. Perlmutter et al. (1981) 
obtained comparable results in a sirnilar paradigm and concluded that even 2-year-
olds can use picture cues to encode location and search for objects. 
A variety of other issues concerning search and retrieval have been investigated 
in studies of memory for location. For instance, Sophian and Weilman (1983) 
focused on children's ernerging understanding that objects are not always found 
where they were hidden. If an object is hidden under a cup at place A, and the cup 
is then exchanged with the cup at place B, looking at place A will not produce the 
hidden object. Children who are 30 months old understand this fact better than do 
children who are 24 months old (Sophian, Larkin, & Kadane, 1985). It is now well 
established that visible retrieval cues that are strongly associated with the hidden 
object are readily used by preschoolers. For instance, Gordon and Flavell (1977) 
demonstrated that fmding a picture of a fireman that was hidden in one of four 
folders was easy for 3-year-olds when a picture of a fire hat was placed on the outside 
of the folder containing the fireman. 
One of the most impressive studies of preschoolers' use of retrieval cues was con-
ducted by Ritter, Kaprove, Fitch, and Flavell (1973), who demonstrated that youn-
ger preschool children's (i.e., 3-year-olds) effective use of retrieval cues occurred 
only when the task was very simple. They observed substantial development of 
retrieval cue use during the preschool years. In Ritter et al. (1973) the testmaterial 
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consisted of six pictures of people (e.g., a soccer player) and six small toys (e.g., a 
soccer ball)-each person was functionally related to one of the toys. The 3- to 
5-year-old subjects watcbed as each person entered one of six houses and put their 
toy in a box with the toy in the box visible at all times. In contrast, the people were 
placed out of sight in the house. The cbild's task was to show a ''twin" of each person 
(6 pictures identical to the 6 people pictures that were hidden), the way to their part-
ner. After this task, all materials were removed except for a single set of people pic-
tures that were placed facedown in front ofthe child. The children were then asked 
to recall the narnes of the toys. The children were free to use the picture retrieval 
cues if they chose to do so. The majority of children at each age Ievel made use of 
the visible toys as retrieval cues durlog the first task, with no striking age differ-
ences. The second task yielded a clear developmental pattern, however. Approxi-
mately 20% of the 3-year-olds turned over the pictures of the people and used them 
as retrieval cues. In contrast, about 75% ofthe 5-year-olds used this device. See Geis 
and Lange (1976) and Schneiderand Sodian (1988) for complementary results. 
lt is one thing to use retrieval cues that are provided. It is quite another for chil-
dren to prepare for retrieval themselves. Ritter (1978) conducted a now dassie study 
that is relevant to this point. The task was to prepare to fmd a piece of candy hidden 
in one cup on a turntable containing six cups. Paper clips and gold stars that could 
potentially be used to mark the relevant cup were placed near the turntable. The 
children were aware of the memory requirement and of the fact that they would have 
to close their eyes as the turntable was spun. The child would then be given an 
opportunity to retrieve the candy. 
After placing the candy in the cup but before spinning the turntable, the experi-
menter asked the child, "Is there something you can do to help you fmd the candy 
right away?" Using the paper clips or gold stars to mark the appropriate cup was 
defined as spontaneaus preparation for retrieval. If the child failed to mark the cup 
following this nondirective question, graded prompts were provided to induce prep-
aration for later retrieval. The least explicit of these consisted of the experimenter 
pointing to the clips and stars and saying, "Can these help you to fmd the candy right 
away?" A slightly more explicit prompt consisted of the experimenter pointing to the 
clips and stars and commenting, "Can you use these over here to help you find the 
candy right away?" More explicit still was the experimenter putting a marker on the 
cup and asking, "Will this help you find the candy right away?" and "Do you want 
to leave the marker there or put it some other place?" 
Although third-grade subjects placed the retrieval cues spontaneously without 
prompting to do so, all preschoolers required prompting with 3-year-olds needing 
more than 5-year-olds. Although all the third graders and 90% of the older pre-
schoolers ( 4 ~ to 5 ~) used the retrieval cues at testing to find the candies, approxi-
mately one-third of the younger prescboolers (aged 3 to 41h) failed to prepare 
retrieval cues given even the most explicit prompting. 
Others have produced data generally confuming the pattem of outcomes reported 
by Ritter (1978). For instance, Beal and Fleisig (1987) reported that prescboolers 
needed several prompts before they would use retrieval cues in search tasks structur-
ally identical to the task studied by Ritter. This was despite the fact that Beal and 
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Fleisig made eertain that their subjeets were aware that retrieval would be diffieult 
without eues. Whittaker, MeShane, and Dunn ( 1985) also used a task that w'as strue-
turally similar to the one employed by Ritter. They observed that 3-year-olds did not 
make use of strategies spontaneously to remernher locations, with many failing to 
plaee a retrieval eue after several prompts. By 9 years of age, half the ehildren 
prepared retrieval eues without a prompt to do so, and seven of the remaining eight 
ehildren in the sample did so following some prompting. In short, there are observ-
able improvements hetween the presehool and grade-sehool years in ehildren's 
robust and flexible use of retrieval strategies. 
In interpreting the memory-for-location and retrieval results, we point out that 
looking for eoins under a eup (as weH as most of the other laboratory tasks used in 
these investigations) is not a partieularly eommon hehavior for ehildren, and it 
rnight be expected that greater strategie aetivity would he obtained with more 
naturalistieally valid seareh tasks. A study by DeLoaehe, Cassidy, and Brown (1985) 
is partieularly interesting in this regard, offering evidenee that precursors of Stra-
tegie behavior in location tasks are observable in ehildren hetween 18 and 24 months 
of age. The most important data were collected between the hiding of a Big Bird doll 
by an experimenter (e.g., under a pillow in the living room where the study took 
plaee) and the time when the ehildren were asked to retrieve the toy from the hiding 
plaee. Although the ehildren were occupied with very attraetive toys during this 
interval, they frequently interrupted their activities to Iook at the hiding plaee, to 
point at it, or to repeat the name of the hidden objeet. A follow-up study provided 
data making clear that these were aetually memory-related aetivities. In that study, 
when Big Bird was plaeed in the environment, but not hidden (e.g., put on top of a 
pillow in sight of the ehild) so that no rememhering was required to retrieve the doll, 
few orienting behaviors oceurred. 
The DeLoaehe et al. (1985) data support the hypothesis that ehildren as yoling as 
2 years of age ean use rudimentary memory strategies. These strategie behaviors 
were only observed in tasks with very simple structures, however. With barder 
tasks, intentional preparation for retrieval is not observed until later. Consider a 
study by Wellman, Ritter, and Flavell (1975). The goal in that study was to remem-
ber where an object was hidden- under one of three identieal cups-from the time 
an experimenter left the room until her return. Three-year-olds but not 2-year-
olds exhibited what appeared to be eonsciously intentional memory hehaviors 
including watehing and touehing the correet eup. In faet, 3-year-olds seem to be 
Strategie aeross various types of hide-and-seek games and location tasks (e.g., 
Haake, Somerville, & Wellrnan, 1980; WeHman & Somerville, 1982; Wellrnan, 
Somerville, & Haake, 1979). 
Memory for Events and Event Sequences 
Diary entries have provided mueh evidence of very early memory for everyday 
events. Bühler (1930) pointed out that 2-year-olds sometimes remernher even infre-
quent events for a long period of time. There are sirnilar reports in more reeent 
sturlies (e.g., Nelson & Ross, 1980; Todd & Perlmutter, 1980). 
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Whereas Todd and Perlmutter (1980) characterized the memories of3- to 5-year-
olds for everyday events as examples of "nondeliberate" memory, Somerville, 
Wellman, and Cultice (1983) studied children's prospective memory for everyday 
activities in an effort to fmd deliberate memory behavior by preschoolers. Parents 
cooperated in this study of2- to 4-year-olds. The parents instructed their children to 
carry out a particular activity at a specified future time. The to-be-remembered 
event was either one that was highly interesting and appealing to the child (e.g., 
getting candy) or one that would be oflittle interest to the child. The child either had 
to remember the event for a short period of time or for a long time. There was better 
memory at all age Ievels in the study for the interesting event and when the time 
interval was short, with the interest variable having a greater impact on perfor-
mance. That there were no significant effects in Somerville et al. that involved the 
age factor suggests that even 2-year-olds are capable of intentional memory, at least 
when given an interesting event to remember. See Renninger and Wozniak (1985) 
for complementary evidence documenting that interesting stimuli can prompt 
deliberate memory behaviors in children. 
What are children's representations of everyday evepts like? Katherine Nelson 
(Nelson, 1978; Nelson, Fivush, Hudson, & Lucariello, 1983; Nelson & Gründel, 
1981) and Jean Mandler (Fivush & Mandler, 1985; Mandler, 1983, 1984, 1986) 
have studied this problem. Both researchers believe that the script model developed 
by Schank and Abelson (1977) can provide an explanation of children's memory of 
everyday routines. Scripts are general representations of events, a type of general-
ized knowledge about temporal and causal relations between event and action com-
ponents. For instance, there are "going to a restaurant" and "birthday party" scripts 
that specify how to reach certain goals in predictab!e fashions. These generalized 
scripts are believed to develop out of specific (episodic) experiences. 
Nelson and Mandler and their associates have provided many empirical confirma-
tions that even very young children organize their memories of daily events via 
scripts (Mandler, 1983, 1984; Nelson, Fivush, Hudson, & Lucariello, 1983; Nelson 
& Gründel, 1981). For instance, materials thatcan be related to a common script are 
remernbered better by young children than materials that are taxonomically related 
(e.g., Lucariello & Nelson, 1985). Although the scripts possessed by 3- to 4-year-
old children are very general, they become increasingly specific and complete with 
development (e.g., Adams & Worden, 1986). 
Memory for Lists of Objects, Pictures, and Words 
When preschoolers are presented lists of objects, pictures, or words to Iearn, they 
typically can recognize many more of these items later than they can recall, with 
recall often very poor (e.g., Myers & Perlmutter, 1978; Perlmutter, 1984; Perlmut-
ter & Myers, 1979). That stimuli can be recognized suggests that the children have 
encoded the materials that were presented for learning; that they cannot recall them 
suggests that preschoolers are not very proficient at searching their memories and 
self-prompting themselves about events that they have experienced. Thus, an 
hypothesis advanced in a nurober of studies was that preschoolers' recall might be 
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improved if they were provided prompts (e.g., category clues for recall of categoriz-
ab1e lists) . Consistent with this hypothesis, semantic prompts (like category cues) 
improve recall by 3- to 5-year-o1ds (e.g., Ceci, Lea, & Howe, 1980; Davies & 
Brown, 1978; Emmerich & Ackerman, 1978; Morrison & Lord, 1982; Perlmutter 
& Myers, 1979; Perlmutter, Schork, & Lewis, 1982; Sophian & Hagen, 1978; 
Wingard, Buchanan, & Burnell, 1978). 
Although cue manipu1ations at retrieval seem to produce dramatic and generally 
consistent effects, encoding manipu1ations (e.g., b1ocked versus nonb1ocked presen-
tation of categorizab1e items for study) have been more variab1y successful. Thus, 
some investigators have reported facilitation due to b1ocking of categorizab1e items 
(e.g., Kobasigawa & Orr, 1973; Perlmutter & Myers, 1979; Morrison & Lord, 
1982), whereas others have failed to observe benefits due to b1ocking (Emmerich & 
Ackerman, 1978; Garrison, 1980). Very salient prompts during encoding do seem 
to affect memory, however. Thus, requiring 4- to 5-year-o1ds to sort to-be-1eamed 
1ists into semantic categories enhances memory ofthe material (e.g., Moe1y et al. 
1969; Lange & Griffith , 1977). These sort-recall resu1ts make clear that even very 
young children can be 1ed to emp1oy organizationa1 strategies profitab1y, a1though 
nonprompted, intentional use of such strategies has never been observed with 2- to 
5-year-o1ds (Perlmutter & Myers, 1979). 
Ana1yses of children's sorting have produced evidence that preschoo1ers' classifi-
cation behaviors are more dominated by perceptua1 than taxonomic criteria, consis-
tent with Piagetian theory (e.g., Piaget, 1970). Preschoo1ers tend to classify 
according to color rather than according to semantic or taxonomic characteristics 
(Me1kman, Tversky, & Baratz, 1981; Perlmutter & Ricks, 1979). Perlmutter, 
Schork, and Lewis (1982) studied the effects of perceptual versus conceptua1 orient-
ing questions during encoding. That the preschoo1ers in the study benefited from 
both color and category cues permits the conclusion that even very young children 
can use semantic category knowledge when encoding information. 
A difficulty with the studies by Melkman et al . , Perlmutter and Ricks (1979), and 
Perlmutter et aJ. ( 1982), however, was that children were not aware at encoding that 
they would be required to recall materia11ater. What do sorting preferences Iook like 
when preschoo1ers and kindergarten children are aware of an upcorning test? 
Sodian, Schneider, and Perlmutter (1986) presented 4- and 6-year-olds with 16 toys 
that could be classified according to taxonomic and color criteria. The subjects in 
the "sort-and-remember" condition were told to code items into memory by putting 
them into groups that they feit be1onged together. Subjects in a "play-and-
remember" condition were given no instructions specific to sorting but rather were 
to1d that they were allowed to play with the items awhile before they would be given , 
a memory test. All subjects categorized more according to taxonomic classification 
than according to color. Not surprisingly, the provision of category cues at recall bad 
a more positive effect than provision of color cues. An especial1y important finding 
was that there was significant1y more categorical dustering in the sorting condition 
than in the p1ay condition during both encoding and recall. A significant memoriz-
ing versus p1aying effect in favor ofthe memorizing condition was obtained, but only 
with the 4-year-o1ds. 
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Although the average categorical clustering value differed significantly from zero 
during the sorting condition for both age groups, the design of the study by Sodian 
et al. (1986) did not permit conclusions about whether the organizational behaviors 
could be interpreted as intentional memory strategies. This was due to the fact that 
the play condition also included mention oflater recall. Intentionalmemory strate-
gies in young children can be most safely inferred when encoding behaviors occur 
following instructions that indicate a future memory requirement, and the same 
behaviors do not occur following instructions that do not indicate that a memory test 
will occur (i.e., following intentional but not incidental leaming instructions; 
Wellman, 1977a). 
One of the earliest studies with an intentional versus incidental instructional 
manipulation was reported by Appel et al. (1972). They observed no differences 
in the bebaviors of prescboolers who were provided intentional versus incident-
al learning instructions (a result generally comparable to some of the Soviet data 
discussed in Chapter 1). Appel et al. 's (1972) initial study of the ••differentia-
tion hypotbesis" stimulated a number of follow-up studies (e.g., Galbraith, Olsen, 
Duerden, & Harris, 1982; Yussen, Gagne, Gargiulo, & Kunen, 1974; Yussen, 
Kunen, & Buss, 1975). In contrast to Appel et al. (1972), there was clear differ-
entiation between intentional and incidental learning situations tbroughout child-
hood in most of these followup investigations, most critically, even with pre-
schoolers. 
Baker-Ward, Omstein, and Holden (1984) offered especially convincing evi-
dence that preschoolers consciously memorize. Children in that experiment were 
presented either memory-neutral (play) or memory-relevant instructions. The 
subjects in the two play conditions were given no indication tbat they would have 
to recall information later. Children in the memory condition were informed 
that they could play with the toys awhile, but they should also do all that they 
could to remember a specified subsample of the toys (i.e., the to-be-remembered 
items). Subjects in tbe memory condition played significantly less than subjects 
in the play condition. Children in the memory condition were more likely than 
play subjects to name the to-be-remembered objects or Iook at them intensely. 
These differences in the frequency of memory-related behaviors as a function of 
experimental condition were found at all age Ievels and increased with age. These 
memory-related behaviors only affected the recall of the 6-year-olds in the study, 
however. Baker-Ward et al. (1984) speculated that tbis might be because the newly 
leamed strategies were not routinized to the point that tbey could actually be useful 
to subjects. 
Evidence of strategy development between the prescbool years and kiDdergarten 
was also obtained in a study by Hudson and Fivusb (1983). Kindergarten children 
in that study strategically used the structures of word lists that they were presented 
to leam whereas the preschool children did not. 
The studies reviewed in this subsection make clear that rudirnentary memory 
strategies can be observed when preschoolers prepare for recall. Preschoolers are 
more competent than was assumed just a few years ago (cf., Myers & Perlmutter, 
1978; Perlmutter, 1980). 
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Summary 
The empirieal studies eonducted in the last deeade have coneentrated on the identifi-
cation of eompeteneies in preschoolers more than defieits. The hypothesis that there 
is a "five-to-seven" shift from nonstrategie to Strategie (eoineidental with the onset 
of schooling) is no Ionger tenable (Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983). 
Many strategie behaviors have been identified in preschoolers, behaviors that indi-
cate self-directed, goal-oriented aetions. These behaviors are especially obvious 
when ehildren are studied in familiar surroundings and with farniliar tasks (eharae-
teristic of many of the sturlies eonsidered in this section). For instanee, strategie 
behavior can be observed with some variations ofthe hide-and-seek task when eog-
nitive demands are low. With less farniliar tasks, the results ean be quite different: 
The fact that the child thinks to prepare for retrieval in a toy hiding game does not necessarily 
mean that he will select a suitable cue to bait the correct container in a very similar retrieval-
cue-selection task (Brown et al., 1983, p. 94). 
For instanee, see Whittaker et al. (1985) for direet evidenee that laboratory hide-
and-seek tasks are more complex than toy finding, and that the laboratory tasks 
can only be solved by sehool-age ehildren. Even though preschoolers have some 
strategie skills, the ones they possess are extremely Lirnited in seope of applieation. 
Development of an Encoding Strategy: Rehearsal 
It is not easy to determine that a strategy affects encoding only, and in fact, may be 
impossible to do so (Waters & Andreassen, 1983), since the advantages eonferred 
by eneoding strategies are often not realized until retrieval is required. Encoding 
strategies refer to procedures that are deployed during study of material in prepara-
tion for a subsequent test. Although there are many encoding strategies, a few have 
reeeived mueh more attention from developmental psychologists than have others. 
We review two of the more prominently researched procedures in this section. 
Rehearsal has been studied very intensely by developmental psyehologists. This 
interest was partially motivated by the eritieality of rehearsal in both multi-store 
memory models (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968, 1971) and "Ievels of processing" 
models (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and by Flavell's early work establishing rehearsal 
as a strategy that deve1oped between 5 and 10 years of age. 
Flavell, Beach, and Chinsky (1966) studied List learning by 5-, 7-, and 10-year-
olds. The children wore spaee helmets while they prepared for serial recall of 
picture Lists. The helmets were constructed so that the experimenter could see the 
child's mouth and thus determine ifthe subject was verbally rehearsing the rnaterials 
as they were presented. Only a very few 5-year-olds displayed multiple-item rehear-
sal strategies; in contrast, most of the oldest subjects cumulatively rehearsed the 
Iist items. 
Direct measurement of rehearsal was eomplemented in Flavell et al. (1966) and 
in other studies by less direct indicators of eumulative rehearsal. The most irnpor-
tant of these was analysis of recall by serial position in the List. When especially 
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good recall occurred for items early in the Iist (primacy effect), rehearsal processesx 
were assumed (Belmont & Butterfield, 1977; Hagen & Stanovich, 1977). Primacy 
effects were generally not found when preschoolers and younger school children 
were left to their own devices to learn material. lt is, however, relatively easy to 
evoke primacy in these nonproducers by training them to use rehearsal strategies 
(Gruenenfelder & Borkowski, 1975; Hagen & Kingsley, 1968; Hagen, Hargrave, & 
Ross, 1973; Keeney et al., 1967; Kingsley & Hagen, 1969). Clear primacy durin 
uninstructed learning can be observed from about 8 to 10 years of age. 
In addition to correlations between primacy effects, use of rehearsal, and age, 
researchers who were interested in rehearsal were able to confirm a causal link 
between rehearsal and primacy through experimental manipulations. For instance, 
primacy effects are reduced among older but not among younger children when 
rehearsal opportunities are limited by time constraints (Allik & Siegel, 1976; Hagen 
& Kai), 1973). 
Other measures of input activity also supported the conclusion that rehearsal 
develops. One of the most important of these involved analyses of subjects' pauses 
while they studied (Ashcraft & KeUas, 1974; Belmont & Butterfield, 1969, 1971). 
Although 13-year-olds in Belmont and Butterfield's study displayed progressively 
Ionger pause times with the presentation of each new item on a serial Iist, pause 
times were more uniform as a function of Iist condition with younger children (i.e., 
9-year-olds). It was inferred from these results that the older subjects used an active, 
cumulative rehearsal strategy but that the younger subjects probably did little more 
than verbally Iabel individual items as they were presented. 
Data obtained using the overt rehearsal technique developed by Rundus (1971) 
permitted even more detailed developmental conclusions (Cuvo, 1975; Kellas, 
Ashcraft, & Johnson, 1973; Ornstein, Naus, & Liberty, 1975). The advantages of 
the overt rehearsal method, which requires that subjects memorize all items out 
loud, are that the quantity and quality of rehearsal activities can be directly meas-
ured and evaluated. The work of Peter Ornstein, Mary Naus, and their associates 
(Naus & Ornstein, 1983; Ornstein & Naus, 1978, 1985; ornstein, Baker-want. &r 
Naus, in press) using this method have been especially revealing, and thus will be 
considered in detail in the remainder of this subsection. tein and bi& associates 
studied whether changes in rehearsal were more qualitative or quantitative in 
nature; the importance of encoding and retrieval processes for the efficiency of 
memorization; and contextual conditions that are necessary and sufficient to induce 
active memorization strategies in younger children. 
Ornstein et al. (1975) made a detailed study of qualitative differences in the 
rebearsal of third, sixth, and eighth graders. The subjects were instructed to 
rebearse seriallist items out loud, with five seconds provided between the presenta-
tion of each item. The typical age effects for serial recall were obtained. Older sub-
jects both recalled more items and exhibited a primacy effect. In contrast, therc 
were no age differences in the total amount of rehearsal nor was the correlation 
between amount of rehearsal and recall very !arge. Qualitative analyses of the 
rehearsal sets, however, were much more informative, with a rebearsal set defined 
as the number of items rehearsed together. 1bird graders tended to rebearse single 
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items (rote repetition). The older subjects, however, put more items together in each 
rehearsal set. Ornstein et al. (1975) argued that older subjects' active rehearsal 
accounted for both their greater recall and the primacy effect that was obtained in 
their data. 
Naus, Ornstein, and Aivano (1977) provided clear evidence that the difference in 
rehearsal betwee third graä'ers and older childreiUeflected a roduction deficiency 
b~ t e xoun~r children. en they trained third graders to use three-item re earsal 
sets, third graders displayed the primacy effect typical of older children. In addition, 
their recall was approximately at the Ievel of grade-6 children (also Ornstein, Naus, 
& Stone, 1977). A more thorough analysis of the third-grade rehearsal revealed 
more rigidity in the younger subjects than in older children, however, with younger 
children tending to form a single three-item set following each item and repeating 
it until the next item was presented. Older children tended to vary their three-item 
sets more. 
When all of the relevant data are considered, it seems that the essential difference 
between the memorization processes of younger compared to older children are 
qualitative rather than quantitative. Passive one-word memorization strategies are 
replaced by cumulative rehearsal strategies, with the nurober of different items in a 
rehearsal set eventually reaching three or four (Ornstein & Naus, 1978). These 
cross-sectional results were recently complemented by longitudinal analyses. In 
Kunzinger (1985) an overt rehearsal task was presented to 7-year-olds who were 
retested two years later. There was an increase in the rehearsal set size with develop-
ment (from 1. 7 to 2.6 items). Rehearsal frequency never correlated with recall . The 
size of the rehearsal set correlated only at the second measurement point. An espe-
cially interesting fmding was the high stability in performance. Children who had 
larger rehearsal sets at the initial measurement also had larger sets at test point 2. 
Guttentag, Ornstein, and Siemens (1987) observed comparable longitudinal stabil-
ity between 8lh and 9lh years of age. 
All of the relevant data suggest that developmental increases in active, curnulative 
rehearsal play a crucial role in the explanation of age differences in free and serial 
recall tasks. The question remains, however, about the degree that cumulative 
rehearsal facilitates encoding of information versus retrieval of it. Perhaps only 
active rehearsal transfers information from short-term memory into long-term 
memory. Alternatively, perhaps both forms of rehearsal permit transfer of informa-
tion to long-term memory, but that active rehearsal makes it easier to retrieve the 
information later. An experiment that would test these two possibilities would com-
pare the effects of various types of rehearsal under testing conditions that differ with 
respect to retrieval demands. 
Comparison of recognition versus recall testing provides such an opportunity. 
Recognition tests reduce retrieval demands considerably, but provide information 
about what is available in long-term memory. If developmental differences occur on 
recall tests, but there are none on recognition tests, it can be assumed that the 
material was encoded into long-term memory at all age Ievels, but that younger 
children experience retrieval difficulties tbat are somehow linked to their failure to 
use curnulative rehearsal. If, bowever, there arealso developmental differences in 
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recognition, this could be taken as evidence that different repetition strategies 
produce different encodings- that is, the amount and quality of information in long-
- term memory depends on the strategy used to code the material. 
Naus, Ornstein, and Kreshtool (1977) conducted an experiment along these lines. 
Third and sixth graders learned a word Iist and then took either a recognition or a 
recall test. Consistent with other developmental data, there were significant 
developmental differences in recall, especially due to developmental differences in 
recall of items at the beginning of the word lists. No age differences were found in 
the recognition data, however. Both active and passive rehearsal seemed to produce 
transfer of information from short- to long-term memory. 
There probably are different types of representations in long-term memory fol-
lowing passive versus active rehearsal, however. Naus et al. (1977) discussed the 
possibility that the overt cumulative rehearsal strategies build inter-item associa-
tions that make it easier to retrieve them during recall. Compatible with this 
assumption, the effects produced by active rehearsal strategies are considerably 
reduced when to-be-learned material is presented in a blocked fashion (e.g., by 
category). Presumably, salient list structure produces inter-item associations auto-
matically (Omstein et al., 1975; Omstein, 1977). An additional mechanism that 
may account for the retrieval benefits produced by cumulative rehearsal is the self-
testing that is part of cumulative rehearsal. Thus, cumulative rehearsers have prac-
tice with recall more than passive rehearsers before the actual recall test takes place 
(Naus & Omstein, 1983; Omstein & Naus, 1978). 
Possible Explanations of Young Children's Fallures 
to Use Rehearsal Strategies 
Studies of the content of older children's rehearsal sets reveals that better retention 
occurs when items are produced in groups that include both recently encountered 
items and items from earlier Iist positions (Cuvo, 1974, 1975)-that is, when 
rehearsal is cumulative. An interesting observation by Cuvo (1974) was that older 
school children and college students were more likely to include items that they 
liked in cumulative rehearsal sets. They focused on these items and that seemed to 
result in them being rehearsed more. Thus, one possible explanation of cumulative 
rehearsal isthat motivation plays a role. 
Kunzinger and Witryol (1984) believed that motivational stimulation of items 
would also affect younger children who normally prefer passive rehearsal strategies. 
They believed that the younger children might be motivated to pay more attention 
to the items that they were interested in. Motivation was manipulated by assigning 
a monetary value to items on the list, with some worth 1 C and others worth lOC. The 
second graders in the study were told that they would receive the amount of money 
associated with the items that were recalled later. In the control group, 5C was 
associated with each item. There were important differences in recall between the 
experimental and control conditions. The size of the rehearsal sets was doubled in 
the experimental condition to an average of more than two highly valued items. 
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There was also a clear primacy effect in the experimental condition. The differential 
motivation condition thus produced effects that are compatible with those of direct 
training procedures (Ornstein, Naus, & Stone, 1977). 
A second hypothesis is that specific prior knowledge can activate memory strate-
gies (Bjorklund, 1985, 1987; Chi, 1978, 1985b; Naus & Ornstein, 1983; Ornstein 
& Naus, 1985). Older children's cumulative rehearsal may be tied to the develop-
ment of semantic memory, with older children having more concepts and intercon-
ceptual associations to trigger use of strategies. Tarlcin, Myers, and Ornstein 
(reported in Ornstein & Naus, 1985) tested this hypothesis directly, examining the 
influence of the knowledge base on the rehearsal activities of young children. Eight-
year-olds were presented word lists that varied in their meaningfulness and familiar-
ity to children (even the least meaningful words, however, were known by all chil-
dren) . The chlldren displayed age-typical rehearsal (i.e., less than two items per 
rehearsal set) for nonrneaningful items. In contrast, the learning sets for meaningful 
items contained more than three items. Memorization behavior with meaningful 
materials was comparable to the behavior of 11- to 12-year-olds with normal word 
lists (Ornstein & Naus, 1985). Highly meaningful stimulus materials make rehearsal 
processes and retrieval easier in that the learner profits from associations between 
the individual items that are activated automatically. Ornstein and Naus (1985) also 
demonstrated in a second example (the comparison of adult foothall experts and 
novices) that especially meaningful material increases the size of rehearsal sets. The 
familiarity of material seems tobe an important determinant of use of more efficient 
and effective rehearsal procedures. 
Guttentag (1984, 1985) proposed that young chlldren do not employ cumulative 
rehearsal strategies spontaneously because the mental effort required to do so strains 
their functional capacity. Guttentag studied thls hypothesis with a dual-task pro-
cedure. In addition to rehearsing to-be-recalled items overtly, subjects simultane-
ously performed key tapping. The subjects were informed that rehearsing was the 
more important task, although they should try to do both at once. Mental effort was 
operationalized as the interference on key tapping produced by cumulative rehear-
sal. Interference was measured as the difference between normal tapping during a 
baseline period when sirnultaneous rehearsal was not required and tapping 
during rehearsal. 
In Guttentag's first experiment, second, thlrd , and sixth graders were instructed 
to employ the overt cumulative rehearsal strategy and to perform the motor task 
sirnultaneously. Even the youngest subjects were able to do this with no age differ-
ences in performance. There were, however, significant differences in the degree of 
interference experienced. Motoric performance was clearly disrupted more when 
younger children rehearsed compared to when older children did so. There were no 
age differences in interference when children were instructed to rehearse passively, 
however (experirnent 2). Basedonthese data , Guttentag (1984, 1985) argued that 
age differences in spontaneous use of cumulative rehearsal strategies may in part be 
due to the enormous effort required of young children in order to employ complex 
strategies. See Bjorklund and Harnishfeger (1987) for a sirnilar finding concerning 
the role of mental effort in the use of categorization strategies. 
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A study conducted by Ornstein, Medlin, Stone, aod Naus (1985) is interesting 
because it not only confirms the interference detected by Guttentag, but also pro-
vides a more exact analysis of the components of cumulative rehearsal that pose 
special difficulties for younger grade-school children (i.e., those that cause the 
mental effort). Omstein et al. (1985) demonstrated that the efficiency of cumulative 
rehearsal improved considerably when second graders were provided additional 
visual cues as they rehearsed, that is, when previously presented items continued to 
be visible (thus, reducing the pressure on working memory to hold previously 
presented material in consciousness). lt was clear in this study that cumulative 
rehearsal was easier for second graders given the visual cues; with the visual cues, 
they cumulatively rehearsed almost five items per set in response to the cumulative 
rehearsal instruction compared to about three items per set given the cumulative 
rehearsal instruction without pictorial support. Guttentag et al. (1987) used a 
similar manipulation and produced complementary data with children in grades 
3, 4, and 6. 
In summary, rehearsal is an "ill-defmed group of memory strategies" (Brown, 
Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; Flavell, 1985, p. 218). Thus, 5- and 6-year-
olds often respond with single verbal Labels in response to each item on a serial 
Iist. Slightly older children repeat the Iabels several times while an item is in view. 
The majority of 10-year-olds use cumulative rehearsal to leam seriallists. Although 
not considered in this section, more complex rehearsal tactjcs are eyi<ienced b'z: 
even older subjects. For in§tance, maoy uojyersjty-age snbjects nse cumulative 
rehearsal for early_list ite111s_fullowed.hy a fast-finish roach ta final Iist items 
(e.g., Barciay,l979). 
Our understanding of rehearsal strategies was made possible by use of observa-
tional methods, especially when overt rehearsal was required of subjects. These 
analyses revealed that quantitative increases in rehearsal played little roJe in explain-
iog recall data. In contrast, use of cumulative rehearsal has strikingly positive effects 
on recall. 
Instructional experiments made clear than even children in grade 1 can carry out 
cumulative rehearsal strategies when taught to do so, even though very few first-
grade children use cumulative rehearsal spontaneously. Procedures and materials 
can sometimes be modified, however, so that children who are normally production 
deficient with respect to cumulative rehearsal will employ more active rehearsal 
strategies. This occurs when there is high motivation for learning and when particu-
larly meaningful or familiar material is employed. An important difficulty for 
younger children seems to be the mental effort required to carry out cumulative 
rehearsal. This is probably due to inefficient use of strategy components, such as 
maintaining previously presented items in short-term memory so that they can be 
included in rehearsal sets. 
Development of Another Encoding Strategy: Organization 
Bousfield's (1953) work on subjective organization during learning was pioneering 
work on subject-controlled memorizing activities (Murphy, 1979; Murphy & Puff, 
52 W. Schneiderand M. Pressley 
1982; Pellegrino & Hubert, 1982). Bousfield's methods permitted many inferences 
about processes that mediate learning and recall. In general, subjects were presented 
a Iist of words or pictures in a random order in preparation for free recall. Organiza-
tion of the materials at output were presumed to reflect processes that occurred 
during study. For example, if a word could be categorized according to semantic 
categories and recall was organized following these categories, it would be inferred 
that the learner engaged in intervening organizational processes. In many cases, 
however, subjects were presented lists that did not contain items that went together 
in any concensually meaningful way. Nonetheless, when subjects attempt to reca I 
such lists several times, it is often the case that there is trial-to-trial regularities in 
recall (i.e., subjective organization). 
Development of organizational strategies was studied with picture and word 
lists, usually ones containing items that could be categorized. The items were often 
selected using age-appropriate norms (e.g., Posnansky, 1978b; Bjorklund, Thomp-
son, & Ornstein, 1983) with common items from farniliar categories (e.g., animals, 
furniture, professions). Depending on the age ofthe subjects, three to 12 categories 
were used, each containing three to five items (Murphy & Puff, 1982). Subjective 
organization was most often measured in developmental studies using the adjusted 
ratio dustering (ARC) measure (Roenker, Thompson, & Brown, 1971) and the 
ratio of repetition measure (Bousfield & Bousfield, 1966). For both of these 
measures, values dose to 1 represent almost perfect organization and 0 indicate 
random responding. 
Bousfield, Esterson, and Whitmarsh's (1958) study on conceptual and perceptual 
dustering stimu1ated a flood of developmental work assessing factors that affect 
organization. Many ofthe early developmental studies on semantic grouping during 
free recall reported s_reater outputdustering with increasing age. The inference was 
that older children organized input more in preparation for recall (e.g., Cole, 
Franke!, & Sharp, 1971; Moely et al., 1969; Neirnark, Slotnick, & Ulrich, 1971). 
A frequently cited result is Moely et al.'s (1969) fmding that only the 10- t~ 11-year-
old children in that study organized at a Ievel that was significantly greater than 
chance (index of organization = .6). This finding suggested that organizational 
strategies develop somewhat later than the passive rehearsal strategies reviewed in 
the last section, and probably even a little later than cumulative rehearsal. This 
makes sense since the discovery or creation of semantic relations between items 
seems like a more complex and demanding process than rehearsal. 
On the other band, even young children's recall contains a Iot of organization 
when lists containing highly associated items are learned (Myers & Perlmutter, 
1978; Rossi & Wittrock, 1971; Sodian et al., 1986). For example, Haynes and 
Kulhavy (1976, experirnent 1) varied whether subjects studied a list composed of 
highly associated items or items that were not associated. There were dear age 
trends in recall and dustering with the low association lists. In contrast, there was 
a great deal of dustering at all age Ievels for lists composed of highly associated 
items. There are now many demonstrations that the degree of output organization 
systematically covaries with association and typicalness values of the item lists 
(Bjorklund, 1985; Corsale, 1981; Franke! & Rollins, 1985; Hasselhorn, 1986; 
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Schneider, 1986). Lange (1973, 1978) argued, based on this type of result, that the 
output duster values are less an indicator of conscious strategic operations than the 
inter-item associations in the to-be-leamed materials. A high degree of output 
organization for highly associated items probab1y occurs because recall of any par-
ticular item more or less automatically triggers recall of closely associated words. 
No consciously controlled strategic processes are necessary for this mechanism to 
work. Associative effects can occur at both encoding and retrieval: 
The subject is "struck" by the organization he perceives, and he encodes and stores organiza-
tional units as a direct and automatic function of their perceived structure. Assuming the 
validity oftbis analysis, it is reasonable to pointfurther than the recall organization we some-
times see in preschool and elementarY school children . . . [organization] occurs through a 
series of involuntary actions that can operate at both the perceptual-encoding and retrieval 
phases of processes (Lange, 1978, p. 107). 
A recent study by Schneider (1986) summarizes weil the development of chil-
dren's use of organizational strategies. Second- and fourth-grade children were given 
a recall task, witb categorizable pictures serving as the stimulus materials. Tbe 
pictures were movable (and tbus, could be sorted into piles). Subjects were pennit-
ted to do anything tbat they wanted to leam these items. Four different types of lists 
were used in the study. e list ntained items that were highly related to tbe 
category (Battig & Montague, 1969), with high interassociations (Marshall & 
Cofer, 1970; Palermo, Flamer, & Jenkins, 1964) between some ofthe items on the 
list (hereafter the High Related-High Associated list) . Thus the animals on this list 
included dog, cat, mouse, horse, cow, and pig. The ~as composed of 
items highly related to the category, but with low inter=terilissociations (High 
Related-Low Associated). The animals on this list induded tiger, elephant, cow, 
pig, bear, and dog. Tb~ was composed of items that were weakly related to 
the category, although there were some high inter-item associations (Low Related-
High Associated). Animals on tbat list were goat, deer, buffalo, hippopotamus, 
monkey, and lamb. The ~ Itelated-Löw ASsoCJafM ü8t1nduded the animals 
beaver, rat, alligator, camel, squirrel, and giraffe. 
In general, the fourth graders in the study employed much more categorical sort-
ing during study than did the second graders. Not surprisingly, the fourth graders 
also dustered more at recall and recalled more than the second graders. In addition, 
there was a main effect on dustering for inter-item associativity at recall, with 
highly associated lists producing more dustering. Most importantly, there was a 
striking age by list associativity interaction in the dustering data, such that low 
associativity especially penalized younger compared to older subjects. In fact, the 
dustering ofhigh and low assoc1 ted lists was approximately equal for the older sub-
jects in the study. Although the main effect for associativity and the age by 
associativity interaction were not significant in the recall data, there were strong 
trends in the recall data mirroring the dustering data. In general, there were signifi-
cant correlations between dustering at study, dustering at recall , and recall. 
Wbat emerges from Schneider's study is a portrait of second graders who use 
organizational strategies much less than fourth graders. On the other band, younger 
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children's use of the dustering strategy can be evoked when the categories contain 
highly associated items. 
Effects of Input Organization 
A typical procedure in early studies of organization was to present children with 
lists composed of items from a few categories with the items in random order. In 
general, there was little evidence in these experiments that 6- to 8-year-olds used 
available categories to reorganize to-be-leamed lists (e.g., Moely et al., 1969; 
Neimark et al., 1971). 
These failures were followed by studies in which children were prompted to make 
use of potential organizational features through directions to sort to-be-leamed 
materials into meaningful groups. In general, when children were asked to sort a list 
several times, the items were sorted into stable groups after a few trials-that is, 
sorting became consistent from trial to trial, with these sorts generally (although not 
perfectly) consistent with the categorical structures of the lists (Lange & Griffith, 
1977; Lange & Jackson, 1974; Worden, 1975). A main hypothesis in these studies 
was that these subject-determined sorts would positively affect recall of material. 
Prompted sorting during study did in fact produce high dustering at output and 
improved recall (e.g., Lange & Griffith, 1977). In short, instructions to young 
grade-school children to sort during study seemed to overcome a production defi-
ciency with respect to use of organizational information in lists (see also Black & 
Rollins, 1982; Franke), Hagan, & Rollins, 1984; Moely et al., 1969; Schneider, 
1985b; Schneider, Borkowski, Kurtz, & Kerwin, 1986). 
Lange (1978) proposed two possible explanations for young children's failures to 
organize their free recall when left to their own devices to leam potentially 
categorizable lists. One possibility was inputfailure, or the failure to group stimulus 
materials dearly and stabily during encoding. The other involved failures during the 
retrieval phase to make use of groupings that were constructed at encoding. Lange's 
own work (Lange & Griffith, 1977) favored the former interpretation, since he 
obtained strong covariation between children's input organization and their recall. 
The two alternative explanations proposed by Lange could be evaluated most 
unambiguously by considering actual sorting behaviors generated during study and 
the relationships between organization of sorts during study and organization of 
recall. Neimark, Ulrich, and Slotnick (1971) observed very early that young grade-
school children often failed to sort dassifiable materials according to semantic 
categories and that there was often poor concordance between the spontaneaus 
organization of young grade-school children's sorting during study and the organiza-
tion of their subsequent recall. Unfortunately, the analyses in this early work do 
not permit detailed description of the relationship between sorting and recall 
organizations. 
Later research was more analytical. Consider Kee and Bell's (1981) study that 
included subjects from grades 2 and 6 as well as university students. They measured 
the ARC duster values for both encoding and recall. The oldest subjects in the study 
had high ARC duster scores at both input and output. In contrast, the grade-2 and 
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grade-6 subjects had low ARC scores during input, but higher ones at output (a fmd-
ing generally consistent with the results reported by Neimark et al ., 1971). Kee and 
Bell's (1981) study also included an instructional component. When the child sub-
jects were instructed to sort into experimenter-specified categories during encoding, 
their ARC scores at encoding and output were high. Instructions to use categories 
at testing had a much less pronounced effect on organization than did the study 
instruction. The study instruction generally improved the children's recall perfor-
mance, especially at the grade-2 level. Kee and Bell (1981) concluded that varia-
tions in organizational behaviors during encoding and not during testing produced 
differences in memory performance in the sort-recall task. Kee and Bell's (1981) 
conclusion has been supported in more recent studies that used multiple regression 
procedures to estimate effects of organization at input and organization at output on 
memory performances in children ofvarious ages (Black & Rollins, 1982; Weinert, 
Knopf, and Körkel , 1983; Schneider, 1985b, 1986; Schneideret al . , 1986). 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on lists that were organizable along taxo-
nornic lines. There are other potential dimensions to organize input, however. In 
addition, there have been proposals over the years that although use of taxonornic 
criteria rnight be a classification criterion that would be used by older children and 
adults, younger subjects might prefer to group items using other standards. The next 
subsection takes up this hypothesis in some detail. 
Developmental Changes in Classification Styles 
The assumption that memory processes in young children are deterrnined by the 
available knowledge base goes back to Piaget (1970; Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). In its 
moststringent form, Piaget argued that preschool children could not profit from the 
provision of taxonornical organization since categorical knowledge is not available 
during the preoperational stage. A more lenient version of this hypothesis is that 
younger children have organizational preferences, such that perceptual or functional 
stimulus dimensions are more likely to be noticed by preschoolers, and thus, can be 
used more meaningfully than taxonornic attributes (Markman & Callanan, 1984; 
Worden, 1976). A more specific hypothesis that follows from'this general position 
is that preschoolers and kindergarten children should tend to categorize objects or 
pictures by color or functional attributes (e.g. , hammer with nails) rather than 
regarding taxonornic relationships. 
There is experimental evidence relevant to both the strict and more lenient ver-
sions of the "developmental shift" hypothesis. lt was apparent from Melkman et al ., 
(1981) and Perlmutter and Ricks (1979) that 3- and 4-year-olds considered percep-
tual as well as conceptual stimulus dimensions during sorting (see also Kobasigawa 
& Middleton, 1972; Moely, 1977). Categories seem to figure more prominently in 
children's sorting, however, when tbey know that tbey are sorting in preparation for 
a memory task (Sodian et al., 1986). In addition, categorical prompting at recall is 
more efficient than color prompting even for very young children (Melkman et al., 
1981 ; Sodian et al., 1986). Data generated in sorting tasks certainly do not seem 
consistent with the stringent version of the knowledge hypothesis. 
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lnvestigatiQns of the "syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift" (i.e., children prefer to 
group objects on the basis of functional relatedness before they organize using taxo-
nomic criteria) arerelevant to the lenient version ofthe hypothesis. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, Denney and Ziobrowski ( 1972) reported that frrst graders preferred 
to organize sorts using functional attributes (e.g., grouping knife and cake together 
because a knife can cut a cake) in contrast to categorical dimensions (sorting knife 
with other instruments and cake with other foods) used by adults. Worden (1976) 
compared sorting and recall by second and fifth graders. She included a condition 
in which children were permitted to sort any way that they wished, as weil as condi-
tions in which sorting was taxonomically constrained and functionally constrained. 
Worden believed that there would be a qualitative shift between second and ftfth 
grade from preference for functional to taxonomical organization. Her results, 
however, were not consistent with this position. At both age Ievels, subjects who 
sorted following their own preferences recalled more material than subjects who 
sorted into experimenter-determined categories. At both age Ievels, spontaneous 
sorts reflected preference for functional (thematic) grouping compared to taxo-
nomic organization. Siaw (1984) provided data consistent with Worden (1976), in 
that bis subjects did not benefit from instructions to sort into categories. None-
theless, Siaw did not observe much use of thematic sorting at either the 7- or 
10-year-old Ievels in bis study, with use of taxonomic organization in free sorts 
increasing with age. Other results are also antagonistic to the syntagmatic-
paradigmatic shift hypothesis (Bjorklund, 1976; Cox & Paris, 1976; Lange & Jack-
son, 1974). For exarnple, Bjorklund (1976) was able to show in a series of experi-
ments that kindergarten, third-grade, and sixth-grade children could identify more 
taxonomic than thematic categories prior to recall. In short, although there are 
some differences between sturlies in the conclusion that is reached about children's 
preference (i.e., thematic versus taxonomic, with most of the data favoring taxo-
nomic), there is little evidence within these experirnents for a developmental shift 
from thematic to taxonomic. 
An alternative hypothesis to explain apparent developmental differences in organ-
ization is that young children do organize, but do so using categories that are consis-
tent with their knowledge of the world rather than the taxonomic knowledge of 
adults. Rosch (1973, 1975; Mervis & Rosch, 1981) provided data supporting the 
hypothesis that semantic categories in younger children are at frrst represented by 
prototypical examples. Given that the typicallist in sort-recall experiments is com-
posed of both prototypic and nonprototypic exemplars, there is the possibility that 
young children's failure to use categorization may be tied to their Iack of knowledge 
of noncentral category members. 
This type of thinking stimulated research on recall in which children's knowledge 
of category members was examined as a possible determinant of categorization 
strategy use. Chechile and Riebman (1982) and Richman, Nida, and Pitman (1976) 
found, for exarnple, that the usual age differences in recall of categorizable lists 
could be reduced by constructing lists that were equally meaningful to the various 
ages of children, with meaningfulness of items determined through use of age-
specific norms rather than adult meaningfulness norms. In fact, when lists are com-
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posed of material that is more meaningful to children than adults, it is possible to 
reverse the usual age-recall relationship. For instance, Lindberg (1980) reported 
that the third graders in bis sample remernbered significantly more items than col-
lege students and bad higher duster values when the items were extremely salient 
and meaningful for the younger subjects compared to the older ones. This result is 
similar to Chi's (1978) observation that child chess experts remember meaningful 
chess positions better than do adult chess novices. In addition to Haynes and 
Kulhavy's (1976) study that was taken up earlier, Bjorklund and Thompson (1983) 
dernonstrated that the ease with which categorical relations could be identified 
directly influenced recall organization and Ievel in first, third, and sixth graders. 
Nonetheless, because retrieval cues were provided by both Haynes and Kulhavy 
(1976) and Bjorklund and Thompson (1983), it was difficult to conclude based on 
their data that meaningfulness necessarily affected children's encoding (i.e., most of 
the effect could have been due to the influence of retrieval cue). Rabinowitz (1984) 
taclded this problern through the addition of a "cue neutral" experimental condition. 
Groups of second and fifth graders were better able to organize and recall more 
prototypic than category-nontypic items when no retrieval cues were present. 
The influence of meaningfulness of organization on recall seemed to be dear in 
this study. 
The roJe of associative and categorical processes on children's memory perfor-
' mance have been analyzed especially carefully by David Bjorklund and bis associ-
ates (Bjorklund, 1985, 1987; Bjorklund & de Marchena, 1984; Bjorklund & Jacobs, 
1985; Bjorklund & Thompson, 1983; Bjorklund et al., 1983). Their basic hypothe-
sis was that there was a developmental shift in list learning during the grade-school 
years that was mediated by changes in the knowledge base. This shift is from use of 
salient associative relationships du ring encoding to the use of taxonomic categories, 
a shift mediated by changes in the organization of children's semantic memory 
rather than increased use of conscious organizational strategies. A variety of evi-
dence supports this hypothesis. In a study of the sort-recall task, Bjorklund and de 
Marchena (1984) reported that younger children (first graders) relied primarily on 
associative grouping principles to organize their sorting and continued to use this 
strategy even when the list structure permitted several ways to exploit category cues. 
In contrast, fourth and sixth graders used taxonomic information alone. Bjorklund 
and de Marchena conduded that the greater-than-chance dustering values in the 
younger children's recall were not due to the processing of taxonomic-conceptual 
relationships, but rather were caused by the inter-item associativity ofthe material . 
Consistent with Lange's (1973, 1978) hypothesis, it seemed that associative-
organizational processes occur relatively automatically. 
Other studies provide additional support for Lange's position. Frankeland Rollins 
(1982) discovered, for example, that in recalling material that could be semantically 
categorized, young children produced categorizable material in pairs, with older 
subjects remembering Ionger "strings" per category. Frankel and Rollins argued that 
this pattem of performance indicated that youngec children's intemal organization of 
categorizable information is more associative than categorical. A more direct test 
of the associativity theory is possible when children leam lists that vary system-
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atically in their item prototypicality (high vs. Jow) and their inter-item associativi-
ties (high vs. Jow). Using such Iists, Franke! and Rollins (1985) were able to show 
clearly that high duster values occurred with leindergarten children only when both 
inter-item associativity and prototypicality was high. High dustering was found 
with older children regardless of Iist structure. Similar effects of inter-item 
associativity on orgänization of item sets were found by Schneider (1986) in Ger-
man second graders. 
Bjorklund and Jacobs (1985) constructed lists of categorizable items, some of 
which were highly associated with the category items and others of which were low 
category associations. Words that were recalled contiguously could be classified 
according to whether they (1) belonged to different categories (e.g., dog-apple) and 
(2) were highly associated (dog-cat) or poorly associated (dog-tiger) category mem-
bers. Subjects at all grade Ievels in the study (third, fifth, seventh, and ninth 
graders) bad lower latency for contiguous recall of highly associated items in a 
category than for contiguous recall oflow associated category members. There were 
significant age differences in contiguous recalllatencies of low associates. Only the 
two oldest groups of children were able to process these more quickly than words 
from different categories. These results are quite compatible with those obtained by 
Frankel and Rollins ( 1985) and Schneider (1986) and can be interpreted to mean that 
younger children benefit little from categorical information when inter-item associ-
ations between items are low. 
Most of the data reviewed in this subsection support the position that children's 
systematic application of categorical information in the recall of word lists clearly 
covaries with the familiarity of the stimulus material (especially Bjorklund & 
Thompson, 1983; Corsale, 1981; Hasselhorn, 1986; Rabinowitz, 1984; Schneider, 
1986). Rasselhorn (1986), who made use of latent variables path analysis (Loh-
möller, 1984), provided additional support for this conclusion. He examined rela-
tionships between the quality of prior knowledge, organizational behavior at recall, 
and memory performance. The quality of grade-4 children's prior knowledge 
directly influenced both the organization and level of recall. 
Are developmental improvements in recall of categorizable lists due only to 
changes in the child's knowledge base (see Chapter 4 for discussion of knowledge 
base effects), or do developmental increases in use of intentional organizational 
strategies account for at least sorne ofthe memory improvement? Bjorklund (1985) 
took a clear stand, favoring the position that most of the improvement in memory 
during the grade-school years at least is tied to changes in the child's knowledge 
base: 
I dispute this position [strategy development hypothesis], arguing instead that most ofthe age 
changes in the organization of children's recall are not strategic, but rather can be attributed 
to developmental changes in the structure and content of children's conceptual representa-
tion. Organization in memory does become Strategie, I believe, sometime during adoles-
cence, resulting in a qualitatively different type of memory functioning. However, I argue 
that the regular improvements observed in memory organization over the course of the 
preschool and elementary school years can most parsirnoniously be attributed to developmen-
tal differences in the structure of semantic memory and the ease with which certain types of 
semantic relationships can be activated (p. 103). 
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One of Bjorklund's (1985) main assumptions was that with increasing age, the 
inter-item relationships in semantic memory become more elaborate and could be 
activated relatively automatically. He presumed, based on Case et al., (1982), that 
with development the functional mental space becomes larger, in part because of 
increasingly automatic access of relevant knowledge. With increases in efficiency of 
knowledge access, and hence increases in functional capacity, older children can 
deal with to-be-leamed material at a more abstract Ievel (i.e., taxonomically). Even-
tually, access to higber order categorical information also become very automatic. 
At that point (sometime in adolescence), there is excess capacity that could be used 
in the service of strategies. 
Every aspect of Bjorklund's ( 1985) position was extreme ( cf., Rabinowitz, 1984). 
Developmental increases during childhood in use of categorical relations were inter-
preted solely as a function of the knowledge base. Semantic relationships that could 
mediate the leaming of children were activiated unconsciously. No hint of intention-
ality was apparent until adolescence. Bjorklund contended that conscious strategies, 
when they eventually did occur, were in fact stimulated by the knowledge base. He 
argued that at some point subjects will notice the duster structure of tbeir outpul and 
in turn recognize the gains associated with dustering. Tbis would stimulate tbe 13-
to 15-year-old cbildren to use dustering in the future. 
Many of Bjorklund's ( 1985) dairns were speculative, although there are data that 
support bis portrait of memory development in part. For example, at least for free 
recall and sort-recall tasks, there is evidence that automatic, associative use of 
semantic relationships occurs (Lange, 1973, 1978). Nonetheless, this does not 
imply that intentional Strategie behavior does not occur, a point raised by many 
' critics (Hasselhom, 1986; Omstein & Naus, 1985; Omstein et al., in press; 
Schneider, 1986; Zembar & Naus, 1985a). In fact, there was plenty of reason to 
doubt tbe condusion that conscious use of organizational strategies does not occur 
until adolescence. 
Studies that examined organization at input rather tban at outpul (Bjorklund's 
focus) produced data suggesting more use of strategies than Bjork.lund's (1985) 
framework permitted (Omstein et al., in press; Schneider, 1986). Investigators 
studying input assumed that intentional memorization processes during encoding 
could be presumed when spontaneous sortings by categories or other efficient leam-
ing processes were observed at study. Thus, Schneider ( 1986) recorded sorting and 
other memorization activities used by second and fourth graders. One of the most 
interesting aspects ofthe data was that the children who used sorting behaviors were 
also the ones who engaged in otber strategic activities like rehearsal and self-testing. 
One possible condusion suggested by this outcome was that the children who sorted 
realized that sorting would positively affect memory. This hypothesiswas evaluated 
by Schneider ( 1986) by examining children's metacognition about strategies. lf sort-
ing behaviors at study are only a side effect of an increasingly elaborate knowledge 
base, then knowledge of taxonomic sorting as a strategy should show no substantial 
relationship to sorting during study. On the other band, correlation between 
strategy metamemory and sorting would be expected if cbildren were engaging in 
intentional sorting in the service of a memory goal . Althougb there does not seem 
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to be a correlation between strategy metamemory and sorting with 7- to 8-year-old 
children (Schneider, 1985b, 1986; Weinert et al., 1984), there are consistently 
significant correlations (averaging between .3 and .4) among third and fourth 
graders (Andreassen & Waters, 1984; Hasselhorn, 1986; Schneider, 1985b, 1986). 
This pattem of correlations is consistent with the hypothesis that intentional use of 
organizational strategies as mediators of sort-recall tasks develops during the grade-
school years. 
An additional important point that became obvious in Schneider's investigations 
was that it is very difficult to conclude a Iack of strategy knowledge by a subject 
simply because the child fails to evidence sorting during study. Consider the study 
behaviors and comments of a second grader (Schneider, 1986), a subject who made 
no obvious attempt to sort a Iist of low prototypic and low associated items: 
They're all animals, clothes, fumiture, and things to drive. Probably it helps if I put the 
animals and other things together that belong together. But these here? I don't k:now. Maybe 
it's just as good if I try to remernher where each picture was located? 
This child clearly knew more about Strategie use of categorization than indicated by 
input or output organization. What this case suggests isthat effective use of categori-
zation as a strategy depends on a well-developed knowledge base that includes 
remote associations and nonprototypic category members. 
It seems not tobe very sensible to conclude that memory development boils down 
either to development of semantic knowledge or development of intentionally 
deployed strategies. The Iiterature reviewed here suggests that realistic models of 
memory development during preschool and the grade-school years should consider 
both the nonstrategic knowledge base and use of memory strategies (Ornstein & 
Naus, 1985; Omstein et al., in press; Rabinowitz & Chi, 1987; Zembar & Naus, 
1985a, 1985b). In particular, tbere is a Iot of evidence consistent with the develop-
mental portrait of memory development suggested by Ornstein and Naus (1985). 
They argued that younger children's attempts at sort-recall tasks are Stimulus driven 
in that strong associative inter-item relations automatically induce some semantic 
encoding. Ornstein et al. (in press) assume further that during grade school, children 
experience enough memory tasks to discover Strategie information, like the utility 
of exploiting categorical and associative relations between items. These Obser-
vations fuel attempts to organize to-be-leamed materials even when inter-item 
associations arenot salient (Best & Omstein, 1986). Efficient use of organization 
depends on the elaborateness of tbe available knowledge base. Thus, Omstein and 
his associates emphasize the relevance of intentional and automatic factors on 
memory performance. 
We note in closing this subsection that even Bjorklund is now accepting that both 
intentional and automatic factors are important in memory development (Bjorklund 
& Muir, 1988). lt is notable that this most recent paper by Bjorklund cites prorni-
nently many of the studies of strategy development that are included here, including 
those that suggest that strategy use occurs even in very young children. Bjorklund 
and Muir develop in detail potential theoretical relationships between strategies and 
the knowledge base. Although first attempts have been made at elucidating such 
knowledge by strategy interactions (e.g., Zembar & Naus, 1985a, 1985b), much 
3. Development of Encoding and Retrieval Strategies 61 
more researeh is needed on this prob lern. For instance, there have been few eompar-
isons of normal and learning-djsabled ehildren. The work that has been done (Ceci, 
1983, 1984; Ceei & Howe, 1982) has Iead to better understanding of the nature of 
defieits in learning-disabled ehildren in terrns of their use of automatie and inten-
tional processes. We suspect that Bjorklund and Muir's ehapter wiU be an important 
souree of hypotheses for future work relating automatie to intentional processes. 
Summary 
In general, the development of organizational strategies resembles the development 
of rehearsal strategies, although rehearsal is an earlier acquisition- pr uetion defi-
ciencies are obtained during sort-recall tasks with low prototypical and low asso-
cialed . materials well after eumulative rehearsal skills are used consistently and 
profitably. 
One methodological eonclusion is especially striking. The use of outpul organiza-
tion as a sole indieator of strategie behavior is generally rnisleading. Output organi-
zation reflects more eharaeteristies of the to-be-leamed materials than intentional 
strategie processes. The merit of the work done by David Bjorklund and Franke] and 
Rollins (1985) is that they demonstrated that ma erial arameters like ea~gory 
prototypieality or inter=item-assoeiativity ean play a_role in determining recall. 
These vanab es greatly influenee both input and output organization. Sometimes 
the organization of input is so striking that even very young ehildren use strategies 
like sorting at input. This is not intentional study behavior. 
Deterrnining whether input behaviors are intentional requires additional assess-
ments that can be related to the memorizing behaviors. In addition to observing 
whether sorting occurs, use of other strategies should also be assessed and the sub-
jeets should be questioned about their knowledge of sorting as a strategy and its 
effects on memory. f sorting is one o seve strategies that a child is attempting to 
use, and if the ehild reports that sorting does increase recall, and if the ehild states 
that sorting is being used to prepare for the test, it seems fair to eonclude that sorting 
is being used intentionally (along with other strategies) in the serviee of memory. 
We believe that the evidenee eonsidered as a whole suggests that both the 
increased knowledge base and the gradual development of flexible and intentionally 
used organizational strategies contribute to developmental improvements in leam-
ing of categorizable lists. Categorization strategies are extremely interesting 
because they depend on a well-developed knowledge base for their effieient execu-
tion (i.e., one eannot eategorize if one does not have knowledge of the relevant 
categories). lnteraetions between strategy use and the knowledge basewill be eonsi-
dered further in Chapters 4 and 6. 
Development of Retrieval Strategies 
Although rehearsal and organization have been deseribed as eneoding strategies, 
their effects become apparent during retrieval (Flavell, 1985; Kail, 1984). Some-
times ehildren fail to recall all that they have eneoded, however. On those oceasions, 
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it is sometimes possible to increase the probability of recall through strategic efforts 
at the time of testing, through the use of retrieval procedures. 
Some anecdotal evidence from Schneider (1986) makes clear the irnportance of 
retrieval strategies for recall. Two fourth graders attracted some attention during the 
sort-recall task described earlier because both of them very purposely sorted the 24 
to-be-learned pictures into the four categories represented on the Iist. These two 
subjects were not similar at all, however, in how they wentabout trying to recall the 
items on the test. One seemed to generate test answers in a random order, an obser-
vation supported by very low dustering in the recall data. This child's memory per-
formance was slightly below average for grade-4 subjects. In contrast, the 
commentary made by the other child implicated a more sophisticated retrieval 
strategy. He first recalled the four category names and thought about how six iterns 
had to be remernbered for each one. He began recall with one category and shifted 
categories only after all six items were recalled. Hismemorytest performancewas 
perfect. Since the subjects did not differ in intelligence or memory span or in any 
other obvious way, it seems likely that the difference in their memory performances 
was due to their use of different approaches to retrieval. 
In this section we consider in detail whether there are age differences in the use 
of retrieval strategies, and if so, whether development of retrieval skills irnproves 
memory performance. Kobasigawa (1977) analyzed in detail potential deficiencies 
in children's retrieval: (1) Children can fail to perceive that internal or external 
memory cues are potential memory aids; (2) they may Iack strategies for locating 
target information in memory; (3) they may not have enough experience with the 
problern to evaluate when the search process should be considered finished. 
There are many studies of the first potential deficiency cited by Kobasigawa, 
especially with respect to recognition and use of external memory aids. For 
instance, Kobasigawa (1974) presented lists of categorizable items to 6- to 11-year-
olds to learn for subsequent free recall. He also provided picture cards to the chil-
dren during learning and recall. Each picture represented one of the categories on 
the test (i.e., a picture of a zoo for zoo animals). Six-year-olds generally did not use 
these retrieval cues at testing, but 8- to 11-year-olds used the cues more systemati-
cally. Developmental improvements in recall were interpreted by Kobasigawa 
(1974, 1977) to mean that there was a developmental difference in efficient use of 
retrieval cues. 
Retrieval deficits in grade-school children are also evident with respect to use of 
internal cues in the form of category narnes. An early example was provided by 
Scribner and Cole (1972). Second, fourth, and sixth graders were presented 
categorizable words in a random order. As in Kobasigawa (1974), the subjects were 
aware of the category names during learning and recall. The subjects in the control 
condition were simply instructed to recall the items given the category cues. In con-
trast, subjects in the experimental condition had to recall all the items from one 
category before they were allowed to proceed to the next category (constrained 
recall). The constrained recall condition evoked exactly the sophisticated behavior 
used by the retrieval-talented fourth grader in the Schneider (1986) study (discussed 
earlier), and produced memory performance that was significantly better than 
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occurred in the cued recall condition. Moreover, this held at all age Ievels. None of 
the children transferred the constrained strategy, however, when given a transfer Iist 
consisting of to-be-leamed-and-recalJed items from new categories. Generally com-
parable results were reported by Lange (1973) whose procedure was similar except 
that he used pictures rather than verbal' materials and used the same categories for 
the transfer task. 
How should these results be interpreted? Methodological problems in these stu-
rlies preclude a definitive conclusion. First, including a free recall condition without 
retrieval cues would have improved both studies. Such a condition would have made 
it possible to estimate better the age-speciflc effect of cue presentation, particularly 
during the transfer phase. In addition, nothing was known about how subjects 
behaved during the encoding phase. Age-correlated differences could be due to the 
older subjects already having created better conditions for retrieval, that is, by 
organizing the leaming material into categories during the encoding phase. FinalJy, 
the to-be-remembered lists were presented several times in succession in these 
studies, with items presented in a random order on each trial. Such a design 
increases the probability of encoding variability (Waters & McAlaster, 1983; Waters 
& Waters, 1976, 1979), since subjects encounter each item in the encoding con-
text and then again in a subject-determined retrieval context (i.e., the item is 
retrieved with other items with the order of retrieved items often quite different 
than the order at encoding). Great encoding variability affects younger children 
more negatively than older children, so that these experiments may have provided 
poorer conditions for effective leaming by younger compared to older children. In' 
short, it is difficult to differentiate between the quality of encoding and retrieval 
processes in the experiments performed by Kobasigawa (1974), Lange (1973), and 
Scribner and Cole (1972), although all of the sturlies suggest retrieval deflciencies 
in young children. 
One solution to this problern is to minimize age-correlated differences in encoding 
strategies, for example, by having the items sorted exactly according to their taxo-
nomic groups du ring the learning phase. A number of sturlies (Ceci & Howe, 1978a; 
Ceci et al., 1980; Williams & Goulet, 1975; Worden, 1974) have used such a proce-
dure. The study by Ceci and Howe (1978a) is especially relevant. They employed to-
be-leamed lists that could be organized thematicalJy and taxonomicalJy and deter-
mined that their 4-, 7-, and 10-year-old subjects could organize the stimuli perfectly 
. in both modalities. A cued-recalJ test given immediately following sorting employed 
taxonomic cues for half of the subjects at each age Ievel and thematic cues for the 
remaining subjects. Free recall was measured one day later. Table 3.1 summarizes 
the main results. 
First of alJ, note that cued recall varied little as a function of developmentallevel, 
suggesting that about the same nurober of items was avaiJable in memory for each 
of the age groups. The free recall results were quite different. Older children spon-
taneously generated many of the taxonornic and thematic cues and used them to 
mediate free recall, but younger children did not do so. A "modal switching index" 
was calculated (also shown in Table 3.1) to index the degree to which subjects 
switched between taxonomic and thematic modalities during free recall. Although 
,. 
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TADLE 3 .1. Mean numbers of pictures cue recalled and free 
recalled along with the proportion of mode switching as a 
function of age.* 
Age Proportional amount of 
(yr) Cued recall Free recall modal switching 
4 20.15 12.25 .14 
7 21.20 16.75 .29 
10 21.79 18.50 .66 
•oata from Ceci & Howe, 1978a. 
the 1 0-year-olds made such a shift for 66% of all possible cases, younger children did 
less switching. Within each age Ievel there was a significant positive relationship 
between this index and the total number of items recalled. Additional analyses led 
Ceci and Howe (1978a) to conclude that the age differences in free recall were due 
primarily to use of moreflexible retrieval strategies by the older children (see also 
Hasher & Clifton, 1974) rather than to several alternative interpretations (ones too 
complicated tobe considered here). 
Age differences in the flexibility of retrieval strategies were also demonstrated by 
Salatas and Flavell (1976a). They attempted to control the developmental differ-
ences in encoding strategies by having the subjects (6- and 9-year-olds, college 
students) learn all items to a high Ievel ofperformance-to the point that they could 
perfectly recall alllist items (all of which could be categorized) during constrained 
recall (i.e., with category cues provided and exhaustive recall of category members 
required). At the end of this phase, the subjects were asked indirect retrieval ques-
tions that required searching through the items using dimensions other than the 
categories specified during study. For instance, one question was, "Which items are 
small enough to be put in this carton (box)?" An optimal retrieval plan for this situa-
tion consists of the following: (1) Recall the category names used during encoding; 
(2) search in each of these categories exhaustively; (3) evaluate each item in each 
category to see if it meets the requirements mentioned in the question; (4) tell the 
selected items to the experimenter. 
Given the complicated nature ofthe optimal retrieval strategy, it is not surprising 
that only a few of the school children used it. Most of the college students, however, 
did retrieve using the optimal approach. For another example of the development of 
a complex retrieval heuristic, see Keniston and Flavell (1979) . 
Although precautions were taken in studies Jike Ceci and Howe (1978a) and 
Salatas and Flavell (1976a) to minimize the older children's encoding advantages, 
some encoding differences may have remained that favored the older compared to 
the younger children (Sophian & Hagen, 1978). Hall, Murphy, Humphreys, and 
Wilson (1979) attempted to eliminate further the influence of developmental differ-
ences of during-the-experiment learning processes. They used items from different 
semantic categories that had comparable associativity values for second and fifth 
graders. In order to preclude the older children's encoding advantages, the analyses 
focused on recall of the items in the middle of the Iist rather than at the beginning 
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or the end (i.e., so that primacy and recency effects that might occur as a function 
of encoding strategies could be eliminated). These middle-list items were free 
recalled to the same degree by both the younger and older children in the sample. 
The most important results were on a cued recall test that foUowed free recall. 
Highly associated cues produced better memory at both age Ievels. Fifth graders as 
a whole remernbered more cued items than second graders. A comparison of the 
cued recall probabilities to the cue-word associative strength values revealed an 
especially interesting age difference. The cued recall probabilities were signifi-
cantly bigher than associative probabilities at the grade 5 Ievel, but not at the grade 
2 Ievel. Hall et al. (1979) concluded that intentional, strategic retrieval operations 
could only be inferred for the older children. Younger children's cued recaU reflected 
associative processes more than efficient retrieval. 
We conclude that tbere are developmental differences in the efficient use of 
retrieval strategies. The attempts to isolate retrieval that were summarized in this 
section consistently revealed clear trends in the development of efficient retrieval 
processes from 4 to 12 years of age. The spontaneous application of simple retrieval 
strategies such as the use of extemal associative cues can be observed in leinder-
garten or early grade-school years. Really complex retrieval strategies, such as 
reorganization of the stored information combined with exbaustive search and 
thorough evaluation (e.g., Salatas & FlaveU, 1976a) does not enter the Strategie 
repertoire until the late grade-school or adolescent years. In general, older children 
are much better than younger children at employing flexible and exhaustive search 
procedures. That encoding and retrieval processes cannot be studied independently 
makes it difficult to determine the proportion of memory due to use of encoding 
compared to retrieval heuristics, although this problern is being tackled using some 
ingenious methodologies, ones reviewed briefly in the next section. 
Encoding Versus Retrieval Strategies as Determinants 
of Memory Development 
The Descriptions Model 
How should an experiment be designed in order to determine the interaction 
between encoding and retrieval processes and their effects on recall? A balanced 
factorial design would be preferred by many, where subjects of various age groups 
are assigned to conditions that vary systematically with respect to the use of encod-
ing and retrieval strategies. Emmerich and Ackerman (1978) used this approach 
with first and fifth graders as weU as college students. At encoding, the to-be-
leamed items were either presented randomly, blocked into categories, or subjects 
sorted them into categories. Testing involved either free recaU, categorically cued 
recall, or categoricaUy constrained cued recaU (i.e., aU items from a category bad 
tobe recaUed before moving to another category). 
The encoding and retrieval factors influenced recall performance independently 
and in interaction. Both factors seemed to contribute to age-related performance 
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improvement. That the independent effect of encoding on children's performance 
was quite modest compared to the effect of retrieval, led Emmerich and Ackerman 
to conclude that encoding processes are only efficient inasmuch as they support the 
generation of effective retrieval strategies. 
Brian Ackerman has recently taken a different approach to the study of encoding-
retrieval interactions, generating data relevant to a "descriptions" model (Acker-
man, 1987; Norrnan & Bobrow, 1979). Ackerman assumes that encoding of stimu-
lus inforrnation depends on the context in which the information is encountered, 
and that the representation of an event (description) that is constructed reflects only 
a subset of the information in the original stimulus, a subset determined by biasing 
cues that are present during encoding. The adequacy of a representational descrip-
tion is a function of whether it contains functionally important properties of the 
stimulus that permit adequate retrieval. 
Consider the pair knife/axe. Suppose that when these items are presented at study, 
subjects are asked a categorical question, ')\re these weapons?" Presumably that 
biases information that is stored about these objects, suchthat the encoding ofknife 
and axe includes inforrnation about their weapon status. At testing, subjects would 
be presented knife and be required to recall axe. Recall of axe should be increased 
if the retrieval context biases the subjects toward cues that were encoded at study. 
Thus, posing the question about weapons at retrieval rnight be expected to facilitate 
recall of axe. Posing a question that focussed on some other attribute (e.g., "Is this 
a kitchen utensil?) would be expected, if anything, to reduce the likelihood of recall-
ing axe since the subject would be oriented away from cues that were salient at origi-
nal encoding. 
Ackerman and bis colleagues (1982, 1983, 1984; 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1985d, 
1985e; 1986a, 1986b; Ackerman & Hess, 1982; Ackerman & Rathburn, 1984; 
Ackerman & Rust-Kahl, 1982) have studied in detail the dependency of children and 
adults on identical study and retrieval environments. One tactic has been to vary the 
types of questions asked at encoding and retrieval (e.g. , either identical ones at 
study and testing or different ones). Are there developmental differences in the need 
for compatible encoding and retrieval environments? In general , stimulus recall is 
lower following different questions than following same questions. Ackerman calcu-
Iated the difference in recall performance for both types of orientation questions in 
order to determine the degree of performance decrease (encoding penalty shift) 
resulting from the presentation of incompatible cues. The encoding penalty 
decreased with increasing age, suggesting that the recall perforrnance of younger 
children is more strongly dependent on compatible study and testing cues. 
Ackerman has obtained other developmental interactions that are interesting as 
weil . For instance, when children were given categorical orientation questions at 
encoding and retrieval (i.e., there was compatibility), there was a developmental 
increase in recall. This suggested that second graders may have difficulty with cate-
gorical orientation questions. If so, perhaps younger children would do better with 
more specific questions that did not require evaluation of category membership, but 
instead tappedrelationships that are salient to young children (e.g., functional rela-
tionships) . For instance, would asking a question like, "Could a prince use this 
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object to fightbis enemies?" (a specific, function question) be more helpful than ask-
ing, "ls this a kitchen utensil?" (a categorical question)? Ackerman (1985b) deter-
mined that even though there are age-correlated differences in recall given compat-
ible categorical questions, there are none with more specific compatible questions. 
Young children could competently employ compatible specific retrieval cues. 
Ackerman and bis colleagues (1983; Ackerman & Hess, 1982; especially Acker-
man & Rathbum, 1984) evaluated one possible explanation of why same-categorical 
questions produce lower recall with younger compared to older children. Perhaps 
categorization questions do not permit discrimination of category members that are 
stored in memory? If so, Ackerman and Rathbum reasoned that compatible ques-
tions about smaller categories should have a larger effect with young grade-school 
children than compatible questions about large categories. After alllarger category 
questions specify many more possibilities that must be considered and discrimi-
nated from the correct answer than do smaller category questions. Ackerman and 
Rathbum presented pairs to second graders, fourth graders, and college students 
(e.g., knife/axe). The manipulations relevant to the present discussion were that 
pairs (a) were accompanied either by large category questions (Are these weapons?) 
or small category questions (Are these small hand weapons?) at acquisition and (b) 
were accompanied by either large category, small category, or specific questioris 
(Might a prince use these to slash his enemies?) at retrieval. The results supported 
the conclusion that part of the problern with large category questions is related to 
discriminability in that same small category questions produced better recall than 
large same-category questions. Nonetheless, there was no support for the hypothe-
sis that this could account for developmental differences in the effectiveness of large 
category questions in that there was a main effect for same small versus same large 
category questions that was not qualified by an age by category size interaction. 
A strength of Ackerman's approach is that there is a serious search for encoding 
by retrieval interactions. That there are generally consistent advantages for same 
compared to different questions is consistent with the conclusion that orienting 
activities at encoding produces a trace that is best retrieved by comparable orienting 
cues at recall. That younger children are more dependent on compatible encoding 
and retrieval cues is supportive of the general conclusion in the last section that 
there are developmental improvements in children's retrieval skills. In closing this 
discussion of Ackerman's work, we emphasize that we only scratched the surface of 
his theory and data (see Ackerman, 1987, for more complete details), which we 
view as extremely impressive evidence that the relationships between encoding and 
retrieval can be tapped and studied developmentally. 
Mathematical Modeling Approaches 
Those who subscribe to mathematical modeling approaches for the analysis of 
encoding and retrieval make minimum theoretical assumptions about the nature of 
these processes. Their emphasis is on the analyses of probability pararneters that 
describe learning and retention (e.g., the probability of an item being stored on a 
first trial, the probability of an item being stored on any trial after the frrst trial, 
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probability of consistently recalling an item given that it was recalled on the frrst 
trial). In particular, study and comparison of these pararneters should permit more 
complete description of learning and the pinpointing of effects produced by various 
manipulations. 
Three different groups have proposed mathematical models for separating encod-
ing and retrieval processes. The approaches all build on Markovian probability 
models and use memory tasks where the to-be-learned material is presented over a 
nurober of trials. These three models can be differentiated in that they seem to 
emphasize different aspects of memory. Following Brainerd's (1985a) classification, 
we refer to them as short-term memory, long-term memory, and retention models. 
Chechile and Meyer's (1976) modelwas designed to answer questions about short-
term memory. The main question was whether forgetting in short-term memory was 
due to the loss of traces that bad been encoded or failures to retrieve traces that 
remained available (perhaps retrieval failures mediated by retroactive or proactive 
inhibition). Chechile and Meyer generally assumed that traces were either encoded 
or they were not, with a pararneter es that specified whether items were stored. In 
a similar manner, retrieval was conceived of as either adequate or inadequate and 
the parameter er specified the probability across several trials that memory traces 
that were stored could be recaUed. The probability of forgetting (er) can be deter-
mined in a Straightforward fashion given these two parameters as 1 - es er-
Chechile and Meyers (1976) used an experimental paradigm consisting of a ~x­
ture of recall and recognition tasks. It was a modified version ofthe Brown-Peterson 
distractor task. Each trial consisted of a subspan recaU test and two recognition tests. 
During the recognition test subjects judged confidence in their recognition decision 
on a 3-point scale. The data yielded a total of 11 independent empirical probabilities 
(for details, Brainerd, 1985a, 1985b; Chechile & Meyers, 1976). 
Chechile, Richman, Topinka, and Ehrensbeck (1981) completed the frrstdevelop-
mental study using this approach. First and sixth graders and college students 
learned 18 different sets of five items over the course of five trials. lt was a serial 
probe task where. five hidden pictures were turned over one after the other, each for 
approximately half a second, and then returned to their original position. A short 
distractor task followed the presentations, with recall and recognition subsequently 
assessed. RecaU consisted of responding to the question, "What was here?" as the 
experimenter pointed to each location. Recognition required responding to the ques-
tion, "Was this picture here?'' 
At all age Ievels, Storage proved easier as reflected by mean values of the Storage 
and retrieval parameters (i.e., es > er>· Particularly important from a developmen-
tal point of view, the value of the forgetting parameter increased between the frrst 
and sixth-grade Ievels, but with no additional improvement between sixth grade and 
the undergraduate Ievel. The retrieval pararneter, however, increased consistently 
across the three age groups. Chechile et al. (1981) concluded that storage and 
retrieval processes develop at different rates. The storage processes are at a rela-
tively high Ievel early and seem to stabilize in late childhood. In contrast, young chil-
dren evidence low Ievels of retrieval with improvement into adulthood. 
A follow-up study by Chechile and Riebman (1982) with kindergarten and 
second-grade children was conducted to determine the influence of the meaningful-
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ness of materials on encoding and retrieval. The children were presented nine-item 
(supraspan) lists, agaih with both recall and recognition assessed. Two groups of 
second graders served in the study, one that learned exactly the same materials as 
the kindergarten subjects and another who received a different set of items. This 
different Iist was constructed by selecting items that were as meaningful to second 
graders as were the items on the kindergarten list to kiDdergarten children. The most 
importaßt result was that when meaning was controlled, there were no recall differ-
ences as a function of developmentallevel. Chechile and Riebman interpreted this 
result in terms of their "hardware invariance" hypothesis. They believed that these 
data supported the position that many age differences in short-term memory perfor-
mance are mediated by developmental changes in the knowledge base. 
In contrast to the focus on short-term recall in Chechile and Richman's work, 
Brainerd and his colleagues (Brainerd, 1982; Brainerd & Howe, 1982; Brainerd, 
Howe, & Desrochers, 1982; Brainerd, Howe, & K.ingma, 1982; Brainerd, Howe, 
K.ingma, & Brainerd, 1984) have studied long-term memory. Much oftheir develop-
mental work has been based on a Markovian model first used by Greeno (1968, 
1970; Greeno, James, Da Polito, & Polson, 1978) tq measureencoding and retrieval 
processes. The model has the advantage that it can be used for a variety of list-
learning tasks where recall is measured (e.g., free recall, cued recall, paired-
associate learning, serial recall). lt assumes two di~crete phases in the learning 
process that can be characterized by the transition between three states. There is an 
initial "unlearned" state (U), where only errors occur. The intermediate partially 
learned state (P) is where errors (substate E) and successes (substate C) can occur. 
Only success occurs in the fmal, learned (L) state.- lt is assumed that transitions 
between these states occur in discrete (all-or-none) jumps. Brainerd's model has 11 
independent parameters described in Table 3. 2. In general, these pararneters are dis-
tinguished by stage of learning that they refer to, with some indexing transitions 
from one stage to the next. Thus, the transition from U to P is due to the encoding 
of a trace in long-term memory. Here, the three parameters a; a, andjare relevant. 
Following initial storage, the trace may not be readily retrievable. Thus, there is a 
mixture of recall successes and failures. The transition from stage P to L is charac-
terized psychologically as retrieval learning, where the parameters b; b, c, and d 
index the probability of reliable retrieval. During this phase, when recall is still 
,characterized by mistakes, one speaks of heuristic retrieval. Reliable retrieval 
(referred to as algorithmic retrieval) during state P is described by the parameters 
e, g, h, and r. 
Brainerd and his colleagues have carried out many necessity and sufficiency tests 
(Greeno, 1968) of this two-stage model (e.g., Brainerd, Howe, & Kingma, 1982). 
Necessity tests determine whether the assumptions of a two-stage process model 
produce better explanations of a set of data than would a one-stage model. Suffi-
ciency tests are used to decide whether more than two stages are required to account 
for the data. In general, good fits to the two-stage model have been obtained for both 
children's and adults' recall data. 
Particularly relevant here, Brainerd and his colleagues have offered a great deal of 
evidence that encoding and retrieval parameters measure independent processes. 
The majority ofthe developmental studies were conducted using second- and sixth-
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TADLE 3.2. Theoretical interpretations of the ll parameters of the two-stage model.* 
Parameter 
Storage 
1i 
a 
f 
Retrieval learning 
b' 
b 
c 
d 
Retrieval performance 
1-r 
1-e 
g 
h 
Interpretation 
Probability of storing a trace on Trial I 
Probability of storing a trace on any trial after Trial I 
Probability of losing a previously stored trace 
For traces stored on Trial I, the probability that no further retrieval 
learning is needed 
For traces stored after Trial 1, the probability that no further retrieval 
learning is needed 
The probability of learning a retrieval algorithm after a success in State P 
The probability of learning a retrieval algorithm after an error in State P 
For items entering State P on Trial I, the probability of a success 
For items entering State P after Trial I, the probability of a success 
For two consecutive trials in State P, the probability that a success follows 
an error 
For two consecutive trials in State P, the probability that a success follows 
a success 
~Adapted from Brainerd, 1985a. 
grade subjects (e.g., Brainerd, Howe, & Kingma, 1982; Brainerd et al., 1984; Howe 
et al., 1985a, 1985b), although several have included other age groups (adults in 
Brainerd, Howe, & Desrochers, 1982; kindergarten children in Brainerd, 1982, and 
Brainerd & Howe, 1982). Much (but certainly not all) of the work has been con-
cemed with free recall. For instance, subjects were often asked to leam n-item word 
lists over the course of severalleaming-testing cycles. Learning ended only after alt 
items could be reproduced without error on two successive trials. We review here 
only the most important developmental trends. 
Similar to Chechile and Meyers, developmental trends were found for both 
encoding and retrieval parameters. The most important result, which was again con-
sistent with Chechile and Meyer's outcomes, was that encoding developed faster 
than retrieval. A number of developmental invariances were detected. For instance, 
the values for the parameter a were always higher than those for a; indicating that 
all subjects found it easier to store a memory trace on later trials compared to storing 
it on the first trial. It was always more difficult to store a trace on the first trial 
(parameter a) than it was to retain a trace (parameter J-f). 
A few of the results produced by Howe, Brainerd, and Kingma (1985a, 1985b) 
provide interesting information about the development of encoding and retrieval 
parameters in learning oftaxonomically structured lists. Howe et al.'s (1985a) most 
important experimental manipulations were Iist structure (unrelated words vs. 
taxonomically-related items), the number of categories in taxonornically organiza-
ble Iists (two vs. four), and whether recall was free or cued. Consistent with other 
findings, developmental differences in the retrieval-Iearning parameters were 
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greater than the developmental differences for the encoding parameters. Although 
the presentation of a cue during the test phase affected both the encoding and 
retrieval parameters, the size of these effects varied witb age. With younger chil-
dren, cuing had the greatest effect on the encoding pararneters. In contrast, the 
retrieval-learning pararneters were most affected in the older sample. Increasing the 
nurober oftaxonomic categories has a positive effect on retrievallearning (following 
success) in the cued-recall condition for second graders. For sixth graders it had a 
positive effect during free recall for both the encoding and retrieval pararneters. In 
general, it was clear that developmental improvements in recall were due both to 
encoding and retrieval-learning components, but not to forgetting or retrieval-
performance pararneters following successful storage. 
The third research program on mathematical modeling that we consider was con-
ducted by Alex Wilkinson and his associates. Wilkinson, De Marinis, and Riley 
(1983) and Wilkinson and Koestler (1983, 1984) studied the "repeated recall" 
paradigrn, in which a single short learning trial is followed by three test trials with 
no further opportunity for study of the target lists. Because there is only one oppor-
tunity for encoding at the beginning of the session, the focus of this model is on 
retention, although it is possible to analyze performance in terms of encoding, 
retrieval, and forgetting processes. Encoding was considered the establishrnent of a 
memory trace. Retrieval in this study was roughly comparable to what Brainerd and 
his colleagues referred to as retrieval learning. Retrieval and forgetting processes 
were viewed as complementary aspects of learning lists. 
The clearest developmental results produced by Wilkinson occurred in Wtlkinson 
et al. (1983). The values for the storage pararneters increased significantly between 
fourth and ninth grade in that study. The retrieval and forgetting pararneters did not 
vary significantly with age. The sarne pattem of outcomes was also found by Wtlkin-
son and Koestler ( 1983). Thus, the ability of a subject to store a durable trace follow-
ing a single trial is age dependent, although there seems to be no development in the 
tendencies to retain a trace. 
Summary 
The three models converge in supporting the conclusion that there are developmen-
tal differences between childhood and adulthood in encoding. On the other hand, 
althougb Chechile and Riebman and Brainerd and his associates report data suggest-
ing that developmental retrieval functions are more striking than developmental 
encoding functions, Wilkinson detected little development of retrieval in the 
paradigm that he studied. In addition, the relative contributions of encoding and 
retrieval components as explanations of memory development seem quite different 
in Chechile and Richrnan's model compared to Brainerd's work, and thus, there is no 
clear, simple answerthat emerges from this work as to whether encoding or retrieval 
processes drive memory development. Brainerd (1985a) exarnined these data and 
concluded that the relative contribution of encoding and retrieval development may 
be task specific. 
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We believe tbat matbematical models of the type described bere will prove addi-
tionally useful in analyses of tbe development of encoding and retrieval processes. 
Brainerd's group especially seems tobe developing procedures tbat can be used with 
a variety of paradigms that have traditionally interested workers in memory 
development (i.e., free and serial recall, paired-associate learning). Brainerd's 
group bas also showed how investigation of mathematical modeling parameters can 
be illuminating about traditional experimental manipulations, for example, picture 
versus word effects on learning (Brainerd, Desrochers, & Howe, 1981). Given the 
enthusiasm and commitment of researchers working in this area, we expect a great 
deal of developmental work from them in the future. 
In applauding this research approacb, we do not believe that it can in any way 
replace the alternative methods of analyses reviewed in this chapter. We are struck 
that the mathematical modelers focus on analyses of memory output, completely 
ignoring measurable encoding and retrieval activities of the learners that they are 
studying. In this regard, they seem to be making the same mistake that Bjorklund 
and his associates made, and in doing so, risk missing many important develop-
ments. More positively for the math modelers, tbere seems tobe no reason that their 
exceptionally analytical skills cannot be put to work analyzing tbe differences in out-
put for more versus less behaviorally active encoders and retrievers. The mathemat-
ical modelers are providing tremendously powernd methods of decomposing the 
typical dependent variable in memory experiments-memory output. lf combined 
with clever ways of determining individual differences between leamers that can be 
measured independently of the memory outcome variable, our understanding of 
within-age and between-age differences in children may increase dramatically. See 
Howe, Brainerd, and Kingma ( 1985b) for an interesting first example of this type of 
work, with the differences between learning disabled and normallearning children 
analyzed into a number of components in that study. 
Cross-Cultural Studies of Strategy Development 
How typical or universal is the development of Strategie competence? Because 
school is an institution where memory performances are expected and rewarded, 
there is tbe possibility that schooling affects the development of memory and 
memory strategies. Because amount of schooling and chronological age are com-
pletely confounded in western culture, it is impossible to decide on the basis of 
westem data alone whether strategy development is a function of maturation, 
schooling, or age-correlated environmental experience other than schooling. There 
is an important role for cross-cultural experiments here. 
The research strategy most frequently used in cross-cultural sturlies of memory 
consists of measuring memory performance in American and non-westem samples. 
Much of this work has been conducted with the Kpelle and Vai in Liberia, with 
Mayasand Mestizos in Mexico, and Guatemala, and with the Aboriginals in Austra-
Iia. We discuss briefly some of tbe most important of these studies. 
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For instance, Cole, Gay, Glick, and Sharp (1971) studied the development of free 
recall of lists of categorically related words, providing some of the most complete 
cross-cultural information on memory development. The weU-known advantages of 
free recall consist of being able to assess both recall and the amount of dustering 
during recall (which can be taken as one indicator of the use of organizational strate-
gies). To-be-learned materials were carefully selected to ensure that the subjects 
(Kpelle from Liberia) would be quite familiar with them. Both lists of words and 
objects were used in these studies. For one series of experiments, three age groups 
were involved, 6- to 8-year-olds, 10- to 14-year-olds, and 18- to 50-year-olds. The 
two younger groups induded approximately equal numbers of schooled and non-
schooled subjects. None of the adults had attended school. A group of California 
children (in school, of course) served as the comparison group. The memory differ-
ences between the American and African sarnples were enormous. The usual adult 
versus child differences in memory were obtained in the American sample. In the 
Kpelle sample, however, the adults and children did not differ significantly. lt was 
particularly noticable in the African subjects that they did not improve much over 
trials. Finally, it was also apparent that the American 11-year-olds and adults used 
categorical information to mediate recall. In contrast, low dustering was found for 
aU ages within the Kpelle sarnple, suggesting that these subjects did not organize the 
to-be-learned material semantically. Taken as a whole, these results indicate that 
semantic organization strategies are not spontaneously employed by the Kpelle. 
Wagner (1974) examined the degree to which intentional memory strategies were 
spontaneously employed in nonweslern cultures. Wagner used a serial-memory 
task. lt was assumed that the analysis of serial position curves would enable condu-
sions about intentional rehearsal processes (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). The sub-
jects were presented seven cards, each of which depicted two objects (an animaland 
a household object). The picture cards were only presented briefly and then turned 
over one by one. Following this, a test stimulus was presented containing one of the 
two items on one of the cards, with the child's task to identify which of the seven 
tumed-over cards included this item. 
Inferences about rehearsal strategies and structural memory characteristics were 
made by analyzing primacy and recency effects respectively. Beginning at about 14 
years of age, there were memory differences between the educated and noneducated 
samples that were primarily due to differences in the fli'st few items in the list. That 
is, there was a primacy effect. Following Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1968) logic, 
Wagner (1974) assumed that the differential primacy effects reflected greater use of 
rehearsal in the educated compared to the noneducated sarnple. Wagner concluded 
from these results that memory strategies for serial recall are only employed spon-
taneously by subjects with schooling. The invariance of the recency effects across 
age groups and educationallevels can, on the other hand, be interpreted to mean 
that structurally-mediated pararneters (i.e., short-term memory) should probably be 
considered universal. 
Wagner (1978) pointed out an important problern with Wagner (1974). The effects 
of education and urbanization were confounded in the earlier study. Whereas the 
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subjects with school experience came from the capital of the Yucatan province in 
Mexico, the non-schooled subjects were recruited from the country. Thus, the 
between-group differences could have been due to educational or urban-rural differ-
ences. These two factors have been separated carefully in more recent sturlies 
including Wagner (1978). 
Wagner's (1978) study included the serial task described previously. There were 
four age groups in the study (6- to 9-year-olds, 10- to 12-year-olds, 13- to 16-year-
olds, and 17- to 22-year-olds). There were equal numbers ofmales in each age group 
with subsamples of schooled and nonschooled subjects and subsamples of urban and 
rural subjects. Thus, it was possible to analyze age, educational, and urbanization 
effects separately. For the serial recall task, Wagner's (1974) results were replicated 
in the Wagner (1978) study. In addition, however, both education and urbanization 
proved to be contrjbutors to serial recall performance. The city versus country effect 
was especially apparent in the younger children. Younger city children remernbered 
more regardless of schooling status. The educational effect was apparent among the 
older subjects, starting at about 13 years of age, with the effect of rural versus urban 
environment decreasing in importance with increasing age. The superiority of the 
schooled groups was reflected mainly in a primacy effect that was not apparent in the 
recall of the non-schooled subjects. This was interpreted by Wagner as additional 
evidence that rehearsal strategies are a byproduct of schooling. 
All ofthe research reviewed up to this point in this subsection has involved labora-
tory tasks. Perhaps memory for everyday materials is mediated by strategies and 
processes that are universal in their development. Some of the best and most 
interesting of this research involves memory for text. Most of the text research does 
not support the position that cultural background determines memory performance. 
On the contrary, they tend to show that universal schemata are operative during the 
encoding and recall of stories so that almost no differences are observed as a func-
tion of culture or Ievel of formal education. 
For instance, in Mandler, Scribner, Cole, and DeForest (1980), children and 
adults from the Vai tribe of Liberia, with and without schooling were presented with 
a total of five stories, four of which were westem in origin and one of which was 
from the Vai tribe. Significant differences were found between children and adults 
with regard to total recall of th~ stories. More importantly, however, there were no 
differences found in recall of familiar and unfarniliar types of stories (i .e., no ten-
dency for cultural-specific results). Finally, a comparison of these results and those 
of earlier sturlies with American grade-school children and college students (Man-
dler & Johnson, 1977) also provided clear evidence that the recall pattems of the 
stories (in terms of the structural elements of the stories that were recalled) 
remained relatively invariant in both cultures. Mandler et al. (1980) concluded from 
these results that the general schematic structure of stories was an important deter-
rninant of recall performance. The results supported the assumption that story 
schematic elements are important mediators of text learning and recall. (See Chap-
ter 4 for more on structural-schematic qualities of text as a determinant of memory.) 
Further support for this conclusion was provided by Dube (1982) in a study of 
African and Americanjunior high school students and African adolescents without 
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school experience. All groups were presented two stories of African and two of 
European origin. The African groups demonstrated better memory performance as 
a whole. Consistent with Mandler et al. (1980), Dube found no difference in 
memory of the European and Mrican stories. The superior memory performance of 
the Mrican subjects was interpreted by Dube as possibly being due to the African's 
greater experience with oral storytelling and retelling. Ross and Millson (1970) 
obtained a comparable result in a comparison of adults from Ghana and New York. 
The Africans outperformed the Americans in story recall. 
In drawing general conclusions about the cross-cultural text recall data, we would 
be remiss if we did not pointout that there are some results that differ from the ones 
reviewed thus far. For instance, Kintsch and Greene (1978) found that American 
students were much worse recalling an Indian story than Grimms' fairy tales. Rogoff 
(1981) found that memory performance ofyoung children varies with whether they 
have bad formal education or not. Multiple regression analyses established that 
memory performance for two mythological stories was better predicted by nurober 
of years in school than by age or social background variables. When taken as a 
whole, however, the cross-cultural text sturlies provide clear evidence that recall of 
meaningful stories depends less on education than recall of unrelated materials. 
With respect to children, it seems likely that this effect may reflect the fact that chil-
dren rarely use the types of sophisticated strategies that really efficient learning and 
memory of text requires (e.g., Bereiter & Bird, 1985). Because many stories in 
many cultures have structural-schematic properties, children throughout the world 
have opportunities to experience and learn these structures that can mediate 1earn-
ing and recall of text ( e. g. , Mandler, 1984). 
A comparable analysis can be applied to other ecologically meaningful tasks, ones 
for which there are few or small cross-cultural effects. Consider a study conducted 
by Rogoffand Waddeli (1982). School children from Guatemala and North America 
(8 to 10 years of age) demonstrated comparable memory performance in reconstruc-
tion of a miniature scene. The children's task was to place 20 familiar objects in a 
three-dirnensional panorarna representing a location familiar to children. The slight 
(although not statistically significant) superiority of the Mayan children seemed to 
be particularly interesting because the Mayans were recruited from the same.area 
that provided Kagan, Klein, Finley, Rogoff, & Nolan's (1979) sample. In that study, 
the Mayans performed more poorly than Americans in a traditional memory span 
task. Given that both Mayan and North American children have many opportunities 
to experience scenes during development, there seems tobe equivalent opportunity 
to leam the memory and retrieval skills necessary to mediate such tasks. 
That memoiy performance depends greatly on prior familiarity with to-be-
learned stimulus materials has been established especially clearly in studies on 
visual-spatial memory ( e.g., Drinkwater, 1976; Kearins, 1981; Kleinfield, 1971). A 
main premise in all of these investigations was that the survival chances for the 
populations in question (eskimos in Kleinfeld's work, Australian aboriginals in the 
studies by Drinkwater & Kearins) depended greatly on their visual-spatial skills 
(i.e., their ability to orient themselves spatially in relatively monotonous terrain). 
When similar abilities are required in memory tests, children from Eskimo and 
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aboriginal groups clearly outperform Caucasians from civilized regions. Kearins 
(1981, 1983) work is a particularly good example ofthistype of research. 
Kearins (1981) required subjects to Iook at an array of objects for about 30 
seconds. Then, subjects were required to place the objects back into their array 
positions. Regardless of the types of objects in the arrays (i.e., civilized items like 
bottles and knives or natural items like stones and leaves), the aboriginal children 
were consistently betterat remembering array locations. Kearins (1983) provided 
additional data supporting the criticality of stimulus familiarity, reporting differ-
ences favoring aboriginal children over civilized children in verbal recall of wild 
animals. Kearins hypothesized that aboriginal children's interest in and knowledge 
about wild animals promoted their memory in this task. Kearins reported a variety 
of data suggesting that Anglo-Australian children were more likely to attempt verbal 
rehearsal strategies, whereas aboriginal children seemed to rely more on spatial-
imaginal strategies. In summary, Kearins data clearly support the hypothesis that 
prior knowledge and culturally-supported visual-spatial skills can more than com-
pensate for verbal strategies. 
In summary, cross-cultural differences in children's memory seem to be very 
specific. lt seems that use of rehearsal and organizational strategies during list Jearn-
ing is more common in westem cultures than in nonschooled societies. The develop-
ment of the Strategie skills that mediate strong performance on list-like tasks seem 
to be tied to schooling. Materials that possess similar meaningful structures that 
children experience universally (e.g., stories, scenes) are more likely tobe remem-
bered equally in schooled and nonschooled cultures than are materials that are not 
experienced universally. 
The results presented here can be reconciled with Oerter's (1985) thesis that 
school and instruction not only influence human development in the form of knowl-
edge expansion and the development of specific capabilities, but also basically 
change that development. Thus, the development of some memorization strategies 
represents school-dependent developmental change. lt is impressive that the effects 
of formal education on the performance of various memory tasks can be shown 
more clearly than the effects of chronological age, social environment, social class, 
and urbanization. 
We must caution, however, that the methodological problems involved in this 
cross-cultural research are enormous. For instance, the schooled and nonschooled 
children in a particular region may differ on many characteristics besides school-
ing-that is, there are obviously selection factors in determining who will go to 
school in these regions and who will not. Sometimes culturally specific personality 
characteristics undermine attempts to conduct comparisons. For instance, Rogoff 
and Mistry (1985) found that young Mayan children demonstrated poorer memory 
of stories than young American children. As it tumed out, the Mayan children were 
extremely uncomfortable in the experimental situation because they are usually not 
permitted to speak freely with adults. An anecdote like this suggests that other cross-
cultural data may be tainted by social interaction effects not understood by 
westemers. The general conclusion that formal education probably has specific 
effects on memory rather than a general one seems fair enough given the data that 
are on band, and it is is a very important fmding. 
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Closing Comment 
Reseaehers interested in memory development have spent a Iot of time studying the 
development of encoding and retrieval strategies, with some of the more important 
developments and issues taken up in this ehapter. The development of Strategie com-
petence was probably attraetive to memory development researehers at the end of 
the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, in part because it seemed at that timethat 
there were qualitative differences in strategy use as a funetion of age. At the end of 
the 1980s, strategy development appears more eontinuous. For instanee, there is 
gradual development of rehearsal skills. Even presehoolers rehearse the location of 
a hidden object by looking at the hiding plaee during a retention interval. Single-
item repetition ofto-be-leamed words on lists is gradually replaced by inereasingly 
eomplex eumulative rehearsal . 
Early work on strategies was eharaeterised by a narrow focus on strategies only, 
and then only in western eultures. There is now a realization that use of encoding 
and retrieval strategies must be eonsidered in interaetion, and that use of these 
strategies depends on nonstrategie knowledge. Some ofthe strategies that have com-
manded the greatest attention by workers in memory development seem to be ones 
that are most sensitive to sehooling effects. That is, they do not develop universally, 
but rather are observed more in sehooled societies than in nonsehooled societies. 
New methodologies are opening exeiting possibilities for inereasing understand-
ing of strategie development. For instance, matbematieal modeling and the deserip-
tions approaeh permit analyses of eneoding versus retrieval . Matb modeling in 
partieular permits more eomplete analysis of the dependent measures that has been 
tbe case in mueh ofthe previous researeh. Researehers have also become very clever 
at eoding overt memorizing and retrieving behaviors and relating these to memory 
perforrnanee. The identification of observable behaviors that are telling about 
strategy use is a major advanee. 
In subsequent ehapters, strategy use will be considered additionally with respect 
to knowledge and metacognitive faetors, especially the dependeney of strategy use 
on these faetors. The immediate coneerns in the next ehapter, however, are occa-
sions when the knowledge base predominantly determines memory. This diseussion 
will make clear that those (e.g., Bjorklund) who believe that the knowledge base 
ean produce important main effects on memory are correct, even if some of the 
specifie hypotheses about knowledge main effects diseussed in this ehapter proved 
nottobe eorrect. 

4. The Knowledge Base 
The nature of the contents of the lrnowledge base is more than a little bit fuzzy. It 
certainly contains information about how to do things (i.e., procedurallrnowledge) 
and nonprocedural facts about the world (declarative lrnowledge) (e.g., Siegler, 
1983). Although there is not an exact equivalence between procedurallrnowledge 
and strategies, tbe most important procedural knowledge considered in this book is 
memory strategies, which were considered in detail in the last chapter. Thus, the 
concem in this chapter is more on the declarative knowledge base and how it affects 
memory directly (i .e., through mechanisms other than facilitating the use of strate-
gies as discussed in Chapters 3, 6, and 7). 
Even restricting discussion to the declarative knowledge base does little to reduce 
the uncertainties concerning the nature of the memory base. For instance, there are 
great debates about the modes of representation in tbe base (e.g., imagery, Paivio, 
1986; propositions, Pylyshyn, 1984) and the organization of information (e.g., cate-
gorical versus schematic, Mandler, 1983, 1984). Not surprisingly, there arealso a 
variety of models about how the long-term knowledge base changes with develop-
ment. Although it is not our purpose to review these conceptions in any detail, a 
brief review of the available alternatives makes clear that developmentalists have 
been considering potential changes in lrnowledge from a variety of perspectives. 
Both Bjorklund and Chi posit modified network models of semantic memory ( cf., 
Anderson, 1976; Coltins & Loftus, 1975; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975). They 
assume that every item (concept) in semantic memory is represented by nodes that 
are connected to each other by means of links. The connections between the nodes 
are determined by various relations, with inter-item associativity considered a fun-
damental one. Bjorklund (1987) in particular assumes that cbaracteristic features 
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are stored for every item, features that mediate inter-item associative processes 
(e.g., a child can associate a cat and a dog by recognition of the common features 
"four legs;• "domestic pets;' or "friendly"). Knowledge structures are viewed as 
hierarchic (i.e., some aspects ofknowledge are subordinate to others- "cats;' "dogs;· 
and "frogs" are categories that are subordinate to the category "animals;• which is 
subordinate to the category "living things." The probability that a specific item will 
be activated and transferred to the short-term memory is viewed as a function of 
context, inter-item associativity, the nurnber of characteristic item features, and the 
frequency with which this specific item was activated in the past. Developmental 
changes in this network affect the nurober of available items and their accessibility. 
Bjorklund (1987) assumes that developmental changes in concept representations 
follow from additional encounters with items. New features are added with 
experience, with the additional features permitting more elaborate codings when 
items are presented as to-be-learned information. The enriched encodings that 
follow permit better accessibility of the items during retrieval. In addition to the 
nurober of characteristic item features, the strength of the relation between the 
individual nodes can vary. Bjorklund assumes that the strength of relations between 
nodes increase (a) with additional encounters of the items and (b) because the 
encoding preferences for objects change from more imaginal to more linguistic and 
semantic (e.g., Bruner, Olver, & Greenfield, 1966). 
The basic assumptions made by Chi and Rees (1983) are quite similar to ones 
made by Bjorklund. Chi and Rees are more strongly oriented to computer models, 
however. In addition to networks, they focus on production rules (if-then relation-
ships). In contrast to the factual knowledge represented by semantic networks, these 
production rules portray procedural knowledge. Such production rules are elements 
of a production system that generates and activates the system activities as well as 
generating new rules. Furthermore, Chi and Rees include schema in their model of 
children's knowledge. If a new situation resembles previous situations that are 
represented in the generalized schema, the schema may be activated, permitting 
organization and interpretation of all of the incorning information according to the 
schema. Thus, consider a child who is led by a parent from a parking lot into a build-
ing that has a counter with people who order food and receive it. This information 
should be more than enough to activate the fast-food restaurant schema, at least by 
children residing in westem, industrialized economies who are permitted frequent 
opportunities to dine at McDonalds, Burger King, and Wendy's. In turn, the child 
has no problern responding, "Burger, fries, and a Coke;' when the parent asks what 
the child would like-even if the child is not old enough to read the menu! In addi-
tion, the child may not wait for a waitress to clear the table, but instead beg to be the 
one who carries the tray to the trash can. Chi and Rees (1983) emphasize that with 
development, there are changes in both procedural and declarative knowledge. 
Consistent with Bjorklund (1987), they also assume a shift in the preferred mode of 
representation from predorninantly imaginal to linguistic and semantic. 
Mandler (1983) designed a rudimentary model of the development of knowledge 
organization that took into consideration both categorical and schematic represen-
tations. Both categorical and schematic knowledge are assumed to be established in 
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the daily episodes of early childhood. The child registers the similarity of episodes 
that are repeated regularly aod learns to categorize various objects that are encoun-
tered in the world. Classifications are attempted as part of everyday functioning, 
thus, explaining the dominant functional character of young children's classification 
systems (Chapter 3). On the other band, classifications become more independeot 
of cootext with opportunities to judge objects free of context, solely on the basis of 
similarity (as occurs in formal educational settings). 
In short, there are a variety of positions about changes in the knowledge base with 
development, with changes in knowledge about facts, procedures, and scripts consi-
dered explicitly. The life episodes that young children experience provide a rieb data 
base for establishing representations, especially ones that emphasize functional 
properties of objects and how to function in particular settings (i.e. , everyday 
scripts). Young childreo's representations also seemed tobe dominated by percep-
tual ioformation. In contrast, o1der childreo's representations are more complete, 
aod with development, they resemble increasingly the knowledge base of adults. 
Thus, older children can classify materials taxonomically rather on the basis of their 
function alooe. Scripts become increasingly general, and thus, more flexible. 
Whereas the 3-year-old's restauraut script might be adequate to mediate understand-
ing of McDonald's and Burger King, but nothing eise, the older child's fast-food 
restauraut script is elaborate enough to assimilate new instances from White Castle 
to a sit-down-but-decidedly-fast-food steak house. These changes in knowledge are 
important to understand, given that it is clear that knowledge p1ays a major role in 
determining memory of at least some newly encountered content, a main theme 
developed in this chapter. 
It has been recognized for some time that memory performance is highly depeo-
deot on the developing knowledge base. Flavell (1985) eloquently describes the 
situation: 
Thus, what the head lmows has an enormaus effect on what the head learns and remembers. 
But, of course, what the head lmows changes enormously in the course of development, and 
these changes consequently make for changes in memory behavior (p. 213). 
Systematic studies on the influence of task-relevant prior know1edge on memory 
behavior and performance have only been carried out in the last decade. The results 
have been so striking that the knowledge factor has been portrayed in recent descrip-
tions of memory development as an extremely importaot explanatory component of 
memory performance (e.g., Bjorklund, 1985; Howe, 1985; Kail, 1984; Körlcel, 
1987; Oerter & Schuster-Oeltzschner, 1987; Ornstein & Naus, 1985). 
Some coverage of knowledge effects on memory was appropriate in the previous 
chapters (i.e., knowledge effects on the development of functional capacity and the 
use of particular strategies), and the points covered there will not be re-reviewed 
here. Rather, in this chapter we consider evidence that task-specific prior 
knowledge can affect memory performance directly-that is, wben developmental 
improvemeots in memory performance may be due to development and application 
of the knowledge base predominantly rather than due to development of Strategie 
competence. There have been empirical studies of diverse types of prior knowledge. 
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Whenever researchers have looked, it has proven possible to identify prior 
knowledge influences on memory. 
That prior knowledge can affect children's memory was confrrmed in studies of 
"inferential" memory, with Scott Paris and bis colleagues providing especially tell-
ing data (Paris, 1975, 1978; Paris & Lindauer, 1977, 1982; see also Trabasso & 
Nicholas, 1980). Children in the Paris' experiments (e.g., Paris & Carter, 1973; 
Paris & Lindauer, 1976; Paris & Upton, 1976; Schmidt, Paris, & Stober, 1979) were 
presented mini-stories that were followed by memory tests. Constructive, inferen-
tial processes in remembering texts (processes driven by prior knowledge of rela-
tionships in the world) were assumed whenever there was incorrect memory of 
sentences that were not actually included in the original stories but were consistent 
with the meaning ofthe material in the text (i.e., when true inferences were made). 
In general, there were clear developmental increases in inference skills. For 
instance, Paris and Upton (1976) reported a developmental increase in inferring 
instruments used to perform actions (e.g., inferring a shovel was used by a boy who 
was reported tobe digging a hole). In general, others have been able to replicate this 
development (e.g., Omanson, Warren, & Trabasso, 1978). The conclusion that 
follows from all of this work is that older children are more likely than younger 
children to use their general knowledge and go beyond the facts presented in text to 
fill in the gaps in information that is to be remernbered. 
A study of prior knowledge that was conducted by Brown, Smiley, Day, Town-
send, and Lawton (1977, experiment 2) is especially interesting in that specific 
prior knowledge was experimentally induced in subjects. The second-, fourth-, and 
sixth-grade participants received information about a topic a week before they were 
presented a text passage that could be interpreted in light of this prior knowledge. 
The memory of even the youngest subjects in the study was affected by the prior 
knowledge manipulation. Particularly relevant here, the children made many con-
structive errors in recalling the text passage, making inferences that were consistent 
with the prior knowledge they bad acquired the week before. The presence of rele-
vant prior knowledge clearly affected the children's learning of related but "new" 
material. 
Perhaps the most robust fmding in the Iiterature on knowledge effects is that 
experts in an area leam more when studying "new" information in their domain of 
expertise than do nonexperts. For instance, the second graders in Pearson, Hansen, 
and Gordon (1979) could be categorized as snake experts or novices. Questions on 
a short textabout snakes dealt with information explicitly presented in text, as weil 
as facts that were only implied in text, but could be deduced based on prior 
knowledge. As expected, the experts answered the questions much better than the 
novices. The relatively greater superiority of experts on text-implicit questionswas 
considered due to the operation of snake-content schema possessed by the experts 
but not the novices. 
Schneider, Körkel, and Weinert (1987a) presented grade-3, grade-5, and grade-7 
children a story about a soccer game, with the participants classifiable as soccer 
experts or novices. The children could further be classified with respect to generat 
ability, either as poor leamers or good leamers. The results were generally consis-
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tent across a variety of measures that tapped both exact memory of the text and 
memory for appropriate inferences. There were clear main effects for expertise such 
that soccer experts outperformed novices. Even more striking, the expertise classifi- \/ 
cation was much more redictive of performance than was the general ability clas- ~ 
sification. Low general ability experts descriptively outpe ormed high general 
ability novices on every memory and comprehension measure included in the study. 
A third dramatic demonstration of the effects of the knowledge base on children's 
learning was provided by Chi and Koeske (1983). A 5-year-old dinosaur expert was 
asked to retain two lists of dinosaur names of equal length, one list consisting of 
familiar names. The same pattem of results was found in a post-test about a year 
later, which can be interpreted to mean that a direct relationship does indeed exist 
between the degree of prior knowledge and the ability to memorize. 
Other studies contrasting experts and novices have provided additional impres-
sive demonstrations of factual knowledge effects on memory performance. Superior 
memory performance by experts are almost always limited to areas of expertise, 
however (Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Chiesi, Spilich, & 
Voss, 1979). In particular, Chi (1978, 1981, 1985b) has produced striking develop-
mental data consistent with this conclusion. 
Chi (1978) recruited experienced and inexperienced chess players and gave them 
the task of recalling various chess positions presented to them briefly. The most 
interesting aspect of this researchwas that subjects' knowledge correlated negatively 
with age-the children (average age = 10 yrs) were the experts and the adults were 
the novices. Although the children performed significantly worse on traditional 
memory-span tests than the adults, they averaged much better on the chess-related 
memory tasks. They were able to remernher more chess positions correctly, needed 
fewer trials to reach the leaming criteria, and predicted their performance more 
accurately. 
Chi ( 1978) has stimulated follow-up studies. For instance, the reversal of the usual 
age effect was also demonstrated by Weinert et al. (1984) for text leaming. The 
subjects in that study were fourth, sixth, and eighth graders, half of whom could be 
classified as soccer experts and half of whom were soccer novices. The expected 
differences between experts and novices were especially evident in the comprehen-
sion of a soccer-related passage, particularly in the importance ratings given to 
individual parts of the text. The youngest experts (fourth graders) were clearly 
superior to the oldest novices (eighth graders) in recognizing the important com-
pared to the less important aspects of text. 
In general, all of the effects referred to in the last few paragraphs have been 
attributed to possession of a well-developed knowledge base. One possibility is that 
many of these effects are actually a combination of greater knowledge and greater 
interest in the content in question, however. After all, it seems a safebetthat the 
experts in these studies were probably both knowledgable and interested in the con-
tent of expertise, and there is a Iiterature substantiating that children leam more 
content when reading text that is interesting to them (Asher, Hymel, & Wigfield, 
1978; Belloni & Jongsma, 1978; Bernstein, 1955; Ceci, 1984; Estes & Vaughan, 
1973; Stevens, 1980) The separation of knowledge and interest effects is important, 
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because children often acquire knowledge about material that really does not fasci-
nate them (i.e., elementary schools often require specific contents to he learned 
regardless of student interest). The small amount of research that does exist in fact 
suggests tbat cbildren's interest and knowledge probably both contribute to compre-
hension and learning of text (Baldwin, Peleg-Bruckner, & McClintock, 1985), and 
thus, our suspicion is that work on interest will prove complementary rather than 
antagonistic to the theoretical position tbat the knowledge base is an important 
determinant of memory. 
In contrast to the studies of children with expertise not possessed by most chil-
dren, Bjorklund and bis colleagues (Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982, 1983; Bjorklund 
& Bjorklund, 1985) concentrated on knowledge that is more universally acquired. 
For instance, Bjorklund and Zeman presented 7-, 9-, and 11-year-old children with 
two structurally similar memory tasks. Tbe subjects were supposed to (a) remernher 
the names of their dassmates (dass recall task) and (b) memorize and recall a Iist 
of taxonomically dassifiable items. Although the usual age differences in recall and 
dustering were found in the traditionallist learning task, subjects of all ages could 
remernher the names of their dassmates equally weil. It has also become apparent 
that the duster values computed for seating arrangements, reading groups, and sex 
were comparable at each of the age Ievels. Since a post-recall metamemory inter-
view did not provide much evidence that the cbildren's hehavior in the dass recall 
task reflected conscious memory strategies, Bjorklund and Zeman (1982, 1983; also 
Bjorklund, 1985, 1987) conduded that children's performance on the dass recall 
task was mostly due to the automatic activation of associative relations. In a follow-
up study, Bjorklund and Bjorklund (1985) induced subjects to use a specific retrieval 
strategy (i.e., use seating arrangement to mediate recall). Organizational measures 
(dustering) were affected by use of this strategy (in fact, organization was maxi-
mized). Consistent witb other observations that young cbildren can learn some 
retrieval strategiestoahigh Ievel of competence with little effort (e.g., an alphaheti-
cal retrieval strategy in Chi, 1985b), even young cbildren could follow tbe new 
retrieval instructions and produced dustering values comparable to tbose of the 
older subjects. Nonetheless, there was no improvement in Ievel of recall as a func-
tion of use of the strategy. Bjorklund and Bjorklund (1985) argued that this result 
was consistent with their position (reviewed in Cbapter 3) that the employment 
of intentional memory strategies only has a ... minimal effect on performance in this 
type of task. 
Even more abstract and general forms of long-term knowledge can have an effect 
on children's learning and memory. Traditional stories bave become a favorite 
research stimulus in psycbology of memory, mainly because they have a typical or 
"canonical" form independent of content. There is an initiating event (usually a 
problem) to wbich the protagonist of the story reacts emotionally (internal 
response). Attempts to solve the problern produce consequences to wbicb the pro-
tagoßist must react. Formal story grammars have been developed that descrihe story 
structures (e.g., Johnson & Mandler, 1980; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & 
Glenn, 1979), accompanied by specific tests of the effects of children's story gram-
mar knowledge on memory performance. 
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When stories conform almost perfectly to ideal story grammar forms, develop-
mental differences in recall are Iess strilcing than when stories deviate from the ideal 
structure. For instance, even prescbool children are capable of recalling temporal 
sequences in ideally structured stories (W"unmer, 1980). When stories differ from 
Stereotypie story grammatical format, children as well as adults bave a tendency to 
recall the stories in their canonical form, that is, the order of story elements is trans-
formed as part of the encoding and retrieval processes (Mandler, 1978; Mandler & 
DeForest, 1979; Stein & Glenn, 1975, 1979). The structural simi1arity of story 
recall in normal children, learning-disabled children, and adults from different 
cultures (Bower, Black, & Thmer, 1979; Nelson, 1978; Mandler et al., 1980; 
Weaver & Dickinson, 1984) suggests that certain general structural schema have 
universal meaning. 
Age differences in quanrity of recall are striking, nonetheless, when story ele-
ments are presented in other than canonical order (McClure, Mason, & Barnitz, 
1979; Stein & Nezworski, 1978). The ability to recall such Stories increases with 
age, with children having greater difficulty remembering stories that deviate from 
the canonical form than they do remembering stories that are consistent with con-
ventional story grammar structures (e.g., Mandler, 1978; Nelson & Gründel, 
1981). Adults who process such stories seem tobe able to reorder and sbuffle tbe 
information that they are presented to make the story consistent with story grammar 
conventions, at least when prompted to do so (e.g., Stein & Nezworski, 1978). Chil-
dren on the other band seem not to be able to reorder story elements (Buss, Yussen, 
Mathews, Miller, & Rembold, 1983). Consistent with the theme that various types 
of knowledge can affect memory performance, there is an important exception to 
this generalization. Children have less difficulty processing and remembering non-
canonical presentations when they are presented content that can be related to 
scripts that arealready very familiar to them (Nelson, 1978; Nelson et al., 1983; 
Nelson & Gründel, 1981; Nelson & Hudson, in press). 
On the other band, possessing familiar scripts can cause memory problems. 
Fivush, Hudson, and Nelson (1984) compared children's general "museum script" 
with kindergarten children's report of their own visit to a museum. Memory tests 
after six weeks or a year showed that the general script had cbanged very little. 
The memory of the personal museum visit was also astonishingly accurate after 
six weeks or even after a year. All subjects were capable of differentiating the 
visit from the generat museum script. On the other hand, less special events (e.g., 
memory of a specific dinner) sbare more features with generalized script memory. 
Nelson and Hudson (in press) report on an unpublished study in whicb they ob-
tained no structural differences between 3- to 5-year-olds' general scripts about 
birthday parties and their reports about specific birtbday parties. Nelson and 
Hudson argued that this represented a fusion process in memory, a blending of 
the specific episode with the general script. That this process is not limited to 
young children is suggested by recent data reported by Gehringerand Strube ( 1985). 
Their study included 10- to 11-year-old students, as well as samples of 18- to 
20-year-old adults and 35- to 40-year-old adults. They found that aU groups in their 
study distorted both biographic and autobiographic information to conform to 
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Stereotypie seripts, with few and not very striking developmental differenees in the 
str,ueture of recall. 
Taken as a whole, the results in this ehapter provide impressive evidenee that a 
hild's knowledge base ean have a great effect on memory. There are many ehal-
lenges that remain in elueidating knowledge-base effects, however. For instanee, as 
the knowledge base develops, there is more eomplete eoding of eoncepts and 
stronger intereonnections between them, and thus, long-term memory should be 
more aeeessible with inereasing age. With inereased aeeessibility, both automatie 
and Strategie processes should be faeilitated. Nonetheless, at all age Ievels, there are 
important differences between people in the degree of aeeessibility that they have to 
what is stored in long-term memory (Brown et al., 1983, p. 99). What determines 
these differenees? That there are differenees in aeeessibility makes clear that 
knowledge alone can never be a suffieient explanation of memory performanee. 
Sinee eonseious and systernatie seareh of long-term memory for possible knowledge 
that eould mediate memory is an important learning strategy (e.g., sehema aetiva-
tion; e.g., Levin & Pressley, 1981), we close by noting that the inclusion of a 
separate ehapter on knowledge does not mean to imply that we view knowledge as 
a component that operates autonomously most of the time (a point that was dis-
eussed in detail in Chapter 3). It is often used in eonjunetion with strategies. On the 
other hand, most of the effects reviewed in this ehapter probably were mediated 
rather direetly by the knowledge base, with eonseious use of strategies playing a 
minor role. 
One strategy that is often recomrnended in the Iiterature (e.g., Tierney & Cun-
ningham, 1984), however, boils down to aetivating the background knowledge that 
one has (e.g., as an aid to eomprehension and memory oftext). When people poss t1S 
baekground knowledge that is eonsistent with the eontent of the text, there is plenty 
of reason to expect that prior knowledge aetivation should increase learning, for 
at a minimum the reader is thinking "deeply" about the topie of the upcoming text 
(ef., Riekards, 1976; Riekards & Divesta, 1974; Watts & Anderson, 1971). Not 
suprisingly, people do remernher more that they read if they possess and have aeti-
vated relevant knowledge (e.g., Anderson & Pearson, 1984;.Arnold & Brooks, 1976; 
Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Brown et al., 1977; Levin & Pressley, 1981; Pearson 
et al., 1979; Tierney & Cunningham, 1984). But what ifthe person does not possess 
relevant prior knowledge, andin faet, has misconeeptions about the topic eovered in 
the text? Positive effects following aetivation of ineorrect prior knowledge is 
predieted by the theoretieal view that information eonflicting with prior knowledge 
and expectations is especially noticable and noted, and thus, should be especially 
memorable (e.g., Graesser & Nakamura, 1982; Mandler, 1984; O'Brien & Myers, 
1985; Peeck, van den Boseh, & Kreupeling, 1982; Sehank, 1982). On the other 
hand, there is also the possibility of negative effects when a flawed knowledge base 
is aetivated. Interference, inferenees, and intrusions from errant prior knowledge 
ean follow (e.g., Anderson & Pearson, 1984; Brown et al., 1977; Lipson, 1982; 
Piehert & Anderson, 1977; Srnith, Readenee, & Alvermann, 1984). 
A study by Alvermann, Srnith, and Readence (1985) illustrates the potential 
negative impaet of aetivation of errant prior knowledge on ehildren's eomprehension 
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and Iearning from text. Grade-6 children either activated or did not activate prior 
knowledge about a passage before reading it. Thus, prior-knowledge-activation 
subjects who subsequently read a passage about light and heat from the sun (a pas-
sage containing information that clashed with prior knowledge typically possessed 
by grade-6 students) were first asked to write down all that they knew about the 
topic. After writing the essay, the subjects read the text. Following completion of 
reading, subjects were first asked to write down everything that they could remem-
ber from the passage and then were given 10 multiple-choice questions, some of 
which were explicitly designed to contain foils consistent with misconceptions 
about light and heat from the sun possessed by grade-6 students (determined by pilot 
testing). Procedures in the nonactivation condition were identical to those in the 
activation condition, except that there was no essay writing before reading. 
The outcomes were rather striking in Alvermann et al. (1985). Free recall of the 
text was better when children did not activate the prior knowledge. Specifically, 
there was significantly less recall of text ideas that were incompatible with grade-6 
children's prior knowledge, and a trend toward less recall of the remainder of the 
passage (our reanalyses). In addition, multiple-choice questions that included mis-
conception foils were less likely to be answered correctly in the prior-knowledge-
activation condition. When contrasted to the positive effects produced by congruent 
prior knowledge in other studies, Alvermann et al.'s (1985) data make clear that 
prior knowledge activation is a double-edged sword. Activation of misconceptions 
can significantly interfere with learning of objectively more correct perspectives. 
Complicating the Situation even more, Pressley, McDaniel, Tanenbaum, and Wood 
(1988) recently produced facilitation when correct prior knowledge was activated in 
adults, but observed no interference from activation of incorrect prior knowledge (in 
fact, there was some evidence of slight facilitation). We suspect that quite a bit of 
research will be conducted in the near future on acquisition of new information 
when the learner possesses inconsistent prior knowledge, for it is apparent that both 
children and adults often know Iess than they think with respect to important con-
tents such as basic scientific information (e.g., Anderson, 1987). A hypothesis sug-
gested by comparison of Alvermann etal.'s (1985) results with Pressley etal.'s (1988) 
data is that adults are better than children at subsequently managing an errant 
knowledge base that is activated. A Iot of work relevant to both theoretical and 
educational issues could be generated in response to this issue alone. 

5. Metamemory 
Metamemory is knowledge about memory. It resembles constructs advanced by 
earlier theoretical traditions (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982), such as systematic 
introspection as defined by the "Würzburg School" (Ach, 1905). Otto Selz (1913) 
made assumptions about self-regulating processes. He specified evaluation and 
selection mechanisms that resemble processes that are central to contemporary 
theory. Despite reservations about introspective data throughout the 20th century 
( e.g., Lyons, 1986), the potential importance of modern research on metacognition 
was anticipated enthusiastically by some experimental psychologists, including 
Thlving and Madigan (1970): 
Why not start Jooking for ways of experimentally studying and incorporating into theories 
and models of memory one of the truly unique characteristics of human memory: its 
knowledge of its own knowledge .. . We cannot help but feel that if there is ever going to be 
a genuine breakthrough in the psychological study of memory . . . it will , among other things, 
relate the knowledge stored in the individual's memory to bis knowledge ofthat knowledge 
(p. 477). 
At about the same time, John Flavell (1971) introduced the term metamemory for 
knowledge about memory processes and contents and gave it special status in bis 
taxonomy of memory phenomena (Flavell & Wellman, 1977). There was great 
expansion of metamemory theory in the ensuing decade. 
lntroduction to Metamemory Theory (~ 
Metamemory was viewed by Flavell as one of four broad, somewhat overlapping 
memory categories- structurally-determined capacity, strategies, the nonstrategic 
knowledge base, and metamemory (i.e. , the topics covered in Chapters 2 through 
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5 respectively of this volume). Flavell's (1971) conception of metamemory was 
global, encompassing knowledge of all possible aspects of inforrnation storage and 
retrieval. Metamemory included (but was not limited to) knowledge about memory 
functioning, lirnitations, difficulties, and strategies. Flavell and Wellman's taxon-
omy parsed metarnemory into two main categories, "sensitivity" and "variables." 
The sensitivity category included knowledge of when memory activity is necessary 
(e.g., awareness that a particular task in a particular setting requires the use of 
memory strategies). The variables category was divided into three subcategories: 
(a) characteristics of a personrelevant to memory, (b) characteristics of a task rele-
vant to memory, and (c) potentially applicable memory strategies. An exarnple of a 
person variable is the child's mnemonic self-concept, including clear ideas about his 
or her own memory strengths and weaknesses. Thsk variables include factors that 
make a memory task easier (e.g., farniliar materials, high interitem associations) or 
barder (e.g., Ionger lists, when study time is short). The strategies variable includes 
all changes in knowledge about encoding and retrieval strategies, including the 
many strategies considered in Chapter 4. 
Flavell and WeHman (1977) assumed that metamemorially sophisticated people 
did not view the metarnemory categories and subcategories as independent of one 
another, but rather as overlapping and in interaction. People with well-developed 
metarnemory know, for instance, that different individuals do not always solve a 
problern equally weil (i.e., there are person by task interactions) and that the 
strategy chosen to solve a particular problern depends largely on person and task 
characteristics (i.e., there are person by strategy by task interactions). Flavell 
(1979, 1981, 1984) also argued that metamemorywas not isolated from knowledge 
about other aspects of mind, and he generalized the metamemory taxonomy devel-
oped in Flavell and Wellman (1977) to metacognition in general. As in the meta-
memory classification, general metacognitive knowledge about persons, tasks, and 
strategies was differentiated. Flavell also introduced the terrn metacognitive exper-
iences to refer to occasions during cognitive processing when new insights about 
cognition arose. Thus, a university student might try a method of outlining in order 
to leam textbook content. If, after using the method, the student realized that a lot 
of effort bad been expended and little was leamed, that would qualify as a metacog-
nitive experience. The student would have gained insight into the utility of the out-
lining strategy. Flavell's theory was that metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive 
experiences, and cognitive behaviors constantly interact, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. 
An impression that could be gleaned from some of Flavell's early researchwas that 
a lot of metacognitive development was complete by age 8 or 9 (e.g., Kreutzer, 
Leonard, & Flavell, 1975). One motivation for Ann Brown's (1978; Brown & 
DeLoache, 1978) reconceptualization of metamemory was to counteract this 
impression, which followed largely from analyses of isolated pieces of metacogni-
tive knowledge (i .e., children's knowledge of particular person, task, and strategy 
variables). In cantrast to Flavell, Brown focused on the component that Flavell and 
Weilman ( 1977) labeled ''here and now memory monitoring." Her frarne of reference 
was the competent inforrnation processor, one possessing an efficient "executive" 
that regulated cognitive behaviors. This executive is aware of the system's capacity 
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FIGURE 5 .1. Flavell's model of metacognition and cognitive control. From Cognitive moni-
toring, by J.H. Flavell. In W.P. Dickson (Ed.), Children's orol communication skills, New 
York: Academic Press, 1981, p . 40. 
limits and strategies. The executive can analyze new problems and select appropri-
ate strategies and attempt solutions. Very importantly, the executive monitors the 
success or failure of ongoing performance, deciding which strategies to continue and 
which to replace with potentially more effective and appropriate procedures. In 
addition, the efficient executive knows when one knows and when one does not 
know, an important requirement for competent learning (e.g., Holt, 1964, pp. 28-
29). Brown took the perspective that memorymonitaring played a !arge role in these 
executive actions, and that metacognitive effects on cognitive regulation were more 
important than other metacognitive functions. In cantrast to metacognitively mature 
adults (and many adults do not qualify; see Chapter 7) who possess proficient execu-
tive capabilities, children do not monitor weil and often fail to make appropriate 
executive decisions. For instance, children often do not monitor comprehension 
problems when reading text (e.g., Baker & Brown, 1984; Garner, 1987; Körkel, 
1987), and they fail to recognize when they do not have enough information to com-
plete a task (e.g., Beal & Flavell, 1982; Flavell, Speer, Green, & August, 1981). 
(More discussion of children's monitaring deficiencies is presented in Chapter 7.) 
Brown's contributions to the development of metacognitive theory are enormous. 
Like Flavell, Brown recognized that memory and other cognitive activities (e.g., 
learning, attention, & problern solving) were inextricably intertwined and that a 
theory of metacognition should capture a variety of cognitive phenomena in relation 
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to one another. For instance, personality traits like self-concept and achievement 
motivation are part of metarnemory in that they include knowledge about the self as 
a learner. Brown also mapped out some of the educational implications of meta-
cognition (e.g., analyses of metacognitive processing during comprehension of 
text). She has developed the case explicitly that metacognitive abilities develop 
quite slowly during the school years. In addition, she has compared the metacog-
nitive competencies of retarded and learning-disabled children to those of normal 
children. 
Other theorists have also contributed substantially to the development of 
metacognitive theory, and metarnemory theory in particular. For instance, there has 
been additional study ofpreschoolers' metacognition, with Wellman's (1983, 1985a, 
1985b, in press) ''theory of mind" particularly emphasizing the development of 
metacognition in early childhood. Wellman differentiales five partially overlapping 
classes of knowledge that develop during the preschool years. Knowledge about exis-
tence is the most basic category. Children know by about 2 to 3 years of age that 
there is an inner mental world. They have a rudimentary understanding of mental 
verbs like "thinking" or "remembering" and can separate mental processes from 
extemal behaviors associated with them (although not with absolute certainty or 
accuracy). Children gradually learn to recognize that the mental world can be 
differentiated into processes such as remembering, knowing, and guessing (i.e., 
they acquire knowledge of distinct mental processes). Although 3- to 4-year-olds 
arenot generally capable of differentiating these processes, older preschool children 
mak.e differentiations that are quite similar to those of adults. Although there are 
numerous differentiation possibilities between individual mental processes, these 
processes also have a nurober of things in common. The category knowledge about 
integration attempts to represent the growing understanding of the similarity 
between certain mental activities, such as thinking and remembering. There are 
clear developmental improvements in integration during the preschool years. Cate-
gories 4 and 5 are knowledge about variables (e.g., task, strategy) and cognitive 
monitaring (i.e., awareness of their mental condition relative to task demands) 
and are based on the categories of the sarne narne in the Flavell and Wellman 
(1977) model. 
A great deal of attention has been given to more advanced metacognition in older 
children. Kluwe (1980, 1981, 1982; Kluwe & Friedrichsen, 1984; Kluwe & 
Schiebler, 1984) developed a more complete and more differentiated description of 
metacognition than provided by either Brown or Flavell. Kluwe's model includes 
knowledge about minds in generat (i.e., how all rninds operate) and knowledge about 
individual differences in cognition. Kluwe's conception borrowed heavily from 
generat theories of information processing. For instance, the concepts declarative 
and procedural knowledge were introduced to represent the ideas that knowledge of 
data (i .e., knowing "that") and knowledge of processes (i .e., knowing "how'') are 
both necessary in human thinking. Kluwe considered analysis of knowledge about 
processes to be particularly important. These procedural components are active 
agents in Kluwe's framework. He incorporates ideas about executive and control 
processes that are similar to Brown's, although more elaborate. Kluwe identifies 
control processes that evaluate ongoing cognition (i.e., monitor current perfor-
I 
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mance). Other control processes are more directed at regulation, allocating atten-
tion and selecting other processes to be applied in given situations, as well as deter-
rnining the intensity with which strategic processes are to be applied. Figure 5.2 
illustrates Kluwe's thinking about the complex interactions that exist between 
declarative and procedural processes. 
Scott Parisandhis associates (e.g., Paris & Lindauer, 1982; Pariset al., 1983; 
Paris & Jacobs, 1984; Paris & Oka, 1986) also proposed a taxonomy of metacogni-
tive variables. There are two particularly important categories of metacognition in 
the Paris model. Awareness of cognition includes knowledge about task and strategy 
characteristics in the sense of Flavell and Wellman (1977). lt also includes 
knowledge about when, where, and why to use particular strategies (i.e., the condi-
tional knowledge that a person requires in order to use a strategy). The second major 
category is selfnwnitoring, which includes evaluation of ongoing cognitive 
processes, planning to use cognitive processes, and regulation of those processes. 
Pressley, Borkowski, and their colleagues (e.g. , Borkowski, Johnston, & Reid, 
1987; Pressley, Borkowski, & O'Sullivan, 1984, 1985; Pressley, Borkowski, & 
Schneider, 1987; Pressley, Goodchild, Fleet, Zajchowski, & Evans, in press; Press-
ley, Snyder, & Cariglia-Bull, 1987) have proposed an elaborate model of metacogni-
tion, the Good Strategy User Model, with only a small part of it reviewed here. 
Strategies are the fundamental elements in this framework. Good strategy users 
also have general strategy knowledge, that is, they understand general principles 
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about strategy functioning (e.g., mental effort is necessary to deploy most strate-
gies). In contrast, metacognitive knowledge about specific strategies (often 
abbreviated to specific strategy knowledge) refers to knowledge about particular 
strategies (e.g., when and where to use a strategy). Good strategy usersalso possess 
skills that permit them to acquire additional metacognition. In particular, meta-
cognitive acquisition procedures take other strategies as input and evaluate them. 
For instance, self-testing procedures can be metacognitive acquisition procedures, 
such as when self-testing is undertaken to judge the efficiency of a new strategy or 
when performance comparisons are made to determine which of several memory 
strategies is most powerful as a mediator of a particular type of memory problern 
(e.g., Neuringer, 1981). All of the components of good strategy use interact. For 
instance, specific strategy knowledge influences the adequate application of 
memory strategies. As the strategies are carried out, they can be evaluated, which 
Ieads to expansion and refmement of specific strategy knowledge (i.e., perhaps that 
the strategy in use is particularly helpful in this Situation). The Good Strategy User 
Model is taken up in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In surnrnary, metamemory theory continues to evolve, with this evolution both 
motivating additional research and being motivated by research outcomes. Given 
the complexity of metamemory processes, it is not surprising that a variety of 
research approaches have been required to provide information about the many 
facets of metamemory. Explicit discussion of how metamemory is assessed sets the 
stage for discussion of the major fmdings to date. 
Assessment of Metamemory 
There are a variety of measures that have been used to capture what children know 
about memory. In reviewing the various measures, we rely on a distinction 
introduced by Cavanaugh and Perlmutter (1982). Some measures of metamemory 
are taken without concurrent memory assessment (independent measures), and 
others are collected simultaneously with the measurement of memory activity (con-
current measures). Independent measures usually tap pieces of information about 
memory that children possess, the facts that are known about memory capacities, 
tasks, strategies, and their interactions. In contrast, concurrent measures tap aware-
ness of ongoing processing-They are measures of monitoring. 
Independent Measures: Assessing Knowledge of Facts About Memory 
Although paper-and-pencil metamemory questionnaires are often used with adoles-
cents, adults, and elderly persons (see Dixon, 1985; Dixon & Hultsch, 1983a, 
1983b; Herrmann, 1982, 1984; Perlmutter, 1978; Zelinski, Gilewski, & Thompson, 
1980), they are almost never employed with children. Instead, verbal interviews are 
conducted with child subjects. Undoubtedly, the best known of these studies was 
Kreutzer et al. (1975). They interviewed children in kindergarten, grade 1, grade 3, 
and grade 5 about memory, using 14 items containing one or more questions about 
memory storage and retrieval. These items assessed knowledge of person variables, 
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task demands, and strategies. Many of the questions involved a decision between 
two options (e.g., whether to dial a telephone number immediately after hearing it 
or to get a drink of water before dialing). Other questions demanded more of the 
children. For instance, children's knowledge of retrieval strategies was tested by ask-
ing them to think of all the things they could do to try and find a jacket they bad lost 
while at kindergarten. 
Cavanaugh and Borkowski (1980) conducted the only complete replication of 
Kreutzer et al.'s ( 1975) study, presumably because ofthelarge number of items in the 
original research. Other studies (e.g., Borkowski, Peck, Reid, & Kurtz, 1983; 
Brown, 1978; Kurtz & Borkowski, 1984; Schneider, 1986; Schneideret al., 1986; 
Weinert et al., 1984) have incorporated some of the items, however, with most of the 
data consistent with Kreutzer et al.'s (1975) original fmdings. lt has been established 
that the items used in the study are generally reliable (Kurtz, Reid, Borkowski, & 
Cavanaugh, 1982). More recent interview studies are even better from a psychomet-
ric perspective, however. Hasselhom (1986) illustrates the improvement in assess-
ment. He began with an extensive item pool and then conducted extensive pilot 
testing, dropping items that were not sufficiently reliable or did not seem to be 
otherwise valid. 
Nonetheless, it must be admitted that there is a long history of skepticism about 
the validity of self-reports and interview data (see Brown et al., 1983; Ericsson & 
Simon, 1980, 1984). Many of the concems are about the veridicality of verbal 
reports to actual cognitive processing. These problems are especially acute with 
children (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982). Young children's verbal skills are often 
inadequate for them to articulate their knowledge about memory (Cavanaugh & 
Perlmutter, 1982; Wellman, 1985a). For instance, do performance differences in 
metamemory interviews between preschoolers and grade-1 children indicate ''true" 
differences in children's conceptions of memory or differences in the language skills 
of 5- compared to 6-year-old children? Young children are often less likely to answer 
at all, or they are less able to elaborate wbat they say. They are also less schooled 
in the verbal conventions (e.g., specialized vocabulary) that permit communication 
about complicated topics (like knowledge ofmemory). An anecdotal exarnple makes 
clear that the problern of incomplete verbal reports is not limited to preschoolers, 
however. Brown (1978) reports that when a 7-year-old was asked what he would do 
to remernher a list of taxonomically categorizable pictures, the child answered that 
he would Iook at them. Given the pictures, the child carefully placed them into taxo-
nomic categories and then proceeded to scan them carefully. Asked what he bad 
done to remember, the 7 -year-old replied that he bad looked at the pictures just like 
he said tbat he would. These remarks make evident the importance of converging 
measures rather than reliance on children's verbal reports alone (e.g., Brown, 1978; 
Brown et al., 1983; Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Meichenbaum, Burland, Gru-
son, & Cameron, 1985; Schneider, 1985c). There are a number of other indepen-
dent measures of metamemory that can be employed. 
Weilman (1977b) developed a nonverbal technique to explore metacognition in 
preschoolers. Subjects were asked to make decisions about pairs of pictures, each of 
which portrayed characters in different memory-related Situations. For instance, 
one picture depicted a girl trying to leam the names of five people and another 
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showed a girl trying to learn the names of 15 people. The task was to answer a ques-
tion about memory by picking one of the two pictures, with questions conceming 
memory-relevant variables like age and study time as well as memory irrelevant 
variables such as the color of the person's hair. Yussen and Bird ( 1979) developed a 
similar procedure to test the knowledge ofyounger subjects about how variables lik:e 
noise or study time affect memory performance. Wellrnan (1978) used rank order-
ing of pictured situations instead of paired comparisons to assess children's 
knowledge about the interaction of memory variables (e.g., number of items and 
study time). In all of these studies, age differences in the number of correct solutions 
have been interpreted as representing developmental improvements in knowledge 
about memory. 
Justice (1985, 1986) developed a procedure that involves presenting various 
memory strategies (looking, narning, rehearsal, and grouping) on a videotape. After 
watehing the videotape and naming the four strategies (but without an opportunity 
to see the models attempting recall), the children make paired comparisons of the 
four strategies. For each pair, the children are asked to state which strategy is better 
for free recall of the items on a picture Iist. Investigators (Justice, 1985, 1986; 
Schneider, 1986; Schneider, Körkel, & Vogel, 1987) using this approach have 
produced consistent data. Kindergarten and young elementary-school children 
recognize differential effectiveness only when strategies produce dramatic differ-
ences in performance. Older elementary-school children, however, can detect more 
subtle differences in strategy effectiveness. The conclusion that older children have 
a better knowledge about the advantages or disadvantages of a particular strategy 
was validated in Schneider (1986) and in Schneideret al. (1987), with additional 
analyses in those studies involving the rank ordering of strategies. 
Bestand Omstein (1986) have developed a method of assessment based on peer 
tutoring. The method requires that older children (e.g., third or sixth graders) be 
asked to tutor a young child (e.g., a first grader) about how to do a task (e.g., sort-
recall; see p. 53, this volume) in order to maxirnize learning. The tutors' assignment 
is to describe to the younger children what they themselves would do when given a 
sirnilar task. Thtors' instructions are taped and subjected to content analyses. The 
measure of metamemory is the extent to which the instructions include appropriate 
strategy instructions (e.g., appropriate use of organizational strategies for a sort-
recall task). 
Concurrent Measures: Assessing Memory Monitoring 
Concurrent measures are characterized by the presence of simultaneaus memory 
activity (see Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Meichenbaum et al., 1985). The num-
ber of such measures have increased substantially in recent years, largely due to 
research efforts in the area of reading (see Baker & Brown, 1984; Brown, 1980; 
Forrest-Pressley & Waller, 1984; Garner, 1987; Körkel, 1987). We cover here only 
the concurrent measures used most frequently in metamemory research and that are 
most theoretically revealing. 
Performance predictions, as the name implies, are made prior to study of to-be-
remembered material and involve estimation of how much will be learned. A form 
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of performance prediction that has been used often in developmental research is 
prediction of one's own memory span (e.g., Flavell et al., 1970). Subjects are 
presented incrementally Ionger lists of to-be-leamed materials (pictures, words, or 
figures), with the task to indicate whether she or he could still recall a Iist that 
long. The child's memory span is then tapped using the same lists. Comparison 
of the prediction value with actual memory span yields the metamemory indi-
cator, which is usually interpreted as a byproduct of memory monitoring (i.e., 
children who have monitored their memory proficiently in the past should be more 
aware of their memory span than children who have not monitored at all or not 
monitored well in the past). Performance prediction accuracy can be measured for 
a variety of memory tasks, with recent applications in text learning (e.g., Körkel, 
1987; Uhl, 1986). 
In contrast to performance predictions, which are made before studying occurs, 
recall readiness assessments are made after material has been studied at least 
one time. One variation involves asking subjects to continue studying until their 
memory of to-be-leamed material is perfect. For instance, Flavell et ~I. (1970) 
found that 5- to 6-year-old children are often too optirnistic about their readiness 
for a test, with low Ievels of recall occurring after they claim that they are pre-
pared for a test. Much more realistic assessments can be obtained from older 
children. 
A number of developmental studies have explored children's feeling of knowing 
(Brown & Lawton, 1977; Cultice, Somerville, & Wellman, 1983; Posnansky, 
1978a, 1978b; Wellman, 1977a, 1979). Children are shown series of items and are 
asked to name them. When a child cannot recall the name of an object given its pic-
ture, she or he can be asked to indicate whether the name would be recognized if the 
experimenter provided it. These feeling-of-knowing ratings are then related to sub-
sequent performance on a recognition test that includes nonrecalled items. Like per-
formance predictions and recall readiness estimates, feeling-of-knowing judgments 
are taken before the test of interest. 
In contrast, other concurrent measures tap memory behaviors as they occur. 
Thus, verbal protocol techniques (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984) require sub-
jects either to verbalize all thoughts that come to them while performing a task (i.e., 
think aloud) or to verbalize between trials. 
Finally, children can be asked to judge their memory performance immediately 
after attempting a task (i.e., make postdictions) (e.g., Berch & Evans, 1973; Bisanz, 
Vesonder, & Voss, 1978; Kelly, Scholnick, Travers, & Johnson, 1976; Masur, 
Mclntyre, & Flavell, 1973). This can involve estimating overall performance or 
estimating performance on an item-by-item basis. 
Measurement Problems 
All methods for assessing metamemory have problems. Some of these are very seri-
ous. The existence of such difficu1ties makes it especially imperative that converg-
ing measures be used as often as possible. We touch on some of the more serious 
difficulties associated with particular approaches. 
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As discussed already, differences in verbal skills can cloud interpretations of 
developmental differences obtained using interview measures. There are serious 
problems in asking children to comment on hypotbetical Situations (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1980, 1984), situations that tbey may bave never experienced or may have 
little memory of experiencing. In addition, interviews usually involve subjects 
verbalizing about general rather than task-related cognitive processes, wbich limits 
the chances of verbal protocols being true reflections of the subjects' experiences 
(see Brown et al., 1983). 
Verbal protocols are subject to many of the criticisms of other interview data 
(althougb they are better in that they pertain to a specific task that was just per-
formed). Thinking aloud may also interfere with carrying out the task. The result 
can be eitber incomplete reports or changes in task performance from what would 
occur otberwise, althougb this is less of a problern if tbe verbal reports are solicited 
between trials. 
RaDkorderings have been criticized because tbese methods are procedurally com-
plex. For instance, Weilman (1978) required children to compare depictions ofthree 
tasks. As it tums out, three-option problems are more difficult for young pre-
scboolers than for older children, regardless of the content of the questions (Steuck, 
1984). Individual paired comparisons are conceptually simpler, but often studies 
involve formidable numbers of comparisons (i .e., all possible paired comparisons 
are made, and each may be repeated several times in order to obtain reliable data). 
Fatigue can be a real issue. 
Although peer tutoring seerns to be a highly motivating situation, there is no 
guarantee that tutors express a1l that they know. One likely hypothesis is that they 
might bias their explanations of strategies downward to match their perceptions of 
tbe cognitive Ievels oftutees (e.g., Shatz & Gelman, 1973). 
A number of concems have been raised about the span estimation task (e.g., 
Brown, 1978; Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Hasselbom, 1986). For one, the com-
petence of young children can be overestimated if the researcher stops taking esti-
mates once the child indicates that a Iist is too long-Young children often respond 
inconsistently, and even if they indicated that tbey could not recall a Iist composed 
of five or six iterns, they might claim that seven- or eight-item lists would be no 
problern (Brown, 1978). Whetber span estimates are accurate seems to vary with 
material and task familiarity (e.g., Körkel, 1987; Markman, 1973; Schneider, 
Körkel, & Weinert, 1987b) or whether children receive training on the task (Mark-
man, 1973; Weaver & Cunningham, 1985). Modeofassessment seems to affect span 
estimations. For instance, Weaver and Cunninghalll. (1985) found that prescboolers 
span predictions were more realistic wben they listened to items on a tape and used 
a stop-key to indicate when the list was too long rather than when they responded 
to verbal probes. 
Recall readiness measures can also be criticized. Might young children indicate 
that tbey are ready for a test because they understand the task to be one of learning 
quickly? lt is known that younger and older children use different response criteria 
in evaluating their readiness, with younger children applying more liberal criteria 
than older children (Worden & Sladewski-Awig, 1982). A similar problern plagues 
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feeling-of-knowing data. Nelson and Narens (1980) have shown that the feeling-
of-knowing paradigm confounds the subject's threshold for "know" versus "do not 
know" responses with their knowledge about unrecalled items. This is a problern 
in developmental data since knowledge about unrecalled material varies with 
development. 
In summary, there is not a perfect index of any aspect of metamemory. The candor 
of metamemory researchers about the limitations of their measures is commend-
able. If anything, they seem to be a little too self-critical, for many of the measure-
ment problems that metamemory researchers confront are similar to measurement 
problerns in other areas of psychology. The forthright approach to these methodo-
logical problems has led to considerable methodological progress. For instance, 
some problems associated with plotting the development of test monitoring have 
been solved. Pressley and Ghatala (in press; Pressley, Levin, Ghatala, & Ahmad, 
1987) devised tests that tap prior knowledge (and thus, monitoring during study is 
eliminated) and that are equivalently difficult at each age Ievel (and thus, con-
foundings between developmental Ievel and the objective difficulty of the test are 
avoided). It is impossible to read the metamemory research produced in the last few 
years without being impressed at the methodological savvy of investigators over-
coming what could have been viewed as insurmountable problems. Even more strik-
ing, diversemethodologiesoften produce converging data. For especially impres-
sive evidence on this point, see Wagoner's (1983) or Garner's (1987) repew of 
monitoring during text learning. 
Development of Metamemory 
A Iot of metamemory data has been produced in the last decade, much of which was 
orderly and highly informative about children's knowledge about memory. We 
understand better both (a) children's 1ong-term, factual knowledge about memory 
and (b) their abilities to monitor memory. Brief coverage ofthese two acquisitions 
is provided in this section, with findings organized on the basis of some of the major 
research directions pursued by metamemory researchers. 
Children's Factual Knowledge About Memory 
WHEN Do CHILOREN KNOW THE RELEVANT MENTAL VERBS? 
A basictype of metamemory is understanding mental verbs, such as thinking ,forget-
ting, or knowing. Although Kreutzer et al. (1975) provided evidence that the 
youngest participants in their study (kindergarten children) could properly apply 
mental verbs, it has proven more difficult to determine preschoolers' knowledge of 
mental verbs. Misciones, Marvin, O'Brien, and Greenburg (1978), who studied the 
verbs knowing and guessing, and WeHman and Johnson (1979), who conducted 
research on remembering and forgetting, asked preschoolers to judge the "mental 
status" of an agent who either watched an object be hidden or who was blindfolded 
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as an object was hidden. The agent then searched for the object, sometimes fmding 
it and sometimes not. Thus, the agent should have been labeled as forgetting, if he 
possessed the necessary prior lrnowledge but did not fmd the object; if the prior 
lrnowledge was available and the performance correct, then the agent should have 
been credited with remembering or knowing; and guessing was the appropriate Iabel 
when there was no prior lrnowledge available, regardless of whether the object was 
located. In both studies, however, preschool children judged mental status more on 
the basis of whether the object was found than on the basis of the prior lrnowledge 
possessed by the agent. Whenever the agent in Miseiones et al. (1978) performed 
correctly, the preschoolers used the labet knowing; incorrect actions were Iabeted 
. guessing. Correct actions (locating the object) were described as remembering by 
Wellman and Johnson's (1979) subjects; incorrect actions are consistently defined 
as forgetting. 
In a follow-up study, Johnson and Wellman (1980) hypothesized that the ability of 
preschoolers to distinguish between internal and external worlds might be dernon-
strahle using an additional "trick condition." The children observed as an object was 
hidden in one of three boxes. The children were then requested to tell where the 
object was and were immediately proven wrong. Instead of saying that this was due 
to Iack of knowledge, the subjects stubbornly insisted that they knew and remem-
bered where the object was, even though it was not found there. Mental verbs were 
correctly applied to mental states at all age Ievels (4-, 5-, 7-, and 9-year-olds) in this 
trick condition. Comparisons ofthe outcomes in Johnson and Wellman (1980) with 
Weilman and Johnson (1979) and Miseiones et al. (1978) makes clear that different 
conclusions can follow from collection of data using different methods-although 
4-year-olds in Johnson and Wellman (1980) used mental verbs correctly, the results 
in Weilman and Johnson (1979) and Miseiones et al. (1978) establish that children's 
competent use of these verbs is highly constrained. 
KNOWLEOOE OF PERSON VARIABLES 
Knowledge about personvariables includes knowledge about all variables or perma-
nent personality attributes or states that can influence memory of information 
(Flavell & Wellman, 1977). Kreutzer et al. (1975) included only one item that 
tapped knowledge of person variables. They found that 9- and 11-year-olds could 
better conceptualize memory abilities in that they realized that memorization skills 
vary from person to person and from situation to situation. The 9- and 11-year-olds 
also lrnew that they did not have an equally good memory in all situations and it was 
quite possible that their friends bad a better memory than they did. In contrast, most 
of the kiDdergarten and first-grade subjects were convinced that they always remem-
bered weil and that they were betterat remembering than their friends. In fact, 30% 
of the kiDdergarten children were convinced that they never forgot anything. This 
fmding is consistent with other demonstrations that the memory-related self-
concept ofyoung children is unrealistic (e.g., Schneider, 1985b; Schneideret al., 
1986; Weinert et al., 1984). Five- and 6-year-olds generally tend to overestimate 
their performance. 
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Wellrnan (1977b) included a total of four items that provided information about 
person-related metamemory possessed by preschool children. Three of these items 
were related to irrelevant personal characteristics such as hair color, clothing, or 
weight, whereas the fourth item was directed at a memory-relevant personal charac-
teristic (age). A little more than 75% ofthe 3- and 4-year-olds and allofthe 5-year-
olds rated two of the three irrelevant factors as not important as determinants of 
memory (e.g., judged that whether a personwas fat orthin would not influence 
memory performance). Even more impressive, most of the children were also able 
to provide appropriate reasoning for their decisions. In contrast, however, only 
about 50% of the children in the sample recognized that memory improves with 
increasing age. 
Prelirninary results from the Munich Longitudinal Study on the Development of 
Individual Competencies (Weinert & Schneider, 1987a, 1987b) also indicate that 
4-year-old children do not know that chronological age is a correlate of memory 
performance. Only about 33% of the children in the study were able to judge cor-
rectly that there was an association between age and memory. In contrast to 
Weilman (1977b), however, almost half (49%) of the 4-year-old subjects in the 
Munich study assumed that hair color was correlated with memory performance. 
In closing this subsection, it should be pointed out, however, that the modest 
knowledge about the effects of age on memory that is possessed by preschoolers is 
only evident when age is a salient variable.in the metamemory assessment items. 
Much less awareness of the age-memory association is obtained with problems in 
which age is a less obvious factor (Wellman, 1977b; Yussen & Bird, 1979). Pre-
school children clearly have difficulty in determining the importance of relatively 
stable personal characteristics that determine memory performance. 
KNOWLEDGE OF TASK VARIABLES 
Although there is not much research on knowledge about person characteristics that 
determine memory, there are a number of studies evaluating children's knowledge of 
task factors that affect memory. Weltman (1977b) provided the frrst hints that 
knowledge of task characteristics is available at the preschool Ievel. The study 
included items related to a variety of factors that can affect memory, such as proper-
ties of materials (e.g., how much material there is to learn), circumstaoces of the 
learning situation (e.g., noise & Iength of study time), aod exteroal supports (e.g., 
help from friends or retrieval cues). The clearest results supporting competency in 
preschool children were obtained for the "oumber of iterns" and "noise" variables. 
Eighty-two percent of the children were convinced that 18 items are more difficult 
to remember than 3 items; 66% of the subjects said that noise negatively influences 
memory performance. In contrast, only 37% of the subjects assumed that friends 
could be of help in retention, and only about 26% feit that the amount of totallearn-
ing time would have an effect on memory performance. 
Later studies (Weinert et al., 1984; Yussen & Bird, 1979) produced data suggest-
ing that, if anything, Wellman (1977b) overestimated preschoolers' knowledge of 
task variables. For instance, in both the Munich longitudinal study and in Yussen 
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and Bird's (1979) research, only about 40% of the 4-year-old subjects could judge 
correctly the effect of the nurnber of items on the difficulty of memory problems. 
The 4-year-old subjects in the Yussen and Bird study also made fewer correct 
responses for the noise and time variables compared to the prescboolers in 
Wellrnan's (1977b) research (11% vs. 55%). Interpretation of Wellrnan's (1977b) 
data is especially clouded because he eliminated subjects who could not answer 
simple control questions correctly (i.e., 35% of the 3-year-olds, 25% of the 4-year-
olds, and 10% ofthe 5-year-olds). If one assurnes that these subjects probably would 
have made incorrect responses to the materials questions, Wellman's data are more 
compatible with those in the Munich study andin Yussen and Bird (1979). 
Yussen and Bird reported that 6-year-olds' understanding of the significance of 
task characteristics is much more complete than the understanding of preschool 
children. About 78% of the grade-1, 6-year-olds in their study knew that the nurober 
of items affected memory performance. Eighty-nine percent of the grade-1 subjects 
indicated that noise negatively influences learning performance. Even the most 
difficult item (i.e., the relevancy of learning time for performance) was answered 
correctly by about half of the 6-year-olds. 
Although these results seem to indicate that by grade 1, cbildren know a great deal 
about the importance of some task characteristics on memory performance, it must 
be emphasized that other variables are poorly understood by young children. For 
instance, 7-, 9-, and 10-year-old students in Moynahan's (1978) study were asked to 
judge which of two lists would be easier to learn, one composed of taxonomically 
organized items or one composed of conceptually unrelated words. Although both 
older groups recognized the advantages conferred by taxonomic structure, this did 
not hold true for the 7-year-olds. This result bas been confirmed in followup sturlies 
(Schneider, 1986; Schneideret al., 1987; Weinert et al., 1984). Grade-1 children 
also Iack knowledge of retrieval factors and their effects on memory: (a) The 
majority of grade-1 children in Speer and Flavell (1979) did not recognize that 
recognition memory tasks are easier than recall tasks (i.e., recall requires more 
retrieval). (b) Fifty-five percent and 65% of Kreutzer et al:s kindergarten and 
grade-1 subjects respectively knew that gist recall was easier than verbatim recall, 
compared to 100% of grade-5 children who understood that verbatim recall was a 
more difficult retrieval task. Other studies (Borkowski et al., 1983; Kurtz & Bor-
kowski, 1987; Kurtz, Schneider, Thmer, & Carr, 1986; Myers & Paris, 1978) sug-
gest that, if anything, Kreutzer et al. (1975) overestimated kiDdergarten and grade-1 
children's understanding of the relative ease of gist and verbatim recall. ( c) Although 
the majority of preschool and kindergarten childr~n know that memory tasks are 
easier when retrieval cues are available, sophisticated understanding of retrieval 
cues and how they work develops during the grade-school years (Beal, 1985; 
Schneider & Sodian, 1988). 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AN EsPECIALLY lMPORTANT TAsK: TExT AND lTs STRucruRE 
One of the most common types of to-be-processed and to-be-learned materials in the 
real world is text. Thus, it may not be surprising that a good deal of effort has been 
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expended deterrnining children's knowledge of text structure. Brown and her col-
leag~es (e.g., Brown & Smiley, 1977) have conducted very visible research on this 
problem. Students were asked to rate the pieces of information in text as most 
irnportant (top one-fourth), slightly less irnportant (second one-fourth), less impor-
tant still (third one-fourth), and least important. Although grade-7 students provided 
importance ratings that were roughly equivalent to the ratings provided by college-
student adults, grade-3 and grade-5 children's ratings differed greatly from those of 
adults. One possible explanation of the apparently late development of text 
knowledge in this study is that the texts were fairly long and complicated as was the 
rating procedure. 
Investigators who have used shorter and less complicated texts as well as less com-
plicated rating systems have produced data suggesting greater knowledge of text 
structure by elementary-school children. Unlike Brown's research, most of the 
follow-up studies used texts constructed on the basis of formal story grammars 
(Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Stein & Glenn, 1979). (See Chapter 4 for abrief discus-
sion of story grammar.) High metacognitive knowledge was assumed in these 
studies when children identified the most important elements in text to be the ones 
that are more central according to story grammar models. 
For instance, Yussen, Mathews, Buss, and Kane (1980) showed that fifth graders 
could differentiate central information from less important information in text, but 
that grade-2 children could not do so. Hoppe-Graffand Schöler (1980) obtained 
comparable results, as did Denbiere and Le Ny (1980). Recent studies have sug-
gested, not surprisingly, that children are more proficient at differentiating impor-
tant from less important inforrnation when reading text based on contents in which 
they possess expertise (Denhiere, Cession, & Deschene, 1986; Körkel, 1987). 
Perhaps the most impressive demonstration of early knowledge of the relative 
importance of textelementswas provided by Young and Schumacher (1983). Even 
4- and 6-year-old children were sensitive to relative importance Ievels within simple 
picture stories. The importance ratings of preschool children correlated signifi-
cantly with those of adults; the ratings of 6-year-olds were very similar to those 
of adults. Young and Schumacher's (1983) study is a clear example of the great 
effect that materials modifications can have on task difficulty. A finding such as 
this one prompts skepticism when researchers try to set an absolute age Iimit for 
certain abilities. 
KNOWLEDGE ABoUT STRATEGIES l'HAT ARE USEFUL FOR "NATURAL" MEMORY TASKS 
Since simple strategies are used in natural settings as early as the second year of life 
(see Chapter 3), it might be surmised that preschool and kindergaTten children 
would possess elementary knowledge of memory strategies, particularly ones that 
could be used in real-world memory tasks. 
Kreutzer et al. (1975) included one item to assess knowledge of strategies that 
could be used in preparation for future retrieval. Participants were asked to tell 
everything that they could do in order to be sure that they would remernher to take 
their ice skates to school the next day. The answers could be placed into fouc main 
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categories. The three external categories involved manipulation ofthe skates (e.g., 
putting them near the door), use of extemal memory cues (e.g., notes), and relying 
on cues provided by other people (e.g., asking a parent to provide a reminder). The 
fourth category of answers involved internal processes that the child could carry out 
(e.g., rehearsal of the fact that the skates needed tobe taken to school). There was 
a significant developmental increase in the nurober of strategies reported, although 
even leindergarten children were able to come up with at least one strategy each. All 
age groups reported more extemal than intemal strategies. The strategies reported 
by grade-3 and gra.de-5 children seemed more clearcut and efficient than those 
provided by leindergarten and grade-1 participants. In their replication work, Bor-
kowski and his associates (Borkowski et al., 1983; Cavanaugh & Borkowski, 1980; 
Kurtz & Borkowski, 1987) have obtained generally comparable data in response to 
the "skates" question. 
A similar strategy question was included in the Munich Longitudinal Study 
(Weinert & Schneider, 1986, 1987a, 1987b). Four-year-olds were asked what they 
could do in order to remernher to take their snack to preschool the next day. Children 
in this age group reported only extemal strategies, with 14% ofthe children suggest-
ing a manipulation ofthe snack (e.g., put it near the door); 3% suggested construc-
tion of a note; and 3% said that they would ask someone eise to help. 
Kreutzer et al. (1975) also included an item to assess knowledge of retrieval strate-
gies. the question was, "What would one do to fmd a jacket that bad been lost in 
school?" The answers were classified by Kreutzer et al. (1975) in two main cate-
gories, "search" referring to search procedures carried out by the child and "other" 
strategies referring to solutions that involved other people. Subjects at all age Ievels 
suggested looking places where the jacket would be 1ikely tobe found (e.g., the 
cloakroom) and asking people who would be likely tobe helpful (e.g., the teacher). 
Every kiDdergarten child offered at least one solution, with grade-1 children averag-
ing two solutions. Suggestions to search systematically and elaborately were offered 
rnore often by older (grade-5 children) cornpared to the younger participants. 
Follow-up research has provided data that cornplernents the Kreutzer et al. (1975) 
findings. Only about 25% of the 4-year-olds in the Munich Longitudinal Study 
generated retrieval strategies. Yussen and Levy (1977) reported that the nurnber of 
reported strategies for retrieval of a lost object increased up until about 10-years of 
age; the nurober of strategies for fmding an internal piece of information (how can· 
one remernher a birthday present that one thought to be a good idea but has forgotten 
in the rneantime) increases weil into adolescence according to the Yussen and Levy 
(1977) data. 
Kreutzer et al:s (1975) study also included problerns that required subjects to 
make preparations to remernher an upcoming event (i.e., the birthday party of a 
friend) and to retrieve information about an event that bad already happened (i.e., 
to remernher that Christmas when a particular present was received). The birthday 
party problern produced data that was similar to the data generated for the ice skates 
problern. Even the youngest children could come up with a strategy or two, with 
more and increasingly sophisticated strategies reported by the older children. In 
contrast, the mernory-of-Christmas problern was extremely difficult. Kreutzer et al. 
(1975) reported that leindergarten children could hardly understand the task. First 
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graders said that they would seek assistance from other people, as did third graders. 
Although fifth-grade subjects produced more strategies and more varied strategies, 
there was still room for improvement. Others (Cavanaugh & Borkowski, 1980; 
Kurtz & Borkowski, 1987) have confirmed that very few adequate responses are 
generated for the memory-of-Christmas item until the end of the grade-school years. 
What emerges from the Kreutzer et al. (1975) data and the follow-up research is 
a portrait of developing knowledge of strategies from 4 years of age through the 
grade-school years and into adolescence. The development of knowledge about 
strategies du ring the grade-school years has been confirmed in other research aimed 
at elucidating children's understanding of strategies suitable for performing Iabara-
tory tasks. 
KNOWLEDGE ABoUT STRATEGIES THAT ARE UsEFUL FOR FREE REcALL TASKS 
Children's knowledge about organizational strategies was tapped by a single item in 
Kreutzer et al. (1975). The subjects were shown nine picture cards (three from each 
of three categories), and they were told to imagine that these items had tobe learned 
in a few rninutes. They were also told that they could do anything they wished to 
acquire the items. There was a clear age trend. Only one kindergaTten child used a 
categorization strategy, although many grade-5 subjects did so. When partial cate-
gory use was scored, 35% of the kindergaTten children, 40% of the grade-1 subjects, 
70% of the grade-3 participants, and 80% of the grade-5 subjects evidenced rudi-
mentary knowledge of organizational strategies. 
Data on knowledge of categorization strategies has also been generated by com-
paring videotaped presentations of strategies pairwise. Sodian et al. (1986) pre-
sented lists containing items that could be categorized taxonornically or by color. 
The 4- and 6-year-olds made pairwise comparisons between taxonomic sorting, 
color sorting, random sorting, and looking strategies. The judgments of the 4- and 
6-year-olds differed little, with only one significant difference between the two age 
groups. The taxonomic sorting strategy was judged much more positively by the 
older children. More negatively, the 6-year-olds did not realize that the taxonomic-
sorting strategy was more potent than the color-sorting approach. 
The shift in knowledge about free recall strategies between kiDdergarten and grade 
6 was obvious in three studies using the paired-comparison method (Justice, 1985, 
1986; Schneider, 1986). In general, preschoolers considered "looking at" asthebest 
strategy, with taxonomic sorting, rehearsal, and narning trailing in popularity. Kin-
dergarten children were more likely to view all four strategies as equally effective. 
Second and fourth graders preferred grouping and rehearsal, but did not differenti-
ate between these two. By grade 6 there is clear understanding that semantic-
grouping strategies are superior to rehearsal, narning, and looking. 
KNOWLEDGE .AßOUT THE INTERACTION OF MEMORY VARIABLES 
Until now, we have considered children's knowledge of task, person, and strategy 
variables separately. Weilman in particular has assessed children's knowledge of how 
thesevariables interact, however. Weilman (1978) presented memory problems to 
5- and 10-year-olds. Each problern consisted of ranking three picture cards, each of 
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which contained a memorizing scenario (the three seenarios differing with respect 
to the likelihood of successful memory performance). For instance, one set con-
sisted of pictures of three boys, each of whom was supposed to remernher some 
items, either three, nine, or 18 items. Thus, this was a simple problern tapping a 
single task variable (i.e., numher of items). A complicated interaction problern 
(item by strategy interaction) was depicted with the following three cards: (a) boy 
A who was to remernher 18 items merely by looking at them; (b) boy B who just 
looked at three items; (c) boy C who wrote down the names of three items. This 
metamemory question was considered to he answered correctly if a subject indi-
cated that boy A was less likely to do well than boy B who was Iess likely to do well 
compared to boy C. 
Neither the 5- or 10-year-olds had any trouble solving the simple memory 
problems; there were, however, substantial developmental differences for the com-
plex memory problems. Although the 10-year-olds performed almost perfectly, the 
5-year-oJds only answered 32% of the complex memory problems correctly. The 
younger children tended to estimate task difficulty by taking only one of the two 
relevant features into account. 
Does Wellman's (1978) result mean that preschool children are not capable of 
considering and comparing two different features of memory problems at the same 
time? Probably not. Wellman, Collins, and Glieherman (1981) focused on knowl-
edge about the combined effects of a task variable (i.e., the numher of items to he 
rememhered) and a person variable (i.e., the amount of effort expended). Three 
values of each of these variables were combined factorally to create nine different 
picture cards. The subjects' task (5-, 8-, 10-, and 19-year-olds) consisted ofpredict-
ing how many items the boy on the card wouJd rememher. Prediction of memory 
performance served as the dependent variable. The most important result was that 
all of the children were aware of the combined influence of numher of items and 
effort on probability of success, although there were differences hetween the age 
groups due to different weighting of the two factors as deterrninants of memory per-
formance. Compared to the older children, younger children did not consider the 
amount to he learned to he a particularly important variable, weighting effort much 
more heavily. This result is consistent with young children's general tendency to 
attribute success to effort (Kun, 1977; Nicholls, 1978). Although the older children 
gave greater consideration to the amount that was to he Iearned, only the 19-year-
olds made performance predictions that reflected appropriately balanced considera-
tion of both variables in combination. 
How can the apparent inconsistencies in Weilman (1978) and Wellman et al. 
(1981) he explained? Weilman (1978) required ranking of three scenes that varied 
with respect to two variables. Wellman et al. hypothesized that preschoolers in that 
situation concentrated on one variable and ignored the other one entirely. Thus, 
Weilman et al. presented only one value of each ofthe two variables at a time, which 
should have heen easier than simultaneaus consideration of three pairs of values, 
especially for younger subjects. Although Weilman et al. succeeded in showing that 
5-year-olds possess at least elementary knowledge ofthe combined influence of two 
variables, Wellman's data (1'978; Weilman et al., 1981) also make clear that inter-
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active memory knowledge develops very slowly. This development continues well 
into adolescence. 
SUMMARY: KNOWLEDGE OF FAcrs ABOUT MEMORY 
Using sensitive methods that minirnize demands on the child, it is possible to 
demoostrate some rudimentary knowledge of the metamemorial facts in pre-
schoolers ( e.g., some understanding of mental verbs, knowledge of important versus 
less important elements in picture stories). Knowledge of facts about memory is 
moreimpressive in the primary-grade years, and much more complete by 11 or 12 
years of age. Nonetheless, knowledge of memory is not complete by the end of child-
hood. For instance, understanding the relative importance of text elements con-
tinues to develop, as does understanding of task and person-variable interactions 
that deterrnine memory. 
One of the most important fmdings produced by metamemory researchers is that 
there is increasing knowledge of strategies with increasing age. Nonetheless, 
although late grade-school children know most of the strategies covered by the 
metamemory measures reviewed in this section, there is increasing evidence that 
many adolescents (including college students) have little or no knowledge of some 
powerful and important memory strategies. There is also increasing knowledge 
about the characteristics of the strategies that children do know, including their rela-
tive potencies-This is absolutely critical metamemory for efficient thinking to take 
place. The role of this type of metamemory will be discussed throughout the 
remainder of this book. 
Memory Monitaring 
PERFORMANCE PREDICTION AcCURACY 
If people have monitored their previous performances adequately, they should be 
able to predict future memory performances, and be better able to do so than people 
who have not monitored in the past. That is the logic of accepting performance 
prediction accuracy as a measure of monitoring. 
While preschool children overpredict their memory performance consistently, 
elementary-school children are much more accurate ( e.g., Flavell et al., 1970; Kelly, 
Scholnick, Travers, & Johnston, 1976; Levin, Yussen, De Rose & Pressley, 1977; 
Markman, 1973; Monroe & Lange, 1977; Worden & Sladewski-Awig, 1982). 
Whether elementary-school children over- or underestimate performance seems to 
vary with the memory task. For instance, serial memory span is usually over-
estimated (e.g., Flavell et al., 1970), whereas recall of categorizable lists is under-
estimated (e.g., Worden & Sladewski-Awig, 1982). (The latter result is probably not 
surprising given elementary-school children's Iack of awareness of the effects of 
categorizing on memory as discussed earlier' in this chapter.) 
Several studies have tried to pinpoint preschoolers' difficulties in making perfor-
mance predictions. One likely possibility is that many memory tasks are completely 
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unfamiliar to preschoolers. Thus, preschool children make more realistic predic-
tions when asked how far they can jump (Markman, 1973). Predictions arealso 
more accurate when the memory task is conducted in a familiar context, such as a 
game (Justice & Bray, 1979) or in a simulated shopping situation (Wippich, 1980). 
A particularly interesting question is whether predictions of overall performance 
improve in accuracy as experience with the memory task increases. There seems to 
be developmental improvement here. Subjects in Schneider (1986), Schneideret al. 
(1986), and Uhl and Schneider (in preparation) made a prediction before attempting 
a list-leaming task. Then, after completing the list-leaming task and testing over the 
material on the Iist, the subjects were told that they would be doing another list-
learning task and were asked to predict performance on this second list. Although 
first and second predictions do not differ in accuracy for grade-2 and grade-3 chil-
dren, grade-4 children's predictions did improve with practice. Pressley and Ghatala 
(in press) provided complementary data. In their study, grade-1 and -2, grade-4 and 
-5, and grade-7 and -8 subjects predicted performance on a vocabulary test, took the 
test, and then predicted performance on a future test of comparable difficolty. 
Although there was no evidence of prediction improvement from frrst to second 
prediction at the grade-1 and -2 Ievel, there was a strong trend toward improvement 
at the grade-4 and -5 Ievel, and unambiguous improvement from first to second 
prediction at the grade-7 and -8 Ievel. 
More negatively, prediction improvement may be limited to tasks involving fairly 
simple materials. When Uhl and Schneider's subjects went through the prediction-
learning-testing-prediction-leaming-testing cycle with prose materials, there were 
no improvements in prediction with practice. Uhl and Schneider (in preparation) 
speculated that accurate awareness of the amount recalled on a test of prose content 
may be less certain than accurate awareness for list items, and thus, test monitoring 
during prose study and testing might not be sufficient to permit improvements in 
predictions about future prose learning. (It was obvious in Pressley & Ghatala's, in 
press, study with simpler materials that prior test monitoring and future test predic-
tions were related.) 
In addition to being able to predict overall performance better than preschoolers, 
grade-school children are also capable of predicting which items on a Iist are more 
likely tobe remernbered than other items (Kelly et al., 1976; Monroe & Lange, 
1977; Worden & Sladewski-Awig, 1982). There are developmental shifts in accuracy 
of individual-item predictions, however. For example, Worden and Sladewski-Awig 
demonstrated that grade-2 children were moreliberal than grade-6 children in their 
predictions. Thus, the younger children were more likely than the older children to 
predict memory of items that in fact were not remernbered subsequently. 
In summary, the most obvious improvement in performance prediction is the shift 
between preschool and the elementary-school years from great overconfidence in 
future performance to more reasonable expectations. There are also more subtle 
improvements during the elementary-school years, including increased use of 
awareness of past performance as a predictor of future performance and increased 
awareness of the relative recallability of particular pieces of information. 
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MONITORJNG WHEN INFORMATION ls "ON THE 1iP OF THE TONGUE" 
Wellman (1977a) studied the accuracy of children's feelings that they knew items, 
even when they could not recall them. He showed children pictures and asked them 
to name the object in each picture. Forthose objects that were not named, feeling-of-
knowing judgments were elicited: The subjects were asked whether they knew the 
item well enough that they would recognize its name ifthey heard it. Then, a recog-
nition test was given in whlch the name of the object was provided with the child 
required to select the item from a group of pictures. Feeling-of-knowing accuracy 
increased from kiDdergarten (youngest subjects in the study) to grade 3 (oldest sub-
jects in the study). Weilman (1977a) also noted that only the grade-3 children 
registered the frustration that is typical of adults who have somethlng on the tip of 
their tongue, but who cannot remernher it. (See Brown and Lawton, 1977, for simi-
lar developmental trends in a study of children with learning difficulties.) 
Cultice et al. ( 1983) presented 4- to 5-year-old children a simplified version of the 
task used by Wellman (l977a). The participants were asked to name children who 
were depicted on photos presented to them. The pictures included very familiar 
faces (i.e., children from their own preschool group), somewhat less familiar faces 
(i .e., children from another group in the preschool), and completely unfamiliar pic-
tures. When the children could not name the person in the picture, they were quite 
capable of saying whether they would recognize the person when the name was 
provided. Thus, when feeling-of-knowing problems are simply structured and 
involve highly meaningful materials like faces, even preschoolers evidence the 
memory-monitoring competence tapped by the feeling-of-knowing task. 
KNOWLEDGE OF RECALL READINESS 
In Flavell et al.'s (1970) study of memory span, kindergarten, grade-1, grade-2, and 
grade-4 subjects provided recaU readiness data. The subjects were asked to study the 
learning material long enough to be absolutely certain that they would be able to 
recall the entire Iist perfectly. There was clear developmental improvement in esti-
mation of recall readiness. Kindergarten and grade-1 children were usually unable 
to recall the entire Iist correctly, although they believed that they would be able to 
do so. Recall readiness estimates of grade-2 and grade-4 subjects were considerably 
more accurate. FlaveU et al. believed that the older children's more accurate assess-
ments were due to their greater use of self-testing during study. 
One ofthe problems with FlaveU et al.'s (1970) study was that relatively short lists 
were used, ones corresponding to each child's memory span. Markman (1973) 
demonstrated conclusively that recall readiness assessment skills are typically over-
estimated when children learn materials that are not particularly challenging. More 
positively, even very young children can be taught self-testing strategies that permit 
them to make reasonably accurate recall readiness judgments during Iist learning. 
Brown and Barclay (1976) demonstrated that even children with learning disabilities 
(mental age = 8 years) can do so. 
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'KNOWLEDGE OF WHICH ITEMS REQUIRE ADDITIONAL STUDY 
Masur et al. (1973) required grade-1, grade-3, and college students to leam a Iist of 
pictures and then free recall them. After the frrst study and first recall trial, subjects 
were instructed to select halfthe pictures for additional study. Although grade-3 and 
college students tended to select items not recalled correctly on the first trial, 
grade-1 subjects did not seem to consider frrst-trial performance in making selection 
of items for additional processing. Similar fmdings were reported by Bisanz et al. 
(1978) for a paired-associate task. They found that grade-5 and college students 
were more likely than grade-1 or grade-3 students to select items not leamed on a 
frrst trial. 
It is somewhat puzzling that young grade-school children do not choose to allocate 
more study to items that they have not yet mastered? lt does not seem likely that it 
is because they are unaware of which materials are not known. For instance, Press-
ley et al. (1987) and Pressley and Ghatala (in press) both showed that even grade-1 
and -2 children are aware of which test items they are almost certainly answering 
correctly and which are probably answered incorrectly, albeit there is develop-
mental improvement in these discriminations during the grade-school years. When 
processing differentially learnable text, even grade-2 children know which parts of 
text are easier to acquire than others (e.g., Danner, 1976). Apparently, knowing 
which information is known already or easier to learn and which information is 
unlikely to have been mastered is not sufficient to result in appropriate self-
regulation (i.e., studying the iterns that have yet tobe learned). See Kobasigawa and 
Dufresne (in press) for an exceptionally thorough and intelligent discussion of 
potential relationships between awareness ofknowledge state and whether cognitive 
self-regulation occurs. 
Some of the work of Ann Brown and her associates suggests that sophisticated 
selection of text material for additional study develops somewhat later than the 
grade-school years. An optimal strategy for restudy of text is to concentrate not on 
the most important ideas of the text (which will probably be recalled anyway) but 
rather to concentr.ate on ideas of intermediate importance. One source of difficulty 
for children is that they are not aware of the relative importance of different parts 
of complicated text (Brown & Smiley, 1977; Kurtz & Schneider, in press), even 
though they can differentiale important from less important information in short 
texts and simple, conventionally-structured stories (e.g., Denbiere & Le Ny, 1980; 
Hoppe-Graff & Schöler, 1980; Yussen et al., 1980). Brown, Smiley, and Lawton 
(1978) demonstrated that between ages 5 and college there is development in know-
ledge of parts of textnot mastered during a first study-test cycle. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that children would not make effective use of additional study opportu-
nity, Brown and Smiley (1978) demonstrated thatgrade-5 children's recall oftext did 
not improve following five minutes of additional study. Grade-7, grade-8, and high-
school students did benefit from the additional study time, with the total pattem of 
data suggesting that knowledge of text parts that were not yet mastered may bave 
directed restudy at those age Ievels. 
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SUMMARY: MONITORING 
The only evidence of monitoring in preschoolers was produced in a simplified 
feeling-of-lmowing task. Although there are clear increases in monitoring skills dur-
ing the grade-school years, additional developments occur during adolescence. 
Additional developmental data on monitoring are presented in Chapter 7. The data 
reviewed there are also consistent with the conclusion that effective monitoring 
occurs only in highly constrained Situations during the early grade-school years and 
continues to develop well into adolescence. 
Metamemory-Memory Relationships 
One of the main motivations for research on metamemory has been the theoretical 
conviction that there are important relationships between knowing about memory 
and memory behaviors (e.g., Brown, 1978; Hagen, 1975). Such relationships have 
sometimes proven elusive, however. Why might there be occasions when a child 
possesses important pieces of metamemory (e.g., knowledge of how to execute 
categorization-organizational strategies and that their use improves recall), but does 
not use the knowledge (e.g., does not use categorization strategies to learn a 
categorizable Iist of items)? There are a lot of potential reasons (Flavell & Wellman, 
1977; Weinert, 1984, 1986). For one, the leamer might not be motivated to exert the 
effort necessary to use the strategy; the leamer may be too tired to carry out the 
strategy; or there may not be sufficient time to use the procedure. If the list is so 
short that it can be leamed without strategic effort, no strategy may be employed. 
If the list is so long that the child perceives that there is no hope of mastering it, the 
child may make no strategic efforts. Even if a child knows that a strategy facilitates 
performance and is willing to say so on a metamemory interview, he or she may still 
believe that pure effort represents the best strategy (Wellman, 1983). Perhaps it 
should not be surprising that metamemory-memory behavior correlations are far 
from perfect. 
But are they inconsequential, as suggested by some reviewers (e.g., Cavanaugh & 
Perlmutter, 1982)? Our point of view is that one ofthebest ways to begin to come 
to terms with all of the available evidence is through meta-analytic procedures ( e.g., 
Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Schneider (1985c) reported such an analysis of studies 
containing metamemory-memory relationship data. Following Glass, McGaw, and 
Smith (1981), he simply averaged the available correlation coefficients from the 
individual studies, reporting an overall correlation of 0.41. 
Since that analysis, it has become clear that it is better to estimate an overall corre-
lation by averaging over individual correlations that are weighted by the sample 
sizes that generated them (Hunter, Schmidt, & Jackson, 1982; Fricke & Treinies, 
1985). Thus, a meta-analysis is summarized briefly here, with correlations weighted 
by sample sizes (as were variances). With the exception of this one change, this 
meta-analysis is procedurally identical to Schneider's (1985c) evaluation ofthe liter-
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ature. The meta-analysis involves aggregation of conventional product-moment 
correlations. Inanumber of cases, this required calculation of the correlations from 
t, F, and X 2 statistics. Those few studies that did not summarize data in sufficient 
detail to permit calculation of the correlation were dropped from the meta-analysis. 
When a publication contained several independent experiments, each experime~t 
was treated as a separate study. When authors reported coefficients for several 
dependent variables, average correlations were calculated within the study follow-
ing procedures outlined by Hunter et al. (1982). 
Updating Schneider's (1985c) meta-analysiswas also mandated by the enormous 
number of new publications containing estimates of metamemory-memory relation-
ships. Schneider's (1985c) meta-analysis was based on 27 publications, which 
generated 47 correlations based on a total of 2231 subjects. The current meta-
analysis is based on 60 publications providing 123 correlation coefficients based on 
data from 7097 subjects. Since much more data were available for this new meta-
analysis, a more exact estimate of the overall correlation was expected. 
The most important fmding in this new meta-analysis was that the overall meta-
memory-memory correlation coefficient was 0.41, exactly the same value produced 
by Schneider (1985c). The standarddeviationwas reduced, however, from 0.18 to 
0.14. The overall correlations as a function of grade and kind of study are summa-
rized in Table 5.1. (Because some authors only reported correlations aggregated 
over age, there are fewer correlations for each age Ievel than could have been the 
case with more complete reporting of data in the individual reports.) 
In summary, there is no doubt that there is a statistical association between 
metamemory and memory. More pessimistic evaluations based on only a very small 
portion ofthe data base (e.g., Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982) werein error. There 
are two problems (memory monitoring, organizational strategies) that have been 
studied in especially great detail, with metamemory-performance relationships 
obtained in both of these literatures. Even though caution is required in evaluating 
the age trends due to the small nurober of correlations contributing to some of the 
values reported in Table 5.1, the data are generally homogenous from grade 4 on. 
The correlations for memory monitoring are greater than the correlations for 
organizational strategies at the younger age Ievels. Although this meta-analysis pro-
vides a good sense of the overall quantitative relationships in the data, qualitative 
analyses of studies of metamemory-memory relationships are still revealing, mak-
ing especially clear that some metamemory-performance relationships are more 
theoretically compelling than others. Not surprisingly, some metamemory-perfor-
mance correlations are more likely to be obtained than are others. In addition, 
examination of significant metamemory-performance correlations makes obvious 
that some of these index situations where metamemory might play a causal role in 
directing processing, and through direction of processing, play a causal role in 
memory. Sometimes, it is apparent that such a causal sequence is unlikely. Four of 
the more visible questions that have been explored as part of the search for 
metamemory-performance correlations are considered in greater detail in the 
remainder of this section. 
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TABLE 5.1. Overall correlations between metamemory and memory, classified by kind of 
study and school grade of subjects (number of sturlies providing data in parentheses). 
School grade 
Type of study K 1/2 3/4 516 7+ Average 
Memory monitaring .39 .45 .35 .42 .59 .39 
(Iab tasks) (5) (7) (10) (8) (2) (16) 
Memory monitaring .24 .28 .49 .41 .44 
(text processing) (2) (3) (10) (4) (15) 
Memory monitoring .52 .~7 .37 .28 .40 
(training studies) (4) (10) (10) (I) (13) 
Organizational strategies .12 .15 .41 .47 .33 
(clustering) (I) (6) (14) (5) (43) 
Organizational strategies .39 .32 .37 
(training studies) (10) (19) (36) 
Relationships Between Prediction Accuracy and Memory Performance 
People who are good information processors should have good memories. Presum-
ably, proficient information processors also monitor their performances better than 
poor information processors. Thus, they should know more about their memory 
capacities and limitations and be better able to predict their memory performances 
than other people. Therefore, people who have good memories should predict 
memory more accurately than people with poor memories. 
Ti1e first explicit test of the relationship between prediction accuracy and memory 
performancewas conducted by Kelly et al. (1976) who obtained negative results. 
There was no obvious relationship between prediction accuracy and memory in 
their study. Ceiling effects rnight have played a part in this failure, however 
(Schneider, 1985c). Since prediction accuracy was generally very high at all age 
Ievels, it probably is not surprising that the correlations between prediction 
accuracy and memory performance were low (i .e., there was restricted range in the 
metarnemory measure). 
Follow-up investigations were more successful in establishing prediction accuracy-
recall relationships. Levin et al. (1977) administered recall and recognition tasks to 
grade-1, grade-5, and college students and elicited performance predictions for both 
tasks. The authors hypothesized that higher prediction accuracy would be obtained 
for recall compared to recognition, arguing that recall tasks are more like the 
memory tasks that children and college students usually confront. As expected, 
there were correlations between prediction accuracy for recall at all age Ievels, but 
generally poor prediction accuracy for the recognition test. In general, the Levin 
et al. (1977) results were replicated by Yussen and Berman (1981) with grade-1, 
grade-3, and grade-5 subjects. In both studies, children tended to overestimate 
recall, with developmental increases in prediction accuracy with respect to recall 
(i.e., overestimations declined with increasing age). There was clear underestima-
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tion of recognition memory in both sturues. In general, people do not realize how 
really good recognition memory can be! 
Wippich (1981) found that even kiDdergarten children could provide reasonable 
predictions about their recall in everyday situations (i.e, shopping) . Wippich found 
no relationship between preruction accuracy and recall in children's recall in the 
laboratory, however. 
In summary, although there was some evidence of prediction accuracy-memory 
linkages in these sturues, there was also clear data that preruction accuracy-perform-
ance relationships were task specific (e.g., obtained with recall but not recognition, 
more likely in "natural" situations with 5-year-olds). 
Additional evidence of specificity has been obtained when there have been com-
parisons between performance prediction-memory relationships for categorizable 
versus noncategorizable lists. The earliest work on prediction of recall of categoriza-
ble and noncategorizable lists established that by the middle of the elementary-
school years, there is clear understanding that categorizable lists can be learned 
more easily than noncategorizable lists (e.g., Moynahan, 1973; Yussen, Levin, Ber-
man, & Palm, 1979). More recent studies (Hasselhorn, 1986; Schneider et al., 
1987; Weinert et al . , 1984) have focused on the differences in preruction accuracy 
for tbe two types of lists. In general, the performance prediction-memory correla-
tions in these studies were positive, but not large (i.e., typically in the .10 to .30 
range). There were developmental trends, with increasing correlations between 
prediction and performance with increasing age during the grade-school years. The 
correlations between predictions and perforrnance were higher for the noncategor-
izable than for the categorizable lists. The lower correlations for the categorizable 
lists were due in part to general underestimation of the positive effect of list struc-
ture on memory. 
A likely hypothesis is that metamemory-memory relationships are greater when 
memory tasks are more rufficult. More difficult tasks require more explicitly con-
trolled processing in order to produce high recall, with controlled processing 
presurnably more likely to be initiated by metacognitively advanced learners (Bor-
kowski, 1985; Pressley, 1985). That the preruction-performance correlations are 
lower for categorizable list recall than for recall of noncategorizable lists is consis-
tent with this hypothesis, since noncategorizable lists are more difficult to learn. 
(For the same reason, so is the lower prediction-performance correlation for learn-
ing of noncategorizable materials compared to seriallist learning.) 
Relationships Between Knowing Which ltems Require Additional Study 
and Memory Peformance 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Masur et al. (1973) required children to select 
items for additional study after an initial study-recall cycle. Metamemorial com-
petency was presumed when subjects selected items not recalled on the previous 
trial. Although both grade-3 and college subjects made appropriate item selections, 
only college students' subsequent memories were affected by selection of appro-
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priate items. There was adequate metamemory (i.e., knowing which items to select) 
and reliable memory improvement at the college Ievel only. Brown (1978) offered 
an interesting explanation of this pattem of results. She argued tbat in focusing 
attention on tbe items that were not leamed previously, children failed to process 
additionally the items that were recalled previously. These previously recalled items 
were not mastered so well that subsequent recall was certain witbout additional 
encoding effort. Tbus, even though memory of previously unrecalled items may 
have increased on subsequent recall tests, recall of previously recalled items would 
have declined, resulting in little advantage for the child subjects who selected 
unrecalled items for additional study. Brown (1978) suggested that effective restudy 
in this situation requires complex coordinations that bave only been partially 
mastered by young grade-school children, if they have been mastered at all. 
In addition to consideration of allocation of effort during encoding, there have also 
been studies of selective effort allocation during retrieval. WeHman (1979) reana-
lyzed Wellman's (1977a) data. He investigated wbether there were correlations 
between children's feeling-of-knowing judgments and the effort deployed to try to 
retrieve the word. Tbere were at all three age Ievels in the study (kindergarten, grade 
1, and grade 3), althougb the relationship between tbe strength of feeling-of-
knowingjudgments and effort increased with age. This fmding is consistent witb the 
conclusion that even very young children can sometimes use their knowledge of 
information availability to guide strategic efforts. 
Relationships Between Metacognition and Text Processing 
There are consistent correlational relationships between various types of metacog-
nitive knowledge about text and various outcome measures that presumably reflect 
text processing, such as comprehension and recall of what was read ( e. g. , Forrest-
Pressley & Waller, 1984; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Körkel, 1987; Ubl, 1986). These 
correlations generally range from low to moderate (i.e., .1 0 to .50). 
One of the more completely researched correlational relationsbips is between 
knowledge of the relative importance of information in text and recall of text. Even 
preschool children tend to remernher more centrat inforrnation in text compared to 
less irnportant information (e.g., Brown & Smiley, 1977, 1978; Brown et al., 1977; 
Christie & Schurnach er, 1975; Denhiere, in press; Denbiere & Le Ny, 1980; Hoppe-
Graff & Schöler, 1980; Young & Schurnacher, 1983). These correlational relation-
ships do little to convince that recall of higber-order information is due to meta-
cognitively-directed, differential processing ofthat inforrnation, bowever. Perbaps 
the most convincing evidence on this point was provided by Brown and Smiley 
(1978) who inferred from recall pattems that seventb- and eigbtb-grade children 
directed their attention to the more important aspects of text when they were given 
additional study time. In contrast, ftfth graders studied less selectively. In sbort, 
Brown and Smiley's (1978) evidence suggested that metacognitive control of text 
processing based on knowledge of relative importance of text knowledge occurs a 
number of years after correlations between recall and importance Ievels are present. 
In fact, a fmding in many of the studies that establisbed the correlational relation-
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ship between importance of information and recall also established that their 
youngest participants were not consciously aware of the relative importance of 
text elements. This pattem of data simply does not add up to a convincing case 
that knowlege of importance Ievels directs the text processing of children in the 
early elementary grades, although it may do so later in development (Brown 
& Smiley, 1978). (See Chapter 4 for additional comrnentary about mechanisms 
that can mediate recall of more important compared to less important text infor-
mation.) 
Relationships Between Metamemory, Strategy U se, 
and Recall of Categorizable Materials 
Salatas and Flavell's (1976b) study is a favorite citation for those who argue that 
metamemory is not strongly related to memory behavior (e.g., Cavanaugh & 
Perlmutter, 1982). This study dealt primarily with the ability of young children 
(grade-1 students) to react sensitively to differences in instructional demands. Sub-
jects in the experimental condition were instructed to do everything that they could 
in order to remernher a set of categorizable items. Control subjects were merely 
instructed to Iook at the pictures; they were not even aware that their memory of the 
materials would be tapped. Aftermemory was tested, both experimental and control 
subjects were given a metamemory quiz, consisting of two questions. The children 
were asked whether lists containing categorizable items were easier to remernher 
than lists of noncategorizable items. As expected, the subjects in the experimental 
group remernbered more items than the control subjects. There was no systematic 
relationship between metamemory and categorical strategy use, however. This 
study offered no evidence that metamemory is a necessary prerequisite for use of 
strategies in memory tasks. 
The situational specificity of Salatas and Flavell's (1976b) result was made clear 
by a study initiated by Rarriet Salatas Waters (Andreassen & Waters, 1984). The 
presentation of the items in the new study differed in one way from the presentation 
of the items in the old study. Salatas and Flavell presented the Iist items on cards that 
were placed in a four-row array. Each of these rows had a lid that had to be lifted in 
order to expose the pictures. This setup made it possible for Salatas and Flavell to 
record time used for looking at the pictures during the study phase, but it also made 
it impossible for the subjects to Iook at the entire item set at once. Andreassen and 
Waters (1984) believed that the application of the organizational strategy may have 
been made unnecessarily difficult by this aspect of the procedure, and thus, they did 
not use the lid in their replication study. 
A second change or addition to the design was made with respect to assessment 
of metamemory. In Salatas and Flavell (1976b), the metamemoryinterview always 
followed the memory test. In the new experiment, half of the subjects answered the 
metamemory items before the experiment and half answered them after the test. 
Andreassen and Waters (1984) believed that metamemory questions before the 
actual memory test would produce information about children's general, day-to-day 
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knowledge about memory. The answers to metamemory questions after completion 
of the recall task should more strongly reflect metamemory activatedduring the task 
that was just completed (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1980). The correlation between 
metamemory and organizational behaviors was r = -.05 for the interview-before 
subjects and r = .39 for the interview-after subjects. This latter correlation in 
particular contrasts with the results of Salatas and Flavell (1976b). The timiog of 
the metamemory interview obviously has an important influence on whether 
metamemory-strategic behavior correlatioos are obtained, a result confirmed by 
Schneider's (1985c) meta-analysis. Stronger correlations between metamemory and 
memory were obtained when the metamemoryinterview followed the memory task 
than when it preceded it (overall r = .54 vs. overall r = .25). 
What specific cooclusions can be drawn from comparison of Salatas and Flavell 
(1976b) and Andreassen and Waters (1984)? lt seems that minimal modification of 
the recall task resulted in children recognizing and/or using the categorical structure 
of the item set better. Furthermore, their fmdings sbow that specific knowledge 
about the effects of categorization is activated wben grade- I children do a memory 
task that cao be mediated using categorizatioo strategies. Such activation does not 
lead to long-term activation of the metacognitive knowledge, however. Andreassen 
and Waters repeated the memory task six weeks Iater. The categorization behaviors 
of children at the later date could not be predicted by their metamemory at the end 
of the first experiment. 
Wimmerand Thmquist (1980) also produced clear correlations between know-
ledge of organizational strategies and their use in grade-I, grade-4, and high-school 
studeots, fmdings consistent with the data in the interview-after condition in 
Andreasseo and Waters (1984), but inconsistent with Salatas and Flavell. Wimmer 
and Tornquist adrninistered a warm-up task (memory span) that may very weH have 
heightened awareness of their subjects about the difficulty of memory tasks and have 
alerted them to tbe utility of Strategie efforts during memorization. 
In Cavanaugh and Borkowski ( 1980), kindergarten, grade-1 , grade-3, and grade-5 
children completed alll4 subtests ofKreutzer et al.'s (1975) interview. Three differ-
ent memory tasks were also administered, ones that benefit from use of various 
organizational strategies. When the data were aggregated across age groups, there 
were significant correlations between metamemory, Strategie behaviors, and 
memory performances, although these were relatively low. When the data were ana-
lyzed according to developmental Ievel, however, significant correlations between 
metamemory and strategy use and performance were only obtained with the oldest 
subjects. Task-specific subtests in the interview battery predicted Strategie 
behaviors in children even when the aggregated metamemory scores failed to do so, 
however. Sirnilar support for the predictive potential of task-specific metamemory 
items has been produced in other studies as weil (e.g., Bestand Ornstein, 1986; 
Cantor, Andreasseo, and Waters, 1985). 
In concluding that there are correlational relationships between knowledge about 
the efficacy of organizational strategies and memory behaviors, it must also be 
pointed out that samples of young grade-school children (e.g., grade- I) typically 
include very few subjects who know a lot about semantic organizational methods 
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and the advantages associated with these strategies. For instance, Wimmer and 
.. 
Tornquist (1980) used the data of24 grade-1 students, who were equally divided into 
a metamemory-before-memory-task and a metamemory-after-memory-task group. 
Adequate metamemory was obtained for half of the children in the before and after 
groups. From those, about half of the subjects in the before group also showed spon-
taneous sorting behavior, while not a single child in the after group used semantic 
organizational strategies. This means, that out ofthe 24 grade-! children, there were 
only three subjects who possessed adequate knowledge of semantic organizational 
strategies and used semantic categorization. Sodian et al. (1986) obtained a statisti-
cally significant correlation (r = .37) among 6-year-olds between reported prefer-
ence for sorting strategies and their use in a memory task. Nonethe1ess, perceptual 
sorting strategies were preferred over semantic-organizational strategies by this age 
group. The positive correlation reflects the fact that the few subjects who reported 
preference for semantic sorting in their metacognitive interview also used this 
strategy to a large extent. 
Although relationships between metamemory about semantic organizational 
strategies, us~ of semantic organizational strategies, and memory performances can 
be obtained reliably with older children (Cavanaugh & Borkowski, 1980; Cos & 
Paris, 1979; Hasselhorn, 1986; Justice, 1985; Körkel, Schneider, Vogel, & Weinert, 
1983; Schneider, 1986; Schneideret al., 1987; Weinert et al., 1984), it cannot be 
taken for granted that even these children clearly prefer semantic organization to 
alternative procedures (like rehearsal). For instance, Cox and Paris (1979) found 
preferences for rehearsal strategies in grade-4 students. Although Justice ( 1985) and 
Schneider ( 1986) noted tendencies at this same age Ievel to favor semantic organiza-
tion over rehearsal, nontrivial proportions of the children used rehearsal. More 
positively, by grade 6, students aremore likely to provide across-the-board endorse-
ment of semantic organization over rote rehearsal (e.g., Justice, 1985). 
Finally, even though correlations between metamemory about organizational 
strategies and organizational strategy use are regularly obtained in contemporary 
research, we believe that much greater correlations between metamemory about 
strategies and memory-strategy use are likely if the focus in this research is broa-
dened to reflect more completely the nature of strategy development. For instance, 
really proficient use of semantic organizational strategies also incorporates a self-
testing component. Metamemory and strategic assessments that capture both use of 
semantic organization and self-testing should correlate more highly with each other 
and memory performance than measures based on semantic organization alone. See 
Schneider (1986) and Schneideret al. (1987) for preliminary evidence consistent 
with this point of view. 
A typical feature of more recent studies is that they do not limit themselves •o 
analyses of simple intercorrelations. In several studies (e.g., Kurtz et al., 1986; 
Schneider, 1986; Schneideret al., 1986; Weinert et al., 1984) multivariate regres-
sion analyses were used in order to deterrnine the relative importance of meta-
memory components and other potential predictors (e.g., verbal intelligence, 
acadernic self-concept, attributional style) of semantic organizational strategy use 
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and/or memory performances in tasks that can be mediated by semantic categoriza-
tion. From about the third grade on, metamemoryvariables have emerged as signifi-
cant predictors in these analyses (Kurtz et al., 1986; Schneideret al., 1986; Weinert 
et al., 1984). Task-specific metamemory is usually a better predictor than generat 
metarnemory measures. Metamemory predicts recall even when other factors are 
controlled statistically (e.g., Borkowski et al., 1983; Kurtz et al., 1982). 
Research on the relationships between metamemory and memory behaviors and 
performances increasingly have tended to use even more sophisticated approaches 
than regression, including path and causal models. While most regression proce-
dures do not require a theoretically specified sequence of predictors, causal model-
ing does. The basic causal model for analysis of the relationship between 
metamemory and memory generally assumes that metamemory theoretically pre-
cedes memory behaviors and performances. Thus, a child's knowledge about bis 
memory ought to influence Strategie behavior, and the amount of Strategie behavior 
should predict memory performance. The models presented in the Iiterature vary to 
the extent tbat tbey operate on observed versus "latent" variables (i.e., constructs in 
the Iatter case). Two versions of latent-variable models can be distinguished. 
Exploratory modeling emphasizes the construction of a potential model given the 
data on band. Confmnatory approaches go farther, permitting tests of potential 
modelsthat are specified in advance (e.g., Crano & Mendoza, 1987). Exarnples of 
exploratory analyses using the LVPLS (latent variable partialleast square) computer 
program from Lohmöller (1984) can be found in Hassethorn (1986), Hassethorn and 
Körkel (1986), Körkel et al. (1983), Kurtz and Borkowski (1987), Kurtz et al. 
(1986), Schneider (1985b), and Schneideret al. (1986). Studies on tbe relationship 
of metamemory to memory using conf1Cmatory LISREL (linear structural relation-
ships; Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1984) modeling have been presented by Körkel (1987); 
Schneider, Körkel, and Weinert (1987b); as well as Weinert et al. (1984). 
A study conducted by Fabricius and Hagen (1984) illustrates tbe possibilities for 
using path analyses with observed variables that were conceived of as a sequence of 
multiple regression analyses. Fabricius and Hagen assumed that metacognitive 
judgments about Strategie use of categoricallist structure du ring tbe initial session 
of their study would directly affect categorical strategy use and amount recalled in 
a categorical recall task presented a week later. There was a significant, direct path 
from f1Cst-session metacognitive judgments to use of tbe categorizing strategy. Use 
of the strategy positively influenced .organization during recall, which positively 
affected amount recalled. While the path coefficients between metamemory and 
organization during recall and between metamemory and recall were positive, they 
were not statistically significant. Moreover, use of the sorting strategy did not 
directly affect recall. 
Fabricius and Hagen (1984) limited their interpretations to the direct patbs. lt is 
possible to calculate the indirect paths, however, based on what is provided in the 
original report. For exarnple, the indirect effect of metamemory on dustering during 
recall (which is mediated by use of the categorical organization strategy use during 
study) was greater than the direct path. The samewas true of the indirect effect of 
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metamemory on recall. In short, the contribution of metamemory was more obvious 
by consideration of both direct and indirect effects of metamemory on subsequent 
memory behaviors and performances. The advantage of path analyses is that such 
indirect effects can be calculated. 
There is convincing evidence of relationships between metamemory, Strategie 
behaviors and memor from studies that u s w1t atent varia les 
(Borkowski et al., 1983; Hasselhorn, 1986; Kurtz et al., 1982; Schneider, Körkel, 
& Weinert, 1987b; Weinert et al., 1984; Weinert, Schneider, & Knopf, in press). 
These analyses permit the conclusions that even relatively young elementary-school 
children possess knowledge about organizational strategies that has a direct influ-
ence on strategic behaviors, which increases the tendency to organize to-be-learned 
materials taxonomically. Metamemory has proven to be consistently predictive of 
Strategie behaviors in these analyses even when general factors like intelligence are 
taken into account. It is a more powerful predictor of Strategie behavior than theo-
retically related concepts like academic self-concept and causal attributional tenden-
t cies. On the other hand, the link between metamemory and recall is weaker than the link between metamemory and strategy u~actors other than metacogrutl 
directed strategy use can also influence recall Ievel (e.g., speed of information 
processing). We emphasize in presenting these conclusions that they should not be 
considered general Statements about strategy functioning, since virtually all of the 
relevant causal model analyses have involved study of metamemory as a predictor 
of semantic organizational strategies. 
Summary 
Quantitative averaging of metamory-memory performance correlations is a reason-
able first step in understanding this data base. Meta-analyses makes clear that there 
are nontrivial quantitative associations between metamemory and memory. 
Qualitative review of the various metamemory-memory behavior problems makes 
obvious, however, that no single statistic could capture the diversity and richness of 
the findings. Sometimes there are associations between metamemory and memory 
behavior, and sometimes there are not. Some consistently positive associations are 
stronger than others. For instance, there are often stronger relationships between 
metamemory about a strategy and strategy use than between metamemory and 
memory, since strategy use directed by metamemory is only one of several deter-
minants of performance (e.g., capacity, the nonstrategic knowledge base). 
Metamemory about strategies is an extremely important type of metacognition, 
with its relevance to proficient memory behaviors taken up in much greater detail 
in the next two chapters. Presumably, such critical metamemory develops in part 
through monitoring processes, such as when people notice when a procedure they 
are using is improving performance (e.g., Pressley et al., 1984, 1985). That is one 
reason that monitoring will be considered in greater detail in the next two chap-
ters, which are integrative discussions about the variety of factors that determine 
skilled memory. 
6. Good Strategy Use: A General Model, 
A Specific Example, and Comments on How 
To Do Research on the Development 
of Strategy Proficiency 
Up until this point, this book bas been mostly about immature memory behaviors. 
We have focused on acquisition of individual components of memory competence 
(e.g. , particular strategies) or, at most, on a few components in interaction (e.g., 
some strategies rely on certain aspects ofthe knowledge base). In contrast, this chap-
ter begins with an overview of fully mature memory behaviors and the multi-
component articulation that characterizes truly sophisticated strategy use. 
There are two motivations for presenting a portrait of refmed memory behavior. 
First, explicit specification of the human memory potential makes obvious tbe 
immaturity of memory behaviors displayed by children, adolescents, and many 
adults. Second, it clarifies that moststurlies of memory development- ones that 
have focused on single acquisitions or acquisitions of only one or two components 
of competent memory bebavior-are too narrow to capture memory functioning 
completely. Those who wish to plot naturalistic memory development must plan 
multidimensional research programs; those planning intervention·s to promote more 
mature memory behaviors must design treatments that address a variety of memory-
relevant components in interaction. 
Mature Strategy Functioning 
What is reviewed bereis a specific instantiation of a Good Strategy User Model 
(e.g., Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, & Pressley, in press; Pressley, 1986; Pressley, 
Borkowski, & Johnson, 1987; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987; Pressley, 
Goodchild, Fleet, Zajchowski, & Evans, in press; Pressley, Johnson, & Symons, 
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1987)-a good memory strategy user model. In presenting it, we emphasize that it 
represents a hypothetical memorizing superperson. We also point out that in order 
to construct a coherent presentation about this type of complicated performer, it is 
necessary to do some simplification, and thus, good memory strategy use is taken 
up in a component-by-component fashion. Consideration of complex interactions 
between components is deferred until each is considered separately. 
Strategies 
Memory strategies are processes (or sequences of processes) that, when matched 
appropriately to a memory task, can facilitate performance. Earlier we discussed 
dustering and rehearsal strategies for leaming categorizable lists. A well known 
encoding strategy is the pegword-mnemonic .. approach for acquiring information 
that must be recalled in order (e.g., the one based on the poem, "One is a bun, two 
is a shoe .. ,.;).-.... ~~arizing and imagery strategies can also be used to leam text 
containing arbitrary relationships. 
A good memory strategy user possesses a variety of these memory strategies and 
used them consciously at one time, even though many of them now are used out of 
awareness (e.g., Baron, 1985, Chapter 3; Campione & Armbruster, 1985). The 
good strategy user has bad many opportunities to use and practice strategies, and 
thus, their application in appropriate situations has become automatic and habitual. 
Strategies are always potentially consdous and controllable (e.g., Pressley, Forrest-
Pressley, Elliott-Faust, & Miller, 1985), however. For instance, extension of 
farniliar strategies to new tasks may be undertaken deÜberately. By arguing that 
strategy functioning need not be deliberately controlled, we do not abandon the 
position that strategy use is always intentional in the sense of being goal directed, 
with memory improvement the goal in using memory strategies. 
For example, making a shopping Iist is a memory strategy that most good memory 
strategy users would employ regularly. When the user becomes aware of the need for 
a good from the store, the item is added to a Iist that is always kept in the same place 
(e.g., beside the kitchen telephone). For many, this behavior is reflexive, done with 
little thought at all after years of experience with this approach. Making and using 
such a shopping list is controllable, however. A person could easily stop doing it or 
do it in a different fashion (e.g., recording the Iist on a microcomputer file). Consis-
tent with the perspective tharstrategic behaviors began as conscious actions, there 
is usually a time in life when a conscious decision was made to keep shopping lists. 
There are some distinctions that can be made about strategies that make more 
obvious how various memory techniques differ from one another. ~re both 
extemal memory strategies (e.g., making shopping lists, puttin a to-be-t~to­
sc tem~ the door) and internal memory strategies (e.g., covert re rsal 
and elaboration). Some ritemory strategies involve a mixture of ext mal and internal 
factors, such as when a person arranges to-be-learned pictures in piles to facilitate 
the intemal generation of meaningful stories that could be used to mediate recall of 
the pictures. 
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Some memory strategies can be used only in very, very specific situations in par-
ticular domains. These task- and domain-limited strategies are trides for aiding 
memory of particular pieces of information. A number of these are described in an 
aptly-named volume by Slung (1985), 1he Absent-Minded Professors Memory 
Guide. Slung's book includes chapters on how to remernher particular historical, 
geographic, religious, linguistic, musical, and scientific contents. That these tricks 
are helpful only for certain tasks in particular domains can be appreciated by con-
sidering some familiar techniques for remembering specific musical content. The 
notes on the treble staff (E, G, B, D, F) can be encoded by memorizing the sentence, 
"Every Good Boy Does Fine." The notes in the treble staff spaces form a word-
FACE. Memorizing the sentence, "Good Boys Do Frne Always;' increases recall of 
the bass staff lines. Memory of bass staff spaces foUows from, ':411 Cows Eat Grass:· 
It seems a good bet that there are examples of task- and domain-limited strategies 
for virtually every domain, with these techniques often specific instantiations of 
more general procedures. That someone could know many specific tricks without 
abstracting or using the general memory techniques on which they are based (e.g., 
How many school children use the music-staff tricks, but do not understand or use 
first-letter rnnemonics more generally?), however, mandates separating these pro-
cedures from approaches that are more general in their application. 
There are a variety of goal-limited memory strategies. These can be applied to 
leam content across a variety of content areas, although particular strategies are 
suited to acquisition of material with particular structure (e.g., rehearsal facilitates 
learning of simple lists but not associations; forming images between paired items 
increases associative recall of one item given the other dramatically, but has little 
influence on free recall of pairs). The across-content applicability of goal-limited 
memory strategies can be appreciated by considering summarization (constructing 
summaries oftext segment as reading proceeds along). This strategy can be applied 
with fictional and expository materials. Nonfictional content can range from 
recipes to history to mathematics. Learners who acquire a specific goal-limited 
memory strategy have a powerful tool at their disposal, for there is a great deal of 
evidence that rehearsal, elaboration, summarizing, and organizational techniques 
(among others) can improve memory tremendously ( e.g., Garn er, 1987; Ornstein & 
Naus, 1985; Pr~ssley, Heisel, McCormick, & Nalcarnura, 1982; Rohwer, 1973). 
' Strategies tbat enhance memory are often used in concert witb wbat we refer to 
as general strategies. These strategies do not aid memory themselves, but tbey sup-
port the profitable use of task-specific and goal-limited memory strategies. An 
important one is checking performance (i.e., monitoring) to determine if a memory 
strategy that is in use is acbieving the current memory goal. Other general strategies 
include being generally attentive to the task at band and trying to relate the ~urreo'"'t 
challenge to situations that have been encountered previously in order to acquire 
clues as to which strategy might be appropriate to use on a current task (e.g., 
Entwisle & Rarnsden, 1983). Anotber is attending to the environment, specifically 
looking for clues as to how to proceed and whicb specific goal-limited strategies to 
use in a given situation. 
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The interaction between general strategies and more specific memory strategies 
can be understood through illustration. First of all, good strategy users are generally 
attentive to the material that they are going to read, and they approach challenging 
reading tasks with a settobe Strategie (i.e., intending to use strategies to understand 
and remernher material presented in text). Good strategy users also employ a 
nurober of more specific strategies for understanding and remembering text (e.g., 
Bereiter & Bird, 1985; Garner, 1987; Levin, 1982). They can rephrase or para-
phrase text; they can backtrack and/or reread; they can search for cause-and-effect 
relationships; they can summarize; good strategy users can self-question; and, they 
can form rnnemonics to encode what they perceive to be particularly hard-to-
remember pieces of information. In order to know when these strategies are neces-
sary, readers need to note which aspects of text are difficult to learn and when they 
are having problems understanding and encoding relationships specified in text-
That is, they need to monitor their text learning (e.g., Markman, 1981). Good 
) strategy users also monitor their use of strategies to determine if the procedures that 
have been elected are in fact permitting progress toward the goals of understanding 
and remembering text. If not, the good strategy user switches tactics (e.g., Baker & 
Brown, 1984). In short, adequate memory oftext is accomplished through complex 
articulations of general strategies and goal-limited memory strategies. The useof all 
these strategies depends largely on a particular type of metacognition. 
Metacognitive Knowledge About Specific Strategies 
(Specific Strategy Knowledge) 
\ 
One popular defmition of metaco ·tion is that it is, " ... lcnowledge concerning 
, one's own cognitive processes and products or anything related to them ... " 
(Flavell, 1977, p. 232). Of course, strategies are processes and there are many 
pieces of information that a person could have about specific Strategie processes. For 
instance, consider imagery techniques. One could recall a grade-6 teacher describ-
ing an imagery strategy. A particular student rnight remernher using imagery tech-
niques in history or science class. The second autbor recalls vividly having to learn 
lists of tips about driving in driver education class and forrning interactive images 
containing cues linked to each ofthe tips. Thus, memory ofthings to do before taking 
a long trip was accomplished by forrning an image of a person looking at a map, 
while holding an oil dip stick in bis bands, as windshield wiper fluid dripped on his 
shoe that was kicking the tire. Worse yet, be was being hit by water flying out of tbe 
radiator and one of the hoses. He came to realize during the course of high school 
that such images required effort and attention to create (a theme now explored in 
greater detail in bis recent research; Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, Deane, & Schneider, 
1987), and that they were worth nothing iftbey were not explicitly retrieved at test-
ing (another theme explored in bis research; Pressley & Levin, 1980; Pressley & 
MacFadyen, 1983). He also recognized, however, that when he did take the time and 
make the effort to create such images and used them at testing, that bis learning and 
recall of lists of related items was more certain. 
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This general understanding of imagery-strategy utility, a piece of metacognitive 
knowledge about imagery strategies, evolved from many specific occasions when 
learning was enhanced through use of imagery. This type of information is important 
to acquire because persistent and consistent use' of a m~iltory_ strategy depends in 
part on rstanding that it aids memo~y (e.g., Black & Rollins, 1982; 
Borkowski, Levers, & Gruenenfelder, 1976; Cavanaugh & Borkowski, 1979; 
Kennedy & Miller, 1976; Lawson & Fuelop, 1980; Ringel & Springer, 1980). Other 
metacognitive knowledge is required for really general use of a strategy- transfer to 
Situations not eneountered before, but ones that benefit from applieation of the 
strategy. Generalization requires that learners understa when and wbere to use 
rocedures (e.g., Duffy, l«>ehler, Sivan et al., 1987; Paris, Lipson, & WIXSon, 1983; 
Pressley, Borkowski, & O'Sullivan, 1984, 1985; Roehler & Duffy, 1984). 
The eritieality of partieular pieces of metaeognitive information about strategies 
can be demonstrated easily using simple experimental designs, as was done in .... 
-:. O'Sullivan and Pressley (1984). Those investigators hypothesized that embellishing . 
strategy instruetion by adding information about when and where to use the trained 
strategy (an imagery mnemonie strategy for vocabulary learning) would inerease 
children's generalized use of the trained procedure. Students in grades 5 and 6 were 
presented two memory tasks during the experiment, both of whieh eould be medi-
ated profitably with the trained procedure. The first task was learning the products 
manufaetured in partieular eities, and the second was acquisition of Latin word 
defmitions. 
Control subjects learned both types of materials, but were provided no strategy 
instruetions. In four other eonditions, the subjects were taught to mediate the 
city-produet task using the rnnemonic imagery procedure, with the eonditions vary-
ing in the amount of ''when" and "where" information about strategy use. No sub-
jects were instrueted to use the strategy when the Latin task was presented. In 
generat, transfer of the rnnemonie imagery strategy from the city-produet task to the 
Latin task was more likely given greater provision of when and wbere information 
during strategy instruetion. 
The good strategy user model assumes that every strategy that a person possesses 
can be accompanied by metaeognitive knowledge, like when and where to use the 
strategy. People vary with respect to how mueh of this typ_e of information tbey 
~............. ,.... 
possess, although really good strategy users have a rieb network of knowledge 
specifying the occasions when it is appropriate to use many of the Strategie proce-
dures that they know. 
There are at least three ways that this type of information ean be aequired (Press-
ley, Borkowski, & O'Sullivan, 1984). As was the case in O'Sullivan and Pressley 
(1984) and in many of the studies eited earlier tbat focused on strategy utility, an 
external agent (like a teacher or a parent) can provide tbe information to the ehild. 
Alternatively, ehildren ean be left on their own to discover metaeognitive informa-
tion as they work witb strategies. For instance, when people try two different strate-
gies for accomplishing the same task (strategies tbat differ in poteney), tbere is the 
opportunity to discover that one of tbe two strategies faeilitates better the particular 
type of performanee that was attempted witb the two techniques (Pressley, Levin, & 
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Ghatala, 1988). Unfortunately, however, autonomous abstraction of metacognitive 
information about strategies is far from certain, with children less likely than adults 
to discover such information (Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984). lt is also far from 
certain that children will use self-discovered metacognitive knowledge (Pressley, 
Ross, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984). Such failure. to abstract and use important meta-
cognitive information about strategies has prompted substantial research on a-tbird 
method for increasing metacognitive knowledge. 
<~ .., Children can be taught metacognitive acquisition procedures. That is, they can be 
taught to monitor their use of strategies with an eye toward metacognitively impor-
tant information such as how much a strategy enhances performance compared to 
alternative techniques. Ghatala and her associates have begun to study the effects 
produced by teaching simple metacognitive acquisition procedures (e.g., Ghatala, 
Levin, Pressley, & Goodwin, 1986; Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, & Lodico, 1985; 
Lodico, Ghatala, Levin, Pressley, & Bell, 1983), with these studies discussed more 
extensively in the next chapter. For the present, suffice to say that even 6- to 7-year-
old children benefit from instructions to compare strategies with one another, to 
note which oftwo strategies is more powerful, and to use that information to guide 
future strategy use. On the other band, suc~ ~s~uction with young grade-school 
children must be quite detailed, with explicit tuition,to compare the strategies, note 
their relative potencies, and use the metacognitive information about relative poten-
cies in decision mak:ing. 
One point to stress in closing this subsection is that the study of specific strategy 
knowledge has just begun. In particular, almost nothing is known about how some 
potentially irnportant categories of knowledge are acquired, such as understanding 
that a strategy is fun or burdensome to apply. There is little longitudinal study of the 
use of specific strategy knowledge, although there is an assumption that its initial 
deployment involves conscious analysis of a new task in order to identify elements 
that are specified in metacognitive knowledge about strategies possessed by the 
learner. For exarnple, a leamer wbo possesses strategies that are weil matched to 
expository prose (e.g., summarization) might exarnine a new text to determine if it 
were truly expository, and once determining that it was, consciously summarize. 
Eventually, however, it is assumed that conscious and reflective matehing of strate-
gies to tasks vis-a-vis metacognitive knowledge about strategies gives way to auto-
matic association of strategies to tasks. Studies need to be done to trace out 
explicitly the path from conscious to automatized use of metacognitive knowledge 
as a mediator of strategy use. Given the demonstrated potency of metacognitive 
information as a determinant of strategy use, this work is valuable as part of the Vali-
dation of the good strategy user model and as part of pragmatic research designed 
to determine how to enhance general application of strategies that are taught. 
Styles ' '. 
Some people tend to reflect quite a bit before performing actions, and others are 
habitually impulsive (Baron, 1981, 1985; Messer, 1976). Some people confront aca-
demic challenges calmly; others are anxious given the slightest challenge (e.g., 
~
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Tobias, 1977). In short, there arepersistent and pervasive s le differences between 
people. Of greatest concem here, a person's style can be an important factor mediat-
ing whether they use the metacognition about strategies that they possess in analyz-
ing task variables in order to make strategy decisions. 
Consider, fpr example, the habitually impulsive student. This is a person who 
has a" eneral bias to sto too soon when coilecting evidence" (Baron, 1985, p. 157). 
Are such people, who react quickly and fail to take critical information into account 
(e.g., Messer, 1976), likely to make careful analyses of task situations, likely to 
search for task characteristics, and likely to match carefully the characteristics of 
new tasks to strategies as specified by specific strategy knowledge that they possess? 
Such analyses and matehing takes time, and impulsive children often fail to delay 
their responding long enough for task analyses and metacognitively informed 
strategy planning to occur. Rapid and haphazard responding, which characterizes 
impulsivity, preclude the time-demanding processing that many acadernic and 
behavioral strategies require (Baron, 1985; Messer, 1976). 
Habitually anxious people also exhibit behaviors that are inconsistent with good 
strategy use. lt is weil known that people can hold a lirnited amount of information 
in consciousness at any given time (e.g., Baddeley, 1986). lt is also known that 
strategy planning and execution often demand a great deal of the lirnited amount of 
consciousness (i.e., short-term capacity) that a person has available (e.g., Case, 
1985; Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, Deane, & Schneider, 1987). Unfortunately, anxious 
people functionally reduce their.. conscious capacity because they exert cognitive 
effort attending to signs of arousal and negative thoughts about themselves 
-(Eysenck, 1979, Chapter 12; Sarason, 1972; Wine, 1971). Anxiety can, thus, have 
a negative effect on strategically mediated performance, especially for strategies 
that require a good deal of conscious capacity in order to acquire (Tobias, 1979). 
More positively, there are styles that defmitely can serve to facilitate strategy use 
and effectiveness. Reflective people think before.they respond, and tend to study sit-
uations extensively and appropriately before acting. Habitually calm people do not 
waste scarce consciousness on irrelevant cognitions (like negative self-thoughts), 
kee~ng their heads and not permitting anxiety_ to distract and detract from the task l 
a~. Not surprisingly, reflection characterizes good strategy users. 
Motivational Beliefs 
le have beliefs about their current competencies and these play an important 
rol in m ·vatmg good strategy use. Certain beliefs are considered tobe particularly 
critical. One is the understanding that how weil a person performs is largely a func-
tion of making an effort to use effective strategies (e.g., Clifford, 1984, 1986a, 
1986b):Thus, the good memory strategy user believes that trying hard to memorize 
is not enough. Good memory only results from use of mental energy in the applica-
tion of strategies appropriate to the material currently presented for mastery. Good 
memory strategy users have believed for some time that their personal memory 
competence can be increased a bit at a time by leaming more effective strategies 
( cf., Dweck, 1987). When they were younger, they be1ieved that they could become 
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good memorizers and good leamers by acquiring the skills and strategies possessed 
by mentally competent adults that they knew. In their view, there was nothing 
mysterious or unattainable about competence. These beliefs mo~ivated the search 
for and mastery of the effective memory strategies that they now possess (cf., 
Markus & Nurius, 1986). 
There are other bel~_atm.otivate behaviors, that are presumed to support good 
strategy use~stance, good memory strategy users recognize that it is important 
to shield theniselves from distractions as they perform important tasks (Kuh!, 1984, 
1985; Heck.hau~en, 1982). This understanding presumably activates acquisition 
and use of a entional strategies, such as arranging for study time to occur in quiet 
e~onments that have few distractions. Good strategy users also understand that 
planning and execution of strategies takes time, butthat it is time well spent (Baron, 
1985, pp. 159-160). They probably believe that thinking is an enjoyable~ivity 
that pays off (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Good strategy users understood as stu-
dents that the memory and learning strategies that they were acquiring in school 
were necessary (or at least helpful) in order to become an effective and competent 
member of society who is able to play a valued roJe. Believing that one's own cogni-
tive efforts can really make a difference is an important motivator for the acquisition 
and use of strategies. 
],!Ist as important as supportive and appropriately motivating beliefs is the Lack of 
dysfunctional and discouraging beliefs that would reduce interest in and the likeli-
hood of memory strategy acquisition. Good memory strategy users defmitely do not 
believe that memorizing ability is an innately determined and immutable ability that 
is determined solely by biological endowment or that memory is either "photo-
graphic" or it is not. They do not view themselves as helpless to discover ways of 
improving their Jot, nor do they believe in effortalone (e.g., that going over and over 
material in order to "burn it in" is a good method). 
I In arguing here that good strategy users possess a host of global and specific beliefs about themselves that affect strategy use, we recognize that there is only a small data base that is directly relevant to the position that good strategy use is tied to motivational beliefs. The most relevant research efforts are the many demonstra-
tions of increased use of strategies when people believe that use of strategies pays off 
(e.g., Black& Rollins, 1982; Borkowski etal. 1976; Cavanaugh& Borkowski, 1979; 
Kennedy & Miller, 1976; Lawson & Fuelop, 1980; Ringel & Springer, 1980). The 
reader may recall that these data were discussed earlier in this chapter in the subsec-
tion on metacognitive knowledge about strategies. In fact, all of the motivational 
beliefs discussed here qualify as metacognition because they refer to cognition about 
both thinking and cognitive tasks, although the Iack of mention of this part of 
metacognition in Chapter 5 makes obvious that metacognitive theorists generally 
have neglected motivational beliefs. Some of the more specific beliefs are tied to 
specific strategies, and thus, qualify as specific strategy knowledge. Thus, the moti-
vation associated with these beliefs is limited to the particular strategies to which 
they are attached. More global beliefs (e.g., good performance depends on effort 
used in the execution of appropriate strategies; I can become a good strategy user by 
learning the skills known and used by good leamers) exert more general influences. 
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Undoubtedly, there will be moreexperimental data about the role of metacogni-
tive beliefs in promoting good strategy use in the very near future. First of all, fairly 
complete theoretical Statements about the role of metacognition and strategy use are 
now becoming available, with the work ofBarbara McCombs, Jere Brophy, and John 
Nicholls especially notable for integrative completeness. McCombs (1986, 1987), 
Brophy (1985, 1986; Brophy & Kher, 1986), and Nicholls (in press) develop the 
ideas about motivational beliefs that are presented here in much rnore detail. See 
Borkowski, Carr, Rellinger, and Pressley (in press) as well. There arealso encourag-
ing research results. For instance, there is a growing data base conf"llllling that get-
ting students to attribute their strategically mediated good performances to the use 
of appropriate strategies increases continued use of strategies (e.g., Dweck & 
Elliott, 1983; Fowler & Peterson, 1981). Some of Borkowski's important, recent 
work on this problern is taken up in the next chapter. For the present, we emphasize 
the ernerging interest of theoreticians and researchers in rnotivational determina-
tion of good strategy use. 
Nonstrategie K.nowledge Base 
In addition to Strategie procedures, metacognition about strategies, and other 
motivational beliefs, good strategy users know a great deal more. Their lifetirne 
experiences have provided opportunities for acquisition of many specific facts ( e.g., 
that the Japanese make good television sets) and many sets of related facts (e.g., the 
economic strengths and weaknesses of rnany parts of the world). They have 
organized and categorized knowledge that corresponds to the organized knowledge 
bases of many other people (e.g., that dolls, board games, and model trains are sub-
sets of the larger set of toys). They know elaborate and generalized scripts that detail 
the temporal and spatial structures of recurring events in their lives. For example, 
their "taking a plane trip" script includes calling for reservations, buying the ticket 
before the trip, appearing at the airport an hour before flight time, checking in, wait-
ing at the gate, boarding the plane ... picking up Iuggage at baggage claim, departing ~ 
the arrival airport. They have images and verbal descriptions of many irnportant 
concepts. See any introductory cognitive psychology text (e.g., Anderson, 1985) for 
greater description of the various types of knowledge and representations of that 
knowledge that are stored in long-term rnernory. 
This knowledge base ca determine_strategy ... use in a nurober of ways. First of 
all, a weU-developed knowledge base rmits some ~arity. with some.' new" 
to-be-leamed content. In general, less strate ic intervention is required with 
moie familiar to-be-leamed material. Thus, ~experienced teacher entering a new 
school must leam a new set of routines. The teacher often has to leam when and how 
to take attendance and report it, where the recess- and cafeteria-duty rosters are 
placed, a percentage marking system used in the school, as well as a myriad of other 
specifics. Leaming these "new" rules is easier for the experienced compared to the 
novice teacher because the experienced teacher already possesses ~ rieb knowledge 
base about schools and school organization. This includes temporally organized 
schemas about the structure of the school day and the school year from the teacher's 
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perspective. lt includes specific knowledge about the type of paper work required of 
teachers as weil as ways of accomplishing that paperwork. lt includes knowledge of 
the laws governing teaching, employrnent in schools, and educational administration 
of students. The task faced by the experienced teacher is simply to adjust this 
knowledge base about schools to fit the current situation. This existing knowledge 
base guides the experienced teacher to expect particular events or classes of events 
to occur. When they happen, the IJrior knowledge base permits recognition of q!ti-
cal versus noncritical information: That is, details about the new school rules and 
structure are assimilated by the existing knowledge base. 
To the extent that old knowledge is not perfect, experienced teachers can add to 
their knowledge of schools, a process referred to as cretion by Rumelhart(l980). 
Sometimes all that is required is fme-grained modifi~n of existing knowledge, or 
fine tuning according to Rumelhart's analysis of knowledge change. If sorne aspect 
of the school is cornpletely different frorn previous experience, it rnay be necessary 
to r:estmctu.Le (again, a term used by Rumelhart) some part of the knowledge base 
completely. For example, complete restructuring ofknowledge about acceptable stu-
dent dress rnight be required of a teacher moving from a conventional public school 
to a military school. Although the three rnechanisms of accretion, fine tuning, and 
restructuring have most explicitly been developed with respect to schernatized prior 
knowledge (Rurnelhart, 1980), these types of changes probably occur for diverse 
types of prior knowledge representations. For example, categorizable information 
can be accreted (i.e., categories added) , fine tuned (i.e., slight changes in particular 
categories to capture newly encountered contents), or cornpletely restructured (i.e., 
reclassifying animals on the basis of indigenous geography rather than on the basis 
of genus and species considerations). 
Summary of Good U se of Memory Strategies 
Good memory strategy users are always looking for procedures to enhance perfor-
rnance. For rnany farniliar tasks, there are autornatic associations between rnernory 
I goals and strategies. For the authors, these include writing out lists of items to be 
bought at the grocery store and mnemonically recoding the number-letter designa-
tion when one's car is parked in a rnulti-tiered garage (e.g., section 3-B can be 
remernbered by imagining the 3 bears visiting the car) . On other occasions, the good 
/
strategy user analyzes the task situation to determine if (s)he could recognize sirni-
larities between the current mernory problern and previous acadernic rnernory 
experiences that were strategically mediated, and thus, generalize a previously 
acquired procedure to the new situation. If sirnilarities are identified, that triggers 
strategies associated with previous, sirnilar problems. Rather than just letting these 
strategies frre off in a heiter skelter fashion , however, the good strategy user formu-
1Iates a planthat sequences relevant strategies appropriately and includes rnonitoring 
of strategy use and execution. Once a person begins the sequence, performance is 
rnonitored to deterrnine if progress is being made toward the goal. lf not, the student 
rnight try barder or substitute other strategies until one is identified that provides 
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progress toward the goal. Although this description of self-regulation is simplified, 
it captures the reflective, informed, and monitored use of memory strategies that 
characterizes good use of memory strategies. As such, this sketch of competent cog-
nition is not controversial (e.g., Baker & Brown, 1984; Baron, 1985; Brown et al., 
1983; Chi, 1985b; Frederiksen, 1984; Glaser, 1985; Rigney, 1980; Schoenfeld, 
1985; Wagner & Sternberg, 1984), although the good strategy user model contains 
more explicit specification of its components than do many of the alternative 
descriptions of good thinking. 
Use of memory strategies depends largely on appropriate beliefs and strategy 
knowledge according to the good strategy user model. The different types of strate-
gies operate in conjunction with one another and with processing determined by 
style. That the operation of general strategies such as monitoring can change beliefs 
and strategy knowledge is also specified. Strategy use sometimes depends on the 
nonstrategic knowledge base; in turn, the nonstrategic knowledge base is often 
enriched by strategy functioning. Most strategy components are stored in long-term 
memory, but operate in short-term memory-thus, operations that occur in short-
term memory can increase long-term knowledge. For example, use of a vocabulary-
learning strategy sometimes increases long-term knowledge of particular words. 
When the learner monitors that long-term retention occurred, there may be 
increased recognition that the strategy is useful with the particular type of vocabu-
lary that was acquired on this occasion- that is, a change in strategy knowledge. 
The explicit selection and conscious execution and monitoring of strategies 
requires learner attention (Baddeley, 1986; Case, 1985; Kahnemann, 1973), espe-
cially during the early phases of strategy acquisition. Consider a child who is being 
taught to comprehend and remernher text. The child can be asked to direct attention /?.. 
to relevant parts of text, to seif-test, and to review. At first, execution and articula- '-' 
tion of the strategies are clumsy. Awkward and conscious execution can consume 
most if not all of the child's attentional capacity, leaving little for other cognitive 
demands of reading (e.g., relating content that is being read to information that the 
learner already has stored). Fortunately, witb practice, the amount of attention that 
is required to execute individual strategies and sequences of strategies decreases 
(Logan, 1985; Schneider, Dumais, & Shiffrin, 1984). Such automaticity frees atten-
tion for other activities. In short, much of good strategy use occurs automatically-
out of consciousness. In fact, development of such automaticity for farniliar tasks is 
an important goal of strategy education. 
In summary, good memory strategy use is complicated since it involves the coor-
dinated development and use of strategies, metacognition, and the nonstrategic 
knowledge base, all operating in the confmes of limited capacity. (Hence the presen-
tation of Chapters 2 through 5 on capacity, strategies, nonstrategic knowledge, and 
metacognition logically preceded the integration presented here and in tbe next 
chapter.) We emphasize that a global good strategy user is something of an idealized 
endstate. More optimistically, there is a good deal of evidence tbat children in fact 
do make substantial progress toward good strategy use. We turn our attention now 
to research on a particular group of strategies in order to illustrate this point. 
' 
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The Development of Good U se of Elaboration Strategies 
Children are often presented factual knowledge that they are expected to acquire. 
Sometimes the facts are listed out; sometimes they are presented in text. The 
memory strategies reviewed in this section can dramatically facilitate learning of 
factual information and knowledge of relationships between particular pieces of 
information. Such associative, factual knowledge plays a prominent role in the 
knowledge base. Because the knowledge base plays a large role in cognition and 
good strategy use in general (last section; Chi, 1985b; Pressley, Borkowski, & 
Schneider, 1987; Pressley, Goodchild, Fleet, Zajchowski, & Evans, in press), there 
is strong motivation to do all possible to increase both the amount and organization 
of associative knowledge (e.g., Anderson, 1983). 
Introduction to Paired-Associate Elaboration 
Until the last decade, almost all research on associative leaming and associative 
strategies was conducted in the context of paired-associate learning. This paradigm 
has been used in developmental studies for most of this century (Vertes, 1913, 
1931). Rohwer (1973) presented an extremely detailed task analysis of paired-
associate learning. Reviewofthat analysis provides a good introduction to the think-
ing of most researchers who are interested in various types of associative learning 
and approaches to elaboration. 
During study, both pair members are usually presented simultaneously. At testing, 
only the stimulus is presented with the subject required to recall the paired response. 
Success at this task is more likely if subjects somehow associate the stimulus and 
response terms meaningfully as they study a pair. (In many studies, the stimuli and 
responses were not related in ways that were obvious at first glance.) Rohwer ( 1973) 
assumed that efficient learning of pairs was accomplished by generation of shared 
meaning between stimulus and response terms: 
._/ ... the hypothesis is that shared meanings are oriented in noun-pair learning by a process of 
generating an event that can serve as a common referent for the members of each pair. Here-
after, this process wilJ be designated by the term elaboration . . . (p. 5) . 
Elaboration of paired associates specifically refers to joining of stimulus and 
-.) response items into a common phrase or image. For instance, a verbal elaboration 
of the pair cat-apple could be, ''The cat rolled the apple around." An imaginal 
elaboration might be an intemal represention of a cat rolling the apple around, for 
example, an old yellow cat that one knew as a child playing with an apple that fell 
from the apple tree in the yard of the house that one grew up in. There has been 
anecdotal evidence for more than two millenia that creation of such elaborations 
improves memory (Yates, 1966), although systematic and programmatic study of 
paired-associate elaboration processes has been conimed to the last 25 years (Press-
ley, 1977; Reese, 1977). Although an enormous amount of important information 
about memory d~velopment was generated within the paired-associate paradigm, 
researchers who are interested in associative elaboration strategies now consider 
' 
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processing of a variety of materials. Given the diversity of materials in studies 
of elaboration, it is not surprising that there are a number of different elabora-
tive strategies. 
Types of Elaborative Strategies 
Two generat categories of strategies (referred to here as transfonnational and non-
transformational elaboration) emerge from inspection of the various elaborative 
techniques. Transfonnational strategies involve the introduction of relationships 
into to-be-learned material that arenot always naturally connected to the materials. 
In contrast, nontransfonnational elaborations are additions to to-be-learned content 
that are naturally and meaningfully associated with tbe content. Brief consideration 
of various elaborative strategies will make this distinction more obvious and facili-
tate the discussion of the development of elaborative skills. (j) The best known transformational elaborations are the imagery mnemonics consi-
dered briefly in the last subsection. Although there are some developmental con-
straints on the construction of elaborative mnemonics (covered later), in general, 
the evidence is quite consistent that if a learner is exposed to or can form an imag-
inal or verbal transformational elaboration, learning of paired associations i~creases 
dramatically (e.g., Pressley, 1982; Rohwer, 1973). Such transformationa 
mnemonic strategies have proven useful for learning more ~ological\y valid 
materials than paired associates. There is an enormous Iiterature supporting the 
..._. case that transfonnational mnemonics can be engiDeered to facilitate learning of 
vocabulary definitions (e.g., Pressley, Levin, & Delaney, 1982), with this claim 
extending across a number of populations, including mentally handicapperl children 
(e.g., Mastropieri, Scruggs, & Levin, 1987; Pressley, Johnson, & Symons, 1987; 
Thmure & Lane, 1987). Acquisition ofbasic social studies facts (e.g., countries and 
their capitals, states and their products, presidents and their accomplishments) can 
be facilitated by rnnemonic elaborative techniques, as can memorization of many 
pieces of scientific information (e.g., cbemical reactions, parts of the skeletal and 
nervous systems, and mathematical equations). See Levin (1981a, 1983) and 
Higbee ( 1977, 1987) for exarnples. Many of these applications are specific instances 
--;., of the keyword metbod, a procedure devised by Atkinson and Raugb (1975) and 
originally adapted to child learning by Pressley (1977; Pressley & Levin, 1978). 
The keyword metbod is easily understood by considering a few exarnples. Sup-
pose that as an English-speaking person you wish to remernher tbat der Spiegel 
means mirror in German. First, note a sound association between tbe German 
word and a familiar word in English. For instance, the second author remembers 
vividly tbat during his childhood, winners on game shows were always given 
gift certificates for the Spiegel catalog. Then, form an image between this acousti-
cally similar word (the keyword) and a mirror (the referent of the to-be-acqoired 
foreign item). In this case, an image of someone holding a Spiegel catalog up to 
a mirror might do. Later, when der Spiegel is presented, the acoustic association 
to Spiegel catalog should come to mind, whicb would permit ac;cess to tbe inter-
active image whicb in turn permits retrieval of the meaning of der Spiegel. A second 
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example can be culled from physics. Heisenberg proposed the uncertainty principle, 
which is that it is impossible to measure the position and velocity of an object at the 
same time. Perhaps heist could serve as a keyword for Heisenberg. Then imagine a 
robber leaving a scene of an accident wearing a pedometer that he has stolen. He is 
anxious to try out the captured instrument, but has trouble figuring out where he is 
on his escape route as he tri es to measure his speed of walking. 
'/' Some of the most impressive applications of the transtorrnational mnemonics 
have been provided with respect to memory ofprose (McCormick & Levin, 1987, 
review that Iiterature in detail). Consideration of a recently completed investigation 
makes obvious the power of this approach. Suppose that a person is required to learn 
a set of facts, perhaps biographical points about particular people. One common way 
ofpresenting such biographical information is in loosely structured prose. Consider 
the following text used by McCormick and Levin (1987) to present biographical 
information about a fictitious person named Charlene McKune (critical to-be-
remembered content highlighted): 
Born and raised on a dairy farm where she helped take care of the cows, Charlene McKune 
has always been used to hard work. When she was a child, McKune enjoyed creating homes 
for her pets out of her toy building blocks. To earn extra money and because of her hatred for 
dirt of any kind, McKune began washing cars for her parents' friends ... (p. 400). 
Control subjects in McCormick's and Levin's research read this passage, with even-
tual recall of the name-biographical facts associations required. 
There were elaborative transformations in three other conditions of their studies. 
In one of these three, the loosely connected passages were presented, with subjects 
instructed to use a ke word strate to learn the content. Thus, for the illustrative 
passage, the subjects were provided the word raccoon as a keyword for Charlene 
McKune. They were told to imagine a pet raccoon outside afarmhouse jumping over 
a long row of building blocks with some kids washing cars nearby. 
In the second transfonnational elaborative condition, subjects were presented the 
same biographical facts, but this time McCormick and Levin (1986) transformed 
the thematically loose passage into one in which a unifying theme tied the biograph-
ical facts together. For the Charlene McKune passage, the theme was "country": 
Charlene McKJJne spent much ofher Iife living in the serenity ofthe remote countryside. Born 
and raised on afarm, McKune grew to Iove the peace and quiet of rural Iiving. When she was 
a child, her father made her building blocks out of bits of wood on the farm, and McKune 
spent hours building "barns" and "silos" with these blocks. To earn extra money, McKune 
began washing cars- and sometimes tractors-for the neighboring farmers (p. 400).* 
*lf McCormick and Levin had started with just the name and biographical facts and generated the 
country-thematic passage given here, they would have been engaging in a nontransfonnational elabora-
tive strategy, since they would have been generating linking prosethat would be semantically consistent 
with the biographical facts- that is, a fann logically is in the country, the building blocks logically would 
have been made of scrap wood from the fann, as a farm child it would make sense that she would con-
struct barns and silos, and washing both cars and tractors would seem to be reasonable for a fann young-
ster trying to start a vehicle-washing service. Because these relationships do not map directly on to the 
facts as presented in the loosely structured passage, McConnick and Levin's passage is a transfonnational 
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The third elaborative condition involved presentation of both the thematic pas-
sage and the mnemonico 
McCormick and Levin (1986) bad hypothesized that people would be able to 
remernher which facts went together better when the facts were embedded in the 
thematic passageo That is, they would recall that whoever it was that lived on the 
farm bad building blocks and washed carso The thematic passage provided no link 
to the name ofthe individual, however, and thus, it was hypothesized that recall of 
the person who went with each set of biographical facts might be difficult even given 
the thematic passageo The special strength of the keyword images is that they 
provide interlinkages for the biographical facts and a link from the biographical 
points to the name of the person. In general, the results reported by McCormick and 
Levin (1986) to date conf'rrm that the keyword approach provides greater overall 
learning than the thematic appreach, and specifically facilitates acquisition of fact-
name associations. Consistent with predictions as weil, the thematic passages 
improve memory of which pieces of biography go together. This work is important 
for its implications about how prose content should be structured in order to improve 
memory of proseo Passages highlighting integrative themes have a Iot going for them 
relative to passages that do not (more about this later when studies of precise 
elaboration are considered). In addition, there are occasions when keyword 
approaches can be reasonable adjuncts even for memory-facilitating, thematically 
integrative prose. 
Short of completely transforrning some given prose (i.e., by rewriting it as 
McCormick & Levin, 1986, did), there are a number of nontransforrnational 
elaborative techniques that can be used with prose that facilitate performanceo For 
instance, many readers construct~ges representing the content of text that they 
are reading (e.go, Denis, 1987). Text can be presented with uestions that require 
.........,.._ 
the learner to go beyond the information presented in the material in order to pro-
vide an adequate answer (eog., Pressley, McDaniel, Thrnure, Wood, & Ahmad, 
1987) 0 People can be taught to pose questions to themselves (and to Iook for answers 
to those questions) as they process text (e.go, Wong, 1985); they can be taught ques-
tioning strategies to facilitate inference formation (e.g., Elliott-Faust & Pressley, 
1986; Hansen & Pearson, 1983)0 All ofthe strategies in this paragraph involve~ 
be ond t 0 ation given in the to-be-learned content, but doing so in a way that 
involves introductio 0 onshi s that naturall and meanin full consistent 
with the content that is being studied. 
Both transformational and nontransformational elaborative strategies have been 
studied developmentally. There are clear developmental increases in noninstructed 
use of these procedures; there are also clear developmental differences in the ade-
quacy of elaborative strategy use following instruction. In this section of the chapter, 
we review some of the most important developmental fmdings, ones that make clear 
elaboration, particularly because there is deletion of content that did not fit the transformational "coun-
try" themeo In making this point, we also appreciate that this example makes clear that the boundary 
between transformational and nontransformational elaborations is sometimes a fuzzy oneo 
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that the road to good elaborative strategy use is a slow one. There is far too much 
Literature on the development of elaboration to provide a comprehensive overview. 
Instead, we present important developmental conclusions that are relevant to the 
good strategy user model, briefly mention some ofthe more important sturliesthat 
support the conclusion, and then discuss in detail some particularly pertinent results 
that support each of the main conclusions that are presented. 
Development of Elaboration Skills 
C Ihere is greater use of elaborative strategies (without instruction to do so) with 
development. Ihere are especially impressive increases from late childlwod to late 
adolescence. The empirical tipoff that there was increased use of elaboration among 
older adolescents was provided by Rohwer and Bean (1973). They noted that in all 
of their experiments, grade-school children benefited from instructions to construct 
transformational elaborations when learning paired associates; in contrast, this 
instruction only worked some of the time with samples of older adolescents. The 
most sensible explanation of instructional failure when it occurred with 11th- and 
12th-grade students was that they were already elaborating, and thus, the instruction 
failed to promote cognitive activity over and above what the older adolescents were 
already doing. This explanation seemed sensible given that it was weil known by 
1973 that university students would elaboratively mediate paired nonsense syllables 
and other materials as they tried to leam them (e.g.; Prytulak, 1971; Underwood & 
Schutz, 1960). 
Pressley and Levin (1977a) provided some more direct support for Rohwer and 
Bean's (1973) developmental interpretation. They interviewed students in grades 5, 
7, and 9 about their strategy use during paired-associate learning. There was a clear 
increase with age in the proportion of children reporting use of elaboration, 
although at no developmentallevel did even a majority of students report elaborat-
ing most of the pairings that they were trying to learn. One of the most striking 
aspects ofthe results reported by Pressley and Levin (1977a) was that classifications 
of children with respect to strategy use was much more predictive of associative 
learning performance than age. For example, the associative learning of fifth-grade 
elaborators was almost as good as the associative leaming of ninth-grade elabora-
tors. Both of these groups outperformed fifth- and ninth-grade students who relied 
on rehearsal. Again, there was only a slight cued recall difference between fifth- and 
ninth-grade rehearsers. 
Others have also generated data consistent with the strategic development posi-
tion advanced by Rohwer and Bean (e.g., Kemler &Jusczyk, 1975; Kennedy & Su-
zuki, 1977; Waters, 1982). Beuhring and Kee (1987a, 1987b) have recently reported 
:=/ a set of results that provides especially strong support for Rohwer and Bean's (1973) 
/ hypothesis. They included samples of 10- to 11-year-old children and 16- to 18-year-
old adolescents. The subjects were presented two lists of 36 unrelated noun pairs. 
They were gi~ each pair one time for 15 seconds and were told to leam it so they 
could recall.fhe second pair member given the first. The subjects were also required 
to verbalize their thoughts while they studied. The researchers were extremely care-
ful not to prompt the subjects about the types of strategies that could be used to learn 
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the word pairs. lt was explained explicitly that the purpose of the study was to fmd 
out what people really did to learn this material. There were several indicators that 
the subjects were faithful to the instructions, including high ratings of confidence 
that they had in fact reported all of the elaborations as they were occurring. 
The verbalized strategies were classified into three categories: rebear al, elabora-
tion, and other associative strategies: 
Rehearsal was defined as the repetition of a noun pair with or without a conjunction (e.g., The 
CA TTLE and the BAY) and Elaboration was defmed as the description of a direct interaction 
between the members of a noun pair (e.g., The CATTLE swam in the BAY). Strategies that 
provided associations other than a direct interaction were grouped Iogether in a category of 
Other Associative Strategies (e.g., identifying an attribute the nouns shared in common such 
as color or shape; indicating that the pair members were owned by the same person; forming 
an interaction between the Stimulus and a new, intermediate, response that would cue the 
actual response because of some preexisting association with it) (pp. 260-261). 
The mean nurober of each type of mediator reported at each age Ievel is recorded 
in Figure 6.1. There was a dramatic decrease with increasing age in the mean nurn~ 
ber of rehearsals that were reported. There was concomitant increase in the number 
of elaborations and other associative strategies. In short, these data supported Roh-
wer and Bean's (1973) hypothesis that the use of elaborative strategies increased 
with age. In addition, regression analyses were conducted in whicb the number of 
elaborations reported, the number of other associative strategies reported, and the 
age of subjects were entered (in that order) as predictors of paired-associate 
memory. Number of elaborations accounted for 42% of cued recall; nurober of 
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FIGURE 6.1. Mean number of mediators (maximum = 36) reported at each age Ievel in Beuhr-
ing & Kee (l987a, 1987b). 
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associative strategies accounted foranother 29% ofthe perfonnance variability; age 
accounted for less than 4% of the remaining perfonnance. Beuhring and Kee 
~987a, 1987b) concluded that nearly all of the developmental increase in recall 
could be accounted for by the developmental increase in elaborative strategy use. 
In short, there is a good deal of evidence that elaborative activity increases during 
adolescence. lt is noteworthy that compared to some of the other strategies 
reviewed earlier in this book (e.g., cumulative rehearsal), elaboration is a late 
~ development. It is also notable that elaboration is not universally applied by 
-:;:;. university-age adults, either during paired-associate learning as in Beuhring and Kee 
(1987a, 1987b) or during learning of other materials with associative structure. For 
instance, in recent studies of vocabuJary learning, Pressley and Ahmad (1986), 
Pressley (1987), and Pressley, Levin, and Ghatala (1988) reported that university 
students used keyword-elaborative strategies between 20 and 30% percent of the 
time (specific value varied slightly from condition to condition). A nurober of sub-
jects reported no use of elaboration for vocabulary learning, relying exclusively on 
rehearsal. There is plenty of room for additional development of elaborative compe-
tence, even in good adult learners like those enrolled in a university. It is clear from 
these data that if good elaborative strategy use is to occur, it cannot be left to 
naturalistic development. 
2 Some elaborative strategies can be carried out by older but not younger children. 
A great deal of research effort was expended in the last 15 years toward determining 
when children can generate transfonnational imagery strategies. Much of this work 
was done using paired-associate materials, with the relevant experiments including 
conditions in which the subjects were instructed to construct interactive images to 
learn the pairings and control conditions in which subjects were left to their own 
devices to learn the associations. Most of this work was stimulated in part by Roh-
wer's (1973) developmental elaboration hypothesis (see Pressley, 1982), that with 
increasing age less and less explicit cuing would be required to activate elaboration 
in children. Support was found for this hypothesis in the case of transfonnational 
imaginal elaboration. 
In most of these studies, ability to construct transfonnational elaborative images 
was inferred if there was greater stimulus-cued recall of responses in a condition in 
which children were provided transfonnational imagery instructions than in a con-
::_:) trol condition in which subjects were not provided imagery directJons. Although 
there is evidence that even 4-year-olds can generate imagery rnnemon·cs for paired 
associates (e.g., Bender & Levin, 1976), a Iot ofprompting and environmental sup-
i>ort is required (e.g., pairs are presented as toys rather than as words). Less prompt-
ing and support is required with increasing age, with development of imagery 
generation skill continuing until the end the of the elementary-school years (e.g., 
Danner & Taylor, 1973; Kernler & Jusczyk, 1975; Pressley & Levin, 1977b). 
Development of elaborative imagery skill has also been explored in the context of 
vocabulru:y learnin , with researchers studying an imagery version of the keyword 
rilethod. Pressley an Levin (1978) specifically proposed a developmental model of 
imagery skills as a function of environmental support for generation of elaborative 
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images. Consider the Spanish word, carta, which means Ietter. Suppose that a child 
leamer is presented the word, its definition, an English keyword (e.g., cart), and a 
direction to use the keyword method to leam the word. To carry out the elaboration 
instruction, the child learner must retrieve from long-term memory images of a 
Ietter and a cart, and then must construct a semantic relationship that links a Ietter 
and a cart as weil as an image to represent the relationship. The information-
processing Ioad is reduced considerably if the leamer is presented the word, a key-
word, and its defmition, with pictures of the keyword and definition referents 
provided as weil. Compared to the purely verbal presentation, the child learner 
given the pictures of the keyword and definition referents does not need to retrieve 
images for these two items. 
Pressley and Levin (1978) hypothesized that whether young children could exe-
cute an irnagery-elaborative strategy would be tied to the arnount of processing 
required to construct the irnagery mediator. This hypothesis arose from supporting 
work that established that functional short-term memory (i.e., consciousness) is 
more limited in younger children than in older children and adults ( e. g. , Case, 1985, 
Chapter 13; Dempster, 1981). Thus, they expected that children would be able to 
execute the keyword strategy given pictorial support before they would be able to 
execute the strategy if they were provided only verbal materials. 
Pressley and Levin (1978) included grade-2 and grade-6 children as subjects. In 
three conditions of the study, children were given keyword instructions. In one of 
these conditions, the subjects were also presented pictures completely representing 
a complete mnemonic image (e.g., a picture of alarge postalleuer in a cart). In the 
second condition, pictorial support for imagery generation was provided. In the 
third, there was no pictorial support, with only verbal presentations of the vocabu-
lary and keywords. There were also two control conditions, one in which the defmi-
tions were presented as pictures and one in which the vocabulary and meanings were 
presented verbally only. The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 6.2. 
Interacting pictures promoted learning of the vocabulary at both grade Ievels. There 
was also significant facilitation at both grade Ievels due to the keyword instruction 
when picture support was provided. In contrast, although the keyword instruction 
facilitated the performance of sixth graders when they were provided the materials 
verbal1y only, no comparable facilitation was obtained at the grade-2 Ievel. These 
data generally supported Pressley and Levin's (1978) hypothesis that grade-2 chil-
dren could generate elaborative images given an instruction to do so, if they were 
provided support that promoted generation of the images. Grade-6 children do not 
require pictorial support for them to construct keyword-mnemonic images. 
Pressley and his associates continue to study the development of children's abili-
ties to construct imaginal elaborations. Given the contemporary prominence of 
theories relating the development of children's cognitive performances to the 
development of short-term memory (e.g., Case, 1985), there is renewed interest in 
determining whether children's ability to generate images is tied to how much infor-
mation a child can hold in consciousness at any one time-whether imagery-
generation skill in children is tied to functional short-term memory differences 
between children, with functional short-term memory a product of short-term 
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storage determined by biological factors, management of that biologically deter-
mined capacity, and the learner's knowledge base (Case, 1978; Chi, 1978). 
Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, Deane, and Schneider (1987) studied in detail the rela-
tionships between children's use of a nontransformational imagery strategy and 
functional short-term memory differences (as assessed by a battery of measures 
administered as part of the experiment), differences in generat verbal competence 
(Peabody scores), and differences in age. Their hypothesis was that functional 
short-term memory would be highly predictive of sentence Iearning when children 
were using an irnagery strategy to code sentences, but would not be so predictive of 
learning when children leamed any way that they wanted. Six- to 13-year-old chil-
dren were presented 20 sentences to learn, ones referring to very concrete events 
that were amenable to imagery encoding (e.g., The angry bird shouted at the white 
dog; The fat boy ran with the gray balloon; The policeman painted the circus tent 
on a windy day; The pirate dropped the gold key in the middle of the jungle). Sub-
jects in the imagery condition were told to make a picture in their head for each sen-
tence. The instructions stressed that the images should represent the rneaning of the 
sentence content as closely as possible. Control subjects were simply instructed to 
try hard. 
Consistent with data generated by Levin, Bender, and Pressley (1979), there was 
a clear developmental effect in that the imagery instructions significantly promoted 
sentence learning for the older half ofthe sample (grades4, 5, 6), butthere was only 
a slight trend for the younger half of the sample (grades 1, 2, 3). The sentence learn-
ing data are presented in Figure 6.3. Much rnore interesting, children with higher 
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functional short-term memory scores were more successful in the imagery condi-
tion than were children who were less able to hold a number of items in conscious-
ness at one time (zero-order correlation = . 71). The potency of short-term memory 
as a predictor in the imagery condition was especially clear given that it was a sig-
nificant predictor even with age and verbal competence in the regression equation. ~ 
LISREL analyses made clear that even the predictability of sentence learning from 
verbal competence was mediated in the imagery condition in part by the influence 
ofverbal competence on functional short-term memory. In contrast, the relationship 
between short-term memory and sentence learning was much less pronounced in the 
control condition (zero-order correlation = .40). With age entered into the regres-
sion equation, neither verbal competence nor short-term memory differences 
between children were additionally predictive of sentence learning in the control 
condition. In short, all of the analyses in Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, Deane and 
Schneider (1987) were consistent with the conclusion that imagery-generation com-~ 
petence in children is tied to functional short-term capacity. Kee and Davies (in 
press) have presented complementary evidence that elaboration is short-term capac-
ity demanding for children, with decreasing capacity required to execute elabora-
tion strategies with increasing age during adoloscence. We expect a great deal of 
additional research on the developmental relationship betWeen use of elaboration 
and functional capacity given the clear relevance of this work to a variety of 
theoretical perspectives. 
Because of the enormous general interest in the development of imagery skills 
during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. , Bruner et al., 1966; Kosslyn, 1980; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1971), the development of imaginal elaboration received much more atten-
tion than the development of verbal elaboration skills. The identification of clear 
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developmental trends in irnagery generation fueled interest in imagery addition-
ally-lt became clear that irnagery generationwas more certain with prirnary-grade 
children with to-be-leamed materials presented pictorially compared to verbally, 
with paired items that had obvious semantic relationships compared to nonobvious 
elationships, and when materials were presented relatively slowly. In contrast, by 
the end of the grade-school years, children can generate elaborative irnages given 
purely verbal presentations, given materials that are arbitrarily related, and given 
fairly rapid presentation of to-be-learned materials. 
From a pragmatic perspective, it is unfortunate that more attention has not been 
given to children's verbal elaboration under instruction, because there is very con-
vincing evidence that some verbal elaboration slcills are developed far in advance 
of imagery elaboration. Even nursery school children's learning of pair~ associates 
can be improved easily by very brief instructions to them to construct meaningful 
sentences linking paired items (e.g. , Levin, McCabe, & Bender, 1975; Milgram, 
1967). 
The potency of verbal ela ion instruction relative to imagery elaboration 
instruction for young grade-school children can be appreciated by comparing the 
-:;. results ofa study reported by Pressley, Levin, and McConnick (1980) (summarized 
in Figure 6.4) with the results of Pressley and Levin (1978) (Figure 6.2) . Grade-2 
and Grade-5 children were presented the same vocabulary to learn that children in 
Pressley and Levin (1978) studied. Subjects in the verbal e1aboration condition were 
simply told to make up a meaningful sentence containing the keyword and the mean-
ing for each vocabulary word as it was presented (e.g. , The mailman carried the Iet-
ter in his cart) . Control subjects were given the same instruction as control subjects 
in Pressley and Levin (1978) . At both age Ievels the keyword instruction had a large 
and dramatic effect on children's leaming of the vocabulary w,ords. The ease and 
potency of verbal elaboration instruction with young grade-school children makes it 
-:;;' an appealing alternative to irnagery elaboration instruction during the prirnary 
grade-school years. 
A good deal of developmental work on a variety of elaborative strategies is antici-
pated in the coming years. One motivation for this work is that new and potentially 
very powerful strategies are being proposed and developed. For instance, Bransford 
and his associates have argued that memory for seemingly arbitrary relationships in 
text can be irnproved by providing elaborations that make clear the significance of 
the relationship stated in text (i .e. , precise elaborations, following their terminol-
ogy). Bransford and colleagues have conducted a number of studies (e.g., Bransford 
et al. , 1982; Owings, Petersen, Bransford, Morris, & Stein, 1980; Stein, Littlefield, 
Bransford, & Persampieri , 1984) in which subjects (both children and adults) have 
been presented a series of mutually interfering sentences that specified relationships 
that arenot obviously meaningful at first glance (base sentences, again following the 
terminology employed in Bransford's publications) . For example, three base sen-
tences used in these studies were the following: 
The hungry man got into the car. 
The strong man helped the woman. 
The brave man ran into the house. 
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These base sentences can be expanded with precise elaborations: 
The hungry man got into the car to go to the restaurant. 
The strong man helped the woman carry the heavy packages. 
The brave man ran into the house to save the baby from the fire. 
What are the effects of precise elaborations on learning? Pressley, McDaniel, 
Turnure, Wood, and Ahmad (1987) investigated in detail the effects of providing 
precise elaborations to adults. The results were complicated. When learning was 
incidental (i.e., subjects were not aware as they processed sentences that they would 
be required to recall them later), there was a small positive effect on adult learning, 
a result compatible with Bransford and his associates' own data (e.g. Stein & Brans-
ford, 1979; Stein et al., 1984). In contrast, when learning was intentional, subjects 
who studied only the base sentences actually outperformed subjects given the pre-
cisely elaborated sentences. Supplementary analyses determined that during inten-
tionallearning, adults generated many and very effective elaborations of their own 
as they read base sentences. The most important data in the experiment were in con-
ditions in which subjects were instructed to generate their own elaborations for base 
sentences by responding to "Why?" questions (e.g., Why did the hungry manget 
into the car? Why did the strong man help the woman? Why did the brave man run 
into the house?). Answering why questions promoted both incidental and inten-
tionallearning, and to a large extent. The results of the Pressley, McDaniel et al. 
(1987) studies are surnmarized in Figure 6.5. 
These adult results suggested that uestioning was an elaborative technique tha 
should be explored in greater detail, especially given the prominent and natural role 
of questioning during classroom learning (e.g., Redfield & Rousseau, 1981; Winne, 
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~ 1979). Wood, Pressley, and Winne (1988) provided such a test. Children in grades 
4 through 8 were presented sentences to learn with the learning goal strongly 
emphasized (i .e. , learning was intentional) , sentences sirnilar to those used in 
Bransford's studies. In one condition of the experiment the subjects were presented 
only base sentences with an instruction to try hard to learn the sentences. In a second 
condition the subjects were provided precisely elaborated sentences and were told 
to try hard to remember them. In the thirdcondition, base sentences were presented 
and the participants were required to answer why questions. In the fourth condition, 
the base sentences were presented and the subjects were asked to construct non-
transfonnational images representing the content of each of the sentences. Thus, 
Wood et al. ( 1988) replicated the three elaboration conditions in Pressley, McDaniel 
et al. (1987) and included an irnagery condition as weil. 
The results were somewhat different for the younger compared to the older par-
ticipants in the study. The data are summarized in Figure 6 .6 by splitting the sample 
at the medianage into a younger (mean age = 9 yrs, 9 mos) afld into an older group 
(mean age = 12 yrs, 4 mos). At the younger age Ievel, the percentage learned in the 
questioned and imagery conditions significantly exceeded the percentage leamed in 
the base sentence condition (p < .01 for this and all significant comparisons in this 
study). Provision of precise elaborations produced nonsignificantly more learning 
than presentation of base sentences only, and nonsignificantly less learning than 
occurred in either the questioned or imagery condition. At the older age Ievel, pro-
vision of precise elaborations, questioning, and generation of images all produced 
greater learning than occurred in the base sentences only condition. In addition, 
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answering why questions produced greater learning than simply receiving precise 
elaborations. In short, these results provide support for the hypothesis that both 
elaborations produced by questioning and nontransformational images promote 
learning of arbitrary content in children between 9 and 14 years of age. 
The results obtained in Wood et al. (1988) are encouraging in that questioning 
produced striking learning gains, but they are somewhat limited in that the materials 
used in the Bransford studies are somewhat artificial. Given the limited develop-
ment of children's knowledge about many topics, they are often presented informa-
tion to learn that would seem somewhat arbitrary on frrst inspection. Thus, there is 
motivation to study the questioning and precise elaboration strategies with 
materials that have greater ecologic validity. As this book is being written, Wood, 
Pressley, and Wmne are conducting such a test, with children learning passages 
about Canadian wild animals. 
In summary, it is apparent from this brief review of examples that there are 
more elaborative strategies that can be taught profitably to older grade-school 
children than there are strategies that can be taught to children in the primary 
grades. Although even very young children can be taught to use verbal elabora-
tion to leam paired associates and verbal versions of mnemonic techniques like 
the keyword method, both nontransformational and transfonnational imagery 
strategies are more likely to be executed by older compared to younger grade-
school children. The gains produced by the questioning strategy investigated by 
Wood et al. (1988) were more impressive with their older sample than with the 
younger sample, with answering why questions unambiguously promoting acqui-
--
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sition relative to the precise elaboration-provided condition at the older but not the 
younger age Ievel. 
An encouraging note with respect to the younger children, however, is that as 
more is learned about the mechanisms that mediate developmental susceptibility to 
elaborative-strategy instruction (e.g., short-term memory factors), it should be 
easier to design materials so that young children are more likely to be able to carry 
out complicated elaborative strategies. For instance, providing picture supports dur-
ing vocabulary learning increases the likelihood that children as young as 7 years of 
age can carry out keyword-mnemonic strategies (Pressley & Levin, 1978); provid-
ing certain types of pictorial supports encourages formation of nontransformational 
irnages during prose learning (Digdon, Pressley, & Levin, 1985; Guttmann, Levin, 
& Pressley, 1977; Ledger & Ryan, 1985; Miller & Pressley, 1987; Press1ey & 
Miller, 1987). 
lt must also be remernbered that even on those occasions when young children 
cannot generate their own elaborative mediators, there is always an alternative 
instructional strategy. The children can be provided mediators, such as interactive 
rnnemonic pictures (transformational elaborations), pictures that represent prose 
exactly (nontransformational pictures), and precise elaborations. There is impres-
sive evidence that provision of elaborations often promotes young children's learn-
ing substantially. For instance, Pressley, Samuel, Hersbey, Bishop, and Diekinsou 
(1981) asked kindergaTten and nursery-school cbildren to learn 10 Spanish vocabu-
lary words. The children were either 1eft to their own devices as they studied each 
word for 12 seconds, or they were provided keyword-mnemonic pictures for each 
word (e.g., picture of a duck with a pot on its bead for pato-duck). Learning was 
mucb better in the mnemonic-picture condition compared to the control condition, 
with the results disp1ayed in Figure 6. 7. Suffice to say in closing this subsection that 
there are many demonstrations of impressive learning gains associated witb tbe pro-
vision of elaborations both to normal and special child populations (e.g., Levin, 
1982, 1985a, 1985b; Mastropieri et al ., 1987; Pressley, 1977; Pressley & Miller, 
1987; Taylor & Thrnure, 1979; Thrnure & Lane, 1987). 
3. 0/der children are rrwre likely than younger children to retrieve and use elab-
orative mediators that they have created. Constructing a mediator at study does 
little good if it is not used at test time. Pressley and Levin (1980) hypothesized 
that there might be important developmenta1 improvements in retrieval of elabora-
tive mediators. They asked grade-1 and grade-6 students to learn 18 paired associ-
ates. The subjects were asked to construct interactive images in two of the three 
conditions of the study. The third condition was a control treatment in which sub-
jects were instructed simply "to try hard to remernher that and 
_______ go together." 
At testing, one of the two groups of imagery subjects (hereafter, imagery + 
retrieval condition) were explicitly instructed to retrieve the elaborative mediators 
that they had constructed. Subjects in this cells were instructed to: "Think back to 
the picture you made of the (test stimulus) doing something. What went with (test 
stimulus)?" Subjects in the simple imagery condition were not prompted to use the 
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imagery mediators at testing. Aseachtest item was presented, these subjects were 
told: "Try hard to remember what word was presented with ______ _ 
What went wifh ?" Control subjects received this same instruc-
tion at testing. 
What was very clear from examining the data (presented in Figure 6.8) was that 
the retrieval instruction was necessary for the imagery instruction to promote 
associative recall effectively with the grade-1 children but not with the grade-6 sub-
jects. That is, the grade-1 subjects did not retrieve the rnnemonic mediators without 
a prompt to do so; the expücit retrieval prompt to use the imagery mediators at test-
ing was not necessary with the grade-6 children. 
Pressley and MacFadyen (1983) continued the study of the development of 
elaborative mediator retrieval . They hypothesized that one reason that provided 
rnnemonic pictures were powerful with children as young as 5 to 6 years of age 
was that the mnemonic pictures might establish a trace so strong that it would 
be elicited at testing without the necessity of a retrieval prompt. On the other 
hand, it still seemed possible that retrieval deficiencies rnight occur with pro-
vision of mnemonic pictures, perhaps at a still younger age Ievel. Thus, Pressley 
and MacFadyen ( 1983) presented leindergarten and nursery-school children the 
same 18 paired associates used by Pressley and Levin (1980). The difference in 
this study was that the pairs were presented as pictures in this experiment (separated 
pictures in the control condition and interactive mnemonic pictures in the two 
mnemonic picture conditions) compared to the verbal only presentations in Pressley 
and Levin (1980). 
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Tbe results of tbe experiment are depicted in Figure 6. 9. At tbe kiDdergarten Ievel, 
there was significantly better recall in botb tbe rnnemonic picture + retrieval and 
retrieval conditions compared to the control condition, indicating tbat tbe leinder-
garten subjects did not bave a retrieval deficiency witb respect to tbe elaborative 
mediators. In contrast, at the nursery-school Ievel the provision of tbe mnemonic 
picture at study bad no effect unless there was also a retrieval instruction at testing 
(i.e., tbere was a retrieval deficiency in tbe nursery-scbool data). Moreover, in a 
supp1ementary study, Pressley and MacFadyen (1983) replicated tbe retrieval defi-
ciency at tbe nursery-scboollevel, so tbat confidence is high that such a deficiency 
does exist at that Ievel. 
Altbougb retrieval deficiencies bave been studied prominently in many other 
memory situations (e.g., Kobasigawa, 1977), tbere is a lack of such study in tbe 
elaboration literature, despite tbe fact that good use of elaboration strategies is 
bighly dependent on botb study and testing behaviors. In addition to tbe work of 
Pressley and Levin (1980) and Pressley and MacFadyen (1983), see Thrnure (1985) 
for especially persuasive data substantiating tbe need for additional study of 
elaborative study and testing interactions. 
4. There is a developmental increase in the propensity to transfer elaborative strate-
gies. The study by O'Sullivan and Press1ey (1984) tbat was described earlier also 
included a sample of adults. Altbough instruction provided to tbe children in tbe 
study bad to contain a lot of specific strategy information (wben and wbere to use 
the strategy) in order to produce general use of the keyword method (i.e., transfer), 
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19- to 20-year-old subjects transferred the strategy without explicit provision of 
specific strategy information. One interpretation of this result is that university 
students are more likely than children to derive specific strategy information on 
their own as they practice using a strategy, a resu1t supported by some other research 
conducted by Pressley and his colleagues and discussed in the next chapter (e.g., 
Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984). See Pressley and Ahmad (1986) foranother 
example of transfer of an elaborative strategy by university students following 
instruction that was not embellished with specific strategy information. 
Pressley and Dennis-Rounds (1980) were the first to propose that there might be 
striking changes during adolescence in the propensity to transfer elaborative strate--.. 
gies. Their hypothesis was stimulated in part by the development of "spontaneous" 
elaborative strategy use during adolescence, with Pressley and Dennis-Rounds 
hypothesizing that much of the "spontaneous" strategy use by adolescents was 
probably transfer of elaborative strategies that the teenagers bad encountered in 
other contexts. 
Pressley and Dennis-Rounds' subjects performed two associative tasks, the frrst 
learning of cities and their associated products and the second the acquisition of 
Latin definition linkages. There were three conditions in the study that are relevant 
to the current discussion (this study is tak.en up in greater detail in the next chapter). 
Subjects in two ofthese three conditions were taught to use the mnemonic-keyword 
method to mediate city-product Ieaming. Control subjects were Ieft to their own 
devices to Iearn the cities and their products. The critical manipulation with respect 
to transfer occurred before the Latin words were presented. The subjects who 
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were given control instructions for city-product learning were also given control 
instructions for Latin learning, as was one of the two groups that were given key-
word instruction for the city-product task (hereafter, those in the keyword no-
transfer instruction condition) . Subjects in the other keyword condition received 
additional keyword training before presentation of the Latin words (keyword com-
plete reinstruction condition). They were taught explicitly how to apply the keyword 
method with Latin words. Transfer would be apparent in this design if performance 
of no-transfer instruction subjects exceeded the performance of control subjects on 
the Latin task. The more performance in the no-transfer instruction condition 
resembled performance in the complete reinstruction condition, the greater the 
transfer. 
The most critical data in the study are presented in Figure 6.10. There was no evi-
dence oftransfer among 10- to 13-year-old subjects-the no-transfer instruction and 
control means were virtually identical. Consistent with the perspective that propen-
sity to transfer increases during the adolescent years, there was significant transfer 
among 16- to 19-years-o1ds. That is, complete reinstruction in the keyword method 
was not necessary to induce keyword method use on the Latin task. On the other 
band, performance in the no-transfer instruction condition was far below 
performance in the complete reinstruction condition at both age Ievels, indicating 
that spontaneaus transfer was far from complete. Thus, although these data support 
the case that transfer of elaborative strategy use increases during the adolescent 
years, it is apparent that transfer is far from perfect during rniddle to late adoles-
cence. 
15. With advancing agt;, co~rdination_of elaboration strategies and the knowledge 
. , -" ~ 
base becomes more proficient. The 1rst study of this development was conducted by 
Pressley and Levin (1977b). They presented lists of paired associates to 7- and 
8-year-olds and 10- to 12-year-olds. The to-be-learned pairs included ones that could 
be elaborated easily and quickly (based on an extensive pilot investigation) with 
readily available relationships in the knowledge base. For instance, the pair needle-
balloon can be elaborated as a needle popping a balloon and towel-plate can be 
elaborated as a dish towel used to dry a plate. The Iist also included pairs that were 
not so readily e1aborated (e.g., lamp-key, button-comb, and bird-watch). 
The subjects in Pressley and Levin (1977b) either were instructed to construct 
transtorrnational images to leam the pairs (irnagery condition), or they were permit-
ted to study the pairs any way that they wanted (control condition). Half ofthe sub-
jects were presented the pairs at a re1atively rapid rate (i.e., 6 secs), with the 
remaining subjects receiving the pairs at a slower rate (12 secs). The main hypothe-
sis in the study was that even if younger subjects could benefit from imagery instruc-
tions with easy-to-relate pairs and/or when the pairs were presented at a relatively 
slow rate, they rnight have greater difficulty using the strategy with hard-to-relate 
pairs and/or when the pairs were presented rapidly. Consistent with expectations, 
the older children benefited from the irnagery-elaboration instruction for both easy 
and difficult pairs, regardless of the rate of presentation of the materials. Statisti-
cally significant facilitation due to irnagery use was obtained with the younger chil-
dren as weil, except when the difficult pairs were presented at a rapid rate. 
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Elaboration of difficuJt pairs required a search of the knowledge base that could not 
be completed in six seconds by the younger subjects. Older subjects could search the 
knowledge base at that faster rate. 
Rohwer, Rabinowitz, and Dronkers (1982) provided additional data substantiat-
ing the dependence of mnemonic trategy use on the knowledge base and substan- --
tiating developmental shifts in the accessibility and use ofthe knowledge base in the 
service of elaborative strategy use. In fact , in some cases it seems that accessibility 
is so automatic that conscious use of an elaborative strategy is unnecessary. Eleven-
and 17 -year-olds were presented one of two types of paired associates to remember, 
ones closely related in the knowledge base (e.g., ranch-cowboy) and ones not so 
closely related (e.g., ranch-floor). Subjects were presented the pairs and were 
provided either an instruction to leam them by generating verbal elaborations (little 
stories joining the pairs) or a no-strategy control instruction. 
The elaboration instruction failed to improve performance on closely related pairs 
at either age Ievel. Rohwer et al.'s ( 1982) preferred interpretation of this finding was 
that both the children and the adolescents automatically accessed elaborations given 
closely related pairs. In contrast, there was a clear developmental difference with 
the not-so-closely related pairs. The elaboration instruction improved 11-year-olds' 
learning of unrelated pairs, but bad no effect on the 17 -year-olds. The generally high 
performance at the 17-year-old Ievel was interpreted as evidence that these adoles-
cents were probably elaborating the not-so-closely related pairs without an instruc-
tion to do so; the elaboration versus control difference at the younger age Ievel was 
interpreted as evidence that the younger children did not spontaneously elaborate 
the not-so-closely related pairs. Such a developmental shift is generally consistent 
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with the conclusion drawn earlier that there are significant increases in use of 
elaboration strategies during the adolescent years. The more critical outcome for 
the present discussion was the differential effectiveness of the elaboration instruc-
tion with closely related compared to not-so-closely related pairs at the 11-year-old 
Ievel. Very closely related materials seemed to be elaborated automatically at that 
age Ievel in the Rohwer et al. (1982) study; the fifth graders did not seem to elect 
the elaboration strategy on their own given the not-so-closely related pairs. See 
Waters (1982) as wen for additional data substantiating that uninstructed use of 
elaboration strategies depends in part on the knowledge base. lt is clear from Rohwer 
et al. (1982), Waters (1982), and Pressley and Levin (1977b) that knowledge base 
factors are critical determinants of spontaneous use of elaboration strategies and 
use of elaboration strategies under instruction and that complete understanding 
of the development of elaborative competence requires consideration of non-
strategic knowledge. 
6. Metacognition about elaboration strategies increases with development. The very 
first study of metamemory tapped children's developing knowledge about the useful-
ness of elaboration as a memory strategy. Kreutzer et al. (1975) showed seven 
pictures of objects to their child subjects, using the following interview to elicit per-
ceptions about the potency of elaboration: 
The other day I showed these pictures to other boys and girls your age. I asked one girl to learn 
them so that she could teil me what they were later when she couldn't see them any more. And 
I showed the same pictures to another girl, but also told her a story about the pictures [E put 
down each picture as its depicted object was mentioned] (to-be-leamed objects italicized): 
A man gets up out of bed, and gets dressed, putting on his best tie and shoes. Then he sits 
down at the table for breakfast. After breakfast he takes his dog for a walk. Then he puts 
on his hat and gets into his car and drives to work. 
I told the girl who heard this story that she was supposed to leam the pictures so she could 
teil me what they were later when she couldn't see the pictures. She didn't have to teil me the 
story, just the pictures. Do you think the story made it easier or barder for the girl to remem-
ber the pictures? Which girl do you think leamed the most? Why? (p. 11) 
The most important result was that there was a clear developmental increase in 
understanding that verbal elaboration facilitates learning. Kindergarten subjects 
chose the elaboration strategy as more effective 50% of the time (i.e., at chance 
Ievel). In contrast, all grade-3 subjects and 85% of the grade-5 subjects selected 
elaboration as more potent; 70% of the grade-3 and 80% of the grade-5 subjects 
could also offer appropriate explanations for their selection of the elaboration 
strategy as more potent. 
Beuhring and Kee (1987a, 1987b) provided additional data about the development 
of metacognition about elaboration strategies. They included three items that tapped 
understanding of elaborative utility: 
Elaboration-rehearsal. Asked the student to judge the relative ease of learning three lists com-
posed ofthe same noun pairs connected either by a conjunction, a locational preposition, or 
an interactive preposition (the MOP andlby/in the PAN, the JACKET andlby/in the BAG, the 
WATCH and/by/in the ROBE, the NICKEL andlby/in the SNAKE). Empirically the first two 
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are equivalent to rote rehearsal and the third is equivalent to elaboration (Begg & Young, 
1977). Consequently this item assessed knowledge that interactions provided an association 
that would aid cued-recall memory and side by side relationships did not. 
Elaboration-structural. Asked students to judge the relative ease with which they could 
leam three lists of noun pairs for which the most readi1y implied association was either pho-
netic (goat-coat, money-honey, cart-heart, dirt-skirt), Orthographie (phone-purse, coin-coat, 
rose-radio, horse-hose), or an elalxuated interaction (bug-garden, coin-purse, bee-rose, 
water-plant). This item assessed awareness of implied association and knowledge that 
meaningful interactions would aid cued-recall more than the less specific Ietter or rhyme 
associations (see Paivio, 1971; Rohwer, 1973). 
Elaboration-shared anribute. Asked the student to judge the relative ease of leaming three 
lists of noun pairs for which the most readily implied association was either an attribute they 
shared in common (wire-thread, rnilk-snow, buzzer-trumpet, key-peony), a realistic inter-
action (scissors-pants, horse-com, towel-glass, pencil-napkin), or an interaction that was 
very unlikely to occur (ball-jar, Iion-sweater, teeth-chair, needle-sponge). This item assessed 
both awareness of the implied associations and knowledge that pair-specific interactions 
would aid cued-recall more than general associations whether the interactions were plausible 
or not (see Rohwer, 1973). 
The main conclusions that emerged from the responses to the items was that the 
17-year-olds understood efficacy of elaboration more than did the 11-year-olds. 
Nonetheless, there were some 17-year-olds who did not recognize the utility of 
semantic elaborations relative to the alternative strategies. Perhaps most striking, 
the responses to the elaboration-shared attribute item made clear that the prej;on-
derance of 17-year-olds believed that general associations are better than pair-
specific elaborations. When the data collected by Beuhring amd Kee (1987a, 1987b) 
are combined with those obtained by Kreutzer et al. (1975), it is clear that develop-
ment of knowledge about the superiority of elaboration develops over a very long 
period of time and is still incomplete by late adolescence. 
lt is somewhat surprising that study of the naturalistic development of metacogni-
tive knowledge about elaboration strategies has been limited to study of awareness 
of strategy utility. lt is disturbing given the criticality of when and where informa-
tion for general use of strategies. More positively, there is a good deal of recent 
interest in delineating what adults know about elaboration and especially imagery 
(e.g., Denis & Carfantan, 1985; Paivio & Harshman, 1983). 
Arecent study by Katz (1987) is especially revealing about adults' knowledge of 
when to use imagery. Katz presented adult subjects with descriptions of 22 tasks, 
some of which required use of imagery (or at least were facilitated by imagery) and 
others of whlch did not. Nonimagery tasks included language usage, spelling, and 
rating words on a good-bad dimension; imagery tasks included spatial relations, 
memory for designs, and production of autobiographical memories. Both adults 
who were classified as high imagers (i.e., those who reported using imagery a lot) 
and low imagers were able to discrirninate between tasks that required imagery and 
those that did not. 
Given demonstrations that the addition of when and where information to instruc-
tion increases children's use of etaboralive strategies, and given that such explicit 
instruction of when and where information does not seem as critical to adults (e.g., 
O'Sullivan & Pressley, 1984), it seems likely that there are important developmental 
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differences in the possession of when and where information about elaborative 
strategies that one already knows. Undoubtedly, there are also individual differ-
ences in the acquisition of such information when learning and practicing new 
elaborative strategies. The developmental study of when and where information 
should be a high priority. 
SUMMARY 
There is clear development of the good use of elaborative strategies. Adolescents are 
more likely to use elaboration spontaneously than are children. Although older 
grade-school children can be taught many elaboration strategies, they do not transfer 
those strategies as readily as adolescents. Even though young grade-school students 
can execute some elaborative strategies, they are less likely than older children to 
use the elaborations that were constructed to mediate later performance. Adoles-
cents possess more metacognitive infonnation about elaboration strategies than do 
children. In short, there are many and important developments tbat have already 
~een documented. 
What is striking, however, following almost 20 years of developmental research 
on elaboration, is how much remains to be learned. First of all, development has 
been mapped out much more extensively for learning of paired-associate elaboration 
and for keyword-mnemonic mediation of vocabulary learning tban for other 
elaborative techniques. There are fairly small developmentalliteratures concerning 
nontransformational imaginal elaborations of text (although there are a nurober of 
investigations on this strategy conducted at single age levels; Levin, 1976; Pressley 
& Miller, 1987), elaborative summafies of text, or pegword mnemonics. 
In addition, not all aspects of good strategy bave been covered in detail. We 
already noted the Iack of research on the development ofknowledge about where and 
when to use elaboration strategies that one possesses. There is little Iiterature relat-
ing cognitive styles to the development of elaborative strategy use. Borkowski and 
bis colleagues have begun a program of researcb on this problem, however. They 
h J have determined that impulsive children profit from instructions to use elaborative 
j techniques and that impulsive style factors are probably not as important in deter-
mining long-term strategy use as metacognitive factors (e.g., Borkowski et al ., 
1983)-More about this reseach in the next cbapter. The role of motivational beliefs 
in stimulating and/or undermining the use of elaborative strategies at different 
developmental Ievels has not been studied either, although Borkowski and his 
associates have started to work on this problem. They have succeeded in showing 
that maintenance of trained elaborative strategies is more likely if training includes 
a reattribution component -when children are led to understand that their improved 
performance following strategy instruction is due to use of the strategy (Reid & 
Borkowski, 1985). Again, more about this research will be presented in the next 
chapter. All things considered, however, there are important components of good 
strategy use that need tobe addressed in future work on elaboration. This is despite 
the fact that the development of elaborative strategies has been studied more exten-
sively than the development of many other strategies. 
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lt should be apparent by this point that many developmental functions were 
identified in this work on elaboration. In addition, it became clearer during the 
course of this research as to how to collect data that were really revealing about good 
elaborative strategy use. We believe that these insights about methodology are gen-
erally relevant to the study of good strategy use and thus, conclude this chapter with 
a review of procedures that promote clear and complete knowledge of strategy 
deployment. 
How to Collect Data on Good Strategy U se 
The journals are ft.lled with articles about memory development and memory 
strategy use. Many of these studies are convincing and informative, and others are 
less so. Our purposein this section is to provide some guidelines that would increase 
the proportion of articles about memory strategy development that fall in the former 
category. We recognize that some of these recommendations may seem obvious to 
many readers, but present them because we encounter many reports by researchers 
who have not internalized the suggestions reviewed here. 
Conduct Programmatic Research 
Because good strategy use is complex, and its development even more complicated, 
cornpelling data on good strategy use require programmatic research. For instance, 
the many developmental functions associated with elaborative strategy use that 
were reviewed in the last section were produced by researchers who made long-
term commitments to understanding elaboration and its effects. The best work in 
memory development has been produced by researchers who have conducted many 
experiments tapping different questions surrounding the use of the particular strate-
gies in which they were interested. Names like Ackerman, Belmont, Bjorklund, 
Borkowski, Brown, Butterfield, Flavell, Kobasigawa, Levin, Moely, Ornstein, and 
Rohwer come to mind. The impressive bodies of data produced by these workers 
make obvious that there is a lot to be said for persistent and cumulative work on 
particular strategies. 
One obvious benefit of programmatic research is that the researcher gains 
experimental savvy as experience with a strategy increases. This permits ever more 
sophisticated studies of a technique. In addition, programmatic efforts permit exact 
and constructive replications of the most important effects produced by a strategy. 
No single study can provide telling evidence about which of its significant effects are 
wheat and which are chaff. Only replications across materials, settings, and popula-
tions can do that. Thus, we strongly advocate programmatic research on strategies, 
believing that only programmatic efforts can produce data that cover the many 
dimensions of good strategy use. 
In making this recommendation, we have vivid memories of many consulting 
editor's reports from joumals, evaluations generated in response to our own work, 
to the work of colleagues who have shared correspondence with us, and to the work 
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of other researchers whose work we have refereed (and thus, have access to eval-
uations generated by other reviewers). A common criticism of programmatic 
efforts is that the researchers are n.ot really breaking new ground, that they are 
doing work that is simply "paradigmatic;• and that reports in well-researched areas 
often do not open up enough new questions. Such evaluations are bothersome 
because they do not reflect an appreciation of the need for exhaustive programmatic 
efforts. On the other band, they make clear that there is often a fine line between 
cumulative research that advances understanding about an irnportant strategy and 
"beating a dead horse." Researchers who go the programmatic route should give 
some thought to the lyrics of the old Burt Bacharch tune, ''Knowing when to leave." 
Although the time comes when the enormous talents of a programmatic researcher 
should be redirected to a new strategy or area of memory functioning, we believe, 
however, that researchers should not rush away from a strategy or paradigm that 
they know weil until they have produced studies addressing a number of aspects 
of good strategy use and its development. Knowing when to Ieave can be very hard 
to determine. 
Conduct Studies Bothof Naturalistic Strategy Use 
and Strategy Use Under Instruction 
Motivating questions in developmental research on memory strategies include (a) 
What strategies do children use and wben do they use them?, and (b) What strategies 
can children use and when can they use them? The "a" questions tap children's 
naturalistic performance; the ''b" questions tap their competence to use strategies. 
The "a" questions are resolved by studies in which observations are made when chil-
dren are presented a memory task but aie left to their own devices to learn to-be-
remembered materials. The ''b" questions can be studied by instructing children to 
use a strategy and comparing performance with uninstructed controls. Both 
naturalistic and instructed use of strategies are important to study, with each tapping 
unique information about cognitive development. 
All ofthe memory strategies that have been studied intensely from a developmen-
tal perspective have been studied in both naturalistic-observational and instruc-
tional studies, often by the same investigators. For instance, research on cumulative 
rehearsal (e.g., Omstein & Naus, 1978), categorization (e.g., Moely, 1977), and 
elaboration (e.g., Pressley, 1982) come to mind. 
In addition to providing comprehensive information about theoretical issues 
surrounding cognitive development, combined naturalistic-instructional study 
provides a great deal of information for those interested in memory interventions. 
The observational work makes clear whether children are using efficient or ineffi-
cient strategies, and thus, makes obvious which children do not need instruction 
about efficient strategies since they use them already. lnstructional research pro-
motes understanding of which children are capable of executing a procedure and 
learning to deploy it proficiently. 
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Include Manipulations Checks 
Subjects in memory strategy research do not always do as they are told. Sometimes 
they are obstinate, and other times they simply do not understand directions. For 
instance, a brief instruction to use a mnemonic strategy like the keyword method 
often elicits something eise, such as free association to the to-be-leamed vocabulary 
or attempts to relate the vocabulary to cognates in the subject's native language. 
Every effort must be made to make certain that subjects know exactly what to do. 
At a minimum, subjects should be required to report or demoostrate to the 
experimenter how they are going about the assigned memory task, with corrective 
feedback from the experimenter when subjects are not following the directions as 
intended. There is also a well-developed think-aloud technology (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1983) that can be employed in many studies. Post-experimental reports and 
demonstrations of strategy use are sometimes helpful. Although we recognize the 
many potential problerns of on-line and post-experimental reports (see Chapter 5), 
our experience suggests that much can be gained from them, especially if subjects 
are impressed with the fact that they should report as accurately and honestly as 
possible. In addition, it is often possible to obtain objective validation of the reports. 
For instance, there is a substantial body of data confinning that post-test reports 
of elaborative mediation are strongly related to more objective measures of per-
formance such as memory (e.g., Pressley, 1987; Pressley & Ahmad, 1986; 
Pressley, Levin, Digdon, Bryant, & Ray, 1983; Pressley, Levin, Kuiper, Bryant, & 
Michener, 1982). 
lnclude Dependent Variables That Should be Affected by Use 
of the Strategy and Ones That Should Not Be Affected 
1t is almost always a good thing to include multiple dependent measures. In memory 
development research, memory perfonnance and strategy execution measures are 
often variables expected to reflect operation of a memory strategy. When children 
are observed cumulatively rehearsing to-be-recalled seriallists of items, confidence 
that the rehearsal strategy was actually executed as it has been defmed in the 
memory Iiterature is increased if there is improved recall relative to when the chil-
dren did not use the strategy. Failure to see improvement in recall might suggest that 
the children were going through the motions of curnulative rehearsal, but were not 
doing so intentionally, and hence, not paying much attention to the serial items as 
they were overtly processed. Improved recall without observation of curnulative 
rehearsal could be mediated by a variety of other mechanisms (e.g. , the children 
were using a pegword moemonic approach). Clearly, the conclusion that a sample 
of children was using curnulative rehearsal, and this mechanism increased recall , is 
best supported by recall and curnulative rehearsal strategy covariation. 
Why include dependent variables that are not supposed to be affected by the 
strategy? It isamatter of discriminant validation (e.g., Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
For instance, one explanation of elaborative mnemonic benefits that has been 
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presented to us is that rnnemonics are fun or novel compared to the methods natur-
ally used by people, and thus, irnproved learning given elaboration instructions sirn-
ply reflects gains produced by increased motivation when mnemonics are used. By 
collecting a variety ofmeasures, this hypothesis can be easily tested, and contrasted 
with the alternative hypothesis that elaboration effects are really quite specific. 
Most researchers interested in elaboration believe that methods like the keyword 
method are effective because they strengthen the associative linkages between 
vocabulary and their defmitions, but do not do much eise. If the general motiva-
tional hypothesis were true, both associative and nonassociative aspects of vocabu-
lary leaming should be increased by keyword-rnnemonic instruction. 
Pressley et al. (1982) provided telling data on this question, demonstrating strong 
keyword-instructional effects when subjects were required to match vocabulary 
meanings (an associative task) and negligible mnemonic-instructional effects when 
subjects were asked to perform nonassociative free recall of definitions presented 
during study (i.e., without the vocabulary presented at testing). Such a pattem of 
significant and nonsignificant effects provides a convincing case against those who 
would try to explain elaborative-mnemonic effects as little more than artifacts of 
differential motivation between elaborative and other conditions. 
lnclude "Benchmark" Replications in New Experiments 
After a strategy has been studied awhile, certain "classic" effects emerge. For 
instance, providing keyword-mnemonic pictures to children always improves 
associative learning compared to when children try to use their own strategies to 
learn vocabulary (e.g., Pressley, 1982). Teaching nonrehearsing 8-year-olds to 
rehearse cumulatively as they process a serial Iist of items always improves serial 
recall (e.g., Ornstein & Naus, 1978). Manipulations that produce well-replicated 
effects such as these can be induded in sturlies that are more centrally concerned 
with new hypotheses. If the researcher once again replicates the dassie effect, con-
fidence is bolstered in the more novel findings of the study. Perchance the dassie 
effect is not replicated, there is a red flag that something is arniss. The researcher 
is alerted to Iook for other factors that may be different between the strategies and 
situations currently being studied and the strategies and situations studied by others 
who produced the dassie effect. 
Contrast the Effects Produced by the Strategy With the Effects 
Produced by Many Different Control Conditions 
Different control conditions achieve different purposes. lnstructional research on 
elaboration has induded rehearsal control conditions designed to preclude efficient 
processing (i.e., subjects are instructed to say paired words or vocabulary and their 
meanings over and over) and no-strategy control conditions designed to mirror 
learning as it naturally occurs (i.e., subjects do what they want). In addition, 
elaborative methods like the keyword method have been contrasted with a variety 
of semantic-context procedures (e.g., making sentences using the vocabulary words 
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correctly, constructing semantic maps that locate the new vocabulary in a network 
of related words) presumed by vocabulary learning theorists to enhance perfor-
mance (e.g., Levin et al., 1984). In general, elaborative strategies like the keyword 
method have proven potent relative to all control conditions studied to date (Press-
ley, Levin, & McDaniel, 1987). When a technique is tested against a variety of alter-
native procedures, including ones that have either proven potent in the past or are 
presumed potent by practitioners, it is hard to argue that instructional experimental 
tests of the method have been with "straw men" controls. 
Summary 
There are many things that can be done to make research better. In making our 
recommendations, we recognize that memory development research is already 
expensive, certainly relative to research on adult memory. Simple multiple-age 
replications of conditions increase the costs. There is often a need for pilot testing 
to avoid ceiling and floor effects at all age Ievels and to determine that measurements 
are really tapping what they are intended to measure (and doing so at all age 
Ievels!). Nonetheless, the best, most informative, and most believable research on 
good strategy use and memory development in general has bad this labor-intensive 
quality to it. 
We would be remiss in closing this chapter if we did not note one other important 
methodological difference that distinguishes high quality work from research that is 
less than it may appear tobe. Good scientists are extremely candid about what is "in" 
their data and what is not "in" their data. They Iimit their conclusions to ones that 
are unambiguously justified by their manipulations and outcomes. Ambiguities are 
dealt with in subsequent experiments aimed at resolving them. Unfortunately, not 
all researchers conform to this behavioral pattem. Like all other areas of research, 
there are scientists who identify with memory development who attempt to make 
the mostout of very modest manipulations and findings. lt is often possible to con-
struct a fantastic and interesting tale when one does not feel constrained by the avail-
able data. One pattem that we have discerned is the production of a single 
experiment on a problern (perhaps involving only two conditions), followed by a 
!arge number of book chapters or invited joumal "thought" pieces that review the 
modest study and its results in every possible light, often to the exclusion of more 
telling and systematic work by other scientists. 
Thus, the first recommendation made in this section about conducting program-
matic research seems to suggest a consumer guideline. Readers of research and those 
who attempt to devise applications based on research should consider carefully 
whether the authors of a particular study are year-in, year-out contributors to the 
archival Iiterature or individuals who prefer the one-shot approach. The scientists 
who are conducting a Iot of experiments that make sense as packages are the ones 
to consider most seriously. 

7. Is Good Strategy Use Possible? 
How much truth and how much theory is there to the description of good strategy 
use provided in the last chapter? Are there really people who k:now many strategies 
and have a lot of strategy k:nowledge? Unfortunately, there are no large-scale, 
process-sensitive direct Observations of learning and memorization across a variety 
of ecologically valid domains to provide the answers to these questions, despite a 
great deal of interest in ecologically valid, self-regulated leaming (e.g., Bandura, 
1977, 1982, 1986; Meichenbaum, 1977; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987). 
More positively, there are data that permit the conclusion that some people regulate 
their learning better than other people do. 
Interview studies about self-regulated leaming in the real world are being con-
ducted, and thesearesuggestive that some generally competent strategy use occurs. 
One ofthebest of thesewas reported by Zimmerman and Pons (1986), who inter-
viewed high-schoo1 sophomores. Half of the participants were doing weil in school 
and half were doing poorly. These students were probed about their studying in the 
classroom, at home, when doing writing assignments outside of dass, when prepar-
ing for tests, and when they were unmotivated. Studying in these situations was 
tapped by having students respond to meaningful seenarios such as the following: 
Most teachers give tests at the end of the marking periods, and these tests greatly determine 
report card grades. Do you have any particular method for preparing for this type of test in 
English or history? (p. 617) 
These probes elicited rich responses from the students, with many general, goal-
specific and domain-specific strategies cited. For instance, students reported check-
ing and recording what they did not k:now (i.e., a form of monitoring), o anizing 
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and transformin to-be-leamed materials (e.g., making outlines), goal-setting and 
liüiiung ahead (e.g.Yormulating a tWo-week study plan), ~ in nnatioo 
(e.g., goin to the lib~), taking notes, structurin their environrnents tobe con-
ducive to study, self-rewarding themselves for doing weil, rehearsing, seekin social 
assistance (e.g., asking a knowledgable friend for help), and reviewin texts and 
notes. The most striking fmding in the study, however, was thattllehigh- and low-
achieving students differed greatly in their reported use of self-regulating strategies. 
The differences in strategy use between ability groups were most notable with 
respect to seeking information, monitoring, and organizing and transforming. 
Nonetheless, with the exception of checking their work, high-ability students 
reported more use of every strategy than did the lower-ability participants. Using 
discriminant analyses, it was possible to predict achievement grouping (high or low) 
I on the basis of strategy use data alone. In short, Zimmerman and Pons' (1986) data 
suggest that some adolescents use strategies extensively and that there are substan-
tial associations between achievement and reported strategy use. 
One of the mostextensive interview studies of classroom leaming ever conducted 
was recently completed by William Rohwer, John Thomas, and their colleagues at 
the Far West Laboratory for Educational Research. Students enrolled in juniorhigh 
school, senior high school, and university social sciences classes served as subjects 
in the study. The courses that the students were taking were analyzed with respect 
to the demands that were placed on students and the supports that were provided to 
students to assist them in completing requirements. Study activities used by stu-
dents were tapped with a questionnaire that included probes about how students 
selected important information to study, what they did to comprehend lecture and 
reading material, how they went about trying to memorize important content, and 
approaches they used to integrate material within or across informational sources. 
The most revealing analyses of the Far West data for the present discussion were 
conducted by Christopoulos, Rohwer, and Thomas (1987). They found that simple 
rehearsal and nonselective restudy decreased with increasing age Ievel. With 
increasing age, there was more reporting of self-initiated extra processing of infor-
mation that was anticipated to present comyrehension or memory difficulties. 
There was also increasing self-i~tilÜedi~vestigation, id~ntification, and \ii~tiori 
of attention to material that was likely tobe presented on a test. Selective notetaking 
increased with age, too. Consistent with the data presented in the last chapter, there 
was increased elaboration, reorganization, contrasting, integration, and summari-
zation of newly encountered information. 
Christopoulos et al. (1987) also documented that with increasing age, however, 
courses place greater demands on students with diminishing supports, an argument 
that was bolstered by analyses of this )arge data set by Strage, Tyler, Robwer, and 
Thomas (1987). Thus, Christopoulos et al. (1987) argued that much ofthe develop-
mental increase in strategy use might be in reaction to changing environmental 
demands. Nonetheless, despite the pressures applied to university students by their 
dass work, they often engage in less than optimally efficient processing, with some 
students using very good strategies and others relying predominantly on less effi-
cient routines. 
7. ls Good Strategy Use Possible? 163 
The Zimmerman and Pons (1986) and Far West data are consistent with other 
reports of strategy use by adoleseents, reports in whieh very direct measures of 
strategy use have been employed (Pressley, Levin, & Bryant, 1983). There are a 
nurober of sophisticated memory strategies that have been observed in some adoles-
cents but not others. Individual differenees in observed and reported use of strate-
gies are almost always eorrelated with learning and aehievement. Consider three 
examples: (1) Barclay (1979) reported that a minority of high-school students used 
"ewnulative rehearsal and fast fmish" to learn a serial list of single items (i.e., 
cumulatively rehearsing early items in a list combined with rapid processing of the 
fmallist items)-a strategy that positively affects performanee compared to eumula-
tive rehearsal, an approaeh more typieal of high-school students. (2) In studies of 
adolescent associative learning diseussed in the last ehapter (Beuhriog & Kee, 
1987a, 1987b; Kemler & Juscyk, 1975; Pressley & Levin, 1977a), only some 
adolescents used elaborative strategies (e.g., construetiog interaetive images or / 
meaningful sentences containing the to-be-associated items). Invariably, those 
adolescents who elaborated learned more associations than did those who did not 
elaborate. (See Chapter 6.) (3) Brown and Smiley (1978) demonstrated that not all 
high-sehool students use underlining and note-takiog strategies when trying to leam 
text; students who do use these techniques learn more from text than students not 
employing these techniques. In short, by late adolescenee there are students who are 
appropriately strategie in at least some demanding memory situations. 
The research to date does not permit the conclusion, however, that anyone 
develops into the good strategy user described in the last ehapter. It is not known 
whether there are people who are appropriately strategie aeross demanding 
situations. Would the same students who use the eumulative-rehearsal, fast-fmish 
strategy for seriallist learning be the ones who would use associative elaboration for 
pair learning and/or take notes du ring reading of text? It is not known whether there 
are people who eonsistently monitor when learning and thinkiog are going well and 
when they are going poorly, with strategies eontinued or ehanged eon-
tingent on performanee successes and failures. The resolutions of these issues 
require intensive within-person investigations. It ean be eoncluded based on the 
extant data, however, that even very capable adults (e.g., university students) often 
fail to behave like good strategy users. Some of the most telling data have been 
provided in studies of monitoring by adults and in investigations of strat-
egy transfer. 
Monitoring and Fallures of Monitoring 
Are people aware of how well learning, eomprehension, and memorizing are 
proceeding? Consistent with the conclusion that people are aware of their perfor-
mance levels, there are demonstrations with simple materials (e.g., paired associ-
ates, sentences) that people can prediet whieh items will be remernbered on a 
post-lest. Two demonstrations of this effect were provided by Lovelace (1984). In 
one of bis experiments, university students studied paired associates, and in the 
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other study, adults tried to Iearn sentences of the form, "The adjective noun verbed 
the adjective noun." During study the subjects rated on a 1 to 5 scale how sure they 
were that they would recall the item on a test later. The main fmding was that there 
were monotonic relationships in both experiments, such that items that were rated 
as more likely tobe recalled werein fact better recalled on the post-test. What find-
ings like these reflect is that materials with some characteristics are more leamable 
than materials with other characteristics, and people have some knowledge about 
characteristics that positively influence learning and those that make Iearning 
difficult. Predictions of future recallability can be based on knowledge of these 
characteristics. The ability to predict differential Ieamability of simple materials 
seems to hold throughout the adult lifespan (Lovelace & Marsh, 1984; Rabinowitz, 
Ackerman, Craik, & Hinchley, 1982). 
Even children can make accurate estimates of the recallability of simple materials 
based on some materials characteristics. For instance, children understand that lists 
containing members of the same category are more likely to be remernbered than 
lists containing items that are not readily grouped into categories, and they realize 
that highly associated paired associates aremorememorable than unrelated pairings 
(Dufresne & Kobasigawa, 1987; Kreutzer et al., 1975; Moynahan, 1976; Tenney, 
1975). Despite widespread ability to predict differential leamability of some simple 
materials, there is less awareness of performance when adults are learning more 
complicated materials and when they are using strategies that differ in potency. 
Monitoring of Comprehension and Learning of Text 
According to the good strategy user model, good learners should monitor their 
progress as they are memorizing, reading, or carrying out any activity. Such 
monitaring presumably would produce awareness of cognitive progress that permits 
decisions about strategy use. Specifically, capable Ieamers should notice whether 
they are comprehending and remembering text. When miscomprehension is 
detected, reading would be adjusted accordingly. At a rninirnum, good strategy users 
would reread. They should also begin to read more carefully and use strategies that 
had not been called on previously. When they monitor that they are understanding 
and remembering material, they should be likely tostick with the reading strategies 
that they have been applying. In short, monitaring is presumed to provide informa-
tion about ongoing processing, information that is a form of metacognition, and in 
turn, this metacognition has been assumed to arebestrate subsequent reading. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of this good strategy user description of mature read-
ing ( e.g., Baker & Brown, 1984), evidence is accumulating that skilled readers ( e.g. , 
university students) often fail to monitor completely their comprehension and learn-
ing as they read text. Some of the most compelling data on this point have been 
provided by Glenberg, Epstein, and their colleagues (e.g., Gienberg & Epstein, 
1985, 1987; Epstein, Glenberg, & Bradley, 1984; Glenberg, Willcinson, & Epstein, 
1982; Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1986). 
For instance, university students in Gienberg and Epstein (1985, 1987) read a ser-
ies of one-paragraph essays on unrelated topics. For each paragraph, the subjects 
rated their confidence that they would be able to use what was leamed in the text to 
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draw correct inferences about the centrat theme of the text. Then, an inference for 
each paragraph was presented with the subject's task to determine if the inference 
followed from what had been read previousiy. The most important resuit was that 
the correiations between confidence ratings and performance on the inference 
verification task were very Iow. Generalizing across experiments within Gienberg 
and Epstein (1985, 1987) and Gienberget al. (1986), the correiations were essen-
tially zero, a resuit inconsistent with the assumption that aduits monitor their com-
prehension. Even in those cases where awareness exceeded zero, it did not do so by 
much (e.g., Gienberg & Epstein, 1987). Nonetheless, Gienberg and Epstein's Obser-
vations are consistent with those of others who have examined whether university 
students can discriminate between the parts of text that they have learned during 
reading and the parts that were not learned (Maki & Berry, 1984). Even the most 
optimistic of these estimates, however, suggest that the correiation between aware-
ness and learning is not greater than approximate1y .30. 
Pressiey, Snyder, Levin, Murray, and Ghatala (1987) examined a different aspect 
of text monitoring, focusing on whether university students could monitor how 
ready they were for a test over an entire chapter of material. Pressley et al. were 
interested in the students' perceived readiness for examination performance (PREP 
for short) after they read text. In all three of the experiments that they reported, stu-
dents read chapters from university-Ievel textbooks and took objective e:xaminations 
following reading. The participants estimated how weil they would do on the post-
test either before they read the chapter or after reading it. The accuracy of the 
before-reading estimate was assumed to reflect reader's awareness of their usuai per-
formance Ievel following a single reading. The accuracy of the post-reading estimate 
was assumed to reflect awareness of usual performance plus awareness of learning 
of the particular chapter as it was read. That monitaring occurred during reading 
could reasonably be inferred if and only if there was more accurate estimation of 
performance following reading than before reading. On the positive side, post-
reading estimations were consistently more accurate than before-reading estima-
tions. On the negative side, these before-to-after improvements were very small. 
Given these monitaring problems experienced by adults, it is not surprising that 
children are also less than expert in monitaring of their prose processing. For 
instance, Ghatala, Levin, Foorman, and Pressley (in press) had grade-4 children 
read a social studies article in preparation for a fill-in-the-blank test over the article's 
content. In the condition of the study that tapped children's naturalistic regulation 
of study, the children were permitted to read the article as many times as they 
wished with the demand that they should not stop reading until they knew that they 
could achieve 100% performance on the completion test. A reward was prornised if 
they in fact achieved mastery. The failure to monitorwas clear. The subjects stopped 
when they were ab1e to answer 49% of the questions on average. Mter they stopped 
studying (but before they took the test), the subjects were asked to predict how many 
items they would get right on the upcoming test. Children's monitaring failures were 
striking, with most subjects overestimating what their performance would be. 
The paradigm used most frequently to evaluate text monitoring in children was 
developed by Markman (e.g., 1977, 1979), with greater attention to monitoring of 
166 W. Schneiderand M. Pressley 
children's comprehension than to their leaming of prose content. In Markman's 
paradigm, children are presented short prose pieces that either are internally consis-
tent or contain inconsistencies. For example, consider the following story used by 
Zabrucky and Ratner (1986) that contains a contradiction (highlighted in italics): 
Paul finally had a day off from work. He decided that he would go to the Iake for just the after-
noon. Paul packed up his car and headed towards the Iake. When he got to the Iake, he saw 
that he was the only one there. The water in the Iake was very clear and blue. Paul fouod a 
place to sit near the Iake and he leaned against the tree. He watched the clouds in the sky and 
after a while he fell asleep. All of a sudden, a noise woke hlm up. Paul caught a big fish with 
hisfishing pole. Afterwards he opened up hispienie basket and ate a sandwich. Paul was sad 
that he forgot to pack hisfishing pole (p. 1406). 
A consistent version of this passage can be constructed simply by replacing the last 
sentence of the inconsistent version with "Paul was happy that he remernbered to 
pack bis fishing pole." 
The dependent variable that concerned Markman (1977, 1979) was whether chil-
dren would report problems in text. She reasoned that detection indicated that the 
children were monitoring whether they were comprehending text-whether their 
understanding of each new piece of information was consistent with their under-
standing of information presented previously. This type of monitoring is assumed by 
Markman and others (e.g., Baker & Brown, 1984) tobe important in self-regulation 
of strategies during reading. When students monitor that there are comprehension 
problems, they are in a position to initiate strategies to resolve the difficulties. For 
instance, they might Iook back at discrepant information or construct bridging infer-
ences to explain why the incompatible pieces of information coexist in the same pas-
sage (i.e., use fix-up strategies). 
The observation that motivated a great deal of research on comprehension 
monitoring was that young grade-school children (e.g., 8-year-olds) often fail to 
detect glaring inconsistencies in prose (e.g., Markman, 1985; Wagoner, 1983). Not 
surprisingly, they often fail as well to use the fix-up and rereading strategies that are 
presumably called into play by monitoring (e.g., Garner & Anderson, 1982; Mark-
man, 1979; Wagoner, 1983). More positively, there are developmental improve-
ments in monitoring. 
An especially thorough investigation by Zabrucky and Ratner (1986) Wustrates 
the developmental trends in error detection. Twenty grade-3 and 20 grade-6 chil-
dren read eight short stories like the sample presented earlier. Four of the stories 
were consistent and four contained inconsistencies. Grade-6 children were more 
likely to detect problems than were grade-3 children. This held both when subjects 
were asked a general question about consistency (Did the story make sense?) and 
when subjects were asked follow-up questions that specified the inconsistent sen-
tences explicitly. For instance, for the inconsistent "Paul" story presented earlier, 
subjects were asked, "The story said that Paul was sad that he forgot hisfishing pole 
and thatPaul caught a bigfish with hisfishing pole. Does that make sense? (p. 1407)" 
The striking developmental trend on error detection was not paralleled com-
pletely, however, by developmental trends for the use of strategies presumably regu-
lated by error detection that occurs as a function of comprehension monitoring. In 
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particular, at both grade-3 and grade-6 Ievels, subjects spent more time reading 
inconsistent sentences than matched consistent sentences, with this effect about 
the same size at the two grade Ievels. Consistent with the developmental trend for 
verbal reports of inconsistencies, both grade-3 and grade-6 students evidenced 
Iookbacks when reading inconsistent passages, with more Iookbacks at the grade-6 
Ievel. Finally, there was little use of inferential fix-up strategies at eitber age Ievel. 
Within-age correlational analyses of errors and reading strategies complemented 
the between-age analyses. In general, there were only weak relationships between 
verbal reports of errors and use of strategies presumably regulated by comprehen-
sion monitoring. 
What is going on here? A likely possibility is that monitoring occurs and directs 
rereading, butthat children cannot articulate the errors that they have detected. This 
speculation is supported by reports that young children manifest nonverbal signs of 
error detection (e.g., they Iook perplexed) weil before they can verbally report 
errors (e.g., Beal & Flavell, 1982; Flavell et al., 1981; Patterson, Cosgrove, & 
O'Brien, 1982). Regardless of the exact explanation of the Iow interrelations 
obtained by Zabruck:y and Ratner (1986), what is more striking isthat even their 
grade-6 subjects often failed to report errors, often failed to reread when they should 
have, and almost never made bridging inferences to try to reconcile discrepancies. 
What is more-Zabruck:y and Ratner's (1986) data arenot isolated-Such failures by 
older grade-school children have been observed repeatedly (Wagoner, 1983). 
Moreover, adults often pass over problems in text. For instance, university stu-
dents in Baker and Anderson (1982) missed one-third of the inconsistencies in text-
book material; Gienberget al. (1982) observed even moredismal performance, 
although with more complicated texts. Even more shocking, adults sometimes fail 
to detect grotesque inconsistencies in trivially easy texts. Elliott-Faust (1984) 
presented four simple passages to university students. These passages were modeled 
after ones designed by Markman (1979) for use with young grade-school children. 
Some were intemally consistent and some were inconsistent. Hereis an inconsistent 
passage that was used in the study (inconsistency indicated by italics): 
There are many different kinds of snakes. Some snakes are eight feet long and very fat. Some 
snakes are only six inches long and very skinny. Some snakes have a poisonous bite, but some 
snakes are harrnless and even help us. The garter snake, for example, helps us by keeping bad 
insects away from our gardens. Garter snakes eat these insects. They find the insects by listen-
ing for them. The insects make a special noise. Garter snakes do not have ears. 1hey cannot 
hear the insects. They can hear the sounds ofthe insects. That is how they are able to find the 
insects (EUiott-Faust, p. 223). 
The adults who listened to the stories were told that they were helping develop 
nature stories that would be presented to children in a research study. The adults 
were told that their task was to evaluate how easy the stories would be to understand. 
The experimenter told them, '1 want you to Iisten carefully to each story. I am 
interested in your comments as to how clear each passage is, whether you found 
it easy to understand, whether it made sense, etc. I am also interested in your 
suggestions regarding how I rnight change the passages to make them easier to 
understand (p. 62)." 
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After hearing each passage, the subject was interviewed about the story. There 
were a number of opportunities to report inconsistencies, with each passage heard 
twice. Nonetheless, inconsistencies were often rnissed by subjects. lt is hard to make 
a case that comprehension and comprehension monitoring are adequate in adults in 
light of data like these. 
Thus far, we have highlighted some especially striking failures by both children 
and adults to monitor comprehension and learning of prose. Regardless of the type 
of text studied or the dependent variable employed to assess monitoring, it was 
apparent that monitoring is far short of what it could be. Readers cannot spot glaring 
inconsistencies in text; they do not know which parts of text have been leamed 
and which they have failed to master; they are not aware of how much of the infor-
mation in texts has been acquired. Nonetheless, in constructing this case, we 
ignored one of the most optirnistic pieces of data in the literature supporting the case 
that at least some children monitor text comprehension, with monitoring guiding 
rereading and restudy. 
Owings et al. (1980) presented grade-5 children with sets of sentences to learn, an 
easy-to-learn set containing sentences that were congruent with the child's prior 
knowledge (e.g., 1he hungry boy ate the hamburger) and a hard-to-leam set contain-
ing incongruent sentences ( e.g., 1he sleepy boy ate the hamburger). After study, high 
achieving students were able to rate the relative difficulty of the two sets correctly, 
whereas low achievers could not do so. Moreover, the high achievers studied 
differentially in reaction to their perceptions of differential leamability. The high 
achievers studied the hard-to-learn sentences Ionger than the easy-to-Jearn sen-
tences, with the low achievers studying the two types of sentences for the same 
amount oftime. The authors concluded that the high achieving students were spon-
taneously monitoring during study, but that the low achievers were not doing so. 
Thus, these data suggest that even some children can monitor their prose leaming 
while they study. 
Why then did we ignore these data until this point? As it tums out, the participants 
in Owings et al. ( 1980) bad had previous experience with the types of materials used 
in the experiment in that they had participated in a pilot study. Their perceptions of 
differentiallearnability could have been developed during the studying and testing 
that occurred in the earlier session, and thus, the Owings et al. (1980) data were 
difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate with respect to whether monitoring occurs 
during study. A recent follow-up by Ghatala, Pressley, Levin and their colleagues 
(Hunter-Blanks, Ghatala, Pressley, & Levin, in press) restudied the situation that 
concemed Owings et al., producing data that suggests that monitoring during study 
may in fact occur with the type of sentences used by Owings et al. (1980). 
Hunter-Blanks et al. (in press) presented university students with a set of sen-
tences to leam, half of which were very easy to acquire because they were precisely 
elaborated with an explanation that made clear why the particular actor would have 
carried out the action (Chapter 6). The remaining half of the sentences were difficult 
to learn because they were imprecisely elaborated, that is, completed with an elabo-
ration that was semantically consistent with the rest of the sentence but did not 
make clear the significance of the relationship specified in the sentence. For 
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instance, a precise elaboration for the sentence THE HUNGRY MAN Gar IN THE 
CAR would be 1D GO 1D A RESTAURANT; an imprecise elaboration would be TO 
TAKE A RlDE. The latter elaboration is irnprecise because it does not make clear 
why it is a hungry man compared to a tall man or a tired man who got into the car. 
In the portions ofthe Hunter-Blankset al. (in press) experiment that are relevant 
here, subjects' perceptions of how many sentences of each type would be recalled 
were tapped either before they studied the sentences or after they sturlied the sen-
tences. On both occasions subjects indicated incorrectly that they woulrl recall both 
types of sentences equally well. Of course, this finding is reminiscent of the out-
comes in the Gienberg sturlies and other experiments covered previously in this 
chapter. But there were some additional data collected after study that were com-
pletely out of synchrony with the hypothesis that people do not monitor as they 
study. The subjects in fact reported that they harl picked up that the imprecise sen-
tences were barder than the precise sentences as they studied them, and they had 
adjusted sturly accordingly, spending moretime and strategic effort on the imprecise 
sentences! They believed that their compensation would offset the differentiallear-
nability, and thus predicted equal recall of the precise anrl imprecise sentences. 
Hunter-Blankset al:s (in press) finrling makes clear that futuresturlies of monitor-
ing during study need to take measures both of expected recall and perceived differ-
ences in learnability. Most of the research has focused on the former, whereas the 
latter may very well be the more telling with respect to whether people actually rlo 
monitor while studying and whether they make rlecisions to sturly some material 
versus other material or in one fashion versus another as they rearl. For the time 
being, however, we feel that the outcomes reported in the Iiterature and interpreted 
as monitoring failures shoulrl be considered as red flags that people often experience 
difficulty monitoring text. One reason that we are reluctant to compromise this con-
clusion in light ofthe Hunter-Blankset al. (in press) and Owings et al. (1980) results 
isthat those sturlies involved highly unusual text material. Very rarely is real-worlrl 
text as arbitrary as imprecise sentences are, anrl we sensethat salient text arbitrari-
ness is a feature that makes rlifficulty of text leaming especially obvious. A second 
reason that we favor the conclusion that people have problems with text monitoring 
is that such monitoring failures are not isolated, a point that becomes more obvious 
in the next subsection. 
Monitoring Memory Strategy Utility 
People often fail as well to monitor the potency of strategies that they are using. The 
most extensive and analytical research on this problern has been carried out by 
Pressley, Levin, Ghatala anrl their associates, with their work stimulated largely by 
an earlier observationmarle by Shaughnessy (1981). In Shaughnessy's experiments, 
adults studied word pairs, using either a rote rehearsal or an imagery strategy. The 
criterion task was free recall of the pairs. Although the subjects remernbered many 
more irnagery than rehearsal pairs, they were not aware of the differential potency 
of these strategies as they used them-They gave irlentical ratings of recallability for 
items Sturlied using imagery and those studied using rehearsal. This failure to notice 
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the differential potency of the two strategies contrasted with accurate within-
condition ratings of the relative recallability of pairs (i .e., Shaughnessy's data were 
nonetheless consistent with observations like those of Lovelace, 1984, reviewed 
earlier). Shaughnessy concluded that his university subjects were not monitaring the 
utility of the strategies they were being instructed to use. 
Pressley, Levin, and Ghatala (1984) were intrigued by Shaughnessy's report and 
conducted an intensive examination of monitaring during strategy use. They 
required university students to learn foreign vocabulary items, with half of the 
words studied using the very effective keyword method (Chapter 6) and the remain-
ing items studied using a less effective rote rehearsal procedure. In the parts of the 
experirnents that are relevant here, participants were interviewed about the strate-
gies and were asked to express a preference for one strategy over the other, with data 
collected either before subjects had an opportunity to study using the strategies 
(these subjects had had the techniques described to them) or after they studied using 
the strategies. The most important results consistent with the conclusion that 
monitaring did not occur during study were (1) that subjects did not have a prefer-
ence for the keyword strategy even after study, (2) that they did not realize that 
learning was better with the keyword strategy even after study, and (3) that there 
were no dramatic shifts in awareness of strategy utility going from before study to 
after study. 
lt is not surprising, in light of the adult data, that children also fail to monitor the 
efficacy of strategies as they use them to study (e.g., Ghatala et al., 1985; Ghatala 
et al., 1986). Discussion ofthese research efforts are deferred until the next section 
because of their greater relevance to the topic of overcoming monitaring failures. 
How to Improve Monitaring 
So far it sounds very forlom- Monitaring is simply not very good. The only excep-
tion seems to be for simple materials, especially when they possess characteristics 
that dramatically affect their leamability. There is a more positive side, however. lt 
is possible to improve people's awareness of how much they have learned and what 
they have.learned, at least in some situations. 
TESTING 
Giving people tests over what they have studied increases their knowledge of which 
content and how much content has been mastered. This occurs during simple Iist-
learning and associative learning tasks (e.g., King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 
1980; Lovelace, 1984; Thompson & Bamett, 1985) and during more complex tasks 
such as prose leaming (e.g., Gienberget al., 1986; Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, 
& Ghatala, 1987). See Herrmann, Grubs, Sigmundi, and Grueneich (1986) for an · 
especially thorough examination of this point. They compared before- and after-test 
evaluations of performance for 10 different tasks. There was evidence for at least 
some improvement in predictability for. all tasks, with very striking improvements 
on some. 
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This "testing" effect can be appreciated by constrasting some of the failures to 
monitor discussed previously with the improved monitoring that occurs when a test-
ing opportunity is introduced. For instance, Gienberget al. (1986) have explored the 
effects of a practice test on prediction of future test performance. Subjects read one-
paragraph passages. The practice test consisted of one dichotomous item for each 
passage. The item included an idea stated in the passage and one that was not stated 
in the passage, with the subject's task to select the one that had been covered. Then, 
readers rated the confidence that they would perform well on the actual test covering 
the passage. This actual test consisted of three types of items, ones identical to the 
practice items, ones containing items related to the ideas in the practice items, and 
ones containing ideas unrelated to the ones composing the practice items. Prediction 
of performance on items identical to the pretest items was fairly good (mean r 
ranged from .55 to .57 across experiments). Prediction of performance on related 
items was not as accurate (mean r across experiments ranged from .12 to .30), 
although these values were significantly above the zero correlations typically 
observed when predicting without the benefit of a pretest. Unfortunately, however, 
experience witb tbe practice test did little to improve prediction of performance on 
test items tbat were unrelated to tbe practice test items witb these correlations being 
close to zero. 
More striking positive results were obtained by Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, 
and Ghatala (1987). As discussed earlier, they observed that their adult subjects 
were only slightly betterat predicting their post-test performance following reading 
than before reading. They also demonstrated, however, that subjects were reasona-
bly well informed about how they did on the test after they took it. Thus, in the third 
experiment reported in the article, Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, and Ghatala 
(1987) included conditions in which subjects took practice tests following reading 
but before the actual test. These practice tests were in the form of adjunct questions 
included in the text. Predictions when the text included the adjunct-question prac-
tice tests were quite accurate following reading, with the results ot:ttle study surnrna-
rized in Figure 7 .1. Subjects who processed the adjunct questions while they read 
were as accurate in their estimations of performance as subjects who made their 
estimations following the actual test. This is an impressive result compared to Gien-
berget al.'s (1986) fmding, since tbere was no overlap in items on the pretest and 
post-test. Pretests in the form of adjunct questions have great potential for informing 
leamers about their mastery of material that they have read. 
Testing can also make apparent the relative potencies of strategies. Just as Press-
ley, Levin, and Ghatala (1984) determined that adults did not monitor the differen-
tial utility of strategies as they used them, they also determined that testing 
opportunities made relative potency obvious. When they required leamers to study 
vocabulary using the keyword method for half the items and rote rehearsal for the 
remaining items, and then required leamers to take a test on all of the vocabulary 
that were studied, the subjects bad a clear preference for the keyword method fol-
lowing the test. They had definite awareness that they bad learned more keyworded 
than rehearsed items and indicated that this was the basis for their keyword-method 
preference. Particularly potent evidence that relative strategy knowledge was 
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provided in Pressley, Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala (1987). (Greater accuracy indexed by 
lower scores.) 
gained during testing was generated in conditions in whicb the experimenter misin-
formed subjects, telling them that the rebearsal strategy was better. When subjects 
expressed preferences for strategies before trying them or after studying (but before 
testing), they were very ~ucb influenced by the experimenter's recommendation 
that rebearsal was tbe better procedure. After taking the test, however, virtually all 
subjects rejected the rehearsal strategy recommendation. In fact, some participants 
were very indignant about the experimenter's suggestion, indicating that he did not 
know what he was talking about! 
Althougb tests certainly increase adults' knowledge of relative strategy potency to 
the point that they weigh this knowledge more than an experimenter's recommenda-
tion about differential strategy effects, testing effects tbat facilitate choice of effi-
cient strategies are not as certain witb children. Pressley, Levin, and Ghatala's 
(1984) study also included 11- to 13-year-old children. Although children did figure 
out that the keyword method was better than rehearsal as a function of taking a test, 
they did not perceive the difference produced by the two strategies tobe as great as 
adults perceived it tobe. In addition, based on the strategy-utility knowledge gained 
through testing, children did not resist the experimenter's suggestion that rehearsal 
should be preferred over the keyword method. This latter result suggested that cbil-
dren do not always use strategy utility information that they acquire on tests follow-
ing strategy use, an hypothesis that was taken up in a follow-up study. 
Pressley, Ross, Levin, and Ghatala (1984) hypothesized that children may need 
prompting in order to use metacognitive information that they acquire during a test 
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over materials learned by different strategies. In all conditions of the experiment, 
10- to 13-year-olds were told that they wou1d be learning English vocabulary words 
that they did not know already. They were also told about tbe rnnemonic keyword 
method and a semantic-context method for learning vocabulary. The keyword 
method was new to these cbildren, but tbe context method was one they bad 
experienced previously-making up meaningful sentences containing tbe vocabu-
lary words. Control subjects were asked to express a preference for one strategy over 
the otber after baving the task and strategies described. Subjects in a second condi-
tion practiced learning vocabulary using the two strategies, foUowed by a test on the 
vocabulary that were studied. Practice subjects were then asked to express a prefer-
ence for one strategy over the other for use in learning additional vocabulary. A third 
condition was identical to the practice condition except that before subjects in this 
condition made their strategy selections they were prompted tothink back to the test 
and consider how they did with keyworded versus context-studied items. The 
hypothesis was that if cbildren do not spontaneously use relative strategy utility 
information that they acquired during testing in order to make strategy selections, 
then keyword strategy selections would be more likely in this practice plus prompt 
condition than in the practice condition. The fourth condition was identical to tbe 
practice condition except that before making strategy selections, practice plus 
feedback subjects were given explicit feedback about the number of keyword and 
semantic-context items they got correct on the Iist. Consistent with the hypo-
thesis that motivated the experiment, the percentage of practice subjects (42%) 
who preferred the keyword method did not differ significantly from the percent-
age of control subjects (35%) who preferred the keyword method. In contrast, 89% 
of the practice plus prompt and 89% of the practice plus feedback subjects selected 
the keyword strategy. Also, consistent with tbe motivating bypothesis for the 
study, some practice subjects (77% of them) realized that the keyword method 
produced better recall- But only half of these subjects selected the keyword tech-
nique for use on a future Iist. In contrast, of the 84% of practice plus prompt sub-
jects who knew that the keyword method was better, 93% selected it. In sbort, 
the prompt worked. 
The Pressley, Levin, and Ghatala (1984) and Pressley, Ross, Levin, and Ghatala 
(1984) data suggest that testing foUowing strategy use can have an impact on chil-
dren's continued use of strategies, although more prompting is required than with 
adults. In drawing this conclusion, we caution that this testing effect was established 
with children 10 years of age and older. More recent experiments by Pressley, 
Levin, and Ghatala (Ghatala et al., 1985, 1986) indicate tbat cbildren younger tban 
10 years of age are less accurately aware of bow weil tbey perform on tests. In addi-
tion, they are less likely to use past test performance spontaneously as a predictor 
of future performance (Pressley & Ghatala, in press)-which seems necessary in 
order to use information about past performance as a guide to selection of strategies 
for future use. These observations make obvious why the successful monitoring 
training packages with cbildren, which are reviewed in the next section, always 
include explicit information to note how weil performance is proceeding and to 
make use of this type of information in making future strategy selections. 
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l'RAINING 
Although children do not efficiently or completely monitor the effectiveness of 
strategies they are using and do not routinely use strategy utility information that 
they derive from strategy use, they can be trained to do so. Elizabeth Ghatala has 
been the principal investigator in a series of studies ( conducted in collaboration with 
Joel Levin and Michael Pressley) that have addressed the issues that surround train-
ing children to monitor their use of strategies (Ghatala et al., 1985; Lodico et al., 
1983). The most recent investigation in this series illustrates the procedures used in 
these experiments and represents well the conclusions that can justifiably be drawn 
from this type of research. 
Children from 7- to 81h-years of age (total n = 180) participated in Ghatala et al., 
(1986). The children were presented three 8-item paired-associate lists for study. 
Before studying these lists, 36 of the children received a 3-component training that 
had been shown by Lodico et al. (1983) to improve monitoring of strategy efficacy. 
They were taught (1) to assess their performance with different types of strategies, 
(2) to attribute differences in performance to use of different strategies, and (3) to 
use information gained from assessment and attribution to guide selection of the 
best strategy for a task. At the beginning of the training, the children were told that 
there are many ways to play games and that some ways are better than others. They 
were also told that in order to play a game well, they must choose a method that 
allows them to do better. The children then were provided two examples. The first 
involved drawing a circle, with the participants trying two different methods, one 
drawing freehand and the other using a circular cookie cutter to trace the circle. The 
children were then asked to decide which ofthe methods worked better (assessment 
component) and were encouraged to figure out why one method was superior to the 
other (attribution component). They were then asked which method they would use 
if they were asked to draw another circle and wanted to do as well as they could 
(selection component). Feedback was provided, and the few children who had 
difficulty repeated the circle game. At the conclusion of the game the children were 
told that "keeping track of how you are doing when you are playing a game helps you 
to choose the best way to play." The second example required memorization of a set 
of letters initially presented in random order. The children studied the letters and 
tried to recall them. Following this, the children were prompted to rearrange the let-
ters so as to spell their names (each child received a different set of letters), with 
recall requested once the rearranged letters were removed. Then, children were 
asked to assess when they had remernbered more letters, to attribute the differential 
performance to the way the letters were arranged, and to decide how they would 
want the letters presented if they were to replay the game. Again, children were 
rerninded at the end of the task that it is good to monitor performance, to make attri-
butions about why they perform better in one condition versus another, and to use 
assessment and attribution information in making future study decisions. 
In addition to the 36 children who received the complete 3-component training, 
there were three other conditions (each with 18 subjects in them) that received less 
than complete training. Participants in the 2-component condition were taught to 
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make assessments and attributions, but they were not instructed to apply the know-
ledge gained from the assessment and attribution processes in making strategy selec-
tions. The participants in the 1-component condition were taught to make rule 
assessments but were not provided tuition in making attributions or in linking 
assessments to subsequent selections. The 0-component selection condition was 
actually a placebo condition. These children received a strategy-affect monitoring 
training intervention devised by Ghatala et al. (1985). These subjects were trained 
to monitor how much fun they bad while playing the circle and Ietter games, and 
to select the method that was more fun. This condition was a good control for the 
strategy-utility training conditions because it requires reflection on and makingjudg-
ments about Strategie behavior. Thus, whatever performance differences emerged in 
the other strategy-utility-monitoring training conditions relative to the 0-component 
,condition could be attributed to the strategy utility components of training and not 
to monitoring training per se. 
Following training, subjects in the 3-, 2-, 1-, and 0-component conditions were 
told that they would be playing another game that involved remembering pairs of 
words. They were told to do their best to remernher as many word pairs as they 
could. The children were then given two 8-item paired associate lists. On one list 
they were instructed to use a strategy that is moderately helpful for young children 
studying paired associates, repetition of the pairs as they were presented. On the 
other Iist, they were required to use a strategy that impedes performance, searching 
for letters that match in the paired words. (Order of strategy practice was appropri-
ately counterbalanced.) Then, subjects were given a third paired-associate Iist and 
were told that they were to learn as many pairs as possible. The children were asked 
to choose one of the two practiced strategies for use on the third Iist. The children 
were also asked to justify their choices by selecting one of three explanations for 
their selection, either strategy utility (i.e., it helps me to remember), affect (i.e., it 
is fun to use), or effort (i.e., it is easy to use). 
The most important result was that selection of the more effective repetition 
strategy for the third Iist was a linear function ofthe nurober of components that bad 
been included in monitoring training. Eighty-nine percent of 3-component subjects 
selected repetition, with 61%, 50%, and 44% ofthe 2-, 1-, and 0-component sub-
jects doing so respectively. Among the 3-component children who selected repeti-
tion, 88% selected the strategy-utility reason for doing so. Again, whether subjects 
who selected repetition did so on the basis of relative strategy utility was a decreas-
ing linear function of the nurober of training components. Sixty-four percent of the 
2-component, 33% of the 1-component, and 25% of the 0-component subjects who 
selected repetition did so on the basis of strategy utility. 
In addition to the conditions in which subjects were trained to monitor, Ghatala 
et al. (1986) also included conditions in which assessment, attribution, and selec-
tion information was provided to subjects after they tried the two strategies on the 
first two paired-associate lists. These information-provided conditions varied as to 
the number of components of information that were provided, just as the monitoring 
training conditions varied with either 3, 2, 1, or 0 components of information gener-
ated by the subjects. Thus, 3-component, information-provided subjects were told: 
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Let's see which time you remernbered more pairs. You remernbered more pairs the [first, 
second] time when you learned these pairs (pointing to the appropriate list). You used the 
repeating method that time. lt rnust have helped you remernher better (attribution) . The 
repeating rnethod would be a good one to use again if you wanted to remernher as rnany pairs 
as possible (selection) (p. 82). (Parenthetical comments added here.) 
Two-component, information-provided subjects heard only the assessment and 
attribution portions of tbe above remarks. One-component subjects were provided 
assessment information only, and zero-component subjects received no feedback at 
this point. 
Both 3- and 2-component-provided conditions produced preponderant selection 
of repetition (94% in both conditions). In contrast, only 44% of either 1-component 
or 0-component subjects selected rehearsal. Ninety-four percent of the repetition 
selectors in the 3-component treatment justified their selection on tbe basis of strat-
egy effects on memory, with 76%, 12%, and 25% of the repetition selectors doing 
so in the 2-component, 1-component, and 0-component conditions respectively. 
What Ghatala's researcb has established is that even cbildren 7- to 8-years of 
age can be taught to monitor the relative efficacy of strategies that they are using 
and to use utility information gained from monitaring in making future strategy 
selections. lt is impressive that 3-component monitoring-trained subjects were 
as likely to select repetition as 3-component-information-provided subjects-
who were all but told directly before they made their strategy selection that they 
should cboose the repetition method. On the other band, in order for monitaring 
training to be effective, it bad to be very explicit, including directions to compare 
performances with the two strategies and assess whicb was better, to attribute the 
differences in performance obtained with different strategies to use of the strategies, 
and to select strategies for use in tbe future on the basis of bow the strategies had 
worked in the past. 
Impressive gains in monitaring can be produced with young children by providing 
training that is well matched to the requirements of the task. That was the case in 
Ghatala et al. (1986) wbo frrst analyzed the strategy monitaring task into assess-
ment, attribution, and selection components and tben taught these to children. This 
same tactic of perforrning a thorough task analysis followed by training matched to 
the analysiswas taken by Elliott-Faust and Pressley (1986) who sought to improve 
children's comprehension monitoring as assessed in the Markman ( e.g., 1977, 1979) 
error detection task. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, young children often accept prose that con-
tains direct contradictions as fully comprehensible. Markman (1979) hypothesized 
that children may overlook inconsistencies oftbis type because they do not activate 
and compare Contradietory text segments to assess whether the various parts of texts 
are internally consistent. This analysis of comprebension monitaring suggests that 
training comparison processing should improve comprebension monitoring in chil-
dren. To evaluate this hypothesis, Elliott-Faust and Pressley (1986) included condi-
tions in which comparison processing was trained. 
One ofthe conditions involved training the 8-year-old subjects in the study to com-
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pare the two most recently encountered sentences. This was termed local compari-
son training since it involved teaching subjects to make comparisons in a restricted 
area of the text. In a second comparison-training condition, subjects were taught 
local comparison along with more wholistic comparison-to compare the meaning 
of the most recently encountered sentences to the meaning of the entire passage. 
Because the inconsistent sentences were contiguous in the passages, it seemed possi-
ble a priori that Jocal comparison alone might be sufficient to produce improved 
comprehension monitoring. On the other band the more complete meaningful 
processing in the Jocal + wholistic comparison condition provided more extensive 
analysis of the text and its meaning and thus, might produce more cues that made 
obvious the inconsistency in the text. The comparison training was carried out with 
five practice passages, with subjects perfonning the comparison processing overtly 
at first, followed by gradual experimenter-guided intemalization of the comparison 
activity by the subjects. 
Performances in the comparison-trained conditions were contrasted with four 
"control" procedures. The most demanding of tbese was one in which subjects were 
given explicit instructions as to what it meant for something not to make sense. In 
particular, they were told that passages that contained Contradietory sentences are 
passages that do not make sense. This "appropriate standard of comparison" control 
condition was similar to the condition in which Markman's subjects detected the 
most inconsistencies (Markman & Gorin, 1981). In general, performances in com-
parison conditions were high relative to the control conditions, with error detection 
in the local + wholistic cell particularly striking and significantly better than in any 
ofthe controls.ln short, it proved possible to improve comprehension monitaring by 
teaching processes that are critical to monitaring but not performed spontaneously 
by children. 
In conclusion, the failures of children to make comparisons ( e.g., of text segments 
with one another, of strategies with one another) results in poor naturalistic 
monitoring. More optimistically, comparison skills can be developed in young 
children through instruction. Ghatala et al. (1986) trained children to compare 
strategies with one another during the assessment phase of tbeir treatment, and 
Elliott-Faust and Pressley (1986) taught their subjects to compare recently encoun-
tered information with earlier text content. We view these comparison strategies as 
prime examples of the metacognitive acquisition procedures that were discussed in 
the last chapter-Comparison is a strategy that is explicitly geared to the generation 
of metacognitive information, such as utility information about strategies and 
information about whether comprehension is proceeding as it should. In closing, we 
must emphasize that even though it is sometimes challenging to get children to 
execute a procedure like comparison at all, maintenance and generalization of this 
type of strategy requires even more extensive intervention than what has been dis-
cussed so far. Thus, we will retum to the Ghatala et al. (1986) and Elliott-Faust and 
Pressley (1986) studies in the next section, which is concemed with problems of 
strategy durability, problems that reinforce the impression that good strategy use is 
a scarce commodity. 
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Continued U se of Memory Skills Following Instruction 
Good strategy users should use the strategies that they learn both durably and 
appropriately. They should continue to use the strategies for the tasks encountered 
during training ofthe techniques (i.e., maintain strategies). They should stretch the 
strategies to new tasks that benefit from their application (i.e., generalize strate-
gies). Yet, maintenance failures sornetimes occur and generalization failures are 
epidemic in the strategy instructionalliterature (e.g., Brown et al., 1983). This con-
clusion holds for normal and special populations, for children and adults, and for 
intellectual and nonintellectual tasks (Adams, 1987; Borkowski, 1985; Belmont, 
Butterfield, & Ferretti, 1982; Gick & Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Hayes & Simon, 1977; 
Reed, Ernst, & Banjeri, 1974). 
A few examples make obvious the nature and severity of these difficulties. Sorne 
of the best known generalization failures by adults were reported in the problern-
solving Iiterature by Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983). Their studies rnake clear that 
even sophisticated leamers like university students often fail to transfer strategies 
that they have acquired-even when the problems are incredibly similar to ones 
encountered previously as part of training. For example, in sorne of Gick and 
Holyoak's work, adults have been presented a problern about a general who wishes 
to capture a fortress in the middle of a country. There are many roads to the fortress. 
Allare mined, however, so that while small groups of rnen can pass over thern safely, 
an entire army would detonate thern. A full scale, frontal attack is impossible. The 
Strategie solution to the problern of conquering the fort is to divide the army, send 
srnall groups on the individual roads, eventually converging simultaneously at the 
fort. 
What is amazing is that after learning the solution to the "general" problern, adult 
subjects often fail to solve a problern like the following: 
Suppose you are a doctor faced witb a patient who has a maligoant tumor in the stomach. lt 
is impossible to operate on tbe patient, but unless the tumor is destroyed the patient will die. 
There is a kiod of ray that can be used to destroy tbe turnor. If the rays reacb the turnor all 
at once at a sufficiently high intensity, tbe bealthy tissues that the ray passes tbrough on the 
way to the turnor will also be destroyed. At lower intensities the rays are harrnless to healthy 
tissue, but they will not affect the tumor either. What type of procedure might be used to des-
troy the tumor witb the rays, and at the sametime avoid destroying tbe healthy tissue (p. 3, 
Gick & Holyoak, 1983). 
We trust that rnany readers realized that this problern can be solved with an analog 
ofthe "divide-and-conquer" strategy used by the general, that is, to ernploy separate, 
low intensity rays that converge at the location of the tumor. Based on Gick and 
Holyoak's fmdings, however, we know that not all readers of this volurne solved this 
problem! That many university students and intelligent people like our readership 
do not autornatically transfer the divide-and-conquer strategy in a close generaliza-
tion task makes clear that transfer should never be assumed to be an automatic 
byproduct of learning a strategy. Fortunately, there are ways to increase durable use 
of strategies, with two approaches taken up in the rernainder of this section. 
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Hints at the TimeThat the Strategy Should Be Used 
Even when people do not transfer a strategy "spontaneously;• there is a bright side. 
lt is often possible to get them to use the technique by giving them hints to deploy 
it. For instance, Gick and Holyoak (1980) were able to increase the likelihood that 
subjects would solve the radiation problern by telling them that "one of the stories 
you read before will give you a hint for the solution of this prob lern." With the hint 
to Iook for a hint in the general story, 92% of the subjects produced the ray disper-
sion solution; without it, only 20% of the subjects solved the problem. 
Partially motivated by the Gick and Holyoak results, Pressley and bis associates 
have explored the effects of hinting on use of monitoring and encoding strategies. 
Although the results with adults have not always been as dramatic as the ones 
reported by Gick and Holyoak (1980), there have been consistent benefits (e.g., 
Pressley & Ahmad, 1986). With children, hints have generally proven tobe power-
ful facilitators of children's continued use of strategies. 
For instance, earlier in this chapter we discussed Pressley, Ross, Levin, and 
Ghatala's (1984) demonstration that 10- to 13-year-old children were more likely to 
make use of strategy utility information that they bad gained through strategy prac-
tice if they were given a mild prompt to do so. Following such a hint, most children 
selected the more powerful keyword strategy for vocabulary learning over a less 
powerful semantic-context approach. 
Ghatala et al., (1986) also established the importance of hinting in maintaining 
young children's use of monitoring skills. In addition to the first session of the study 
that was discussed earlier, there was a second session for 3-component monitoring-
trained, 0-component monitoring-trained, 3-component information-provided, and 
0-component information-provided subjects. Subjects in these conditions were 
reminded at the beginning of the second session that they bad played a memory 
game during the previous visit with the goal of remembering as much as possible. 
Then, half of the subjects in the 3-component monitoring-trained condition were 
given the following hint: "Last time you leamed to do some things to help you 
choose the method that works better. Do those things as we play the game today." 
Half of the 3-component information-provided subjects were given a comparable 
hint: "Last time you were told some things to help you to choose the method that 
works better. Remernher those things as we play the game today." Of course, these 
hints were designed to activate the strategy-monitoring training/information from 
the frrst session. 
Then all of the subjects who participated in this second session were given two 
additional paired-associate lists to study and recall. For one of the lists the subjects 
were instructed to use the repetition strategy that they had been taught during the 
previous session. For the other list they were told to use a sentence-elaboration 
strategy (i.e., to make up sentences to link each of the paired items), which is much 
more powerful than repetition. (The order of strategies was counterbalanced within 
conditions.) Following the test trial on the second Iist, strategy selections were 
elicited and an interview was conducted about the basis for strategy selections. 
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The greatest selection of the more potent elaboration strategy occurred with 
3-component monitoring-trained subjects who were given a hint. Eighty-five per-
cent of these subjects selected elaboration with 80% of those doing so justifying the 
choice on the basis of memory. In contrast, only 67% of the 3-component 
monitoring-trained subjects selected elaboration, with only 42% of these subjects 
justifying their choices on the basis of memory. Considering that elaboration would 
have been selected 50% of the time by using a coin flip, this 67% figure is not partic-
ularly impressive. In addition, the strategy selections and rationales of3-component 
monitoring-trained subjects who were not given a hint did not differ from 
0-component monitoring-trained subjects or information-provided subjects. Thus, 
only 3-component monitoring-trained subjects given a hint manifested any evidence 
of maintenance of the monitoring strategies taught during the first session. 
That younger children are more dependent on hints than older children was 
demonstrated in Pressley and Dennis-Rounds' (1980) experiment, part of which was 
discussed in Chapter 6. The younger sample were enrolled in grades 5 and 6; the 
older sample were students in grades 11 and 12. There was no evidence at the youn-
ger age Ievel of spontaneous transfer of the keyword strategy from one associative 
task (learning city-product pairs) to another associative task (learning Latin words). 
The older subjects did transfer the keyword strategy somewhat. Although not dis-
cussed previously, the experiment also included a condition in which subjects who 
bad received keyword training for the city-product task were given a hint to use the 
keyword strategy for Latin leaming. When subjects in this condition were presented 
the Latin task, they were told to "use a technique that is like the one you used to learn 
the cities and what they are known for." Providing the hint was sufficient to boost 
the performance of the 10- to 13-year-old subjects over the Ievel of younger control 
performance. That is, the hint produced "transfer" of the keyword strategy from the 
city-product to the Latin task for the 10- to 13-year-olds. There was no significant 
hint effect at the older age Ievel, presumably because the older subjects transferred 
the keyword strategy without a prompt to do so. In concluding that older subjects 
transferred spontaneously and that younger subjects did so given a hint, we also 
emphasize that at both age Ievels Latin learning was greatest (and by a good margin) 
when there was complete reinstruction in how to use the keyword method to learn 
Latin vocabulary. Hinting apparently did not Iead to the complete and consistent 
strategy application that occurs in response to direct and detailed instructions in 
strategy use. Complete transfer of a strategy apparently requires more powerful 
mechanisms, some of which will be taken up later. 
Even though hinting may not Iead to complete transfer, we believe that it deserves 
much additional study, however, because it is assumed to be an important mechan-
ism of cognitive growth in several contemporary theories of cognitive change. The 
most important of these is Vygotsky's (e.g., 1978) hypothesis that mature thought 
develops in social contexts, a point of view shared by many others (e.g., Feuerstein, 
1980; Rinde, Perret-Clermont, & Stevenson-Hinde, 1985). According to this per-
spective, children frrst experience sophisticated processing in interpersonal situa-
tions, with more mature thinkers (i.e., parents, teachers, other children) guiding 
their cognition, often providing hints as to how the children should proceed when 
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they cannot manage on their own. One tenet of Vygotskian theory isthat an impor-
tant individual difference dimension distinguishing more competent from Iess com-
petent children is the amount of prompting that they require in order to manifest a 
new cognitive skill given the same starting competence, with data beginning to 
accurnulate in support of this hypothesis (e.g., Campione & Brown, 1984; Campi-
one, Brown, Ferrara, Jones, & Steinberg, 1985; Day & Hall, 1987; Ferrara, Brown, 
& Campione, 1986). 
Of course, this same theme of progressive prompting for decreasingly competent 
children has been detailed with respect to developmentallevel and memory (Press-
ley, 1982; Rohwer, 1973; Waters & Andreassen, 1983; Chapter 6, this volume). 
Recent theoretical and empirical work suggests, however, that hinting can play a 
rote in the development of memory and skill even in adults. Schank (1982) made the 
case that rerninding is at the heart of cognitive change, with the good thinker con-
tinuously being rerninded of knowledge in long-term memory that is relevant to 
current thinking, knowledge that could promote understanding of a current situa-
tion. Good thinkers consistently and intentionally remind themselves. Even more 
relevant here is Ross' (1984) work on the transfer of newly acquired cognitive skills. 
He found that when the generalization situation contained elements that could 
remind adult leamers of the training of a skill, adults noticed the reminders and were 
affected by the presence ofthese hints. Ross explicitly develops the case that contex-
tual hints play a key roJe in the naturalistic development of skill-a theoretical posi-
tion that harkens back to association by sirnilarity explanations of transfer (e.g., 
Thomdike, & Woodworth, 1901; Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954). All too unfor-
tunately, however, children often do not receive hints to use strategies or hints that 
are explicit enough. 
Training for Transfer 
What can be done to increase the likelihood of strategy maintenance when environ-
mental prompts are not provided or are too subtle? There are many recommenda-
tions about how to train strategies so that they transfer. There are many articles ftlled 
with recommendations about how to train for transfer (e.g., Deshler, Alley, Warner, 
& Schumaker, 1981; Deshler, Schumaker, & Lenz, 1984; Deshler, Schumaker, 
Lenz, & Ellis, 1984; Ellis, 1986; Ryan, Weed, & Short, 1986), recommendations 
that follow from detailed task analyses of what transfer entails. One of the more 
complete task analyses of the different types of transfer was provided by Salomon 
and.Globerson (1987). In singling out their framework to begin this discussion of 
training for transfer, we emphasize that Salomon and Globerson's perspective is con-
sistent with many other points ofview, including the good strategy user model with 
which we identify (Chapter 6; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987). 
Sometimes transfer is "data driven'!-A strategy is elicited automatically by 
environmental cues. This can be expected for strategies that have been used and 
practiced to the point of automaticity. One irnportant characteristic of automatic 
transfer is that the thinker uses little short-term capacity (attention or conscious-
ness, depending on your theoretical terrninological preference!). In fact, such 
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strategy use often seems to occur completely out of consciousness. For instance, one 
strategy that author M. P. has used consistently for years has been to place an object 
that he wants to transport from home to office by the door leading to his garage, so 
that he could not leave in the moming without tripping over the object. Lately 
M. P. has begun to use this same strategy when he is "on the road" (e.g., attending 
a convention). He places the handouts that he must remernher in the moming by the 
door of the hotel room before tucking in for the night. The most important point here 
isthat this transfer occurred without any deliberation, andin fact, the "put-near-the-
door" strategy gets executed all of the time without him thinking about it. 
Automatie transfer of strategies deserves a Iot more research attention, for auto-
matic, appropriate functioning is a very desirable endstate. About all that we know 
about the development of automaticity is that it is linked to strategy practice, and 
even this relationship to practice has not been studied in especially great detail 
(Adams, 1987; Schneideret al., 1984). One reason for this neglect of automatic 
strategy use is the belief by some that automatic, unconscious use of procedures is 
not really strategic-strategic functioning is presumed to require conscious atten-
tion to procedural application (e.g., Pariset al., 1985). Our perspective, presented 
in the definition of strategy use detailed in Chapter 3, isthat strategy use need only 
be potentially controllable and intentional in the sense that it is directed at the 
accomplishment of particular cognitive goals. This defmition captures data-driven 
use and transfer of cognitive procedures, and as such, more adequately deals with 
the range of activities that are commonly considered to be Strategie. 
The second type of transfer considered by Salomon and Globerson (1987) is 
defmitely strategic by all definitions of strategy in that it involves explicitly cons-
cious use of cognitive processes. Salomon and Globerson (1987) provided a 
thorough analysis of such mindful transfer. The mindful strategy user is fully aware 
of the current goal and deliberately seeks a way to do it efficiently. Part of the 
process may involve conscious inhibition of task-inappropriate or task-inefficient 
strategies that were used in the past. For instance, when confronted with an associa-
tive learning task, a person can consciously decide simply not to repeat the paired 
items over and over, recalling that in the past such efforts required a Iot of energy and 
yielded little gain (e.g., Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984). A student can decide not 
to write down the frrst thing that comes to mind when composing an essay, realizing 
that this "natural response" was inefficient in the past. 
Once inefficient strategies have been suppressed, the search for more efficient 
strategies can begin. This normally involves close examination ofthe memory task 
with an eye toward identification of subtle features that might provide clues as to 
the selection of a strategy that is well matched to the task. The person thinks of alter-
natives and considers each, relying on the metacognitive knowledge that is coded 
with each strategy to guide selection and deployment. In short, "mindful" transfer 
and use of cognitive procedures requires great cognitive effort deployed in very par-
ticular ways. 
The two-sided portrait of competent transfer (automatic and mindful) described 
by Salomon and Globerson (1987) is completely consistent with the good strategy 
user conception of efficient strategy deployment. There are occasions when strate-
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gies are "fired off' as automatic reactions to situations, and other occasions when 
strategy execution only follows deliberation. We believe that the good strategy user 
model is more explicit with respect to the most important mechanism mediating 
transfer, and in a fashion that is completely consistent with historically prominent 
analyses of transfer. 
Although Salomon and Globerson (1987) acknowledge ''metacognitive guidance" 
as a key ingredient to deliberate strategy selection, the good strategy user model 
details the nature of the metacognition that is crucial to strategy transfer. The good 
strategy user not only knows strategies but also knows a Iot about situations that are 
associated with effective use of those strategies. This strategy knowledge can be 
used to guide matehing of strategies to tasks. Readers familiar with early 20th-
century experimental psychology will recognize this point of view as a conscious 
and cognitive version of "identical elements" theory (e.g., Thorndike & Wood-
worth, 1901). The identical elementspositionwas that use of a skill on a current task 
depends on the person recognizing similarities of the present situation to attributes 
that define occasions when it is appropriate to use the skill in question. 
Thus, a student can "know" a strategy in that they can execute the procedure, but 
understand little about when and where to use it. This is not a desirable state. In con-
trast, a metacognitively mature thinker will recognize the attributes of situations 
that perrnit the strategy to be used profitably. Only this type of metacognitively 
mature person would be expected to transfer the strategy. Mindful transfer is medi-
ated by conscious analyses of Situations and comparisons with strategy knowledge; 
automatic transfer rnight begin after many trials of conscious strategy transfer. With 
experience, the critical attributes that define Situations that call for use of a strategy 
might be readily perceived (e.g., Gibson, 1969). In addition, as a function of 
experience in transferring a strategy, it would be expected that strategy knowledge 
would be more detailed in ways that would make it easier to assess whether a current 
situation calls for a strategy. It would also be expected that with use, strategy 
knowledge would be more accessible and would be more tightly tied to the strategy. 
Thus, even if a leamer encodes the teacher's explanation that a comprehension 
strategy can be employed whenever the child is reading a conventional fictional 
story, initial transfer of the strategy rnight be clumsy. Confronted with a new story, 
the child rnight recall that there is "something" that she was taught to do when read-
ing short fiction, but require a few minutes before the exact procedure would be 
recalled. With practice, the sight of a story title would automatically and quickly 
Iead to recall and application of the skiU. 
Given that strategy knowledge may be able to account for both rnindful and auto-
matic transfer, it is not surprising that much research on ways to facilitate transfer 
has focused on embellishing strategy knowledge, although all of the research to date 
is about mindful transfer (e.g., O'Sullivan & Pressley, 1984). The promise of embel-
lished strategy instruction as a way to promote transfer has especially captured the 
interest of special educators. These people face many populations who have severe 
leaming problems that cannot be remedied by conventional instruction. More 
optimistically, both retarded and learning-disabled children often respond to 
strategy instruction, in that they can carry out many cognitive strategies that are 
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taught to them (Campione, Nitsch, Bray, & Brown, 1982; Ceci, 1986, 1987; EUis, 
1979). It must be pointed out, however, that the amount and detail of instruction 
required to execute a strategy often exceeds the amount and detail of instruction 
required by normallearners (Day & Hall, 1987), and that transfer is even less likely 
with slow learners than with normal children (e.g., Campione & Brown, 1984). 
That special populations can execute skills but do not seem to generalize them easily 
has prompted a Iot of thinking by the special educator comrnunity about how to 
design strategy instruction that is most likely to generalize. 
Deshier and bis associates at the University ofKansas (e.g., Deshier et al., 1981; 
Ellis & Lenz, 1987) have particularly led these efforts, putting together a set of 
recommendations based on research results, experimenter and teacher intuitions, 
and theoretical convictions. In short, Deshier and his associates advocate extremely 
direct and explicit strategy instruction. Their recomrnendations include fully 
explaining strategies, including each step of the procedures. In addition, Deshier 
espouses modeling of strategies by a variety of teachers in a variety of settings with 
conditions varied greatly over the course of instruction. The advantages of using the 
strategy should be fully explained, with students required to assess their own gains 
as a function of strategy use. The subjects need to rehearse the strategy explicitly 
and extensively. Students should be taught to use general monitoring and checking 
strategies in conjunction with other procedures. They should be taught to employ 
motivational procedures, like use of self-coping Statements (e.g., "I can handle this") 
and use of self-reinforcement (e.g., 'Tm doing well here"). These motivational com-
ponents are included because of the belief by many children who experience learn-
ing difficulties that they really do not have the ability to carry out acadernic tasks 
(Ryan et al., 1986). Students should also be told explicitly to try to generalize strate-
gies. They should be cued that trained strategies are relevant to future, real-world 
demands and that they should try to adapt the skills that they are learning to these 
new situations ( cf., Hatano, 1982). Finally, the child has to be transited from the 
highly structured instructional environrnent to a world where the cues to use strate-
gies are much less explicit and precise. Gradualloosening of control with the learner 
slowly assurning self-direction of his thinking is more likely to result in continued 
use of trained procedures than would an abrupt shift from a highly controlled 
instructional environrnent to unstructured settings (e.g., Schumaker, Deshler, & 
Ellis, 1986). 
We believe that the many instructional recomrnendations made by Deshier and his 
associates make sense, and they are consistent with other suggestions that have been 
made following thorough analyses of the development of educationally relevant 
skills (e.g., Brown et al., 1983; Kendall & Braswell, 1985; Pressley, Goodchild, 
Fleet, Zajchowski, & Evans, in press). We also believe, however, that the Kansas 
suggestions may not go far enough. Borkowski, Carr, and Pressley (1987) in particu-
lar detailed ways to improve the likelihood of generalization by instructing learners 
in ways specifically consistent with the good strategy user model. Their suggestions 
included providing explicit and specific information about when and where to use 
strategies as part of instruction, rather than requiring learners to abstract such 
metacognition from experiences in multiple settings. Although diverse experiences 
with strategies would be sufficient for some leamers to figure out when to use proce-
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dures that they learned, others would probably not develop metacogrutlve 
knowledge that would be adequate to direct future use of strategies. Worse yet, some 
of the time students would probab1y abstract errant information. 
Studies that are particularly relevant to consider in this context were conducted by 
O'Sullivan and Pressley (1984), ones that were discussed in part in Chapter 6. In 
their experiments, children in grades 5 and 6 learned the keyword method in the 
context of a task requiring acquisition of city-product pairs (i.e., the products 
produced in particular cities). Most relevant here, subjects in an "experience" condi-
tion practiced using the technique with other types of materials, including two that 
could be learned better with the keyword procedure (e.g., acquisition of men and 
their profession associations, memorization of foods and countries that produce 
them) and one task that could not be mediated effectively with the strategy (i.e., ver-
batim recall of prose). In contrast, subjects in an elaborated instruction condition 
practiced the keyword strategy with the same tasks, but with the experimenter 
explaining the attributes of the situations that signalled that use of the strategy was 
appropriate. When the children in the experience and elaborated instruction condi-
tions were presented a task not encountered during training but one that could be 
mediated using the keyword technique (i.e., learning of Latin vocabulary defini-
tions), transfer ofthe keyword method was evident in the elaborated instruction but 
not in the experience condition. Requiring children to discover strategy knowledge 
on their own is much less certain to Iead to durable strategy use than directly provid-
ing strategy knowledge to them as part of instruction. 
In addition to developing the case that children often require explicit instruction 
about when to use particular strategies, Borkowski et al. (1987) also developed in 
detail the argument that explicit efforts must be made to get students to attribute to 
strategy use the performance gains derived from appropriate strategy application. 
While the Kansas group goes far in making the case that students need to be 
impressed that effort is an important determinant of achievement (especially Ellis, 
1986), Borkowski et al. (1987) believe that students must come to rea1ize that the 
key to success is effort directed through appropriate strategies. The natural tendency 
of many problern learners to believe that low performance is their fate because of 
innate deficiencies in themselves (e.g., Ryan et al., 1986) must be supplanted with 
an understanding that they are capable of deploying and executing strategies that can 
produce high performance. 
In support of this claim, Reid and Borkowski (1985) reported a study in which 
hyperactive, underachieving 7- to 10-year-olds were taught some memory strate-
gies. What varied between conditions was whether subjects were taught to attribute 
their capable memory performance following strategy training to use of the strate-
gies. When such an effort-channeled-through-strategies attributionwas part oftrain-
ing, greater strategy maintenance (two weeks and nine months later) and strategy 
generalization were observed. See Licht and Kistner (1986) for additional argu-
ments that effort attributional and strategy training should be combined. 
Although much has been written about all the components and embellishments 
that should be included in good strategy training, there has been little evaluation of 
whether the en masse implementation of these recommendations really benefits 
performance as proposed. Perhaps even more disturbing, many of the components 
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that are included in these packages of recommendations have not been tested in well-
controlled experiments that permit the inference that the component is really criti-
cal to transfer; virtually none of the components have been subjected to extensive 
and exhaustive investigation. Studies like O'Sullivan and Pressley (1984) and Reid 
and Borkowsld (1985) are unique in providing rigorous, true experimental evalua-
tion of components. More such work is sorely needed, even though it is often very 
expensive. A detailed consideration of one such study by Barbara Moely and her col-
leagues makes the time- and resource-intensive nature of this type of work obvious, 
but also makes clear that such research is worth it. 
Leal, Crays, and Moely ( 1985) wanted to detennine if 8-year-olds could be taught 
the self-monitoring presumed tobe so critical to good strategy use- including trans-
fer of the monitaringskill to untrained problems. In particular, they studied whether 
children could be taught to test thernselves to detennine if additional study were 
necessary before they were ready for a criterion test. In two of the three conditions 
ofthe study, subjects were told that self-testing was useful for evaluating task perfor-
mance. The subjects were required to practice self-testing with three practice items. 
The participants studied these items, looked away, tried to recall them, and then 
checked to determine that their recall was correct. The experimenter explained that 
if a1l items bad not been recalled that this would be an indication that not all of the 
items bad been learned and additional study was necessary. The trained children 
were reminded at the beginning of each of 12 practice trials about the self-testing 
strategy and about how self-testing aids performance. 
The two training conditions differed in that in one condition subjects performed 
a1l 12 practice trials on one task-free recall of lists of items for half of the subjects 
in this condition and serial recall of lists of items for the remaining participants in 
the condition. In the second training condition subjects practiced on both free and 
serial recall tasks, doing each for half of the practice trials. Lea1 et al. (1985) 
hypothesized that practicing self-monitoring with more than one task would pro-
mote generalization of the strategy relative to practice with one task, by increasing 
the child's awareness that the strategy could be applied to more than one situation. 
In particular, Lea1 et al. (1985) expected that general use of self-monitoring would 
be greatest with the two-task training, but some generalization would occur even 
with one-task training (e.g., Belmont, Butterfield, & Borkowski, 1978) relative to 
the third condition in the study, a control condition. Control children were also 
given 12 trials of practice, with half of the trials requiring serial recall and half 
requiring free recall. In cantrast to the trained subjects, controls were never 
provided any information about how to study, although they were encouraged to do 
weil and were given consistent praise for their efforts. 
One week following the 12 training/control practice trials, subjects were 
administered tasks to determine ifthe self-monitoring strategy would be maintained 
in the absence of a verbal prompt to use the strategy. That is, subjects were given free 
and serial recall tasks. There was evidence of equal maintenance in the two trained 
conditions for both free and serial recall in that there was greater use of self-
monitoring and greater recall in both of the trained conditions relative to the control 
condition. In addition, subjects were given three generalization tasks. In one, the 
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children were required to leam the locations of stores on a blueprint of a shopping 
mall. In the second task, children were required to learn to spell sets of three six-
letter nonsense words. The third task was a variation of paired-associate learning. 
There was evidence of one-week generalization of self-monitoring in all three of 
these tasks in that more time was spent self-testing in the trained conditions than in 
the control condition. Again, however, there appeared to be equivalent generaliza-
tion in the one- and two-task training conditions. 
In short, Leal et al. (1985) failed to find any compelling difference between 
training with one task and training with two-a fmding that seems to fly in the face 
of recommendations by Deshier et al. (1981) and others that training with multiple 
tasks promotes durable use of strategies. As careful and thorough as Leal et al. 
(1985) were, however, it must be emphasized that their evaluationwas limited to a 
comparison of training with one task versus two and to training of only self-testing. 
Much more careful work on transfer following practice on multiple tasks is required 
before a definitive conclusion would be justified, although the result obtained by 
Leal et al. (1985) is consistent with the transfer failure in O'Sullivan and Pressley's 
(1984) experience condition discussed earlier in this subsection. More well-
controlled studies like Leal et al. (1985) and O'Sullivan and Pressley (1984) are 
the most certain route to a definitive conclusion about the training with multiple 
tasks issue. 
In closing this subsection, we recognize that we have recommended here two very 
different approaches to evaluation of strategy instruction- both evaluation of train-
ing packages and component analyses. There is an urgent need to evaluate packages 
of "best bet" components because such packages are being developed for immediate 
dissemination (e.g., Schumaker et al., 1986). Complete understanding of instruc-
tion, however, requires identification of the really active ingredients in these pack-
ages. lt may be that only a very few of the components have really striking effects 
on generalization. Although those providing packaged instruction may be able to get 
a "feel" for the active versus inert ingredients in their training, only carefully con-
trolled comparative experiments can provide defmite "thumbs up" or ''thumbs down" 
evaluative information about a component. This type of analytic work in turn per-
mits the more potent parts of instruction to be highlighted in the design of future 
instructional units. Thus, the evaluation of packages and components are com-
plementary activities, not mutually exclusive or antagonistic ones. 
Challenges to the Teaching of Good Strategy U se? 
The evidence reviewed in this chapter thus far makes clear that really good strategy 
use is a rare commodity even among adults, Iet alone children. We have documented 
so far that monitoring, which is presumably absolutely critical to good strategy 
use, is often defective. There are also many demonstrations of transfer failures. 
These imply that people either do not possess the strategy knowledge necessary to 
recognize when a strategy should be deployed, or that they do not access and use 
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the strategy k:nowledge that they have. In short, this chapter has had a pretty 
somber tone. 
There is good reason to suspect, however, that it might be possible to increase 
good strategy use through instruction. There are many strategies that children can 
execute following briefand simple instruction (Pressley, Heisel, McCormick, & 
Nakamura, 1982). Given these skills, one hypothesis for explaining children's 
failures to use strategies on occasions when they could be deployed profitably isthat 
children may be receiving little strategy instruction. In fact, that is the case. There 
is little evidence of classroom teaching of reading strategies (e.g., Durkin, 1979), 
writing strategies (e.g., Applebee, 1984, 1986), mathematical strategies (e.g., 
Thompson, 1985), and particularly relevant here, memory strategies (Moely, Hart 
et al., 1986; Moely, Leal et al., 1986). 
Why so little teaching of memory strategies?-or any others forthat matter? We 
believe the reason is that the comprehensive strategy instruction that would be 
necessary to get people to the point of generally good strategy use is very difficult 
to do, despite the fact that getting children to execute individual strategies is not very 
hard. We review in this section some ofthe obstacles to strategy instruction. We also 
review our perceptions as to how these obstacles might be overcome, for we remain 
optimistic that there is a cognitive revolution in instruction that is beginning and 
that strategy teaching should play a prominent role in cognitive reformulation of 
instruction. For even more detailed and extensive coverage of problems associated 
with implementation of cognitive strategy instruction, see Pressley, Goodchild, 
Fleet, Zajchowski, and Evans (in press). 
y 1. Ihere are many, many strategies to leam. Efficient list memorization requires 
different strategies than does associative learning; prose learning can involve a host 
of strategies, depending on the prose leaming goal. Material that must be remem-
bered in order should be approached differently than material that can be learned 
without consideration of order. On the other band, there are not so many memory 
strategies that peop1e should not be able to acquire them given years of instruction. 
Si · · easy for children..to execute many memocy_strategies when tbe~ 
_provided fairly simple instru~ions about how to do so_, it seems reasonable to ex~ 
that children could learn many memorization procedures- if they were only tal!&ht 
these skills (Moely, Hart et al., 1986). Given the potency of many memory strate-
gies, it seems like the time is right for attempting an instructional experiment in 
which a nurober of strategies are taught to children over a period of time. It should 
become obvious in the context of such research whether the nurober of memory 
strategies is simply overwhelming or whether there are a managable nurober of tech-
niques that can be conveyed as part of instruction. 
2. Teachers do not think in information-processing tenns. Very little time is spent 
during teacher education in developing awareness and understanding of 
information-processing skills. In fact, many teachers probably only get exposure to 
information processing as one small part of a survey course in educational psychol-
ogy. It is easy to understand why teachers do not use information-processing inter-
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ventions extensively. More positively, entire textbooks dedicated to the cognitive 
perspective are beginning to appear (e.g., Gagne, 1985) and excellent summaries of 
how to teach strategies are available (e.g., Devine, 1987). A nurober of special issues 
of professional journals have been published (e.g., April1986 Educational Leader-
ship), detailing how strategy instruction can be implemented in classrooms. Also, 
given the dependency of teachers on teacher's guides that accompany textbooks 
(e.g., Clark & Elmore, 1979; Duffy, Roehler, & Putnam, 1987; Durkin, 1979), 
there are opportunities to modify teacher's behaviors on a !arge scale by modifying 
the content of these guides. In short, there is plenty of reason to believe that even 
if teachers do not understand information-processing now, they are more likely to 
understand it in the future with substantial support from professional sources for 
implementing cognitive strategy instruction including the teaching of strategies 
aimed at improving memory. 
3. lt takes a Iot of effort for general, durable use of strategies to occur. Transfer 
difficulties following brief instruction are the most frequently discussed instantia-
tion ofthisprob lern. Consistent and efficient use of strategies require that leamers 
be given opportunities to practice procedures until they have been executed fluently 
and without great cognitive effort. Teachers need to arrange opportunities for stu-
dents to practice the skills in a variety of situations, with explicit efforts made to 
make certain that students acquire critical strategy information such as when and 
where to use a procedure. Although there are a variety of means for teaching strate-
gies, Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, and Snyder (1987) developed the case that only more 
complete instructional techniques are likely to produce durable and general use of 
strategies. Only these more complete approaches promote complete understanding 
of strategies. 
One approach favored by Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, and Snyder (1987) is direct 
explanation (e.g., Roehler & Duffy, 1984). The teacher who uses this approach 
explains strategies thoroughly, providing explicit and detailed information about 
how to carry out processing, about the effects produced by strategies, as well as 
information about when and where to use procedures. Direct explanation includes 
concrete examples, modeling, and practice. As part of teacher-guided practice, 
explanations to individual children are tailored to the difficulties that the students 
are expe"riencing. For an excellent example of research on direct explanation (as well 
as an example of educational research at its very best), see Duffy, Roehler, Sivan et 
al. (1987). 
The second approach to teaching favored by Pressley, Cariglia-Bull, and Snyder 
(1987) is the reciprocal teaching approach developed by Palincsar and Brown 
(1984). Teachers and studentstake turns executing strategies that are being taught 
with instruction occurring in true dialogue. Strategie processes are made very overt, 
with plenty of exposure to modeling of strategies and opportunities to practice tech-
niques over the course of a number of lessons. Children discover and teachers con-
vey strategy-utility information as weil as information about when and where to use 
particular strategies. Teachers using reciprocal instruction assume more respon-
sibility for strategy implementation early in instruction, gradually transferring 
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control over to the student. See Palincsar (1986) for extensive description of the 
irnplementation of reciprocal instruction. 
When teachers are confronted with classrooms of pupils varying in abilities and 
motivations, the irnplementation of such complete and sensitive teaching is often 
difficult. The diagnosis demands arehigh for both direct explanation and reciprocal 
instruction, and so are the instructional-tailoring demands. On the other band, 
"expert" teachers ( e. g., Berliner, 1986) seem to be able to carry out such demands 
automatically. Given that serious research on direct explanation and reciprocal 
instruction has just begun, but that there is a flurry of work in progress on these 
two approaches, it seems reasonable to expect that there will be an enormous 
increase in the next few years in understanding how to irnplement these approaches 
effectively. 
4. Teachers can only make decisions based on objective evaluations ifsuch evalua-
tions have been done and are generally available. Unfortunately, only a few of the 
many potentially educationally relevant strategies have been tested extensively. 
Much, much moreformal evaluative work is needed. Even in the cases where much 
data has been generated, however, it is usually the case that such research is not 
placed in sources that are available to teachers. Research-translation joumals like 
The Reading Teacher, Educational Leadership, and The Elementary School Journal 
are a start, but even more is required. One idea would be to create an encyclopedic 
source that summarizes available evaluations of strategic interventions in a fashion 
akin to the Mental Measurements Handbook (Mitchell, 1983). That more evaluation 
work is becoming available with every passing month and that there are some 
general summaries of strategies available that are well informed by research (e.g., 
Devine, 1987) makes it easy to conclude that more, better, and more available evalu-
ations will be the rule in the not-too-distant future. 
5. There are individual differences in children such that some benefit from strategy 
instruction only given great commitment ofresources. Very young children have dif-
ficulty acquiring some strategies like interactive imagery (Pressley, 1982; Pressley, 
Borkowski, & Johnson, 1987). Mentally handicapped children can often learn stra-
tegies, but their continued use by these populations sometirnes requires continuous 
prompting (e.g., Campione et al., 1982). Individual differences that are more subtle 
than age or global mental Status have an influence on strategy generalization as weil. 
One of the most exciting directions in instructional research is the study of 
individual differences as predictors of strategy use and generalization. For instance, 
some strategies require content expertise in order to be executed in a content area at 
all. One such technique is activation of information that one knows about a topic as 
a method for facilitating leaming of a passage on that topic (e.g., Hasselhom & Kör-
kel, 1986). Children who areimpulsive may not take the time necessary to execute 
complicated strategies. Anxious children may be so caught up in their anxiety that 
there is little capacity left over for strategy execution. Girls seem to be competent 
with respect to some aspects of good strategy use before boys are. Girls use organiza-
tional strategies earlier (Cox & Waters, 1986), and grade-1 and -2 girls seem tobe 
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more aware of when they are doing well versus when they are doing poorly on cogni-
tive tasks (Pressley, Levin, Ghatala, & Ahmad, 1987). Might there also be differ-
ences between the sexes in learning strategies given instruction? 
A study by Kurtz and Borkowski (1984) illustrates the importance of individual 
differences research with respect to theories like the good strategy user model, but 
also highlights the important role that individual differences may play in classroom 
acquisition of strategies. The good strategy user model posits an important role in 
self-regulation for knowledge about when and where to use strategies. Such 
knowledge perrnits recognition of situations where strategies can be applied, which 
is one ofthe most critical steps in strategy transfer (Crisafi & Brown, 1986). Given 
the crucial role of this form of metacognition to generalization, Kurtz and Bor-
kowski (1984) reasoned that children who possess more metamemory about strate-
gies in general should be more likely to transfer Strategie skills that they are taught. 
They specifically believed that children who possessed a great deal of prior under-
standing of cognitive functioning would be more likely to generalize new strategies 
that were taught with metacognitive embellishment. 
Kurtz and Borkowski (1984) frrst assessed the metarnemory competence of their 
grade-1 and grade-3 participants. The metamemory battery consisted of questions 
about knowledge of elaboration and other strategies for remembering, knowledge 
about planful behaviors for future events, knowledge of organized memory searches, 
knowledge about the relative difficulties of different tasks, and knowledge of 
memory monitoring. In addition, assessments were made of performance and 
strategy use during several tasks including learning of categorizable lists and learn-
ing of paired associates. Thus, this initial session established individual differences 
in general metamemory about strategy use and individual differences in competence 
on tasks for which the subjects would later be taught strategies. 
Following these preliminary assessments, the children were divided into three 
training groups. Two of these groups received general metamemory training at this 
point. This consisted of group discussion sessions about how the mind works, 
emphasizing that memory can be enhanced by using strategies that are well matched 
to the requirements of particular memory tasks. Both Strategie and nonstrategic 
behaviors were modeled. Some strategies (not ones that were later trained) were 
described and modeled as examples of deliberate Strategie behavior-with both 
encoding and retrieval dynarnics ofthese strategies emphasized. The following was 
a sample dialogue from the session: 
Teacher 1: Did you ever hear anyone say, "Use your head"? What they meant was stop and 
think about what you're doing before you do it. Then after you've thought of the best possible 
way to leam or do something, do it that way. 
Teacher 2: Our rninds can work better and faster if we know how to use them. Today we're 
going to talk about some ways that we can use our minds better. There are two parts to remem-
bering things. First, we have to fasten things in our minds, then we have to take out the things 
we put in. Today we're going to talk about things we can do to help us both put things in our 
rnind and take them out. 
Teacher 1: One of the things we can do to fasten things in our minds is to go over them many 
times. If we go over and over and over something, it will be easier to remember. Have you 
ever done that with anything? (Encourage dialogue.) How many of you know how to clean out 
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the sink at home? You know how to do that weil because you've done it many times. How many 
of you know the roads from your house to school? I imagine that the first time you went to 
school you didn't know the way. But by the time you went over those roads fifty times, you 
hardly had to think about it anymore! 
Teacher 2: We'll give you an example. Molly, I wish we didn't have to learn these spelling 
words today ... they're hard. 
Teacher 1: Yes, fd rather go swimming. But I bet we can learn them pretty quicldy. Let's 
see-(writes words slowly on the board). 
Teacher 2: Hmmm-if I write these over and over, I bet ru remernher them better. (Writes 
words over and over. Makes rnistakes at first and corrects, then gradually writes them all cor-
rectly.) 
Teacher 1: (Writes words, stares at them awhile, writes a few, draws pictures on board, stares 
at words again.) Who learned the words faster? Why? (Encourage dialogue) Do you think that 
would work for other things too?" (pp. 341-342) 
During the time corresponding to when the subjects in the two metamemory training 
conditions engaged in dialogue about metamemory, strategy-trained control subjects 
spent an equal amount of time in dialogue with the experimenters, except that cogni-
tive awareness and increased efficiency of cognitive monitoring were not covered. 
Following these sessions of dialogue, one of the two metamemory groups (here-
after the strategy-trained metamemory condition) and the strategy-trained control 
subjects were given task-specific strategy training. They were taught a categoriza-
tion strategy for learning of categorizable lists and an elaboration strategy for paired 
associates. During this phase, the subjects in the third condition (metamemory con-
trol subjects) received no instruction about how to do the criteria tasks. 
During the fmal session of the study, subjects first were required to perform tasks 
that could be accomplished using the strategies that were taught in the strategy-
training conditions, but ones not experienced previously in the study. Then, the par-
ticipants were given tasks identical to those used during training to assess whether 
strategy use was maintained. 
As expected, strategy training had a dramatic effect on performance. Providing 
general metamemory training did not, except for one dramatically important result. 
Pre-experimental differences in metamemory correlated significantly (Pearson r = 
0.66) with generalization performance in the metamemory-strategy training condi-
tion, but not so in the strategy-trained control (r = 0.35) or metamemory control (r 
= -0.08) conditions. Kurtz and Borkowski (1984) concluded that, ')\pparently, an 
initially high Ievel of metamemory enabled children to benefit more from instruc-
tions, and, specifically, to utilize additional metamemorial knowledge in generaliz-
ing a newly acquired strategy to other tasks (p. 348):' 
There should be a Iot of additional study of metamemorial differences between 
children as predictors of strategy generalization. In addition to Kurtz and Borkowski 
(1984), Borkowski and his associates have demonstrated the correlation between 
prior metacognition and strategy durability several times (e.g., Borkowski et al. , 
1983; Kendall, Borkowski, & Cavanaugh, 1980; see Pressley, Borkowski, & 
O'Sullivan, 1985, for a general overview). Other individual difference dimensions, 
however, probably play a role in determining whether a leamer transfers strategies 
or not, and these should receive serious research attention as weil. For instance, 
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there are clearly differences between children of any given age in their functional 
short-term memory capacities (e.g., Case, 1985). Guttentag (1984) has argued and 
presented evidence that these differences are associated with differences in the 
Jjkelihood that children will use short-terrn-capacity-demanding strategies. A 
hypothesis that follows is that children who have more short-term capacity will be 
more willing to transfer capacity-demanding strategies. A variation on this theme 
is that subjects who enjoy performing cognitively demanding tasks may be more 
willing than other children to try to use strategies in new situations (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982), a result that would be consistent with Salomon and Globerson's (1987) 
position that propensity toward rnindfulness is an important deterrninant of intellec-
tual competence. 
SUMMARY 
Despite the fact that strategy instruction is difficult, there are plenty of reasons 
to believe that progress is being made in deterrnining how to increase the likeJj-
hood that classroom teachers can and will deJjver such instruction. Progress will 
follow from additional research and research-informed dissemination efforts, 
especially if part of this dissemination includes revision of teacher education so 
that teachers are better prepared to deJjver strategy instruction. One such program 
at Michigan State University is supervised by Gerald Duffy and Laura Roehler. 
Prospective teachers are taught a Iot about strategies and information processing 
as part of course work that extends over a year. During this same time they par-
ticipate in practicuum experience that is expJjcitly tied to the coursework, with 
some of the in-course coverage determined by problems that arise during the prac-
ticum. The participating student teachers also have opportunities to watch expe-
rienced instructors teach strategies to children. Thus, the teachers-in-training 
receive exposure to academic content and behavioral models; they leam by doing 
and reflecting on the difficulties that they encounter. The professor provides a Iot of 
guidance along the way. The demands of direct explanation and reciprocal instruc-
tion probably require educational internships of this type. We hope that more such 
opportunities will become available as the process-oriented approaches to education 
gain in prominence (e.g., Gagne, 1985). Such changes in teacher education will 
almost certainly increase the amount of strategy instruction in schools. As cognitive-
strategy instruction becomes more common, the frequency of good strategy use 
should be more evident. 
Summary and Discussion 
We opened this chapter by posing the question of whether there really are good 
strategy users. The best bet is that good strategy use is probably very domain 
specific. Thus, no viewer of the NCAA basketball tournament (U. S. collegiate 
championship) could doubt that the top coaches are consummately Strategie. It 
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seems unlikely that these same coaches display such a high degree of strategic savvy 
in all of the domains that humans operate in. In fact, the only globally Strategie 
individuals that we have encountered are fictitious- the great detectives in the great 
detective novels. Sherlock Holmes, the Hardy Boys, and Fletch process all the right 
information in just the right ways at just the right times all the time. Anyone who 
does not believe that this is an impressive feat should try to write their own detective 
novel. One of us (M. P.) is doing so. lt takes him months of research, writing, and 
rewriting in order to construct a half-dozen chapters of strategic detective activity. 
That captivating and convincing portraits of consistently excellent strategy use can 
be constructed by the likes of Sir Artbur Conan Doyle, Franktin W. Dixon, and Mai-
eolm McDonald in no way guarantees that such globally capable performance is 
ever produced by real people operating in real time. 
For the most part this chapter was about such real people, people who often fail 
to monitor their performances and who often fail to use strategies that they know 
and could deploy. Some of the failures described here might even be considered 
shocking-Many nonpsychologists would be surprised to find out that adults some-
times miss the types of errors that occur in the Markman stories or that even close 
transfer rarely follows automatically from learning a strategy. 
More positively, it seems likely that people can be trained to be better strategy 
users, although we perceive that such training is not easy to accomplish. We also do 
not know if training could ever be complete enough so that most students would 
know a variety of strategies and deploy them appropriately across a host of 
domains-or whether such general use of strategies could be developed to the point 
that there was highly automatized use of many different procedures. The only way 
to find out how much training can improve functioning is to do intensive, extensive, 
and long-term strategy training. The development of compendia of strategies (e.g., 
Devine, 1987) is a first step; the development of training packages like those used 
at Kansas is also a move in the right direction; the training ofteachers who are sensi-
tive to the needs of process-oriented instruction is also desirable. The real challenge 
is to get all of these elements tagether and functioning for a long period of time with 
real students. Our point of view is that the many fine well-controlled laboratory 
studies aimed at specific aspeets of memory (i .e., the studies that provided most of 
the data for this book) could and should be complemented by more ambitious field 
experiments aimed at improving memory and memory-strategy use as much as pos-
sible. It is time to start thinking big-to start thinking about realistic educational 
interventions that have the potential for broadly enhancing memory functioning in 
ways that directly improve ecologically valid intellectual performances of students. 
8. Conclusions 
Our focus in this book was the development of memory for verbal materials during 
childhood and adolescence. Most of the research can be interpreted within the 
general information processing framework. Our purpose in this chapter is to sum-
marize briefly the most important conclusions that follow from what was reviewed 
here, as weil as to comment on a few directions that might be profitably pursued in 
future research. 
What Develops? 
The earliest work on memory development was conducted at the end ofthe last cen-
tury and early in this century. With a few exceptions (e.g., Brunswik et al. , 1932), 
these early sturlies were limited to descriptions of developmental trends. That is, 
they neither tested theoretical models nor specific explanations of memory devel-
opments that were described. In contrast, modern researchers are more interested 
in determining the processes that mediate the developmental trends that have been 
observed. What has emerged from the research to date is a model that explains 
memory development in terms of changes in functional memory capacity, use of 
verbal memory strategies, nonstrategic knowledge, and metamemory. 
FUNCfiONAL MEMORY CAPACITY 
There was little agreement during the 1970s about the role of structural changes in 
memory development. There were arguments that memory capacity was invariant 
over the life span (at least after 3 to 5 years of age) , a theoretical argument that 
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seemed inconsistent with robust correlations between age and children's perfor-
mance on memory-span tasks. Case's ( 1985; Case et al., 1982) developmental model 
becarne extremely popular because it reconciled the apparent contradictions be-
tween theory and data. Case argues that short-term memory consists of two subcom-
ponents, a storage space and an operating space. C<.nnpared to younger children, 
older children can hold more information in short-term memory because they execute 
cognitive operations more efficiently than younger children. Older children have 
used these operations more-the more an operation has been used, the greater.the 
automatic and efficient use of the operation . .In addition, regardless of practice, it 
seems that there are developmental increases in the execution of cognitive opera-
tions (Dempster, 1981). Execution"of cognitive Operations consume less and less 
capacity with increasing age (i.e., the functional operating space decreases). Thus, 
there is increasing capacity available for storage of input, even though the total 
amount of structurally determined capacity does not change with development. Sie-
gier ( 1986) provided the following analogy between developmental changes in func-
tional capacity and apparent changes in the capacity of a trunk of an automobile; ; 
The capacity of a car's trunk: does not change as the owner acquires experience in packing Iug-
gage into it. Nonetheless, the amount of material that can be packed into the trunk does 
change. Whereas the trunk: at fust might hold two or three Suitcases, it might eventually come 
to hold four or five. As each packing Operation is executed more efficiently, trunk space is , 
freed for additional operations (p. 82). 
We emphasize that the postulated developmental invariance in total memory 
capacity is an intraindividual characteristic. Interindividual differences in total 
memory capacity are important when trying to explain individual differences in 
memory performance. Measures of memory capacity are especially predictive of 
performance when memory tasks do not offer much opportunity for Strategie media-
tion (Schneider, 1986). Whether people benefit from instructions to execute stra!e-
gies that require a great deal of capacity to execute is also predictable from 
individual differences in capacity. 
STRATEGIES 
Developmental memory research certainly flourished following the adoption and 
developmental adaptation of the general informatio~ processing model ( e.g., Atkin-
son & Shiffrin, 1968), including the differentiation made in these models between 
structural parameters and control or strategic processes. The study of strategies like 
rehearsal and organizational grouping (i.e., for Iist learning) quickly made it clear 
that a direct relationship existed between age-correlated changes in memory strate-
gies and performance changes. Many developmental psychologists in the 1~nos 
believed that much of memory development could be explained as the development 
of increasingly flexible and more general memory strategies (e.g., Hagen et al., 
1975; Moely, 1977). Most ofthe research supporting this hypothesiswas generated 
with grade-school children, since 5 to 11 years of age was considered to be an 
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especially crucial period for strategy development. These conclusions were pre-
mature, however. 
First, there is now a Iot of evidenee that strategy development begins before the 
grade-sehool years and continues into adulthood. For instance, intentional m~ry 
strategies are observable in presehool children w e are dealing with famliar 
-e-and-seek tasks). At the matureend ofthe developmental 
sS:pe::e::+tni=m;;;-, -h.,.,...."."'e;,..r.;, :o.""'w"'e;;;:r,-;a;;n;;rTKo~m=a:"s -;::and their colleagues ( e. g. , Christopoulos 
et al., 1987) have shown that even eollege studentsoften fail to use sophisticated 
strategies when doing sehoollearning. In addition, it has beeome clearer that studies 
focusing on input or output strategies alone, whieh was the case in most work on 
eneoding and rehearsal strategies, failed to eapture that the interaetion of eneoding 
and recall processes is o~en more important tban enoodin_g or retrieval aetivities 
lone (e.g., Aekerman, 1985a). Finally, it seems that some outcomes that were onee 
believed to be due to use of intentionally deployed strategies are in faet due to auto-
matically oceurring processes that are not eonseiously eontrollable (and thus, not 
Strategie following the definition presented in Chapter 3). Consider when young 
ehildren learn lists of items, with the Iist members drawn from a few salient 
categories (e.g., five foods, five vehicles, and five furniture items). Recall is often 
organized eategorieally. Bjorklund's work (e.g., 1985, 1987) makes clear that such 
organization during recall often refleets associative processes dunng retrieval (i.e. , 
recall of one member of-a eategor~recall anot er mem er er than 
organization at input. In general, there has been inereasing understanding during e 
last~ge faetors can play a large role in developmental improve-
ments in memory performance. 
NONSTRATEGie KNOWLEDGE BASE 
_ The strong version of the knowledge-base hypothesis was that most developmental 
improvements .in memory were not mediated by shifts in strategy use, but rather 
reflected ehanges in th~ nt and ae essibility of the nonstrategie knowledge base. 
Especially supportive of this position were empirieal demonstrations that children's 
learning does not vary with age when to-be-learned materials are equally familiar 
and meaningful to ehildren at different developmentallevels (e.g., Cheehile & Rieb-
man, 1982). Comparisons of ehild experts and adults novices have also provided 
striking support for the hypothesis that nonstrategie knowledge is a powerful deter-
minant of performanee. Chi's (1978) demonstration that 10-year-old ehess experts 
eould learn meaningful ehess positions better than adult chess noviees is especially 
well known. 
_There has also been important work documenting that the use of strategiesoften 
depends on the nonstrategic knowledge base. For instanee, Tarkin, Myers, and Om-
stein (eited in Omstein et al., in press) demonstrated that repetition strategies used 
by third graders vary as a funetion of the meaningfulness of the learning material. 
When grade-3 children leamed especially meaningful materials, their rehearsal set 
sizes were as !arge as those typically produced by grade-6 students. On the other 
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band, grade-3 children's set sizes were much smaller when they processed relatively 
unfarniliar materials. Comparable results have been reported for use of categorical-
organizational strategies (Franke} & Rollins, 1985; Schneider, 1986). 
METAMEMORY 
There was intensive study of metamemory during the last decade. Both knowledge 
of facts about memory and children's memory monitaring were analyzed. 
Memoryfacts can be divided into knowledge about persons, tasks, strategies, and 
the interactions between persons, tasks, and strategies (Flavell, 1985; Wellman, 
1983). The person category refers to whether children understand qualities of their 
own memories and those of other people. The task category consists of knowledge 
about what makes one task more difficult than another. The strategy category covers 
verbalizable knowledge about various encoding and retrieval strategies. Early 
research on children's knowledge of memory facts (e.g., Kreutzer et al., 1975) 
created the impression that knowledge about memory develops quite early and is 
reasonably complete by grade 3. More recent research has established that knowl-
edge about persons, tasks, strategies, and the interactions of these variables con-
tinues to develop into adulthood. 
tori performance on a day-in, day-out basis increases understanding about 
the relative difficulties of memory tasks, thus, permitting predictions about future 
performance. That monitaring contributes to the knowledge of memory facts (e.g., 
that one memory task is more difficult than another) makes obvious that conceptual 
distinctions between various facets of metamemory (in this case, monitaring and 
knowledge of memory) are fuzzy indeed. Monitaring of performance in the present 
(which occurs in short-term memory) is distinctly different from knowledge about 
memory that is in Iong-term storage. For instance, monitaring yields on-line aware-
ness of whether materials that are the current objects of study have been learned 
already or require additional study. Although children as young as 5 to 6 years of age 
have some rudimentary competence to monitor, monitaring develops slowly 
throughout childhood and adolescence. Striking monitaring failures are sometimes 
' observed even in adults, however. 
lt has proven difficult to study and measure metamemory. There are always ques-
tions as to whether metamemory interviews yield complete and accurate informa-
tion. When unambiguous information about monitaring is obtained, it is at great 
expense in that many potentially contaminating factors can only be controlled and 
evaluated using complex experiments that involve a nurober of conditions (e.g., 
Pressley, Levin, & Ghatala, 1984). 
One of the most important research questions addressed by metamemory 
researchers was whether empirical support could be produced for theoretically spe-
cified connections between metamemory, strategic behaviors, and memory perfor-
mances. The first wave of relevant studies failed to produce statistically significant 
connections between metamemory and strategic behaviors or memory perfor-
mances, a conclusion emphasized in some prominent reviews (e.g., Cavanaugh & 
~-~-~ 
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Perlmutter, 1982). Close scrutiny of these studies revealed difficulties including 
measurement problems (e.g., ceiling effects). Theseproblems were remedied in 
more recent sturlies that e_mployed metamemory indicators that were directly rele-
vant to the memory tasks used in the studies. This "second generation" of sturlies has 
produced significant relationships between knowledge, behaviors, and perfor-
mances. The correlations found in the grade-school years were generally medium to 
high, increasing with increasing age ofthe children. The average correlation coeffi-
cient was .41. 
SUMMARY 
Most sturlies of memory development focused on one of the four factors in isolation. 
Thus, relatively littleis known about how the-four factors interaet, although the Situ-
ation is -improving (e.g., recent.interest in knowledge by strategy interactions). The 
Iack of evidence pertaining to interactions makes it particularly difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions about the influence of the four memory development factors 
at different points in development. lt is possible to provide a rough outline based on 
the evidence that is available. 
The basic neurological architecture that supports memory development is estab-
lished in the first five years. Only a few strategies are used during this preschool 
period, mostly ones that are deployed in farniliar Situations. P eschoolers have little 
knowlec:lge of memory or variables affecting memory. In fact, they possess some 
knowledge that is wildly inconsistent with reality (e.g., that they can learn enor-
mous arnounts of material in a short period of time). There is little monitoring of 
performance. More positively, the nonstrategic knowledge base undergoes exten-
sive development during this first five years. 
During grade school (i.e., 5 to 11 years of age), speed of information processing 
increases. A number of memory strategies emerge and develop, with the develop-
ment of rchearsal and organizational strategies for list learning documented in some 
detail. Factual knowledge about memory increases during this period, and monitar-
ing improves. The knowledge base continues to develop and greatly facilitates learn-
ing of content that is related to knowledge already possessed by children (e.g., 
children who know a Iot about soccer can learn new information about soccer more 
easily than children who Iack knowledge of soccer). lt must be emphasized, 
however, that development of memory is far from complete by the end of the grade-
school years. 
jlrocessing speed continues to increase during adolesceQce. More strategies are 
acquired during this interval (e.g., elaboration). Old stra egies (e.g., rehearsal, 
organization) continue to develop and are used more flexibly. Monitaring continues 
to improve. Eighteen-year-olds know more about memory and other things than do 
12-year-olds. Nonetheless, good strategy use is a rare commodity even among 
adults. Although processing speed probably reaches a maximum in early adulthood 
(e.g., Salthouse, 1982), most adults possess only fraction of the strategies, 
metamemory, and nonstrategic knowledge base that they could possess. 
200 W. Schneiderand M. Pressley 
What Next? 
Despite the enormous amount of information that has been generated about memory 
development during this century, knowledge of children's memory is still incom-
plete. Most of the research to date was generated in a very few experimental 
paradigms, mostly laboratory tasks: Everyday memory has been ignored for the 
most part. Many researchers (ourselves included) accept a memory model in which 
contextual and motivational variables are presumed to be important determinants of 
memory. For the most part, however, these same researchers continue to study 
memory without regard to naturalistic situational or motivational states. See 
Perlmutter (in press) for more detailed criticisms. 
We suspect that current theory will in fact stimulate a Iot of additional research on 
memory development. Programmatic research on some real world memory 
problems is beginning to emerge and is being received enthusiastically (e.g., auto-
biographical memory, Rubin, 1986; eyewitness memory, Ceci, Toglia, & Ross 
1986), and thus, there is reason tobe optimistic that study of memory in natural 
contexts will be conducted in the next decade. Realistic and interesting models of 
motivational factors as determinants of memory (see Borkowski et al., in press) 
should fuel research directed at understanding how motivation affects memory. We 
have three particular recomrnendations for those undertaking this research. 
1. Complement traditional developmental and experimental methods with modern 
multivariate approaches like causal modeling. Causa! modelspermit the evaluation 
of models of memory functioning that are composed of a variety of factors in inter-
action (e.g., functional short-term memory capacity, strategies, metamemory, non-
strategic knowledge, contextual factors, motivational variables). In particular, the 
relative contributions of these variables and how they affect one another can be 
specified and evaluated. Researchers at the Max Planck Institute have had good suc-
cess in using LISREL analyses, especially in predicting performance in sort-recall 
tasks (i.e., Situations that can be mediated by use of semantic-organizational strate-
gies). For instance, that group has determined that similar models predict sort-recall 
performance in grade-3, grade-S, and grade-7 children, as weil as in adults. The 
model for the grade Slevel is displayed in Figure 8.1 . 1t specifies that general intelli-
gence affects memory performance directly, but also affects it through the "hope of 
success" and metamemory variables. Memory behavior affects memory perfor-
mance directly; memory behavior is affected by both metamemory (knowledge of 
·memory variables) and monitoring. Monitoring also has a direct effect on memory. 
2. Study potentially important individual differences more intensely. Although there 
has been interest in potential sex differences in verbal memory since the beginning 
ofthe century (see Chapter 1) , we still know almost nothingabout whether there are 
sex differences in memory development. This is because sex differences were not 
even examined in most studies of children's memory. More positively, the recent 
studies by Waters and her colleagues (Cox & Waters, 1986) substantiated that sex 
differences (generally favoring females) are present. Why do we mention this find-
ing? We want to emphasize that there has been neglect of many salient individual 
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FtGURE 8.1. Structural equation model (LISREL) describing and explaining memory perfor-
mance in fifth graders (Schneideret al., 1987b). 
differences variables. After all, there is no difference between children that is more 
obvious than sex. 
Even those individual differences that have been considered have not been studied 
as analytically as they could be. For instance, consider the study of cultural differ-
ences in memory development. One fmding is cited frequently based on this litera-
ture. Children in third-world and underdeveloped countries who experience 
western-type schooling are more Iikely to have the memory skills possessed by 
western children than children in those countries who are not western-schooled. 
More interesting are recent.cross-cultural studies that report progress in identifying 
mechanisms that might mediate omnibus cross-cultural differences. 
For exarnple, Schneideret al. (1986) demonstrated differences in use of organiza-
tional strategies between German and American children performing a sort-recall 
task. The German children used organization more than the American children. 
Since the cause of this cross-cultural difference was not obvious, Kurtz et al. (1986) 
conducted a follow-up study with grade-2 German and American children. Once 
again, the German children used organization more than the Americans. In this 
study additional data were collected tapping the strategy teaching provided by par-
ents and teachers. There was a clear cultural difference in that German children 
were much more likely to be taught memory strategies than American children. 
Complementary within-culture work (United States) has been produced by Moely 
and her colleagues (Moely, Hart, Santulli et al., 1986; Moely, Leal et al., 1986). 
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They concluded based on observation of actual classroom practice that individual 
differences in use of memory strategies correlate with differences in teaching 
emphasis. Children whose teachers introduce memory strategies were more likely 
to use strategies than children whose teachers failed to instruct strategies. Data 
such as these should stimulate additional research on the degree that differences 
in memory skills are related to differences in educational environments. (See 
Beuhring and Kee, 1987a, for fascinating reports by adolescents that their natural 
use of elaboration was prompted by memory strategy instruction that they had 
received in school.) 
In addition to neglect of interindividual differences, there has also been neglect of 
intraindividual differences. Little is lmown about whether children's memory per-
formances are consistent across situations. The few studies that have been con-
ducted focused on whether there were consistent differences in use of strategies 
(i .e., Do children who use strategies in one situation use them in another one?). This 
problern was studied by Kail (1979) with third and sixth graders. Kail employed fac-
tor analytic methods and interpreted bis results as being compatible with the 
assumption that there is a general strategy factor. lnspection of the simple correla-
tions, however, makes it clear that there were great intraindividual inconsistencies. 
The intercorrelations between the various memory performances and strategy 
measures were generally low. Later studies have shown that the degree of intrain-
dividual consistency over varying memory tasks depends on the similarities of the 
tasks and task demands (Cavanaugh & Borkowski, 1980; Knopf, Körkel, Schneider, 
& Weinert, in press). Nonetheless, a Iot of work with a Iot of different strategies 
must be done before there is any refrned understanding of intraperson consistencies. 
3. Con.duct longitudinal studies. Perhaps the most frustrating aspect ofthe memory 
development Iiterature is that very little is lmown about the mechanisms that 
account for the development of strategies (Ornstein et al., in press; Ornstein & 
Naus, 1985). More positively, there are hypotheses. Bjorklund (e.g., 1985). 
believes that strategies are sometimes abstracted from occasions when naturalistic 
mediation enhances performance; the Vygotskians believe that some strategies are 
passed from parent to child as the parent provides instruction that is compatible with 
the child's cognitive Ievel (e.g., Rogoff & Mistry, 1985); we identify with the per-
spective that at least some strategies are taught explicitly to children in school 
(Beuhring & Kee, 1987a; Kurtz et al., 1986; Pressley, Goodchild, Fleet, Zaj-
chowski, & Evans, in press). Nonetheless, there is only scanty support that any of 
these mechanisms mediates naturalistic acquisition of strategies. 
An additional frustration is that there is little information about which memory 
activities can be viewed as precursors to later use of strategies. There has been 
no programmatic research to relate preschoolers' memory behaviors to the Stra-
tegie activities of grade-school children. A sirnilar situation holds true for the 
development of nonstrategic lmowledge and metamemory. There are no clear 
data about how early nonstrategic lmowledge and metamemory contribute to later 
development. 
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There is no doubt that the Iiterature gaps bemoaned in the last two paragraphs can-
not be ftlled by additional cross-sectional research. The cross-sectional paradigm 
(the approach used in the preponderance of memory research) can only provide 
information about developmental differences, not developmental changes. Mechan-
isms that might account for naturalistic changes can only be evaluated when there 
are opportunities to evaluate changes in memory performance following exposure to 
the mechanisms. Whether early person and environmental factors account for later 
memory characteristics can only be evaluated when it is possible to describe how 
particular individuals change and differ from one point in development to another. 
It is obvious that these problems can only be studied longitudinally. The advan-
tages of longitudinal studies areeasy to enumerate (e.g., Omstein et al., in press; 
Schneider & Weinert, in press). Most importantly, such research permits examina-
tion of relationships between early knowledge, characteristics, behaviors, and 
environments and later knowledge, characteristics, and behaviors. ln-depth longitu-
dinal studies of memory development could include long-term measurement of 
many factors believed to contribute to developmental improvements in memory per-
formance. These factors could be examined alone and in interaction to determine 
which are more potent than others and whether there might be developmental 
changes in the mix of factors determining memory performance. 
Such work would greatly enrich knowledge about memory development. 
Although the fmdings summarized in this book are valuable resources that should be 
considered in detail as part of the planning of longitudinal studies, it seems a good 
bet that the best memory development research is yet to come. Thus, we conclude 
confidently that this volume represents nothing more than a preliminary report. 
Much more will be discovered about memory between 2 and 20. 
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Reciprocal instruction, 189-190 
Recognition versus recall, 43-44, 48- 49 
knowledge of, 113-114 
Reflectivity, 127 
Rehearsal , 24-25, 35- 36, 46-51, 61, 73, 
76-77, 105, 158, 162-163, 197-199 
Repeated recall , 71 
Restructuring knowledge, 130 
Retrieval , 14-15, 18, 39-42, 44, 46, 49, 
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Schema (Piagetian) , 29 
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Scripts, as basis for memory, 43, 81 , 
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Semantic memory, 37, 57 
Semantic networks, 80 
Sequencing skill, 27-28, 31 
Serial recall , 3, 10, 46-47, 73-74 
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Short-term memory, 2-3, 20-21, 23-32, 
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193 , 195-196, 198 
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Soviet theory, 13-20, 34 
Specific strategy knowledge, 124-126, 
131 , 148-149, 152-154, 182-187, 189 
Speed of information processing, 28-29, 
30, 120, 199 
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knowledge of, 103 
Story schemata, 74-76, 84-85 
Strategies, 20-21, 24-28, 33-77, 93-94, 
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User Model 
knowledge of, 103-107 
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Strategy monitoring, 169-170, 171- 173 
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Subjective organization, 12, 51 
Syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift, 56 
Test monitoring, 99, 108, 110, 170-173 
Text 1earning, monitoring of, 99, 110, 
164-169, 171 , 176-177 
Textrecall , 15-17, 20, 37, 74-75, 82-85, 
123-124, 134-135, 163 
knowledge of, 102-103, 107, 110 
Theory of mind , 92 
Tip of the tongue, 109 
Transfer paradigms, 10-11 
Transfer, strategy, 125, 148-150, 177-187, 
189-190, 191-193, 194 
Urbanization effects on memory, 73-74 
Validation, discriminant of strategy use, 
157-158 
Verbal 1earning tradition, 10-13 
Visual memory, 17-18 
Visual-spatial skills, 75-76 
Vo1untary memory, 13-20, 34 
Vygotslcy's theory, 16, 180-181 , 202 
Werner's theory, 11-12 
Worlring memory, 23-24 
Univ. Blb. 
Wür 9 

